



JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2010

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Is the Nuclear Order About to Collapse?

Graham Allison
Charles Ferguson

The Road to Energy Security

David Victor &
Linda Yueh

The Problem With Foreign Aid

Jagdish Bhagwati

How to Deradicalize Terrorists

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The Best Defense?

Abraham Sofaer

Helping Women Help the World

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Journalism, RIP?

Peter Osnos

The New Population Bomb

The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World

Jack Goldstone

Let Obama Be Obama

Zbigniew Brzezinski on Why American Foreign Policy Should Move From Hope to Audacity

Taiwan's Love Affair With Beijing
Bruce Gilley

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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- * Return to the Table of Contents from the page header and footer.
- * Use the Table of Contents in the left-side navigation to jump to an article.
- * Click on advertisements and book titles to visit company and publisher Web sites.

Return To Table of Contents

FOREIGN AFFAIRS



MARCH / APRIL 2011
VOLUME 90, NUMBER 2

Comments

A G-Zero World *Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini* 2
In the wake of the financial crisis, the United States is no longer the leader of the global economy, and no other nation has the political and economic leverage to replace it. Rather than a forum for compromise, the G-20 is likely to be an arena of conflict.

Germany's Immigration Dilemma *Tamar Jacoby* 8
Germany is in the throes of a national debate about immigration. But old questions of immigration miss the new reality for Germany, and most all developed countries, attracting highly skilled foreign workers is a matter of economic survival.

Getting China to Sanction Iran *Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney* 15
China, which invests heavily in Iran's energy sector, is the linchpin of the sanctions regime against Iran. If Washington wants to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, it must transform Beijing from a silent, subordinate partner to a vigorous ally.

Arms Sales for India *Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen* 22
With India planning to buy \$400 billion worth of new weapons over the next ten years, arms sales may be the best way to revive Washington's relationship with New Delhi, its most important strategic partner in the region.

Essays

The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy *Walter Russell Mead* 28
The rise of the Tea Party movement has been the most dramatic development in U.S. politics in many years. What does it mean for U.S. foreign policy? Since today's populists have little interest in creating or overseeing a liberal and cosmopolitan world order, U.S. policymakers will have to find some way to satisfy their angry domestic constituencies while also working effectively in the international arena.

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The Time for Urge

Cutting corners: Have modern corporations learned the lesson?

Commodity Purchasing vs. Business Continuity

It seems that the panic of September 2008 and downfall of some of the world's biggest corporate names would be something that we will never forget in our lives. The entire global economy was on its knees, largely because a handful of people acted irresponsibly, fueled by skewed incentives that did not take into account long term risks. ***Cutting corners to make a small short term profit while risking the future of an entire enterprise: that would never again happen in the modern corporation.*** Even before, our parents, teachers, professors and mentors have all told us not to do it. In his 1954 classic, *The Practice of Management*, Peter Drucker told managers to do the right thing and to focus on quality of people for the long run, not the quick buck.

And yet, have corporations learned the lesson?

In a constant rush for earnings, many corporations are focusing on efficiency and savings. This work, often done by procurement and global sourcing units, is laudable. Many purchases in today's economy can be made on a commodity basis — the most cost effective offer can and should prevail. Unfortunately, it's not always so simple — the total relevant cost cannot always be expressed in terms of purchase price. Just as was the case with sophisticated financial instruments, sometimes there are additional risks to consider. Thus, the most sophisticated procurement departments look at total quality and value when they source.

Security and safety are enterprise critical: these are areas where a wrong decision in selecting your partner can be catastrophic. Your security executives, directors, managers, and team are among the most valuable people in the organization. They work hard to diligently protect the people, assets and resources of your enterprise. Behind the scenes they ensure business continuity, preventing millions or billions of dollars in potential losses from business interruption. They have to worry about both the routine and the unpredictable — your corporation can be a target for a common criminal, a fervent terrorist avowed on havoc, cybercrime or global espionage.

Keeping your company secure is about preserving the reputation and legacy of the top management. Day to day management of security is often delegated by necessity, and sometimes senior executives know very little about what is going on in their security organization. And yet, in the end, it is always the senior management that is ultimately responsible; indeed, senior management has a fiduciary responsibility to do everything necessary to protect the corporation

against security threats, such as terrorist attacks, that can be foreseeable. Failure to do what is right can, therefore, result not just in bad publicity but also in personal liability.

Just one incident — a terrorist attack, a manufacturing plant exploding or a disgruntled worker going on a shooting rampage — can cripple the legacy of an executive in a split second. And it's a split second that cannot be undone.

And yet, even if it is composed of the best people, your security team may not be given enough clout to effectively protect your corporation. Indeed, intricacies of the modern organization, driven by short term departmental incentives that do not fully take into account long term enterprise risks, can hinder making the right choices about security.

Given its critical nature for most companies, procurement departments should not be expected to treat security service as a simple commodity, to be sourced at the lowest cost. The security provider selection is about choosing your security experts and professionals who develop and execute your security contingency plans, protect your global data centers, and control ingress and egress to your headquarters, production facilities and other business infrastructure. It's about those last lines of defense for your company against an impending disaster and the corresponding business continuity interruption. The better your defenses, the less likely the perpetrators — be they potential terrorists or common criminals — are to select your company as a target. And the less likely they are to succeed if they target you.

Who secures your facilities, what experience do they bring with them, how do they think, how well they are trained, motivated and engaged in their jobs — all of these things matter. Consider an unattended package or an unusual machinery noise. Will they have the proper site-specific experience, knowledge and commitment to instinctively act and prevent disaster at a moment's notice?

We founded Guardsmark, one of the world's largest security services companies, over forty-six years ago, for the purpose of giving value to our customers. In our business, value is excellent service and cutting edge expertise for the companies that we protect. Who are Guardsmark's customers? They are the smartest, most sophisticated and toughest organizations. The executives in these corporations understand the importance of security and, more importantly, the consequences of security failure.

If you yourself had to make the decision, would you entrust the lives and property of your enterprise to inexperienced, poorly trained and undermanaged minimum wage workers? Would you cut corners?

ncy Is Now[®]

By underestimating the importance of the security services purchase, many corporations are doing just that — cutting corners and trading short term savings for long term exposure to catastrophic risk. Without proper incentives and a green light from the senior executives to make the selection based on total quality and value, your corporation could be selecting the lowest bid providers, even against recommendations of your security managers.

Though this is a difficult time for many companies, this also may be the most dangerous time in the history of our lives. The threat of al Qaeda infiltration has not gone away, indeed there is evidence that terrorists are working hard to prepare for new deadly attacks. And other threats — whether they are cybercrime, espionage, loss of proprietary and intellectual property, workplace violence, and even common crime — are on the rise in this challenging economic climate. In short, this is not a time for mediocrity or complacency.

We urge you today to think a few minutes more about your company's security operations and about how your organization manages them. Give your security managers and procurement department the green light from you to look at ensured excellence from your security partner. That is the only way to protect your enterprise, as well as your own liability and reputation. Once something happens, and you have to look shareholders or fellow employees and their families in the eye to explain why your company had cut corners, it will be too late.



Ira A. Lipman
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Technology. Helping women unlock their potential and change the world.

Technology has changed the way we live, transformed the global economy and opened gateways to new opportunities, industries and careers. But for many women in the world's poorest countries, the lack of technological progress means this: limited mobility and few options beyond important yet time-consuming and low income-generating jobs, such as carrying water or collecting firewood.

Access to technology and innovations—from water pumps and filtration systems to computers and mobile communications—is vital. It enables women in developing countries to improve their own living standards and contribute to the economic well-being of their families, communities and the greater society.

That's why, with such partners as the International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and Ashoka's Changemakers, ExxonMobil is committed to helping identify and deploy technologies that support and improve women's economic opportunities in the developing world.

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"Improving access to innovative technologies can dramatically change the lives of women and actually pave the way for economic growth."

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS



JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2010
VOLUME 89, NUMBER 1

Comments

A Few Dollars at a Time *Philippe Douste-Blazy and Daniel Altman* 2

This year, consumers purchasing airline tickets will have a chance to at the same time contribute to the global fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. This initiative is part of a new movement called innovative financing, which seeks to share a tiny fraction of globalization's enormous economic gains with sick people in poor countries.

Against the Grain *Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge* 8

A few decades ago, fears that the world's population might outpace food production prompted a revolution in agriculture. An aggressive push for technological innovation increased crop yields dramatically—so much so that overconfidence and complacency soon took over. Now, global food stocks are too low, and global food prices are too high. The specter of Malthus is stalking the world's poor once again.

Essays

From Hope to Audacity *Zbigniew Brzezinski* 16

In his first year in office, President Barack Obama has reconceptualized U.S. foreign policy and demonstrated a genuine sense of strategic direction. But so far, Obama's foreign policy has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs. Three urgent issues—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the Afghan-Pakistani challenge—are posing an immediate test of his ability to significantly change U.S. policy.

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
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Contents

- The New Population Bomb** *Jack A. Goldstone* 31
Twenty-first-century international security will be affected by four major demographic trends: the relative demographic weight of the world's developed countries is dropping; those countries' labor forces are aging and declining; the populations of the poorest, youngest, and most heavily Muslim countries are growing the most; and for the first time in history, the world is becoming more urban than rural. Policymakers will have to adapt current global institutions to these new realities.
- Not So Dire Straits** *Bruce Gilley* 44
In recent years, Taiwan and China have increased their economic ties and abandoned the military logic that dominated their relations for decades. As Taipei drifts further into Beijing's sphere of influence, the United States must decide whether to continue arming Taiwan as a bulwark against a rising China or step back to allow the Taiwanese people to determine their own future.
- The New Energy Order** *David G. Victor and Linda Yueh* 61
Growing demand for energy in developing countries and calls for greener energy worldwide are putting unprecedented pressure on the global energy system. Consuming nations worry about the availability of supplies; suppliers worry that demand is too uncertain to justify developing new capacity. The existing energy institutions are struggling to remain relevant. A new mechanism for cooperation is needed.
- Nuclear Disorder** *Graham Allison* 74
The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, threatened by North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and Pakistan's increasing instability. U.S. President Barack Obama has put these threats at the top of his national security agenda, but the effort to prevent catastrophe will encounter serious obstacles and stubborn adversaries.
- The Long Road to Zero** *Charles D. Ferguson* 86
The Obama administration has embraced the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, but many political and economic obstacles stand in its way. If there is any hope of reducing the world's nuclear arsenals, the U.S. government will have to assuage the fears of nonnuclear states, diminish the presumed prestige that the ultimate weapon confers on its owners, and address the risk of proliferation posed by civilian nuclear energy programs.
- Mind Over Martyr** *Jessica Stern* 95
Is it possible to deradicalize terrorists? Several countries in Europe and the Middle East have tried with far-right militants, narcoterrorists, and extremists of all stripes. And the success of a rehabilitation program for extremists in Saudi Arabia suggests that deradicalization can be achieved—so long as the motivations that drive terrorists to violence are clearly understood and squarely addressed.
- The Best Defense?** *Abraham D. Sofaer* 109
Some threats to international security are so potentially damaging that preventing them in advance is preferable to remedying their effects. Yet states often condemn preventive action in legalistic ways, effectively protecting terrorists, proliferators, and rogue states. Instead, states should judge preventive actions by a standard of legitimacy, not strict legality.

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Reviews & Responses

- Banned Aid** *Jagdish Bhagwati* 120
The idea that foreign aid can be used to promote development seems reasonable. But as the Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo argues, it is flawed—not just because corrupt dictators divert aid for nefarious or selfish purposes but also because even in reasonably democratic countries, aid creates perverse incentives and unintended consequences.
- The Better Half** *Isobel Coleman* 126
Efforts to provide the world's women with economic and political power are more than just a worthy moral crusade: they represent perhaps the best strategy for pursuing development and stability across the globe. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn's *Half the Sky* is an insightful and inspiring call to action.
- An Elegy for Journalism?** *Peter Osnos* 131
The rise of American foreign reporting was marked by outsized personalities and an expansive sense of mission. Today, the craft appears to be in steady decline. Two new books argue for journalism's essential role and warn of what may be lost.
- Recent Books on International Relations** 137
Including G. John Ikenberry on "global legalism," Richard Feinberg on narco-violence in Mexico, Robert Legvold on the life of Leon Trotsky, and Nicolas van de Walle on Chinese involvement in Africa.
- Letters to the Editor** 160
Including Michael Humphreys, Andrew Radin, and Obrad Kesic and Steven Meyer on Bosnia; Phongthep Thepkanjana on Thaksin Shinawatra; and others.

The articles in Foreign Affairs do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers will sympathize with all the sentiments they find here, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others, but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries, Foreign Affairs can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. We do not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, that appears in these pages. What we do accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.

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Printed in the United States. Visit our Web site at www.foreignaffairs.com.

GST number 127686483RT.

Canada Post Customer #4015177 Publication #40035310.

Return mail in Canada should be sent to IMEX, PO Box 4332, Station Rd., Toronto, Ont. M5W 3J4

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Comments



Soon, when they buy plane tickets online, travelers will be prompted to contribute two dollars, two euros, or two pounds to development aid—a form of innovative financing that could help save millions of lives.

A Few Dollars at a Time *Philippe Douste-Blazy and Daniel Altman* 2

Against the Grain *Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge* 8

A Few Dollars at a Time

How to Tap Consumers for Development

Philippe Douste-Blazy and Daniel Altman

Starting in this quarter, hundreds of millions of people will have an unprecedented opportunity to help the world's most unfortunate inhabitants. When purchasing airline tickets through most major reservation Web sites or through a travel agent, consumers will be asked if they want to make a direct contribution to the fight against the world's three deadliest epidemics: HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Part of a movement called innovative financing, the project is a new kind of aid that could fundamentally change the relationship between the rich and the poor throughout the world, a few dollars at a time.

Awareness about the epidemics that rage throughout the developing world occasionally crests in the international media when there is an outbreak, as there was of the Ebola virus in the 1990s and of dengue fever in the first years of this century. These periodic outbreaks usually

subside within a year or two, or at least are contained before they become pandemics. The HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis epidemics have shown more staying power, however, and even now, after years of attention and treatment, each of these diseases still causes more deaths in developing countries than any other single disease, according to the World Health Organization. In 2004, the last year for which statistics were available at the time of this writing, together these three diseases caused one in eight deaths in low-income countries.

Part of the reason these diseases are so harmful is that they reinforce one another. Hundreds of millions of people around the world have latent tuberculosis infections. In most cases, tuberculosis never becomes active, but the disease is much more likely to explode into a full-blown infection, and the infection tends to be much more severe, in people who also

PHILIPPE DOUSTE-BLAZY, who served as France's Foreign Minister from 2005 to 2007, is currently the United Nations' Special Adviser for Innovative Financing for Development and Chair of UNITAID. DANIEL ALTMAN is President of North Yard Economics, a not-for-profit consulting firm serving developing countries. This article is adapted from their book on innovative financing, which will be published in January 2010 by PublicAffairs.

A Few Dollars at a Time

have HIV/AIDS. Even those without latent tuberculosis are more susceptible to getting the disease if they already have HIV/AIDS. This is partly because HIV/AIDS suppresses the immune system—which also means that it is harder for people with HIV/AIDS to fight off malaria. And completing the vicious circle, malaria seems to make HIV/AIDS worse: studies by researchers at the Centers for Disease Control suggest that the body encourages HIV to replicate when it creates antigens to fight malaria. Not surprisingly, patients in the developing world—especially in the tropical zones of Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Southeast Asia—are often diagnosed with two or three of these diseases. It makes sense, then, to fight all three together.

Why make them a priority? Worldwide, the mortality rate for heart disease and cancer combined is five times as high as the mortality rate for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined. But unlike HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer are not contagious. Heart disease and cancer also tend to prey on the aged, whereas HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis kill millions of young adults, children, and babies every year. The World Health Organization estimates that HIV/AIDS and malaria together kill more children under the age of five than all forms of cancer and heart disease combined. By contrast, the American Heart Association reports that 83 percent of people who die from coronary heart disease in the United States are 65 or older. Tuberculosis kills across all ages, but the average age at death is dropping in many countries because of the disease's association with HIV/AIDS.

Stopping HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis does not just add a few years to

someone's life; it adds a lifetime. Moreover, these lifetimes add real value to the world, and not just in moral terms. Every life lost to infectious disease represents lost economic activity and lost economic development. For example, the death of all the world's poorest people—those destined to earn just \$2 a day for 30 working years (with weekends off)—would mean a loss to the world's future economic output of more than \$50 billion every year. And that is not counting the loss to overall economic development in poor countries ravaged by these infectious diseases.

There are economic costs to rich countries, too. Disease-stricken states cannot afford to import as much from wealthier ones as they otherwise would. In addition, the desperation caused by these diseases is a source of instability that can devolve into conflict, sometimes pulling neighboring countries and even global powers into difficult situations. As early as 1987, a CIA report discussed how HIV/AIDS could exacerbate conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. A 2006 study by the Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at the College of William and Mary showed that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in developing countries was strongly associated with higher levels of civil conflict and more human rights abuses. Recent research by Andrew Price-Smith of Colorado College has suggested that epidemics can distort demographics by reducing the working-age population, weaken governments, and reduce the state's ability to take care of its people, all effects that in turn can breed conflict. If the world could better control these diseases, the benefits—economic, social, and otherwise—would be remarkable.

Philippe Douste-Blazy and Daniel Altman

The good news is that HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis are completely controllable diseases; successful treatments are available for all three. The hard part is purchasing and delivering the treatments. The United Nations took up this challenge when its members set the Millennium Development Goals and committed themselves to reversing the spread of these three diseases and to making treatments available to everyone who needed them by 2015. In 2002, the UN's members founded the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as a central source of financing. The deadline is only five years away, however, and the effort is running tragically behind schedule.

This is largely for lack of money. In 2007, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 22 wealthy countries on its Development Assistance Committee gave \$118 billion in direct aid to the developing world but earmarked only \$5.3 billion of this for health programs. (Much greater sums went to education, infrastructure, industrial assistance, and debt restructuring.) At the beginning of 2007, according to the World Health Organization, more than five million HIV-positive people in developing countries needed antiretroviral treatment but were not receiving it. To treat all of them every day for a year with just the most basic regimen of drugs would have required raising global aid for health by 20–30 percent. To treat them with the latest generation of antiretroviral drugs would have required more than doubling health-related aid—and that would have been for just HIV/AIDS. There is an enormous gap in the funding for the fight against infectious diseases. The pressing question of how to close it is a matter of

life or death for hundreds of thousands of people every year.

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One of the most promising methods for closing the gap is innovative financing. The goal of this kind of development aid is to harness markets in an intense effort to quickly raise hundreds of millions, perhaps even billions, of dollars—the kind of money that can make a real difference in the development, purchasing, and delivery of life-saving treatments. Starting big and front-loading investments creates incentives for researchers to look for new treatments, encourages pharmaceutical companies to design the resulting drugs so that they are easy to distribute and administer in poor countries, and reduces the drugs' prices by guaranteeing bulk orders.

A handful of such programs have sprung up in the past several years. For example, the International Finance Facility for Immunization, a charitable corporation set up in 2006 under the auspices of the British government, issues bonds guaranteed by the governments of wealthy countries to raise hundreds of millions of dollars a year for vaccines. The governments repay the bonds over time. So far, the International Finance Facility for Immunization has collected \$1.6 billion in up-front cash. Another initiative, (Red), collects donations from companies that sell goods and services under its (Product) Red brand, which is advertised to consumers as a charitable endeavor. Participating brands include household names such as American Express, Apple, Converse, Gap, and Hallmark. Together, they have raised \$130 million in three years.



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
WHEN EUROPE WENT MAD



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A Few Dollars at a Time

And then there is UNITAID. The program, under the auspices of the World Health Organization, stands apart for collecting money directly from consumers and businesses through the worldwide market for airline tickets. The idea is to share a tiny fraction of globalization's enormous economic gains with sick people in poor countries. UNITAID does not require consumers to buy any particular brand. In 13 countries, whenever consumers purchase an airline ticket, a small tax—sometimes as little as \$1—is set aside for the fight against the three major epidemics. With this simple model, UNITAID raised \$1.2 billion in the first three years of its existence. And it has begun to finance the antiretroviral treatments of three out of four children who receive treatment for HIV/AIDS, help treat over one million people for tuberculosis, buy 20 million bed nets to protect against malaria-carrying mosquitoes, and more.

Innovative financing sprang from the recognition by former French President Jacques Chirac, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and former Chilean President Ricardo Lagos that the Millennium Development Goals could not be met with official aid alone. A commission of academics and policy experts established by Chirac to investigate other options released scores of ideas in late 2004. The one that grabbed Chirac's attention called for collecting revenue from a tiny tax on transactions in some major industry—currency exchange, carbon-emissions trading, cars, air travel—and committing it to one or more of the Millennium Development Goals.

The three leaders eventually settled on the idea of an airline-ticket tax, and one of us, Philippe Douste-Blazy, then

the French foreign minister, proposed that he and his staff turn the idea into reality. The genius of the tax was not only that it would be a tiny levy on a very broad base but also that it would not significantly affect the flow of travelers to the countries that instituted it. If the French government implemented the tax, for example, it would apply only to tickets purchased in France. As a result, French people might be marginally discouraged from flying, but not foreigners traveling to France, unless they bought their tickets in countries that also had the tax. It would be the first time in modern history that countries would be levying a tax on their own citizens exclusively for the benefit of citizens of other countries.

The French and Chilean governments began collecting the tax within a year. South Korea and nine African countries soon followed suit. Before Chirac left office in 2007, the program was housed at the World Health Organization under the name UNITAID, derived from the French “tous unis pour aider” (everyone united to help). The board of UNITAID was composed of representatives from its founding countries—Brazil, Chile, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom—with additional seats for representatives from Africa, Asia, international health groups, and nongovernmental organizations, including patients' rights groups.

Soon, the organization began to receive direct contributions from a few European governments and from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. These were motivated not just by UNITAID's pioneering role in innovative financing but also by its novel approach to spending. UNITAID's board remains committed to financing programs that will have a

Philippe Douste-Blazy and Daniel Altman

major impact on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis all at once: creating the first child-sized doses of antiretroviral medicines, lowering the prices of the most cutting-edge malaria treatments to match those of old-fashioned quinine pills, and commercializing the first child-specific drug for tuberculosis. It has also undertaken to finance these treatments as long as the patients need them, something that governments, which allot foreign aid on a yearly basis through an onerous political process, can rarely do. UNITAID can achieve these things because its immense spending power allows it to purchase hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of treatments. Pharmaceutical companies thus have an incentive to reformat medicines—creating, for example, pediatric doses and transforming difficult-to-measure syrups into pills—and to reprice them for underserved populations in the developing world.

One by one, countries began adopting the tax. By the end of 2007, 17 states had passed a law that would implement it and 17 more were considering doing so.

GOOD TRAVELS

But there was limited enthusiasm in the world's biggest market for airline tickets, the United States. And so it seemed clear that if UNITAID was to become truly global, it would need a complementary approach: voluntary contributions. This idea was the brainchild of Jean-François Rial, a French entrepreneur who heads Voyageurs du Monde, France's leading tourism agency. Realizing that only three companies (Sabre, Amadeus, and Travelport) controlled the reservation systems for two billion plane tickets issued each year—roughly 80 percent of the world's

total—he reasoned that if those three companies incorporated a voluntary-contribution mechanism into their reservation software, travelers around the world would have a chance to directly fund the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.

After two years of development, the mechanism is expected to launch on all three systems this quarter. Travelers from any country who book a trip with Expedia, Opodo, or Travelocity, among many other Web sites, will be asked during checkout whether they would like to contribute two dollars, two euros, or two pounds to save the lives of poor people. The prompt will be seamlessly integrated into the booking experience—a pop-up window on the computer screen, a box for the travel agent to check. Within weeks, it will become a routine part of life for millions of travelers around the globe—a routine with the potential to help save as many as three million lives every year and prevent the loss of tens of billions of dollars annually in new economic activity, increasing opportunities for growth in poor countries and limiting some of the causes of instability and conflict. The contributors will also have a chance to interact with one another and possibly with the people they are helping through an associated online social initiative called Massive Good. Such communication will enable participants to make the program even more effective: they will be able to encourage businesses where they live to opt for the voluntary contribution when those businesses book travel, and they will be able to check that the treatments arrived at their destinations.

A preliminary study conducted by McKinsey & Company in 2007 suggested that the new mechanism could

A Few Dollars at a Time

raise \$1 billion in its first four years, almost doubling UNITAID's budget from the airline-ticket tax and other contributions. With this money, UNITAID is now helping manufacturers of generic drugs roll the various medicines needed to treat an epidemic into a single pill. To achieve this, UNITAID is trying to persuade the pharmaceutical companies that developed those medicines to pool their intellectual property and offer it as a package to generic-drug manufacturers. Creating a single pill would greatly simplify the treatment of all three major epidemics—an unprecedented move in public health. UNITAID also hopes to launch a satellite tracking mechanism so that contributors can follow the journey of the treatments they purchase from the factories to the patients, thereby reinforcing solidarity between the world's rich and the world's poor.

SUPPLEMENTS, NOT REPLACEMENTS

Voluntary contributions come with some downsides, however. Most notably, if the program succeeds, the governments of wealthy countries might feel less obligated to send official aid overseas. This possibility could become especially likely during an economic downturn, when governments might be looking for excuses to cut foreign aid—even as they hand out hundreds of billions of dollars to save their troubled banks and insurance companies. Conversely, if the voluntary-contribution scheme were to founder, these governments might take that as a popular verdict against the Millennium Development Goals and use it as a pretext to reduce their official aid.

Some of the nongovernmental organizations that fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis also might have reason for

concern. These groups depend on official aid, in addition to private donations, for a large part of their funding, and they might resent seeing heads of state celebrate the launch of a voluntary-contribution scheme while they freeze or trim that support. Because UNITAID and the other innovative financing mechanisms channel most of their spending through a few big delivery organizations, such as UNICEF and the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative, they cannot replace the efforts of hundreds of smaller groups working on locally targeted programs.

This concern is of paramount importance for all innovative financing mechanisms, which were intended as supplements, not replacements, to help close the gap between official aid and the huge sums necessary to turn the tide against the three big epidemics once and for all. If governments invoke these financing schemes as substitutes for official aid, then those funds' very purpose will be defeated. To avoid this, the Millennium Foundation for Innovative Finance for Health, which is a UNITAID partner, and other independent or quasi-independent entities will have to hold governments to account, by shaming them publicly for cutting aid budgets when they do and by holding them to their promises that they will increase aid at least enough to keep up with inflation. The backers of innovative financing mechanisms, such as UNITAID, have two main responsibilities: to help fight diseases through novel ways of raising money and also to ensure that their success does not undermine the existing efforts they set out to strengthen. 🌐

Against the Grain

Why Failing to Complete the Green Revolution Could Bring the Next Famine

Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge

In the late eighteenth century, the English political economist Thomas Malthus took a look at two sets of numbers and had an unnerving vision: with food supplies increasing arithmetically while the number of people grew geometrically, the world population would eventually run out of food. “By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man,” he wrote in 1798, “the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall some where and must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind.”

He was right, at least at the time: in Malthus’ day, food production was essentially limited by the availability of land, whereas procreation faced few restraints. Malthus did not foresee, however, that new technologies in the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century would dramatically raise agricultural productivity. Farmers worldwide learned to use new fertilizers, petrochemical-based

herbicides and insecticides, genetically improved plants (especially wheat, corn, and rice), and massive diversions of water for irrigation, notably in China and South Asia. Crop yields soared, and in the United States so much so that by the 1950s chronic surpluses and low prices were becoming problems. The economist Willard Cochrane wrote in 1965 that thanks to the recent technological revolution in U.S. agriculture, the previous decade had witnessed “the greatest gain in productive efficiency of any ten-year period in the history of American farming.”

Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, crop yields continued to rise, not only in rich countries but also in many parts of the developing world. In India, Mexico, and elsewhere the “green revolution” was launched by plant breeders, such as the legendary Norman Borlaug. New varieties of wheat, maize, and rice raised yields by amounts that seemed miraculous at the time. The effort provided a new model for traditional farmers and improved their food security. And it encouraged a sense

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Against the Grain

of purpose for agricultural research: to end world hunger. But it also exacerbated the disadvantages of poor, landless farmers relative to land-rich ones, who could afford the innovations. Landed farmers could find the credit to invest in irrigation and purchase high-yielding seeds, but those without access to credit, and thus the new inputs, were left behind.

In the United States, farmers who were quick to adopt the new technologies outpaced their neighbors who were using outmoded methods and then bought them out, enlarging their land holdings and enhancing their eligibility for government subsidies, which are based on the amount of land in production. In the rest of the developed world, successful farmers became more productive and richer, and the income gap between those farmers and landless rural wage earners widened. Nevertheless, the Malthusian problem seemed to have been largely solved, at least in the aggregate. Yet as farmers in rich countries continued their race toward even higher yields, low-technology agriculture in the poorest countries, such as Bangladesh and Mali, fell further behind.

By some measures, the overall situation has continued to improve. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, wheat yields in the United States rose from roughly 26 bushels per acre in 1965 to roughly 43 bushels per acre in 1998 and then to roughly 45 bushels per acre in 2008. Over the same periods, corn yields rose from about 74 bushels per acre to about 134 bushels per acre and then to 154 bushels per acre. This progress, however, has also bred overconfidence or, as the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen put it, “Malthusian optimism.” This overconfidence, in turn, has bred a sort of

complacency about those still in need. In their recent book *Enough*, the *Wall Street Journal* reporters Roger Thurow and Scott Kilman note that when food outputs outstrip population growth, the fear of famine eases and “the people who are still too poor to eat enough seem to evaporate from public consciousness.” As Thurow and Kilman explain, clear advances in food production in the United States, South America, and parts of Asia throughout the late twentieth century masked the ongoing crisis in poor countries, and international development efforts in continuing to spread the green revolution flagged. Meanwhile, the world’s poor farmers were still unable to take advantage of the technological advances that had brought food security and economic development to others. Some scientists, philanthropists, and governments of developed nations seemed to have lost sight of what had once been the green revolution’s central goal: food security for all.

More recently, rising food prices have intensified the risks of large-scale hunger. The reasons for these increases are complex, but one of them is that demand for food is increasing as populations and incomes grow, especially in China and South Asia, even as the supply of food is increasingly being diverted to other uses, such as the production of biofuels. As a result, the specter of Malthus is again stalking the world’s poor.

MALTHUS RETURNS

In June 2009, the Food and Agriculture Organization, a UN agency, projected that hunger now affects one billion people—about one-sixth of the world’s population—due to “stubbornly high food prices” and the global economic slowdown, which

Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge

has depressed the incomes of the world's poorest people. A July 2009 report by the FAO warned that "domestic prices in developing countries remain generally very high and in some cases are still at record levels." Speaking at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in mid-2009, Akinwumi Adesina, an agricultural economist with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, noted that the global recession's dampening of prices on commodity markets was masking "the next storm." Jacques Diouf, director general of the FAO, has stressed that the world's poor, mostly landless laborers and the residents of urban slums, both groups that are largely beyond the reach of global media, are suffering a "silent hunger crisis."

The crisis has been intensifying thanks to three ominous trends that are only now coming into focus. First, the rate of increases in crop yields appears to be slowing. Second, and this is related, agricultural research expenditures have diminished since the 1980s, especially in Africa. Third, global food supplies have begun to fall relative to demand and prices have begun to rise—problems that are being exacerbated by the increasing use, in rich countries, of grain not only as food and feed but also as biofuel. By the middle of this decade, despite record harvests in most of the world, food shelves were increasingly empty. When the 2008 fall harvest in the Northern Hemisphere began, world grain stocks amounted to just 62 days of consumption, a near-record low. Lester Brown, founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, wrote in May 2009 that world grain production had fallen short of consumption in six of the previous nine years.

The next month, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that despite near-

record grain harvests in 2009, which might keep prices in check briefly, shortages could again raise the cost of food to consumers in the next several years, and perhaps even sooner. Oilseed reserves remain at low levels relative to demand, and soybean reserves are nearing a 25-year low. Greg Wagner, an analyst with AgResource, in Chicago, noted last June that "the dynamics for higher food prices are already in place, but they are being masked by problems in the larger economy"—problems such as the crisis in global financial markets and chronic government deficits. The International Monetary Fund's index of primary commodity prices, which measures the average price variation in a group of critical food grains and oilseeds, rose from a base of 100 in 2005 to a high averaging 157 in 2008, fell to 126 in March 2009 as global demand collapsed with the economic crisis, but then rose back up to 143 in May 2009, despite weakened demand. By August 2009, at the beginning of the fall harvest season in the Northern Hemisphere, the index still stood at more than 135. Was Malthus right after all?

RESEARCH OR DESTROY

Since World War II, gains in agricultural productivity around the world have been defined by greater output per acre of land. These gains have primarily resulted from substantial increases in the use of agrochemicals, fertilizers, large farm equipment, water, and (mainly in Asia) labor. But all these inputs have come at a cost. As greater yields were coaxed from the land, the costs of extraction rose as well. Some of the added costs—higher prices for supplies and irrigation and more hours on the tractor or behind oxen and mules—were borne by farmers.

But some costs were borne by villagers. Over-irrigation and the excessive use of fertilizers and agrochemicals polluted and depleted water supplies and sapped the soil's fertility. For example, satellite data show that due to increased crop irrigation, the level of ground water in the aquifers of northern India fell by about four inches per year from 2002 through 2008—representing about the same total volume of water as melted from Alaska's glaciers over the same period. Now, the aquifers cannot replenish fast enough to maintain current yields over time. Thus, the impressive climb in average agricultural yields over the last half of the twentieth century is but a surface reality. The deeper reality is that in the twenty-first century, as water and soil quality has fallen, unsustainable techniques have pushed biophysical systems to their limits. Although yields have continued to increase, they have been doing so at diminishing rates.

The economists Philip Pardey and Julian Alston, who have spent their careers investigating these subtle trends, have concluded that the freight train of yield-increasing technology began slowing in the 1990s. This was due only in part to biological limits; it was also due to cutbacks in agricultural research, a result of the complacency that arose from ever-increasing yields. Pardey and Alston, among others, have demonstrated that the improvements brought by investments in research come with a lag: they peak after about 25 years, and their effects persist for as long as 25 years more. Hence, the consequences of decisions taken in the 1970s and 1980s to limit the growth in funding for agricultural research have only recently become apparent.

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In real 2008 dollars, U.S. investment in agricultural development abroad fell to \$60 million in 2006, down from an average of \$400 million a year in the 1980s. In rich countries, public investment in research, which had grown annually by more than two percent in the 1980s, shrank by 0.5 percent annually between 1991 and 2000. Global official aid to developing countries for agricultural research fell by 64 percent between 1980 and 2003. The decline was most marked in poor countries, especially in Africa.

Exactly who was engaged in research also changed; public and private researchers increasingly switched seats. Until the late 1970s, the public sector—especially the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the international network of agricultural research centers, known as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research—had taken the lead. The CGIAR system, which includes the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines and a maize and wheat research center in Mexico, led the green revolution. In a 2008 review of agricultural research and development (R & D) policy, Pardey, Alston, and the agricultural economist Jennifer James concluded that “support for publicly performed agricultural R&D among developed countries is being scaled back in some cases and slowing down in many others.”

With public investment lagging, multinational corporations—Monsanto, Pioneer, and Dow Chemical, to name a few—have lured many of the most talented scientists to their private laboratories, which are better equipped and better funded than national and international research stations, especially those in developing countries. In the process, agricultural

research has increasingly focused on lucrative technical projects for the private sector. Many of the resulting technological innovations, such as genetically engineered corn and soybeans, have proved both profitable and advantageous to farmers, but they have also changed the nature of the research and its beneficiaries.

The research now primarily pays off for large commercial farmers. Public research tends to cast its benefits more widely, including to many traditional farmers, whom it allows to make small but significant improvements, such as adding nutrients to the soil or replacing draft animals with mechanical tillage. Together, diminished investments in agricultural research and the shift of the research from the public sector to the private sector have redirected the benefits to large, already successful commercial farmers.

Although the Obama administration has called for renewed support for scientific research, it has shortchanged agriculture in its proposed budget for the fiscal year starting October 1, 2009. It has suggested spending close to \$148 billion on R & D this year—\$555 million more than Congress allocated in fiscal year 2008—but the budget for the Department of Agriculture has nonetheless been cut by over six percent, according to *Science News*. The Department of Agriculture conducts some research itself, but the majority of its research funds are passed on to universities designated as land-grant institutions, such as the University of Wisconsin, the University of California–Davis, and Iowa State University. There, the funds end up improving productivity in agriculture by supporting public research projects. It is these public projects that are most threatened by the proposed budgets.

Against the Grain

Politicians and the public are scarcely aware of research efforts in the life sciences; they take notice only when the media report a breakthrough, usually in connection with human health. The results of the research percolate slowly and extend over a very long time, especially in the plant sciences. But what politician will pay attention if investments in agricultural research take a generation to pay off? The problem, as the early-twentieth-century economist Arthur Pigou once put it, is that humanity's "telescopic faculty is defective" and people are, therefore, myopic; present concerns dominate the future.

Alston, Pardey, and the economist Vernon Ruttan concluded in a 2008 paper that the slowdown in productivity-enhancing research likely is a prime reason for the slowdown in agricultural productivity. "The consequences may be severe," they warned, "given expectations of global population growth and the implied growth in demand for food, in conjunction with a shrinking natural resource base and the diversion of the existing resources to produce energy crops for biofuels."

THE CORN OF PLENTY

The biofuel connection, in particular, remains as controversial today as Benjamin Senauer and one of us, Carlisle Ford Runge, argued it was in these pages in "How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor" in 2007. The poor's need for food is inextricably connected to the debate about clean energy and carbon emissions. Food is, after all, energy itself, measured in caloric units, and its production consumes energy and emits carbon. Crops such as corn, soybeans, rapeseed, and oil palm are now the primary sources of biofuels, which means that the prices for these crops track the

price of oil. Most important, the demand for crops for biofuel production is huge: over a third of the corn grown in the United States in 2009 will be consumed not by livestock or humans but by ethanol factories. This has created, as Brown puts it, "an epic competition between cars and people for the grain supply."

Yet in the United States, the biofuel juggernaut continues. Legislation passed in 2005 mandated that the production of ethanol reach 7.5 billion gallons by 2012. In 2007, the Energy Independence and Security Act upped this mandate to 15 billion gallons and also mandated 20.5 billion gallons by 2015 and 36 billion gallons by 2022. Much of the total ethanol mandate was to be satisfied by corn, the rest by new sources of ethanol, such as cellulose. As a result, the mandate for corn-based ethanol also increased, from 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 under the 2005 legislation to 13 billion gallons by 2012 under the 2007 legislation. This, in turn, has driven up demand for corn to be used for ethanol production, which was roughly 200 million bushels per year until 2005 and rose to about 800 million bushels per year for 2005 through 2009. The Energy Independence and Security Act capped corn-based ethanol production at 15 billion gallons from 2015 onward, so that 21 billion of the 36 billion gallons mandated by 2022 are supposed to come from cellulose, among other things. But these advanced biofuels have yet to be produced commercially, which means that corn production will almost certainly have to increase further in order to feed the ethanol maw. This is all the more likely given that President Barack Obama has proposed raising the overall ethanol mandate to 60 billion gallons by 2030—a move that, according to

Carlisle Ford Runge and Carlisle Piehl Runge

Doug Koplow, founder and director of the energy consulting firm Earth Track, could cost U.S. taxpayers \$1 trillion.

In an analysis of the pressure that this new demand will put on food supplies and prices, one of us, Carlisle Ford Runge, along with colleagues at the University of Minnesota, the International Food Policy Research Institute, and the Mayo Clinic, traced the ultimate effects of high food prices to poor and malnourished children under the age of five. Using an econometric model developed at the International Food Policy Research Institute, the group determined that about 30 percent of the projected increases in global food prices over the next several decades can be attributed to increased biofuel production worldwide. Increased prices make it harder for poor households to feed themselves, leading to greater malnutrition, especially among children. Since about half of all infant deaths in poor countries are directly connected to malnourishment, any increase in malnourishment will sicken or kill millions of children over the next decade and a half.

The late Borlaug and his disciples were plant scientists, not economists. By the late 1990s, Borlaug had brought productivity-improving innovations to Ethiopia with major grants from foundations. But without investments to improve agricultural markets and rural infrastructure, the increased yields could not be absorbed. This surplus production had pushed prices down by a catastrophic 80 percent by the early years of this century, Thurow and Kilman reported in *Enough*—and “the bounty led to a bust.” At a seminar at Cornell University in 2002, a graduate student from Ethiopia approached Borlaug and asked how he and the other engineers

of the green revolution in Asia, where preexisting infrastructure had helped bring increased yields to consumers, intended to handle the situation in Africa, where booming production was depressing local prices. “He just looked at me,” she recalled, “and he said, ‘Well, we just didn’t have to worry about the market in Asia. All we had to worry about was the science.’”

Getting both the science and the economics right continues to matter today. Substantial investments in research to increase crop yields are needed, especially in Africa, as is extending this research to scientists in all developing countries. Agricultural development aid, for its part, needs to focus on stabilizing markets and developing the infrastructure to distribute any increased production. Such measures made U.S. agriculture the world’s most productive in history. They can, and must, be repeated elsewhere now. 🌍

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By 2030, the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion—a rise of 200 percent since 2005.

The New Population Bomb *Jack A. Goldstone* 31

From Hope to Audacity *Zbigniew Brzezinski* 16

Not So Dire Straits *Bruce Gilley* 44

The New Energy Order *David G. Victor and Linda Yueh* 61

Nuclear Disorder *Graham Allison* 74

The Long Road to Zero *Charles D. Ferguson* 86

Mind Over Martyr *Jessica Stern* 95

The Best Defense? *Abraham D. Sofaer* 109

From Hope to Audacity

Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy

Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE FOREIGN policy of U.S. President Barack Obama can be assessed most usefully in two parts: first, his goals and decision-making system and, second, his policies and their implementation. Although one can speak with some confidence about the former, the latter is still an unfolding process.

To his credit, Obama has undertaken a truly ambitious effort to redefine the United States' view of the world and to reconnect the United States with the emerging historical context of the twenty-first century. He has done this remarkably well. In less than a year, he has comprehensively reconceptualized U.S. foreign policy with respect to several centrally important geopolitical issues:

- Islam is not an enemy, and the “global war on terror” does not define the United States' current role in the world;
- the United States will be a fair-minded and assertive mediator when it comes to attaining lasting peace between Israel and Palestine;
- the United States ought to pursue serious negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, as well as other issues;
- the counterinsurgency campaign in the Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan should be part of a larger political undertaking, rather than a predominantly military one;

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From Hope to Audacity

- the United States should respect Latin America's cultural and historical sensitivities and expand its contacts with Cuba;
- the United States ought to energize its commitment to significantly reducing its nuclear arsenal and embrace the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons;
- in coping with global problems, China should be treated not only as an economic partner but also as a geopolitical one;
- improving U.S.-Russian relations is in the obvious interest of both sides, although this must be done in a manner that accepts, rather than seeks to undo, post-Cold War geopolitical realities; and
- a truly collegial transatlantic partnership should be given deeper meaning, particularly in order to heal the rifts caused by the destructive controversies of the past few years.

For all that, he did deserve the Nobel Peace Prize. Overall, Obama has demonstrated a genuine sense of strategic direction, a solid grasp of what today's world is all about, and an understanding of what the United States ought to be doing in it. Whether these convictions are a byproduct of his personal history, his studies, or his intuitive sense of history, they represent a strategically and historically coherent worldview. The new president, it should be added, has also been addressing the glaring social and environmental dilemmas that confront humanity and about which the United States has been indifferent for too long. But this appraisal focuses on his responses to the most urgent geopolitical challenges.

CHALLENGES TO WHITE HOUSE LEADERSHIP

OBAMA'S OVERALL perspective sets the tone for his foreign-policy-making team, which is firmly centered in the White House. The president relies on Vice President Joe Biden's broad experience in foreign affairs to explore ideas and engage in informal strategizing. National Security Adviser James Jones coordinates the translation of the president's strategic outlook into policy, while also having to manage the largest National Security Council in history—its over-200-person staff is almost four times as large as the NSC staffs of Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and George H. W. Bush and almost ten times as large

Zbigniew Brzezinski

as John F. Kennedy's. The influence of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on national security strategy has been growing steadily. Gates' immediate task is to successfully conclude two wars, but his influence is also felt on matters pertaining to Iran and Russia. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who has the president's ear as well as his confidence, is likewise a key participant in foreign policy decisions and is the country's top diplomat. Her own engagement is focused more on the increasingly urgent global issues of the new century, rather than on the geopolitical ones of the recent past.

Finally, Obama's two trusted political advisers, David Axelrod and Rahm Emanuel, who closely monitor the sensitive relationship between foreign and domestic politics, also participate in decision-making. (For example, both sat in on the president's critical September meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.) When appropriate, policy discussions also include two experienced negotiators, George Mitchell, who conducts the Middle East peace negotiations, and Richard Holbrooke, who coordinates the regional response to the

Obama has shown a genuine sense of strategic direction and a solid grasp of what today's world is all about.

challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In effect, they are an extension of the president's NSC-centered process.

On this team, Obama himself is the main source of the strategic direction, but, unavoidably, he is able to play this role on only a part-time basis. This is a weakness, because the conceptual initiator of a great power's foreign policy needs to be actively involved in supervising the design of the consequent strategic decisions, in overlooking their implementation, and in making timely adjustments. Yet Obama has had no choice but to spend much of his first year in office on domestic political affairs.

As a result, his grand redefinition of U.S. foreign policy is vulnerable to dilution or delay by upper-level officials who have the bureaucratic predisposition to favor caution over action and the familiar over the innovative. Some of them may even be unsympathetic to the president's priorities regarding the Middle East and Iran. It hardly needs to be added that officials who are not in sympathy with advocated policies rarely make good executors. Additionally, the president's domestic

From Hope to Audacity

political advisers inevitably tend to be more sensitive to pressures from domestic interest groups. This usually fosters a reluctance to plan for a firm follow-through on bold presidential initiatives should they suddenly encounter a foreign rebuff reinforced by powerful domestic lobbies. Netanyahu's rejection of Obama's public demand that Israel halt the construction of settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem is a case in point.

It is still too early to make a firm assessment of the president's determination to pursue his priorities, as most of the large issues that Obama has personally addressed involve long-range problems that call for long-term management. But three urgent issues do pose, even in the short run, an immediate and difficult test of his ability and his resolve to significantly change U.S. policy: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the Afghan-Pakistani challenge. Each of these also happens to be a sensitive issue at home.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONUNDRUM

THE FIRST urgent challenge is, of course, the Middle East peace process. Obama stated early on that he would take the initiative on this issue and aim for a settlement in the relative near term. That position is justified historically and is in keeping with the United States' national interest. Paralysis over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has lasted far too long, and leaving it unresolved has pernicious consequences for the Palestinians, for the region, and for the United States, and it will eventually harm Israel. It is not fashionable to say this, but it is demonstrably true that—deservedly or not—much of the current hostility toward the United States in the Middle East and the Islamic world as a whole has been generated by the bloodshed and suffering produced by this prolonged conflict. Osama bin Laden's self-serving justifications for 9/11 are a reminder that the United States itself is also a victim of the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum.

By now, after more than 40 years of Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 30 years of peace negotiations, it is quite evident that left to themselves, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians will resolve the conflict on their own. There are many reasons for this, but the bottom line is that the Palestinians are too divided and too weak to make the

Zbigniew Brzezinski

critical decisions necessary to push the peace process forward, and the Israelis are too divided and too strong to do the same. As a result, a firm external initiative defining the basic parameters of a final settlement is needed to jump-start serious negotiations between the two parties. And that can only come from the United States.

But the necessary outside stimulus has not yet been forthcoming in a fashion consistent with U.S. interests and potential. In raising the

The United States is already losing the renewed confidence of the Arab world that Obama won with his speech in Cairo.

issue of the settlements in the spring of 2009 but then later backing off when rebuffed by the Israeli government, the administration strengthened the hard-line elements in Israel and undercut the more moderate elements on the Palestinian side. Then, an opportunity provided by the annual UN General Assembly meeting in September to identify the United States with the overwhelming global consensus about the basic parameters of a peace

settlement was squandered. Instead of seizing it, Obama merely urged the Israelis and the Palestinians to negotiate in good faith.

Yet the existing global consensus could serve as a launching pad for serious negotiations on four basic points. First, Palestinian refugees should not be granted the right of return to what is now Israel, because Israel cannot be expected to commit suicide for the sake of peace. The refugees will have to be resettled within the Palestinian state, with compensation and maybe some expression of regret for their suffering. This will be very difficult for the Palestinian national movement to swallow, but there is no alternative.

Second, Jerusalem has to be shared, and shared genuinely. The Israeli capital, of course, would be in West Jerusalem, but East Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian state, with the Old City shared under some international arrangement. If a genuine compromise on Jerusalem is not part of a settlement, resentment will persist throughout the West Bank and the Palestinians will reject the peace process. Although such a compromise will understandably be difficult for the Israelis to accept, without it there cannot be a peace of reconciliation.

Third, a settlement must be based on the 1967 lines, but with territorial swaps that would allow the large settlements to be incorporated

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into Israel without any further reduction of the territory of the Palestinian state. That means some territorial compensation for Palestine from parts of northern and southern Israel that border the West Bank. It is important to remember that although the Israeli and Palestinian populations are almost equal in number, under the 1967 lines the Palestinian territories account for only 22 percent of the old British mandate, whereas the Israeli territories account for 78 percent.

Fourth, the United States or NATO must make a commitment to station troops along the Jordan River. Such a move would reinforce Israel's security with strategic depth. It would reduce Israel's fears that an independent Palestine could some day serve as a springboard for a major Arab attack on Israel.

Had Obama embraced this internationally favored blueprint for peace when he addressed the UN in September, he would have exerted enormous influence on both the Israelis and the Palestinians and instantaneously gained global support. Failing to endorse this plan was a missed opportunity, especially since the two-state solution is beginning to lose some of its credibility as a viable formula for reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians and within the region. Moreover, there are indications that the United States is already losing the goodwill and renewed confidence of the Arab world that Obama won with his speech in Cairo in June.

The next few months will be critical, and the time for decisive action is running out. Perhaps as a consolation to the Palestinians (and in spite of some opposition within the White House) or perhaps as a reaffirmation of his determination to continue pressing the parties to focus on the key issues, in his UN speech Obama called for final-status negotiations to begin soon and included on the agenda four items similar to these. He also made it explicitly clear that the talks' ultimate goal ought to be "a viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967." It can be hoped that the president seized the moment offered by the Oslo ceremony at which the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded (which at the time of this writing had not yet occurred) to give more substance to his Middle East peace initiative. But so far, the Obama team has shown neither the tactical skill nor the strategic firmness needed to move the peace process forward.

THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE

ANOTHER URGENT and potentially very dangerous challenge, with similarly huge stakes, is confronting Obama in Iran. It involves the true character of the Iranian nuclear program and Iran's role in the region. Obama has been determined to explore the path of serious negotiations with Iran despite domestic (and some foreign) agitation and even some opposition within the second echelon of his team. Without quite saying so, he has basically downgraded the U.S. military option, although it is still fashionable to say that "all options remain on the table." But the prospects for a successful negotiation are still quite uncertain.

Two fundamental questions complicate the situation. First, are the Iranians willing to negotiate—or even capable of doing so—seriously? The United States has to be realistic when discussing this aspect, since the clock cannot be turned back: the Iranians have the capability to enrich uranium, and they are not going to give it up. But it is still possible, perhaps through a more intrusive inspection regime, to fashion a reasonably credible arrangement that prevents weaponization. Nonetheless, even if the United States and its partners approach the negotiations with a constructive mindset, the Iranians themselves may scuttle any serious prospects for a positive outcome. Already, at the outset of the negotiating process, Iran's credibility was undermined by the convoluted manner in which Tehran complicated a promising compromise for a cooperative Iranian-Russian-French arrangement for processing its enriched uranium.

Second, is Washington willing to engage in negotiations with some degree of patience and with sensitivity to the mentality of the other side? It would not be conducive to serious negotiations if the United States were to persist in publicly labeling Iran as a terrorist state, as a state that is not to be trusted, as a state against which sanctions or even a military option should be prepared. Doing that would simply play into the hands of the most hard-line elements in Iran. It would facilitate their appeal to Iranian nationalism, and it would narrow the cleavage that has recently emerged in Iran between those who desire a more liberal regime and those who seek to perpetuate a fanatical dictatorship.

These points must be borne in mind if and when additional sanctions become necessary. Care should be taken to make certain that the

From Hope to Audacity

sanctions are politically intelligent and that they isolate the regime rather than unify all Iranians. Sanctions must punish those in power—not the Iranian middle class, as an embargo on gasoline would do. The unintended result of imposing indiscriminately crippling sanctions would likely be to give the Iranians the impression that the United States' real objective is to prevent their country from acquiring even a peaceful nuclear program—and that, in turn, would fuel nationalism and outrage.

Moreover, even the adoption of politically discriminating sanctions is likely to be complicated by international constraints. China, given its dependence on Middle Eastern (and particularly Iranian) oil, fears the consequences of a sharpened crisis. The position of Russia is ambiguous since as a major energy supplier to Europe, it stands to benefit financially from a prolonged crisis in the Persian Gulf that would prevent the entrance of Iranian oil into the European market. Indeed, from the Russian geopolitical perspective, a steep rise in the price of oil as a result of a conflict in the Persian Gulf would be most economically damaging to the United States and China—countries whose global preeminence Russia tends to resent and even fear—and would make Europe even more dependent on Russian energy.

Throughout this complicated process, firm presidential leadership will be required. That is particularly so because of the presence of influential voices in the United States, both inside and outside the administration, in favor of a negotiating process that minimizes the possibility of a reasonable compromise. Prior to joining the administration, some senior second-level officials seemed to favor policies designed to force an early confrontation with Iran and even advocated joint military consultations with Israel regarding the use of force. The somewhat sensationalized manner in which the administration revealed in late September that it had been aware for months of the secret Iranian nuclear facility near Qom suggests internal disagreements over tactics.

Ultimately, a larger strategic question is at stake: Should the United States' long-term goal be the evolution of Iran into a stabilizing power

Sanctions against Iran must punish those in power—not the middle class, as an embargo on gasoline would do.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

in the Middle East? To state the issue even more sharply and simply: Should its policy be designed to encourage Iran to eventually become a partner of the United States again—and even, as it was for three decades, of Israel? The wider the agenda—one that addressed regional security issues, potential economic cooperation, and so on—the greater the possibility of finding acceptable *quid pro quos*. Or should Iran be treated as if it is fated to remain a hostile and destabilizing power in an already vulnerable region?

As of this writing, an acceptable outcome to the negotiations is obviously still very much in doubt. Assuming they are not aborted, by early 2010 it may be possible to make a calmly calculated judgment as to whether the talks are worth continuing or whether there in fact is no room for reciprocal compromises. At that point, politically intelligent sanctions may become timely. So far, Obama has shown that he is aware of the need to combine strategic firmness with tactical flexibility; he is patiently exploring whether diplomacy can lead to an accommodation. He has avoided any explicit commitment to a precise deadline (unlike France's grandstanding in favor of a December date), and he has not engaged in explicit threats of military action.

Those advocating a tougher stance should remember that the United States would bear the brunt of the painful consequences in the event of an attack on Iran, whether the United States or Israel launched it. Iran would likely target U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, possibly destabilizing both countries; the Strait of Hormuz could become a blazing war zone; and Americans would again pay steep prices at the gas pump. Iran is an issue regarding which, above all, Obama must trust himself to lead and not to be led. So far, he has done so.

THE AFPAK QUAGMIRE

THE THIRD urgent and politically sensitive foreign policy issue is posed by the Afghan-Pakistani predicament. Obama has moved toward abandoning some of the more ambitious, even ideological, objectives that defined the United States' initial engagement in Afghanistan—the creation of a modern democracy, for example. But the United States must be very careful lest its engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which still has primarily and most visibly a military dimension,

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From Hope to Audacity

comes to be viewed by the Afghans and the Pakistanis as yet another case of Western colonialism and elicits from them an increasingly militant response.

Some top U.S. generals have recently stated that the United States is not winning militarily, an appraisal that ominously suggests the conflict with the Taliban could become similar to the Soviet Union's earlier confrontation with Afghan resistance. A comprehensive strategic reassessment has thus become urgently needed. The proposal made in September by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for an international conference on the subject was helpful and timely; the United States was wise to welcome it. But to be effective, any new strategy has to emphasize two key elements. First, the Afghan government and NATO should seek to engage locally in a limited process of accommodation with receptive elements of the Taliban. The Taliban are not a global revolutionary or terrorist movement, and although they are a broad alliance with a rather medieval vision of what Afghanistan ought to be, they do not directly threaten the West. Moreover, they are still very much a minority phenomenon that ultimately can be defeated only by other Afghans (helped economically and militarily by the United States and its NATO allies), a fact that demands a strategy that is more political than military.

Additionally, the United States needs to develop a policy for gaining the support of Pakistan, not just in denying the Taliban a sanctuary in Pakistan but also in pressuring the Taliban in Afghanistan to accommodate. Given that many Pakistanis may prefer a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to a secular Afghanistan that leans toward Pakistan's archrival, India, the United States needs to assuage Pakistan's security concerns in order to gain its full cooperation in the campaign against the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban. In this regard, the support of China could be helpful, particularly considering its geopolitical stake in regional stability and its traditionally close ties with Islamabad.

It is likely that before this appraisal hits the newsstands, Obama will have announced a more comprehensive strategy for attaining a politically acceptable outcome to the ongoing conflict—and one that U.S. allies are also prepared to support. His approach so far has been deliberate. He has been careful to assess both the military and the political dimensions of the challenge and also to take into account

Zbigniew Brzezinski

the views of U.S. allies. Nothing would be worse for NATO than if one part of the alliance (western Europe) left the other part of the alliance (the United States) alone in Afghanistan. Such a fissure over NATO's first campaign initially based on Article 5, the collective defense provision, would probably spell the end of the alliance.

How Obama handles these three urgent and interrelated issues—the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian dilemma, and the Afghan-Pakistani conflict—will determine the United States' global role for the foreseeable future. The consequences of a failed peace process in the Middle East, a military collision with Iran, and an intensifying military engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan all happening simultaneously could commit the United States for many years to a lonely and self-destructive conflict in a huge and volatile area. Eventually, that could spell the end of the United States' current global preeminence.

KEY STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS

THE PRESIDENT, in addition to coping with these immediate challenges, has indicated his intent to improve three key geopolitical relationships of the United States: with Russia, with China, and with Europe. Each involves longer-term dilemmas but does not require crisis management now. Each has its own peculiarities: Russia is a former imperial power with revisionist ambitions but declining social capital; China is a rising world power that is modernizing itself at an astonishing pace but deliberately downplaying its ambitions; Europe is a global economic power devoid of either military clout or political will. Obama has rightly indicated that the United States needs to collaborate more closely with each of them.

Hence, the administration decided to “reset” the United States' relationship with Russia. But that slogan is confusing, and it is not yet clear that Washington's wishful thinking about Moscow's shared interests on such matters as Iran is fully justified. Nonetheless, the United States must think strategically about its long-term relationship with Russia and pursue a two-track policy: it has to cooperate with Russia whenever doing so is mutually beneficial, but in a way that is also responsive to historical reality. The age of closed empires is over, and Russia, for the sake of its own future, will eventually have to accept this.

From Hope to Audacity

Seeking to expand cooperation with Russia does not mean condoning Russia's subordination of Georgia (through which the vital Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline passes, providing Europe with access to Central Asian energy) or its intimidation of Ukraine (an industrial and agricultural heartland of the former Soviet Union). Either move would be a giant step backward. Each would intensify Russia's imperial nostalgia and central Europe's security fears, not to mention increase the possibility of armed conflicts. Yet so far, the Obama administration has been quite reluctant to provide even purely defensive arms to Georgia (in contrast to Russia's provision of offensive weaponry to Venezuela), nor has it been sufficiently active in encouraging the EU to be more responsive to Ukraine's European aspirations. Fortunately, Vice President Biden's fall 2009 visit to Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic did reaffirm the United States' long-term interest in political pluralism within the former Soviet space and in a cooperative relationship with a truly postimperial Russia. And it should always be borne in mind that the survival of the former makes the latter more likely.

A longer-term effort to engage China in a more forthcoming approach to global problems is also needed. China is, as it has proclaimed, "rising peacefully," and unlike Russia, it is patiently self-confident. But one can also argue that China is rising somewhat selfishly and needs to be drawn more broadly into constructive cooperation on global economic, financial, and environmental decisions. It also has growing political influence over geopolitical issues that affect core U.S. interests: North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Thus, Obama's decision to develop a top-level bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship has been timely. Cultivating at the presidential-summit level a *de facto* geopolitical G-2 (not to be confused with proposals for an economic G-2), highlighted by Obama's November visit to China, is helping develop an increasingly significant strategic dialogue. The leaders of the United States and China recognize that both countries have a major stake in an effectively functioning world system. And

So far, Obama's foreign policy has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

they appear to appreciate the historic potential and the respective national interests inherent in such a bilateral relationship.

Paradoxically, despite Obama's expressed desire, there seem to be fewer prospects in the near future for a strategically significant enhancement of the United States' relationship with its closest political, economic, and military partner: Europe. Obama's predecessor left a bitter legacy there, which Obama has greatly redressed in terms of public opinion. But genuine strategic cooperation on a global scale is not possible with a partner that not only has no defined and authoritative political leadership but also lacks an internal consensus regarding its world role.

Hence, Obama's intent to reignite the Atlantic partnership is necessarily limited to dialogues with the three key European states with genuine international clout: the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. But the utility of such dialogues is reduced by the personal and political differences among these countries' leaders—not to mention the British prime minister's grim political prospects, the French president's preoccupation with personal celebrity, and the German chancellor's eastward gaze. The emergence of a unified and therefore influential European worldview, with which Obama could effectively engage, seems unlikely anytime soon.

DOMESTIC IMPEDIMENTS

WHAT THEN, on balance, can be said of Obama's foreign policy? So far, it has generated more expectations than strategic breakthroughs. Nonetheless, Obama has significantly altered U.S. policies regarding the three most urgent challenges facing the country. But as a democracy, the United States has to base its foreign policy decisions on domestic political consent. And unfortunately for Obama, gaining that support is becoming more difficult because of three systemic weaknesses that impede the pursuit of an intelligent and decisive foreign policy in an increasingly complex global setting.

The first is that foreign policy lobbies have become more influential in U.S. politics. Thanks to their access to Congress, a variety of lobbies—some financially well endowed, some backed by foreign interests—have been promoting, to an unprecedented degree, legislative intervention in

foreign-policy making. Now more than ever, Congress not only actively opposes foreign policy decisions but even imposes some on the president. (The pending legislation on sanctions against Iran is but one example.) Such congressional intervention, promoted by lobbies, is a serious handicap in shaping a foreign policy meant to be responsive to the ever-changing realities of global politics and makes it more difficult to ensure that U.S.—not foreign—interests are the point of departure.

The second, documented by a 2009 RAND study, pertains to the deepening ideological cleavage that is reducing the prospects for effective bipartisanship in foreign policy. The resulting polarization not only makes a bipartisan foreign policy less likely, but it also encourages the infusion of demagoguery into policy conflicts. And it poisons the public discourse. Still worse, personal vilification and hateful, as well as potentially violent, rhetoric are becoming widespread in that realm of political debate that is subject to neither fact checking nor libel laws: the blogosphere.

Last but not least, of the large democratic countries, the United States has one of the least informed publics when it comes to global affairs. Many Americans, as various

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

National Geographic surveys have shown, are not even familiar with basic global geography. Their knowledge of other countries' histories and cultures is not much better. How can a public unfamiliar with geography or foreign history have even an elementary grasp of, say, the geopolitical dilemmas that the United States faces in Afghanistan and Pakistan? With the accelerating decline in the circulation of newspapers and the trivialization of once genuinely informative television reporting, reliable and timely news about critical global issues is becoming less available to the general public. In that context, demagogically formulated solutions tend to become more appealing, especially in critical moments.

Together, these three systemic weaknesses are complicating efforts to gain public support for a rational foreign policy attuned to the complexity of the global dilemmas facing the United States. Obama's instinct is to lead by conciliation. That has been his political experience, and it has obviously been the key to his electoral success. Conciliation, backed by personal inspiration and the mass mobilization of populist hopes, is indeed the most important impetus for moving a policy agenda forward in a large democracy. In campaigning for the presidency, Obama proved that he was a master both of social conciliation and of political mobilization. But he has not yet made the transition from inspiring orator to compelling statesman. Advocating that something happen is not the same as making it happen.

In the tough realities of world affairs, leadership also requires an unrelenting firmness in overcoming foreign opposition, in winning the support of friends, in negotiating seriously when necessary with hostile states, and in gaining grudging respect even from those governments that the United States sometimes has an interest in intimidating. To these ends, the optimal moment for blending national aspirations with decisive leadership is when the personal authority of the president is at its highest—usually during the first year in office. For President Obama, alas, that first year has been dominated by the economic crisis and the struggle over health-care reform. The next three years may thus be more difficult. For the United States' national interest, but also for humanity's sake, that makes it truly vital for Obama to pursue with tenacious audacity the soaring hopes he unleashed. 🌐

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Graduate School Forum



Answers to *your* questions from students, alumni, and school officials

Choosing the right graduate school program can be daunting. Graduate school entails a tremendous investment of time, money, and energy. You want some assurance that you will get a solid return on your investment—ideally in the form of a rewarding and personally fulfilling career path.

Fortunately, there has never been a better time to make this investment. Now more than ever, a degree in foreign affairs, international business, or international law opens doors to a wide variety of professional opportunities within the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. Whether you are just finishing your undergraduate studies, have a few years of work experience, or are mid-career and interested in applying your experiences in a new direction, these degree programs will equip you with the requisite skills and perspectives to advance your career.

International affairs programs offer interdisciplinary curricula that instill a core knowledge of international relations and economics along with a heavy emphasis on developing strong analytical and research skills. Programs are distinguished by their topical and regional areas of expertise and the degree to which they stress policy analysis, foreign language competency, quantitative coursework, and management skills.

Graduates put this training to use pursuing a wide variety of opportunities. Graduates

from APSIA-member schools, for example, are represented almost equally in the public, private, and nonprofit/NGO sectors. In the public sector, almost every government department or agency has at least one internationally focused office. Private sector opportunities include working in finance, political risk analysis, the growing field of corporate social responsibility, and clean energy technologies. We have witnessed an explosion of nonprofit organizations over the past twenty years, managing programs around the world focused on democratization, civil society development, economic development, postconflict reconstruction, and climate change.

As you research programs that will best advance your unique ambitions and career goals, pay careful attention to a particular program's core course requirements, areas of concentration available, number and type of faculty (traditional academics vs. practitioners) teaching within your area of interest, and where the alumni from the program are employed.

The following pages will provide you with a deeper understanding of the variety of internationally focused schools and show you the kinds of questions your peers are asking about options for graduate study. •

— **LEIGH MORRIS SLOANE**

Executive Director, Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA)

www.ForeignAffairs.com/GraduateSchoolForum

[Return to Table of Contents](#)

“How does a multicurricular approach to the study of international affairs prepare someone for success on the global stage?”



FARAH PANDITH

Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Department of State

Though more interconnected than ever, the world in no way has become a simpler place. The complexities of international relations require that we view the world with a global perspective. The next generation of leaders must be agile in their expertise, able to overcome adversity, and comprehensive in their approach to solving the world's most complicated issues.

As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, dialogue and diplomacy will be at the forefront of the movement to address the profound challenges we face. The tools necessary to bring about understanding and, ultimately, positive international relations will be found in a holistic approach to study and practice in global affairs.

How has Fletcher effectively prepared you for your career?

My Fletcher experience—including its rich curriculum, outstanding faculty, and diverse community—pushed me to experiment and explore all of my academic interests. Working within rigorous standards, a Fletcher student is free to engage in and examine myriad topics, and in doing so find unique links between subjects—precisely what is called for in today's complex international environment. Simply put, there are no pigeonholes in which to fall. Each experience is unique.

In and out of the classroom, my exposure to the issues facing international players in every sector, in every corner of the planet, helped develop the pedigree to compete globally at the highest level. Due in part to the wide array of opportunities to lead projects and work among established, world-renowned professionals, I graduated from Fletcher with polished leadership skills that have enabled me to succeed in my career.

I encounter Fletcher graduates no matter

where I am on the planet. Whether in the Middle East, Asia, or Washington, DC, Fletcher alums are placed in key positions in the private, public, and nongovernmental sectors. As our paths cross, I'm always glad to find that each Fletcherite provides an important perspective, connections, and, most importantly, friendship.

How is The Fletcher School's offering unique?

Fletcher's community shares an unrivaled experience in and acute examination of the most pressing, thought-provoking issues.

Fletcher's curriculum is both flexible and demanding—the right fit for a driven individual who seeks to marry topics of interest for a personalized career track or perform a deep dive into an area of study of their choosing. Building from its core offering in three divisions: international law and organizations; diplomacy, history, and politics; and economics and international business, Fletcher provides a learning environment of collaboration and cross-pollination.

Within the walls of its buildings and virtual spaces, and through its network of leaders around the world, Fletcher delivers the highest-quality, ground-breaking research and thought-leadership one would expect from an institution of its stature.

The tie that binds Fletcherites—and makes them so successful globally—is Fletcher's tight-knit community. Expertise and experience are shared within the community, rather than placed in silos. This approach ensures that each student receives a multicurricular, multicultural experience that prepares leaders to work on the international stage. •



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[Return to Table of Contents](#)



“How can my work experience enhance a master’s education at your school?”

Students come to our program with diverse life and work experiences that serve as the basis for their studies and careers. Several years ago, a young man came into my office. He worked for a Brazilian shipping company in the Port of New York, signaling for containers to be brought in. Though he hadn’t studied social science or economics as undergraduate at the University of Alabama, he thought that his knowledge of logistics could be useful in a humanitarian crisis. He came to the graduate International Affairs program of The New School in New York City to learn what practical skills he’d need to work on disaster relief.

We brought him in. He studied economics; he wrote a thesis on the famine in Ethiopia; we sent him to Turkey and India to work on earthquake reconstruction. Today, he’s working for USAID in the area of disaster reduction.

This story is not unusual at The New School. Time and again, we’ve seen students who want to take their skills, interests, life experience, and work experience and expand on them to address humanitarian issues of global importance. Four hundred students from around the world attend our program. We’re interested in what each of them does, how they do it, and how we can get them out into the world to make a serious contribution.

Should I have a career path mapped out at the start of my education?

There’s nothing wrong with having clearly defined goals, but we’re also interested in challenging students to view problems from new perspectives. We had a student who graduated from Brown and worked for a social

MICHAEL COHEN
Director, Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School



services agency for five years. She described herself as a jeans and sandals person who was interested in hands-on problem solving. We sent her to a women’s cooperative in Uganda that was producing tea and honey and organizing for the free trade movement; it was a natural fit. So I asked her what would be a challenge. I asked her if she could envision wearing a suit and working for a big institution on policy.

I know that graduate students are not going to school just for the sake of going to school. They’re thinking about outcomes—and at The New School, they are thinking about making a real difference in the world.

We then sent her to Argentina to work with the Ministry of the Economy, and she learned about the world of policy. When she returned, she heard a World Bank official speak at The New School. He said that the organization needed to strengthen the social assessments of economic policy. This student thought, “I can do that.” She knew that she had the skills to think about sensitivity, culture, social process, and participatory process. Now she is working at the World Bank.


I know that graduate students are not going to school just for the sake of going to school. They’re thinking about outcomes—and at The New School, they are thinking about making a real difference in the world. The decision to make the financial, intellectual, and emotional commitment to graduate school is serious business. At The New School, we take your education as seriously as you do. •

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[Return to Table of Contents](#)

“With geopolitical power shifting to Asia, what are the benefits of studying in the region?”



KISHORE MAHBUBANI

Dean, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

In the 21st century, one trend will be clear: the re-emergence and renaissance of Asian societies.

Perhaps more than any other public policy program, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, which was set up in partnership with the Harvard Kennedy School, uses its global classroom to provide insight into a newly emerging Asia.

The School has a unique Asian focus and bridges the gap between prevailing theories in the West and best practices emerging in the East. Its strategic location in the region allows our students to study in one of the best public policy laboratories in the world while immersing in and accessing the wider Asia Pacific region.

Our core mission is to educate and train policymakers and leaders from the public and private sectors who will help transform Asia. With more than 330 students from over 50 countries, it is hard to match our classrooms' diversity and dynamism. Twenty percent of our students come from Singapore; the rest from all over the world. Our international students come mainly from India, China, South East Asia, and the United States, converging the world's most dynamic economies and fostering networking with the next generation of Asian leaders.

Our students and alumni are ambassadors, senators, editors, social entrepreneurs, and aspiring leaders. Three recent American graduates illustrate the appeal of the School: Ms. Willow Darsie joined us from the Aspen Institute; Mr. Joel Aufrecht is now a Presidential Management Fellow in the U.S. Federal Government; and Ms. Helen V. Chou, a graduate of Harvard University and the Columbia SIPA dual degree program with the LKY School, transitioned from financial consulting in New York to international development in Asia Pacific.

We are privileged to be part of the National University of Singapore, consistently ranked among the top thirty universities in the world. The LKY School is the first Asian school to be admitted into the prestigious Global Public Policy Network (GPPN), which was set up by Columbia University's School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA), the London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), and Sciences Po.

A select number of our qualified Master in Public Policy (MPP) students obtain a double degree from a GPPN partner school. Students spend one year in Singapore and the second in New York, London, or Paris, and often the School provides full funding. Amazingly, the University of Tokyo has signed its first ever double degree arrangement since its founding in 1877 with the School.

Living abroad may get expensive, how can your school help me in this regard?

The LKY School is among the most generous schools of public policy in the world; nearly 50 percent of our international students study on fully-funded merit scholarships provided by the School.

For aspiring leaders keen to study, work, and live in Asia, there are few institutions that can match our experience and credentials. We currently offer Master's programs to qualifying candidates in the public and private sectors, including a two-year MPP program for young professionals and a one-year Master in Public Administration program for mid-career managers. •



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“Does your school offer opportunities for students to get experience in the field prior to graduating?”

Yes. One reason I chose the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University (GW) is because its location in the heart of Washington, DC, offers an astounding array of opportunities to acquire professional experience. Many of my classmates work in internships near campus at the White House, State Department, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and dozens of NGOs, think tanks, and embassies. The Elliott School's Graduate Student Career Development Office has deep relationships with many employers, bringing coaches-in-residence from organizations like the CIA and State Department to campus, as well as organizing dozens of site visits to potential employers each year.

How does your academic experience contribute to your professional ambitions?

As an international development studies major, I take courses in economics, research methods, policy analysis, and management, among many others.

International Development Economics, taught by Professor Stephen Smith, a leading scholar of poverty, development, and globalization, teaches both economic theory and the nuts and bolts of how to apply that theory. In her Politics of Africa course, Professor Gina Lambright has pushed me to question traditional political science views and truly enhanced my studies in governance and democracy.

The Elliott School faculty comprises the ideal combination of renowned scholars and seasoned policymakers. Professor Sean Roberts, who leads my program, is a



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ANNA PHILLIPS

*Graduate Student, Elliott School;
 Founder, Girls Kick It!*



former USAID official and a PhD anthropologist. David Shinn, former ambassador to Ethiopia, teaches a class on East African politics. Exposure to policy practitioners has helped me understand how I can affect change and gain hands-on experience while still in school. The guidance and support of Elliott School faculty helped me design and implement Girls Kick It!, a community-based program that helps empower Ugandan girls and women through sports.

What other opportunities are there for professional development?

Each year, the Elliott School hosts hundreds of policymakers, scholars, business leaders, and other international leaders in its public event series, adding to the overall academic experience. In November, for example, I walked out of Professor Smith's lecture on the global financial crisis and into a public event on the same topic by a former governor of the Federal Reserve Board.

The opportunity to introduce Sheikha Haya Rashed Al-Khalifa, president of the United Nations General Assembly, was a highlight of my undergraduate experience at the Elliott School. The Sheikha has always been a role model of mine in her pursuit of justice and advocacy for guaranteeing a fair, just, and safe global community.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently spoke at GW, and Gates offered some advice that I found particularly valuable: "There is no more fulfilling way to spend your life than in public service."

The Elliott School and GW have given me tremendous opportunities to expand my international affairs knowledge and experiences. •

“How does your school integrate the new concepts of security, including human security, into its curriculum?”



PEG SANDERS

*Deputy Director, SIÈ CHÈOU-KANG
Center for International Security
and Diplomacy*

The Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver is a unique teaching and research program that integrates twenty-first-century concepts of national security with the world's timeless quest for human security and peace.

After a fascinating career at the Central Intelligence Agency, I brought that wealth of professional experience to my teaching in the Josef Korbel School's exceptional security program, which encourages a wide range of views about how to advance national and human security. I found an academic environment that challenges students and faculty to define international security broadly and to reconcile national interests with the security of a human community that will approach nine billion people by the mid-twenty-first century.

In addition to a rich security studies program, I found a curriculum infused with an implicit commitment to human rights, human development, and human welfare. Students and faculty are challenged to explore and debate a critical question: How do the United States and other major powers reconcile cosmopolitan, internationalist values—and international commitments—with traditional national security interests?

The school's superb faculty and diverse student body study the indissoluble link between the security of an individual state and the fate of other states and peoples around the world. We examine international security, not only as the accumulation of state power, but as a way to develop and preserve individual rights and human security.

In addition, students study the full range and interdependence of modern security threats, including failed states, weak governance, terrorism, genocide, weapons proliferation, economic dislocation, development failure, environmental challenges, disease and

pandemics, and the peculiar pressures of globalization.

Ranked No. 12 by *Foreign Policy* magazine among the world's top MA degree programs in international affairs, the Josef Korbel School welcomes students from around the globe. Its balance of theory, theory applied, and technical skills enables graduates to add immediate value to any organization.

The school's degree programs reflect its philosophy. It offers Master of Arts degrees in international studies; international security; global finance, trade, and economic integration; international development; international administration; international human rights; and homeland security. Students may also pursue certificate programs in humanitarian assistance, global health, and homeland security.

Enhancing these degree programs are the school's research and teaching centers. These include the renowned Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, the new SIÈ CHÈOU-KANG Center for International Security and Diplomacy, and the innovative Center for Sustainable Development and International Peace. Students take on intensive internships either under the auspices of our centers and partnerships in Washington, DC, and Beijing; with the assistance of partner institutions in Istanbul, Barcelona, and St. Petersburg; or as individually identified with the assistance of Korbel's career counselors and alumni networks.

The Josef Korbel School also offers the Sié Fellows program in international security and diplomacy designed for master's-level students demonstrating exceptional academic ability. Persons chosen as Sié Fellows receive full tuition, two-year scholarships, and function as a cohort. •



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Return to Table of Contents



“Does geographic location matter when choosing a graduate program in international affairs?”

Absolutely. No place is more central to the world of foreign policy and international affairs than Washington, DC. Jana Nelson ('09) of Brazil came to Georgetown for “its academic reputation, diverse student body, location in a vibrant cosmopolitan community, and the chance to work with experienced policymakers.” Our master’s programs have been consistently ranked No. 1 in *Foreign Policy* magazine’s global survey of graduate programs in international relations.

How does this affect my academic program?

Georgetown’s faculty are up-to-date on both current scholarship and theory in their fields and active in the debates that shape foreign policy. My recent stint at the National Security Council directing Asian affairs enhanced my teaching and enabled me to give better academic and career advice to my students. Another colleague recently served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia.

We are joined by distinguished scholars and renowned practitioners, including a former secretary of state, World Bank vice presidents, a former national security adviser, a former administrator of USAID, and foreign leaders.

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) graduate students can select from six interdisciplinary programs in regional and functional studies and specialized certificates, as well as from additional courses in other units of Georgetown University. A recent alumnus from Asia who took advantage of our enhanced language offerings—supported by three U.S. government-funded National Resource Centers—has become one of his country’s leading diplomatic experts on the Arab world. From my own work negotiating with North Korea during the last administration, I know firsthand the importance of quality language training.



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VICTOR CHA
*Director of Asian Studies and
D. S. Song-Korea Foundation Professor,
School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University*



What about career opportunities?

SFS graduate students enjoy unique internship and career opportunities in DC and beyond. Special funds support internships focused on improving the human condition: one student credits her internship experience as having led her “to believe in the power of civil society to bring change to poor communities around the world” and to affirm her commitment to a career in development. Our career center professionals, alumni, and faculty facilitate professional connections for our students. A colleague of mine who is a retired four-star general recently helped a graduate obtain a key position with the U.S. military in Israel. The worldwide Georgetown alumni network has aided our graduates in attaining leadership positions on Capitol Hill, at the Department of the Treasury, in international organizations, with the EU, with foreign governments, and more.


What is unique about the Georgetown experience?

Steeped in history and tradition, Georgetown University offers students an intimate graduate experience embedded in a first-class research university. When SFS alumnus Bill Clinton ('68) spoke to the Georgetown community following his election, he stood on the very spot from which George Washington had addressed the campus two centuries earlier. Since 1789, Georgetown has brought together diverse and talented individuals from around the world, united by a sense of purpose and the Jesuit ideals of service to others, care of the whole person, and intercultural understanding.

I invite you to come to Georgetown and join the next generation of global leaders. •

Return to Table of Contents

“ I hear the term ‘global governance’ used more and more frequently. How does your school approach this topic?”



MASAHIKO ITAKI

Dean, Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University

Now that we are witnessing an increasing number of phenomena that cannot be fully explained or understood with conventional theories, there is a movement toward establishing new, diversified theories in the field of international relations. In addition, Western-centric ideas have come under increased criticism.

Many of the researchers at the Global Cooperation Program (GCP) have been playing a leading role in developing this more contemporary, global approach. As the name suggests, the GCP is an English-taught curriculum focusing on global governance issues. In this program, students consider how various actors should cooperate to address problems on a global scale. Each year the program invites world-renowned researchers, such as Dr. Akira Irie, Dr. Johan Galtung, and Dr. Nicolas Onuf, as well as individuals with first-hand experience at organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, to serve as visiting professors.

Through direct communication and exchange with leading universities, research institutions, and international organizations around the world, students engage in a wide range of opportunities designed to deepen their understanding of global issues.

What is the benefit of studying international relations at the Graduate School of International Relations (GSIR) at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, Japan?

Some of the most dynamic development in the world today is taking place in East Asia, where the second- and third-largest economic powers, Japan and China, are located.

The ancient capital of Kyoto, where the GSIR at Ritsumeikan University is located, has one of the most attractive and culturally rich living environments in East Asia.

Ritsumeikan University, one of Japan’s top private universities, is home to 36,096 students. The GSIR consists of 163 students, 45 percent of whom are international students hailing from countries around the world.

With the support of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, Ritsumeikan has just embarked on a bold initiative to dramatically increase the number of international students and faculty members.

In addition to students from neighboring countries in Asia, an increasing number of students are attending from European countries and the Americas. This will continue to make the Graduate School of International Relations at Ritsumeikan University an ideal environment to debate new theories of international relations that supersede identities of East and West.

As a member of a truly global student body, this historic location enables students to experience firsthand the culture and dynamics of the East Asian region while conducting their studies.

Which research topics are particularly strong?

As the only full member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs in Japan, our graduate school has an advantage in research on Asia and Japan. Due to our location in Kyoto, well-known for the Kyoto Protocol, research on global environmental issues is actively being carried out. In addition, global issues that the Japanese government has concentrated on, such as developmental aid, disarmament, and multicultural coexistence, are popular themes of study at the GSIR. •



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“Is it important to have full-time work experience before entering your school’s program?”

Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs’ (SIPA) curriculum, internship program, and Capstone workshops are integrated to ensure that all students have the opportunity to build on their existing skills and knowledge and gain valuable on-the-job experience, culminating in a career that can make a positive contribution to the world around them.

We seek candidates with a combination of proven academic ability and several years of solid, applicable work or internship experience. Since students join SIPA from all corners of the globe with vastly different backgrounds and professional experiences, there is no typical career path. Experience at an international relief organization, a government agency, a nonprofit organization, or a private-sector company with operations in the international sphere are common backgrounds for our applicants.

Approximately 5 percent to 10 percent of students accepted each year come directly from undergraduate institutions. These are individuals with extraordinary academic records who have also had significant internship experience.

What role does practical experience play in your curriculum?

Nearly all students engage in a practice-oriented Capstone workshop during their second year, applying their coursework in analytical methods and practical management to a real-world issue. Students are organized into small teams and assigned a substantive, policy-oriented project with an external client. Our clients have included organizations such as the Clinton Global Initiative, the Fire Department of New York City, Booz Allen Hamilton, Grameen America, the International Peace Institute and

ROB GARRIS

*Senior Associate Dean,
Columbia-SIPA*



Royal Dutch Shell.

The student teams work under the supervision of a faculty expert and address a carefully defined problem posed by the client. Each team produces an actionable report that is intended to effect real change. For example, one Capstone workshop team partnered with UNICEF to help develop an award-winning system for monitoring children’s health in Malawi, Africa, using cell phone text messaging.

Sean Blaschke, a 2009 Master of International Affairs graduate, said of the experience: “SIPA offered me the unique opportunity to combine rigorous academic theory with a lead role on a cutting-edge UNICEF initiative. It was exciting to be a part of an influential project that continues to change the way UNICEF field operations function today.”

We seek candidates with a combination of proven academic ability and several years of solid, applicable work or internship experience.

Internships are also an integral part of the student experience at SIPA. Students are required to work a minimum of 120 hours in an internship position for 1.5 credits, and can earn up to 3 internship credits. Internships span the globe, from working on a master plan for the municipal government of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, to evaluating a refugee program in Northern Uganda to performing macroanalysis for a geopolitical forecasting and consulting company. Most students complete internships during the summer between their first and second years; others during the academic year.

The experience and skills students develop before arriving at SIPA become an important part of what they contribute to the classroom and to the SIPA community. •

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Return to Table of Contents

“ I am searching for a graduate program that will open up a greater range of professional opportunities. How have your more recent graduates accomplished this goal?”



TREVOR HUBLIN

*Maxwell School, MA-IR '07;
Field Program Officer, USAID*

As a recent graduate of the Maxwell School's master of arts in international relations degree program, I can say that Maxwell's unique curriculum allowed me to get a strong foothold into the professional field and led to my current position. I am serving as a field program officer with the U.S. Agency for International Development's provincial reconstruction team in Farah, Afghanistan.

The coursework and internships supported by Maxwell provided me with an in-depth understanding of development issues. The flexibility of the degree really allows you to pursue your own interests, and the opportunity to study and work overseas as part of the degree program was critical to me landing my current position.

While at Maxwell, I focused my studies on foreign policy and global security. I was able to take Turkish and ended up spending four months interning with the U.S. Department of State in Tbilisi, Georgia. That was after spending the summer taking coursework at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel, and a seminar on the European Union in Strasbourg, France. My colleagues had even more varied international exposure with NGOs, IOs, and business via Maxwell programs in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

I am in close contact with many Maxwell alumni, and it surprises me how diverse the group really is. One of my good friends is running the global energy program for a prestigious think tank in DC, another is heading up a political party in Ghana, and I know several who have joined the Foreign Service, United Nations, international financial institutions, or who are working for consulting firms in the security field or for NGOs in humanitarian relief. Right here in Afghanistan, a Maxwell alumnus is directing a local human rights organization.

The Maxwell School has not only given me an

opportunity to explore my interests in security and development, but has opened up a network of contacts through the "Maxwell Mafia" that will help me throughout my professional career.

As I reflect on the impact that the Maxwell School has had on my professional development, I realize that the key element was the way in which the curriculum, the faculty, the culture of Maxwell all combined to help me find a career path. The faculty, a mix of scholars and practitioners, made their extensive networks of contacts available to me and other students. Maxwell requires, not merely allows, students to incorporate fieldwork and professional internships into their programs of study.

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The New Population Bomb

The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World

Jack A. Goldstone

FORTY-TWO years ago, the biologist Paul Ehrlich warned in *The Population Bomb* that mass starvation would strike in the 1970s and 1980s, with the world's population growth outpacing the production of food and other critical resources. Thanks to innovations and efforts such as the "green revolution" in farming and the widespread adoption of family planning, Ehrlich's worst fears did not come to pass. In fact, since the 1970s, global economic output has increased and fertility has fallen dramatically, especially in developing countries.

The United Nations Population Division now projects that global population growth will nearly halt by 2050. By that date, the world's population will have stabilized at 9.15 billion people, according to the "medium growth" variant of the UN's authoritative population database *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*. (Today's global population is 6.83 billion.) Barring a cataclysmic climate crisis or a complete failure to recover from the current economic malaise, global economic output is expected to increase by two to three percent per year, meaning that global income will increase far more than population over the next four decades.

But twenty-first-century international security will depend less on how many people inhabit the world than on how the global population is composed and distributed: where populations are declining and

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Jack A. Goldstone

where they are growing, which countries are relatively older and which are more youthful, and how demographics will influence population movements across regions.

These elements are not well recognized or widely understood. A recent article in *The Economist*, for example, cheered the decline in global fertility without noting other vital demographic developments. Indeed, the same UN data cited by *The Economist* reveal four historic shifts that will fundamentally alter the world's population over the next four decades: the relative demographic weight of the world's developed countries will drop by nearly 25 percent, shifting economic power to the developing nations; the developed countries' labor forces will substantially age and decline, constraining economic growth in the developed world and raising the demand for immigrant workers; most of the world's expected population growth will increasingly be concentrated in today's poorest, youngest, and most heavily Muslim countries, which have a dangerous lack of quality education, capital, and employment opportunities; and, for the first time in history, most of the world's population will become urbanized, with the largest urban centers being in the world's poorest countries, where policing, sanitation, and health care are often scarce.

Taken together, these trends will pose challenges every bit as alarming as those noted by Ehrlich. Coping with them will require nothing less than a major reconsideration of the world's basic global governance structures.

EUROPE'S REVERSAL OF FORTUNES

AT THE beginning of the eighteenth century, approximately 20 percent of the world's inhabitants lived in Europe (including Russia). Then, with the Industrial Revolution, Europe's population boomed, and streams of European emigrants set off for the Americas. By the eve of World War I, Europe's population had more than quadrupled. In 1913, Europe had more people than China, and the proportion of the world's population living in Europe and the former European colonies of North America had risen to over 33 percent.

But this trend reversed after World War I, as basic health care and sanitation began to spread to poorer countries. In Asia, Africa, and Latin

The New Population Bomb

America, people began to live longer, and birthrates remained high or fell only slowly. By 2003, the combined populations of Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent—far less than it was in 1700. (These projections, moreover, might even understate the reality because they reflect the “medium growth” projection of the UN forecasts, which assumes that the fertility rates of developing countries will decline while those of developed countries will increase. In fact, many developed countries show no evidence of increasing fertility rates.)

The West’s relative decline is even more dramatic if one also considers changes in income. The Industrial Revolution made Europeans not only more numerous than they had been but also considerably richer per capita than others worldwide. According to the economic historian Angus Maddison, Europe, the United States, and Canada together produced about 32 percent of the world’s GDP at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By 1950, that proportion had increased to a remarkable 68 percent of the world’s total output (adjusted to reflect purchasing power parity).

This trend, too, is headed for a sharp reversal. The proportion of global GDP produced by Europe, the United States, and Canada fell from 68 percent in 1950 to 47 percent in 2003 and will decline even more steeply in the future. If the growth rate of per capita income (again, adjusted for purchasing power parity) between 2003 and 2050 remains as it was between 1973 and 2003—averaging 1.68 percent annually in Europe, the United States, and Canada and 2.47 percent annually in the rest of the world—then the combined GDP of Europe, the United States, and Canada will roughly double by 2050, whereas the GDP of the rest of the world will grow by a factor of five. The portion of global GDP produced by Europe, the United States, and Canada in 2050 will then be less than 30 percent—smaller than it was in 1820.

These figures also imply that an overwhelming proportion of the world’s GDP growth between 2003 and 2050—nearly 80 percent—will occur outside of Europe, the United States, and Canada. By the middle of this century, the global middle class—those capable of purchasing durable consumer products, such as cars, appliances, and electronics—will increasingly be found in what is now considered the developing

Jack A. Goldstone

world. The World Bank has predicted that by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion—a rise of 200 percent since 2005. This means that the developing world's middle class alone will be larger than the total populations of Europe, Japan, and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly industrialized countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey.

AGING PAINS

PART OF the reason developed countries will be less economically dynamic in the coming decades is that their populations will become substantially older. The European countries, Canada, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and even China are aging at unprecedented rates. Today, the proportion of people aged 60 or older in China and South Korea is 12–15 percent. It is 15–22 percent in the European Union, Canada, and the United States and 30 percent in Japan. With baby boomers aging and life expectancy increasing, these numbers will increase dramatically. In 2050, approximately 30 percent of Americans, Canadians, Chinese, and Europeans will be over 60, as will more than 40 percent of Japanese and South Koreans.

Over the next decades, therefore, these countries will have increasingly large proportions of retirees and increasingly small proportions of workers. As workers born during the baby boom of 1945–65 are retiring, they are not being replaced by a new cohort of citizens of prime working age (15–59 years old). Industrialized countries are experiencing a drop in their working-age populations that is even more severe than the overall slowdown in their population growth. South Korea represents the most extreme example. Even as its total population is projected to decline by almost 9 percent by 2050 (from 48.3 million to 44.1 million), the population of working-age South Koreans is expected to drop by 36 percent (from 32.9 million to 21.1 million), and the number of South Koreans aged 60 and older will increase by almost 150 percent (from 7.3 million to 18 million). By 2050, in other words, the entire working-age population will barely exceed the 60-and-older population. Although South Korea's case is extreme, it represents an increasingly



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The New Population Bomb

common fate for developed countries. Europe is expected to lose 24 percent of its prime working-age population (about 120 million workers) by 2050, and its 60-and-older population is expected to increase by 47 percent. In the United States, where higher fertility and more immigration are expected than in Europe, the working-age population will grow by 15 percent over the next four decades—a steep decline from its growth of 62 percent between 1950 and 2010. And by 2050, the United States' 60-and-older population is expected to double.

All this will have a dramatic impact on economic growth, health care, and military strength in the developed world. The forces that fueled economic growth in industrialized countries during the second half of the twentieth century—increased productivity due to better education, the movement of women into the labor force, and innovations in technology—will all likely weaken in the coming decades. College enrollment boomed after World War II, a trend that is not likely to recur in the twenty-first century; the extensive movement of women into the labor force also was a one-time social change; and the technological change of the time resulted from innovators who created new products and leading-edge consumers who were willing to try them out—two groups that are thinning out as the industrialized world's population ages.

Overall economic growth will also be hampered by a decline in the number of new consumers and new households. When developed countries' labor forces were growing by 0.5–1.0 percent per year, as they did until 2005, even annual increases in real output per worker of just 1.7 percent meant that annual economic growth totaled 2.2–2.7 percent per year. But with the labor forces of many developed countries (such as Germany, Hungary, Japan, Russia, and the Baltic states) now shrinking by 0.2 percent per year and those of other countries (including Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, and Italy) growing by less than 0.2 percent per year, the same 1.7 percent increase in real output per worker yields only 1.5–1.9 percent annual overall growth. Moreover, developed countries will be lucky to keep productivity growth at even that level; in many developed countries, productivity is more likely to decline as the population ages.

A further strain on industrialized economies will be rising medical costs: as populations age, they will demand more health care for longer

Jack A. Goldstone

periods of time. Public pension schemes for aging populations are already being reformed in various industrialized countries—often prompting heated debate. In theory, at least, pensions might be kept solvent by increasing the retirement age, raising taxes modestly, and phasing out benefits for the wealthy. Regardless, the number of 80- and 90-year-olds—who are unlikely to work and highly likely to require nursing-home and other expensive care—will rise dramatically. And even if 60- and 70-year-olds remain active and employed, they will require procedures and medications—hip replacements, kidney transplants, blood-pressure treatments—to sustain their health in old age.

All this means that just as aging developed countries will have proportionally fewer workers, innovators, and consumerist young households, a large portion of those countries' remaining economic growth will have to be diverted to pay for the medical bills and pensions of their growing elderly populations. Basic services, meanwhile, will be increasingly costly because fewer young workers will be available for strenuous and labor-intensive jobs. Unfortunately, policymakers seldom reckon with these potentially disruptive effects of otherwise welcome developments, such as higher life expectancy.

YOUTH AND ISLAM IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

EVEN AS the industrialized countries of Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia will experience unprecedented aging this century, fast-growing countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia will have exceptionally youthful populations. Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing countries. And these are the countries that will continue to have the world's highest birthrates. Indeed, over 70 percent of the world's population growth between now and 2050 will occur in 24 countries, all of which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an average per capita income of under \$3,855 in 2008.

Many developing countries have few ways of providing employment to their young, fast-growing populations. Would-be laborers, therefore, will be increasingly attracted to the labor markets of the aging developed countries of Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia. Youthful immigrants from nearby regions with high unemployment—

The New Population Bomb

Central America, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, for example—will be drawn to those vital entry-level and manual-labor jobs that sustain advanced economies: janitors, nursing-home aides, bus drivers, plumbers, security guards, farm workers, and the like. Current levels of immigration from developing to developed countries are paltry compared to those that the forces of supply and demand might soon create across the world.

These forces will act strongly on the Muslim world, where many economically weak countries will continue to experience dramatic population growth in the decades ahead. In 1950, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey had a combined population of 242 million. By 2009, those six countries were the world's most populous Muslim-majority countries and had a combined population of 886 million. Their populations are continuing to grow and indeed are expected to increase by 475 million between now and 2050—during which time, by comparison, the six most populous developed countries are projected to gain only 44 million inhabitants. Worldwide, of the 48 fastest-growing countries today—those with annual population growth of two percent or more—28 are majority Muslim or have Muslim minorities of 33 percent or more.

It is therefore imperative to improve relations between Muslim and Western societies. This will be difficult given that many Muslims live in poor communities vulnerable to radical appeals and many see the West as antagonistic and militaristic. In the 2009 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, for example, whereas 69 percent of those Indonesians and Nigerians surveyed reported viewing the United States favorably, just 18 percent of those polled in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey (all U.S. allies) did. And in 2006, when the Pew survey last asked detailed questions about Muslim-Western relations, more than half of the respondents in Muslim countries characterized those relations as bad and blamed the West for this state of affairs.

But improving relations is all the more important because of the growing demographic weight of poor Muslim countries and the attendant increase in Muslim immigration, especially to Europe from North Africa and the Middle East. (To be sure, forecasts that Muslims will soon dominate Europe are outlandish: Muslims compose just three to ten percent of the population in the major European countries

Jack A. Goldstone

today, and this proportion will at most double by midcentury.) Strategists worldwide must consider that the world's young are becoming concentrated in those countries least prepared to educate and employ them, including some Muslim states. Any resulting poverty, social tension, or ideological radicalization could have disruptive effects in many corners of the world. But this need not be the case; the healthy immigration of workers to the developed world and the movement of capital to the developing world, among other things, could lead to better results.

URBAN SPRAWL

EXACERBATING twenty-first-century risks will be the fact that the world is urbanizing to an unprecedented degree. The year 2010 will likely be the first time in history that a majority of the world's people live in cities rather than in the countryside. Whereas less than 30 percent of the world's population was urban in 1950, according to UN projections, more than 70 percent will be by 2050.

Lower-income countries in Asia and Africa are urbanizing especially rapidly, as agriculture becomes less labor intensive and as employment opportunities shift to the industrial and service sectors. Already, most of the world's urban agglomerations—Mumbai (population 20.1 million), Mexico City (19.5 million), New Delhi (17 million), Shanghai (15.8 million), Calcutta (15.6 million), Karachi (13.1 million), Cairo (12.5 million), Manila (11.7 million), Lagos (10.6 million), Jakarta (9.7 million)—are found in low-income countries. Many of these countries have multiple cities with over one million residents each: Pakistan has eight, Mexico 12, and China more than 100. The UN projects that the urbanized proportion of sub-Saharan Africa will nearly double between 2005 and 2050, from 35 percent (300 million people) to over 67 percent (1 billion). China, which is roughly 40 percent urbanized today, is expected to be 73 percent urbanized by 2050; India, which is less than 30 percent urbanized today, is expected to be 55 percent urbanized by 2050. Overall, the world's urban population is expected to grow by 3 billion people by 2050.

This urbanization may prove destabilizing. Developing countries that urbanize in the twenty-first century will have far lower per capita

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
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
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The New Population Bomb

incomes than did many industrial countries when they first urbanized. The United States, for example, did not reach 65 percent urbanization until 1950, when per capita income was nearly \$13,000 (in 2005 dollars). By contrast, Nigeria, Pakistan, and the Philippines, which are approaching similar levels of urbanization, currently have per capita incomes of just \$1,800–\$4,000 (in 2005 dollars).

According to the research of Richard Cincotta and other political demographers, countries with younger populations are especially prone to civil unrest and are less able to create or sustain democratic institutions. And the more heavily urbanized, the more such countries are likely to experience Dickensian poverty and anarchic violence. In good times, a thriving economy might keep urban residents employed and governments flush with sufficient resources to meet their needs. More often, however, sprawling and impoverished cities are vulnerable to crime lords, gangs, and petty rebellions. Thus, the rapid urbanization of the developing world in the decades ahead might bring, in exaggerated form, problems similar to those that urbanization brought to nineteenth-century Europe. Back then, cyclical employment, inadequate policing, and limited sanitation and education often spawned widespread labor strife, periodic violence, and sometimes—as in the 1820s, the 1830s, and 1848—even revolutions.

International terrorism might also originate in fast-urbanizing developing countries (even more than it already does). With their neighborhood networks, access to the Internet and digital communications technology, and concentration of valuable targets, sprawling cities offer excellent opportunities for recruiting, maintaining, and hiding terrorist networks.

DEFUSING THE BOMB

AVERTING THIS century's potential dangers will require sweeping measures. Three major global efforts defused the population bomb of Ehrlich's day: a commitment by governments and nongovernmental organizations to control reproduction rates; agricultural advances, such as the green revolution and the spread of new technology; and a vast increase in international trade, which globalized markets and thus allowed developing countries to export foodstuffs in exchange for

Jack A. Goldstone

seeds, fertilizers, and machinery, which in turn helped them boost production. But today's population bomb is the product less of absolute growth in the world's population than of changes in its age and distribution. Policymakers must therefore adapt today's global governance institutions to the new realities of the aging of the industrialized world, the concentration of the world's economic and population growth in developing countries, and the increase in international immigration.

During the Cold War, Western strategists divided the world into a "First World," of democratic industrialized countries; a "Second World," of communist industrialized countries; and a "Third World," of developing countries. These strategists focused chiefly on deterring or managing conflict between the First and the Second Worlds and on launching proxy wars and diplomatic initiatives to attract Third World countries into the First World's camp. Since the end of the Cold War, strategists have largely abandoned this three-group division and have tended to believe either that the United States, as the sole superpower, would maintain a Pax Americana or that the world would become multipolar, with the United States, Europe, and China playing major roles.

Unfortunately, because they ignore current global demographic trends, these views will be obsolete within a few decades. A better approach would be to consider a different three-world order, with a new First World of the aging industrialized nations of North America, Europe, and Asia's Pacific Rim (including Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as China after 2030, by which point the one-child policy will have produced significant aging); a Second World comprising fast-growing and economically dynamic countries with a healthy mix of young and old inhabitants (such as Brazil, Iran, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam, as well as China until 2030); and a Third World of fast-growing, very young, and increasingly urbanized countries with poorer economies and often weak governments.

To cope with the instability that will likely arise from the new Third World's urbanization, economic strife, lawlessness, and potential terrorist activity, the aging industrialized nations of the new First World must build effective alliances with the growing powers of the new Second World and together reach out to Third World nations. Second World powers will be pivotal in the twenty-first century not

The New Population Bomb

just because they will drive economic growth and consume technologies and other products engineered in the First World; they will also be central to international security and cooperation. The realities of religion, culture, and geographic proximity mean that any peaceful and productive engagement by the First World of Third World countries will have to include the open cooperation of Second World countries.

Strategists, therefore, must fundamentally reconsider the structure of various current global institutions. The G-8, for example, will likely become obsolete as a body for making global economic policy. The G-20 is already becoming increasingly important, and this is less a short-term consequence of the ongoing global financial crisis than the beginning of the necessary recognition that Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, and others are becoming global economic powers. International institutions will not retain their legitimacy if they exclude the world's fastest-growing and most economically dynamic countries. It is essential, therefore, despite European concerns about the potential effects on immigration, to take steps such as admitting Turkey into the European Union. This would add youth and economic dynamism to the EU—and would prove that Muslims are welcome to join Europeans as equals in shaping a free and prosperous future. On the other hand, excluding Turkey from the EU could lead to hostility not only on the part of Turkish citizens, who are expected to number 100 million by 2050, but also on the part of Muslim populations worldwide.

NATO must also adapt. The alliance today is composed almost entirely of countries with aging, shrinking populations and relatively slow-growing economies. It is oriented toward the Northern Hemisphere and holds on to a Cold War structure that cannot adequately respond to contemporary threats. The young and increasingly populous countries of Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia could mobilize insurgents much more easily than NATO could mobilize the troops it would need if it were called on to stabilize those countries. Long-standing NATO members should, therefore—although it would require atypical creativity and flexibility—consider the logistical and demographic advantages of inviting into the alliance countries such as Brazil and Morocco, rather than countries such as Albania. That this seems far-fetched does not minimize the imperative that

Jack A. Goldstone

First World countries begin including large and strategic Second and Third World powers in formal international alliances.

The case of Afghanistan—a country whose population is growing fast and where NATO is currently engaged—illustrates the importance of building effective global institutions. Today, there are 28 million Afghans; by 2025, there will be 45 million; and by 2050, there will be close to 75 million. As nearly 20 million additional Afghans are born over the next 15 years, NATO will have an opportunity to help Afghanistan become reasonably stable, self-governing, and prosperous. If NATO's efforts fail and the Afghans judge that NATO intervention harmed their interests, tens of millions of young Afghans will become more hostile to the West. But if they come to think that NATO's involvement benefited their society, the West will have tens of millions of new friends. The example might then motivate the approximately one billion other young Muslims growing up in low-income countries over the next four decades to look more kindly on relations between their countries and the countries of the industrialized West.

CREATIVE REFORMS AT HOME

THE AGING industrialized countries can also take various steps at home to promote stability in light of the coming demographic trends. First, they should encourage families to have more children. France and Sweden have had success providing child care, generous leave time, and financial allowances to families with young children. Yet there is no consensus among policymakers—and certainly not among demographers—about what policies best encourage fertility.

More important than unproven tactics for increasing family size is immigration. Correctly managed, population movement can benefit developed and developing countries alike. Given the dangers of young, underemployed, and unstable populations in developing countries, immigration to developed countries can provide economic opportunities for the ambitious and serve as a safety valve for all. Countries that embrace immigrants, such as the United States, gain economically by having willing laborers and greater entrepreneurial spirit. And countries with high levels of emigration (but not so much that they experience so-called brain drains) also benefit because

The New Population Bomb

emigrants often send remittances home or return to their native countries with valuable education and work experience.

One somewhat daring approach to immigration would be to encourage a reverse flow of older immigrants from developed to developing countries. If older residents of developed countries took their retirements along the southern coast of the Mediterranean or in Latin America or Africa, it would greatly reduce the strain on their home countries' public entitlement systems. The developing countries involved, meanwhile, would benefit because caring for the elderly and providing retirement and leisure services is highly labor intensive. Relocating a portion of these activities to developing countries would provide employment and valuable training to the young, growing populations of the Second and Third Worlds.

This would require developing residential and medical facilities of First World quality in Second and Third World countries. Yet even this difficult task would be preferable to the status quo, by which low wages and poor facilities lead to a steady drain of medical and nursing talent from developing to developed countries. Many residents of developed countries who desire cheaper medical procedures already practice medical tourism today, with India, Singapore, and Thailand being the most common destinations. (For example, the international consulting firm Deloitte estimated that 750,000 Americans traveled abroad for care in 2008.)

Never since 1800 has a majority of the world's economic growth occurred outside of Europe, the United States, and Canada. Never have so many people in those regions been over 60 years old. And never have low-income countries' populations been so young and so urbanized. But such will be the world's demography in the twenty-first century. The strategic and economic policies of the twentieth century are obsolete, and it is time to find new ones. 🌐

Not So Dire Straits

How the Finlandization of Taiwan Benefits U.S. Security

Bruce Gilley

SINCE 2005, Taiwan and China have been moving into a closer economic and political embrace—a process that accelerated with the election of the pro-détente politician Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s president in 2008. This strengthening of relations presents the United States with its greatest challenge in the Taiwan Strait since 1979, when Washington severed ties with Taipei and established diplomatic relations with Beijing.

In many ways, the current thaw serves Taipei’s interests, but it also allows Beijing to assert increasing influence over Taiwan. As a consensus emerges in Taiwan on establishing closer relations with China, the thaw is calling into question the United States’ deeply ambiguous policy, which is supposed to serve both Taiwan’s interests (by allowing it to retain its autonomy) and the United States’ own (by guarding against an expansionist China). Washington now faces a stark choice: continue pursuing a militarized realist approach—using Taiwan to balance the power of a rising China—or follow an alternative liberal logic that seeks to promote long-term peace through closer economic, social, and political ties between Taiwan and China.

BRUCE GILLEY is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University’s Mark O. Hatfield School of Government and the author of *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. For an annotated guide to this topic, see “What to Read on Taiwanese Politics” at www.foreignaffairs.com/readinglists/taiwan.

A TALE OF TWO DÉTENTES

AFTER THE Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, Taiwan and mainland China became separate political entities, led, respectively, by Chiang Kai-shek's defeated nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and Mao Zedong's victorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For nearly three decades, Chiang and Mao harbored rival claims to the whole territory of China. Gradually, most of the international community came to accept Beijing's claims to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and a special role in its foreign relations. By 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China, 69 percent of the United Nations' member states had already severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of relations with China.

The United States, which had merely "acknowledged" Beijing's claim to Taiwan, was slow to recognize the People's Republic of China due to Washington's historical ties with the KMT, dating back to World War II and its conflict with the PRC during the Korean War. The strategic position of Taiwan, astride western Pacific sea and air lanes, gave it added importance. But by 1979, even Washington had recognized Beijing. That same year, the United States enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in order to ensure continued legal, commercial, and de facto diplomatic relations with the island. At the last minute, Senate Republicans—along with several Democrats who worried that President Jimmy Carter was disregarding Taiwan's security—amended the legislation to include promises of arms sales to Taipei and a broader U.S. commitment to "resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion" against the island.

The fading of the Chiang-Mao rivalry, which subsided after both leaders died in the mid-1970s, coupled with Beijing's new inward-looking focus on economic development, made these military commitments appear anachronistic during the 1980s. Beijing ended its shelling of the Taiwanese islands off the Chinese coast and welcomed Taiwanese "compatriots" to the mainland for tourism, investment, and family reunification. Taiwan's native-born president, Lee Teng-hui, who came to power in 1988, had no interest in "retaking the mainland" and approved the creation of such exchanges. In 1993, the heads of the two governments' cross-strait contact groups held their first direct talks, in Singapore.

Bruce Gilley

This “first détente” ended abruptly in 1995, when the United States issued a visa for Lee to visit Cornell University. China, in the midst of a domestic leadership transition, was already hardening its position on Taiwan, and armchair generals in all three places were publishing books on the predicted order of battle to come. Beijing saw the visa as a betrayal of earlier U.S. promises to refrain from any official relations with Taiwanese leaders. Taiwan’s democratization was also leading to domestic popular pressures for a more assertive stance on independence. Beijing reacted by hurling missiles into the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. Washington dispatched aircraft carriers and radar ships to the area. Beijing’s worst fears were then realized in 2000, when Taiwanese citizens elected Chen Shui-bian as their president. Chen, the leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), now the opposition, promised to seek formal recognition of Taiwan’s de facto independence from China. As a consequence, cross-strait relations deteriorated dramatically between 1995 and 2005, leading to a renewed emphasis on militarization by all three sides.

The damage wrought by this “second freeze” led to serious rethinking in all three capitals. Beijing worried that its aggressive posture on Taiwan was threatening its broader influence in Asia, as other nations rallied behind the U.S. security shield; Taipei began to reevaluate the value of its symbolic assertions of nationhood; and Washington began to question its unlimited commitment to an increasingly troublesome Taiwan, which threatened to damage, if not destroy, its more important relationship with China. By the end of George W. Bush’s first term, Washington had become the main check on Taipei’s assertions of independence.

The “second détente” in cross-strait relations began with a 2005 speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao downplaying demands for reunification. Beijing was shifting its view as a result of an emerging grand strategy that stressed regional and global influence; accordingly, it came to see Taiwan less as an ideologically charged and urgent matter and more as a pragmatic and low-key management issue. Ma’s election in 2008 signaled the resurgence of a similar vision in Taiwan. He promised “no unification, no independence, no use of force.” Within months, in rapid and unprecedented fashion, the heads of the contact groups began holding semiannual meetings and signed more than

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


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two dozen previously unthinkable agreements. Although most of these involved economic matters, they had political implications, too. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan—including Taiwan’s long-militarized islands directly off the coast of China—surged by a factor of ten, to 3,000 per day. China sent students to Taiwan, and the two sides authorized 270 flights per week across the strait. Important political fears that had previously restricted economic integration suddenly dissipated on both sides, and Taipei and Beijing began talking about the “total normalization” of their economic and financial ties. The supposedly fixed national interests on which foreign policy realists base their assessments were in total flux.

The second *détente* has also included explicitly political deals. China had previously permitted Taiwan to participate only in international organizations with an economic focus, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the World Trade Organization. In 2009, it allowed Taiwan to participate as an observer at the annual board meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. Both sides began discussing a Taiwanese presence in the UN bodies responsible for civil aviation, commercial shipping, meteorology, and climate change.

Both sides also tacitly agreed to a “diplomatic truce”: Beijing ceased courting the nations on Taiwan’s dwindling list of 23 diplomatic allies, and in 2009 Taipei dropped its perpetual request for UN membership for the first time in 17 years. When Ma was reelected as KMT chair in July 2009, Hu declared that he would like to build “mutual trust between the two sides in political affairs.” As political relations warmed, Taiwanese officials—including leading DPP figures, such as the mayor of Kaohsiung—became regular visitors in China.

There are indications that this second cross-strait *détente* will last. Although both leaders’ terms will expire in 2012, Hu’s designated successor, Xi Jinping, is a well-known advocate of cross-strait exchanges. Ma, meanwhile, has recovered from the political damage wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which struck the island in August 2009. So long as the DPP remains divided between extreme anti-*détente* and limited-*détente* factions, he seems likely to win reelection.

“Finlandization”
need not be a
pejorative term.

Bruce Gilley

Taiwan and China are now approaching their relationship using completely different assumptions than those that governed cross-strait relations for decades. Whereas they previously saw the relationship as a military dispute, today both sides have embraced a view of security that is premised on high-level contact, trust, and reduced threats of force. Their views of economic issues, meanwhile, have placed global integration and competitiveness ahead of nationalist protectionism. This represents a fundamental shift in the political relationship between Taiwan and China.

FROM HELSINKI TO TAIPEI

TO UNDERSTAND the evolution of the Taipei-Beijing relationship, it is useful to consider the theory and practice of what has become known as “Finlandization” in the field of political science. The term derives its name from Finland’s 1948 agreement with the Soviet Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join alliances challenging Moscow or serve as a base for any country challenging Soviet interests. In return, the Kremlin agreed to uphold Finnish autonomy and respect Finland’s democratic system. Therefore, from 1956 to 1981, under the leadership of President Urho Kekkonen, Finland pursued a policy of strategic appeasement and neutrality on U.S.-Soviet issues and limited domestic criticism of the Soviet Union. This policy enjoyed wide support in Finland at the time (despite the subsequent debate in Finland on its merits). Kekkonen also won praise across the political spectrum in the United States, especially from foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, who lauded the Finnish leader’s “composure and firmness.”

Building on the work of others, the Danish political scientist Hans Mouritzen in 1988 proposed a general theory of Finlandization known as “adaptive politics.” Mouritzen stressed the fundamental difference between a Finlandized regime and a client, or “puppet,” state, explaining that the former makes some concessions to a larger neighbor in order to guarantee important elements of its independence—voluntary choices that the latter could never make. Unlike a puppet regime, a Finlandized state calculates that its long-term interests, and perhaps those of its neighbors, are best served by making strategic

concessions to a superpower next door. These concessions are motivated chiefly by geographic proximity, psychological threats from the superpower, and cultural affinities between the two sides. Being so close, the superpower need only issue vague threats, rather than display actual military muscle, to change its weaker neighbor's policies. Meanwhile, the small power perceives itself as engaging in an "active and principled neutrality," rather than a cowering acquiescence, a distinction that is critical to rationalizing these policy changes domestically.

Finlandization posed a direct challenge to the dominant realist logic of the Cold War, which held that concessions to Soviet power were likely to feed Moscow's appetite for expansion. Even if one rejects the theory of Finlandization, it is difficult to deny that Kekkonen played a constructive role in ending the Cold War. In 1969, for instance, Finland offered itself as the venue for a conference between the two blocs that eventually produced a shared document with clear commitments to human rights and freedoms: the Helsinki accords.

Cold War historians, such as John Lewis Gaddis, believe that the Helsinki process was central to undermining the moral authority of the Soviet Union, and others have argued that it prompted the ideological shift necessary to kickstart Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika in the mid-1980s. Moreover, Finland's unique status as interlocutor with Moscow made possible the first serious discussions of nuclear disarmament and of the shared development of Arctic resources, both of which served as templates for the warming of relations between NATO and the Soviet bloc. Although it usually has a negative connotation, "Finlandization" need not be a pejorative term.

Taiwan shares many of the key features that characterized Finland in the late 1940s. It is a small but internally sovereign state that is geographically close to a superpower with which it shares cultural and historical ties. Its fierce sense of independence is balanced by a pragmatic sense of the need to accommodate that superpower's vital interests. Most important, the evolving views of its leaders and its people today focus on seeking security through integration rather than confrontation. This approach could help defuse one of

A Finlandized Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power rather than a U.S. strategic ally.

Bruce Gilley

the most worrying trends in global politics: the emerging rivalry between China and the United States.

The analogy is not perfect. U.S. security guarantees for Taiwan today are more explicit than they were for Finland during the Cold War, although few doubt that NATO would have defended Finland against a Soviet invasion. And China's 1,000-plus missiles targeted at Taiwan are a more direct threat than anything the Soviet military ever mustered across the Vuoksi River. But in general the thinking that has motivated the second *détente* on both sides parallels that which led to the Finnish-Soviet *détente* of the Cold War. Although it is still early, Taipei is moving in the direction of eventual Finlandization.

Under such a scenario, Taiwan would reposition itself as a neutral power, rather than a U.S. strategic ally, in order to mollify Beijing's fears about the island's becoming an obstacle to China's military and commercial ambitions in the region. It would also refrain from undermining the CCP's rule in China. In return, Beijing would back down on its military threats, grant Taipei expanded participation in international organizations, and extend the island favorable economic and social benefits.

The DPP's director of international affairs, Hsiao Bi-khim, has written that the changes in Taiwan's China policy "are leading to a new strategic outlook, which aligns Taiwan with China's sphere of influence instead of maintaining the traditional presumed informal alliance with the United States." Although Hsiao, like many in the DPP, fears this sort of shift, such reservations are unwarranted.

A MEANS OR AN END?

THERE ARE two ways to view the shift in Chinese policy toward Taiwan. The dominant interpretation has long been that Beijing is motivated by nationalism and that the PRC's irredentist claims to Taiwan stem from a broader national discourse of humiliation and weakness. According to this view, the CCP is striving to reincorporate Taiwan into China in order to avert a domestic nationalist backlash and a crisis of legitimacy. Seen in this light, Taiwan is an end unto itself and the second *détente* is merely a tactical shift intended to force

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


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
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
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
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Taiwan into reunification through indirect means: beneath Beijing's silk glove of *détente* is the iron fist of nationalism.

In recent years, many Western analysts have rejected this nationalist interpretation of Beijing's Taiwan policy and opted instead for a geostrategic one. Unrecovered territories are legion in the history of the PRC, and the CCP has found it easy to let go of others (including disputed regions bordering Russia, India, and the Spratly Islands, as well as control over Mongolia and Korea). Taiwan, however, by virtue of its geographic location, represents a potential strategic threat to China. It could serve as a base for foreign military operations against China and even in peacetime could constrain Beijing's ability to develop and project naval power and ensure maritime security in East Asia.

Beijing's core goal from this perspective is the preservation of its dominance in its immediate offshore region, as became clear in 2009 when five Chinese vessels trailed a U.S. Navy ship sailing near a Chinese submarine base. Taiwan represents an obstacle to this goal if it remains a U.S. strategic ally armed with advanced U.S. weaponry, but not if it becomes a self-defending and neutral state with close economic and political ties to China. Beijing's constantly changing position on Taiwan—which has incrementally moderated from “liberation” to “peaceful unification” to “one China” to “anti-independence” since Mao's era—in fact reflects a concern with Taiwan's geostrategic status, not with the precise nature of its political ties to China. According to this interpretation, Beijing has no interest in occupying or ruling Taiwan; it simply wants a sphere of influence that increases its global clout and in which Taiwan is a neutral state, not a client state. Seen through this lens, Taiwan is a means to an end and the second *détente* is a tactic intended to achieve this strategic objective through Taiwan's Finlandization.

China's recent behavior confirms this view; Beijing's decision to allow Taiwan to participate in the WHO represents a cool-headed understanding that giving Taiwan a greater international voice could enhance its independence from the United States, which would, in turn, serve China's own interests. It also gives Beijing an opportunity to show that a China-dominated Asia need not be less peaceful, less prosperous, or even less democratic. As the Chinese scholar Jianwei Wang of the

Bruce Gilley

University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point puts it, “Beijing views the Taiwan issue and cross-straits relations as an integral part of China’s comprehensive ‘rise’ in world affairs rather than as an isolated issue purely affecting national pride alone.”

Recent survey data lends credence to this argument. The mainland citizens polled by Horizon Research in 2004 were not particularly nationalist about retaking Taiwan—only 15 percent wanted immediate military action, whereas 58 percent believed that the government should rule out the use of force in favor of economic integration. In a 2008 speech, Hu identified “political antagonism,” rather than political separation, as the problem in cross-straits relations, breaking with previous pronouncements from Beijing. Subsequent policy statements by the CCP have revealed a calm confidence in the shifting geostrategic relationship with Taiwan, not a bombastic nationalist urgency for reunification.

THE PACIFIER

IN 1995, at the end of the first *détente*, Chen-shen Yen, a Taiwanese scholar and KMT adviser, wrote a paper in the Taiwanese political journal *Wenti yu Yanjiu* explicitly extolling the logic of Finlandization (or *fenlanhua* in Chinese) for Taiwan. By seeking Beijing’s approval for an expanded international voice, maintaining a foreign policy that did not threaten China, and choosing leaders who enjoyed Beijing’s trust, Yen argued, Taiwan could do more to protect its internal autonomy and economic prosperity than it could by challenging the rising superpower on its doorstep. Moreover, Taiwan’s long-term interests in gaining true independence could only be achieved by democratization in China, which would be more likely if Taiwan avoided stoking a military or ideological confrontation. His conclusion echoed that of the Athenians in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue: “Given the responsibility to protect its future existence,” wrote Yen, “a civilized country should adjust itself to external realities.” It has taken over a decade for Yen’s prescient views to gain currency, but they now have widespread support.

Ma’s pursuit of “total normalization” has enjoyed steady and rising popularity in Taiwan since he came to office. It reflects a view that the militarized approach to the cross-strait conflict that has dominated

both Taiwanese (and U.S.) strategic thinking since the days of Chiang and Mao has not resolved the dispute and does not serve Taiwan's present needs. Just as Finland, a small country, was able to pioneer a nonmilitarized alternative to the Cold War, so, too, could Taiwan play that role in the brewing U.S.-Chinese cold war in Asia.

At present, a rising China threatens the world primarily because there has been little in the way of domestic political liberalization to keep Beijing's increasing economic and military power in check. Taiwan could play a far greater role in China's liberalization if it were to become a Finlandized part of the region and its officials were able to move across the strait even more freely than they do now. Already, prominent Chinese liberals, such as Zhang Boshu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are arguing that the mainland should draw lessons about political development from Taiwan. As Sheng Lijun of the National University of Singapore writes, "With the Taiwan political challenge, Beijing will sooner or later have to improve its governance (including democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption)." Taipei's experience with democratic reform offers many lessons for Beijing—especially because the formerly authoritarian KMT's return to power in 2008 showed that the CCP could one day hope to rule again even if the advent of democracy initially brought another party to power.

Democratic reform in China will be encouraged both by popular pressure to emulate Taiwan (PRC citizens have already enthusiastically adopted Taiwanese pop culture and business practices) and by the brute necessity of managing the relationship in a way that meets the Taiwanese electorate's high expectations of transparency and accountability. Some may call it appeasement, but if Taiwan uses appeasement to democratize and pacify a rising China, it will be a worthy appeasement indeed.

SELLING FINLANDIZATION

TAIWAN'S CONTINUED progress toward Finlandization will depend on whether Ma can demonstrate the tangible benefits of this strategy to the Taiwanese population. He will have to secure an even greater international voice for Taiwan (for example, making its WHO observer

Bruce Gilley

status permanent), the ability to negotiate its own free-trade agreements, and the verified removal of some of the more than 1,000 Chinese missiles currently aimed at the island. Best of all would be a peace accord under which China renounced the use of force unless the island were invaded or achieved *de jure* independence. Such an accord, which both sides are seeking, would be the functional equivalent of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish treaty, allaying the large power's security concerns while assuring the small power of its autonomy. Another potential benefit is a promised economic cooperation framework agreement within which Taiwan could pursue a free-trade agreement with Beijing; Taiwan currently risks becoming uncompetitive in the Chinese market and China-based supply chains as a result of the free-trade agreements between members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China.

Ma will also have to reassure Taiwanese voters, who fear losing their political freedoms. In Taiwan, there is a justified concern about being lured into a trap of integration with China that would imperil

The status quo that the United States has protected for decades is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.

Taiwan's democracy and internal sovereignty (meanwhile, Beijing fears that Taiwan's external sovereignty will grow as its participation in international organizations expands). The University of Wisconsin's Wang, whose analysis reflects the CCP's strategic views, writes ominously that Ma will eventually have to show his goodwill by scaling back Taiwan's arms purchases and acknowledging that reunification is an option in the long term.

Wang is correct that Finlandization will not be free of costs for Taiwan. In particular, as was the case in Finland, Taipei will have to restrain anticommunist activism on the island and distance itself from the United States militarily.

Under much domestic pressure and possibly with the tacit consent of Beijing, Ma allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan in September 2009 to pray for the victims of the typhoon. But the same month he denied entry to the Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, citing national security concerns and the public interest. His official statement on the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre—with its delicate

reference to a “painful chapter in history” that “must be faced,” as similar dark moments in Taiwan’s history had to be—was classic Finlandized diplomacy. For Ma, the Tiananmen anniversary was a reminder to “both sides to spur each other to make further improvements in the area of human rights.” A similarly tendentious, if ultimately fruitful, moral equivalence on the part of Finnish leaders is what brought the Soviets to Helsinki to talk about human rights.

For now, domestic opposition to Ma’s policy is muted. Most controversies on the island concern how to pursue integration with China, not whether to do so. The risks of political dependence on China seem worth it to most Taiwanese, especially given the island’s current political dependence on the United States. And Taiwan’s youth, in particular, see China as an opportunity rather than a threat. For the DPP to regain power, it will have to embrace this pragmatic consensus on China. The days of the DPP’s “just say no” platform on China are over.

Just as Ma must consider the views of the electorate, he must also take into account the reactions of other Asian states. Taiwan could still alienate other Asian nations if it shifted to a more China-centered, Finlandized approach, but this is unlikely because it is exactly what ASEAN has been promoting among its members for ten years or more through its “ASEAN + 3” and ASEAN Regional Forum initiatives. The theory of Finlandization may highlight the uniqueness of Taiwan’s situation, but a similar logic already informs policymaking in other Asian capitals. South Korea has been taking a similar tack, and many neighboring nations believe that China can be pacified, as Vietnam was, through inclusion and cooperation. Even Japan, which feels itself to be more vulnerable than other Asian countries to China’s rise as a naval power, has an interest in encouraging internal reforms in China and might learn from Taiwan’s example. After all, West Germany’s successful *Ostpolitik*, which led to a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1970, built on the lessons of Finland’s accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Far from seeking to alienate other Asian governments, then, the KMT government believes that Taiwan’s international status will be

Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit.

Bruce Gilley

enhanced if Taipei falls in step with its neighbors' preferred methods of dealing with a rising China—through accommodation, socialization, and communication.

OUT OF ORBIT

THE FINLANDIZATION of Taiwan will, of course, pose major challenges to current U.S. policy. An April 2009 Congressional Research Service report recognized this dilemma by asking how Washington ought to react “if Taiwan should continue to move closer to or even align with the PRC.” Opinions in Washington are divided between two realist camps. The first wants to allow the changes to proceed so that, in the words of Douglas Paal of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Taiwan does not become a “strategic liability” to the United States. The second wants to rearm Taiwan so that, in the words of Dennis Blair, the U.S. national intelligence director, Taiwan is not “so defenseless that it feels that it has to do everything that China says.” Neither camp seems to accept, much less endorse, the liberal logic of Finlandization as an alternative security strategy for Taiwan.

Taiwan has played a strategic role in U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s—first it served as a buffer against communist expansion out of North Korea, and more recently it has been a bulwark against a rising China. It is strategically located along East Asian shipping lanes and could provide another naval resupply site if China continues to limit U.S. naval visits to Hong Kong. Keeping Taiwan within the U.S. orbit has served Washington's interests by demonstrating that the United States will continue to engage in Asia, despite talk of a declining U.S. role in the region. The tragic result of this policy, however, has been that it has played into Beijing's fears of encirclement and naval inferiority, which in turn has prompted China's own military buildup.

Finlandization will allow Taiwan to break this cycle by taking itself out of the game and moderating the security dilemma that haunts the Washington-Beijing relationship. The cross-strait freeze of 1995–2005 raised fears in Washington that Taiwan was becoming a strategic liability for the United States. Ma's policies have momentarily resolved that concern. And if the United States uses the current

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Dr. Scott P. Stevens is Professor of Computer Information Systems and Management Science at James Madison University, where he has taught for over 20 years. He received his Ph.D. in Mathematics

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
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opportunity to adjust its own policies and support the détente, that concern could be rendered moot. This would make future provocations by either side less likely.

Taipei's decision to chart a new course is a godsend for a U.S. administration that increasingly needs China's cooperation in achieving its highest priority: maintaining the peaceful international liberal order. The United States requires Beijing's support on a host of pressing world issues—from climate change to financial stability and nuclear nonproliferation. William Stanton, Washington's de facto ambassador to Taiwan, admitted as much in October 2009, declaring that "it's in everybody's interests, including Taiwan's as well, that the U.S. try to have a cooperative relationship with China."

In recent years, the U.S.-Taiwanese relationship has been increasingly dictated by the interests of narrow lobbies rather than grand strategy. The U.S. arms industry, the Taiwanese military, and Taiwanese independence activists together make a formidable force. Before the current détente, Taiwan's staunch anticommunism and adversarial policy toward China aligned well with Washington's own ideology and militarized approach to the Taiwan Strait. But the recent evolution of tactical and strategic thinking in Taipei and Beijing has created a disjuncture. The adversarial status quo that the United States has protected is no longer the status quo that the Taiwanese want protected.

Obviously, if Ma were to compromise Taiwan's democratic institutions in pursuit of détente with China, Washington would have reason to complain. But if a democratic Taiwan continues to move into China's orbit, Washington should follow the lead of the Taiwanese people in redefining their future. In the past, U.S. "noninterference" meant maintaining the balance of power across the strait and challenging Beijing's provocations. Today, it means reducing the militarization of the conflict and not interfering with Taiwan's Finlandization.

Even from a strictly realist perspective, there is no need for the United States to keep Taiwan within its strategic orbit, given that U.S. military security can be attained through other Asian bases and operations. Taiwan's Finlandization should be seen not as a necessary sacrifice to a rising China but rather as an alternative strategy for pacifying China. Washington should drop its zero-sum view of the Taipei-Beijing relationship and embrace the strategic logic underlying

Not So Dire Straits

the rapprochement—in effect “losing China” a second time by allowing Taiwan to drift into the PRC’s sphere of influence.

Ma told a visiting congressional delegation in August 2009 that his *détente* would be “beneficial to all parties concerned.” He is right. As was the case with Finland and the Soviet Union, Taiwan has an inherent interest in a peaceful and democratic China. Washington needs to embrace this shift not only because it serves its own long-term strategic aims in Asia and globally but also because what the Taiwanese people choose to do with their sovereign democratic power is up to them. The overburdened giant should happily watch from a distance and focus on other pressing regional and global issues.

SIDELINING UNCLE SAM

THE UNITED STATES has played a crucial role in maintaining cross-strait peace and encouraging democracy in Taiwan since 1949. Today, the U.S. role in this process is nearing its end. U.S. policy toward a Finlandized Taiwan will have to be adjusted both strategically and diplomatically. Expanded official contacts with Taiwan will require consultations with Beijing; the United States and its allies will have to refashion battle plans to exclude Taiwan; Washington will have to support the new approach to cross-strait peace through its public diplomacy; and U.S. intelligence agencies will have to be more careful about scrutinizing technology transfers to the island because the PRC’s intelligence gathering on Taiwan will inevitably expand. Most important, Washington will have to significantly scale back its arms sales to Taipei.

In 1982, the United States pledged to China that it would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan—a promise that it has conspicuously broken ever since. Today, as then, there is a golden opportunity to demilitarize the conflict. The U.S. Congress is not particularly interested in pressing President Barack Obama on the issue, and Taiwan’s economic decline has moderated Taipei’s appetite for major arms purchases anyway. In the past, sales of fighter jets, destroyers, tanks, and missiles to Taiwan were premised as much on the political message they sent to Beijing as on their tactical value. In the new climate, Washington can reinforce the *détente* by holding back planned sales of items such as Black

Bruce Gilley

Hawk helicopters, Patriot missiles, and additional fighter jets. The Pentagon must view the shift not as simply a minor adjustment due to reduced cross-strait tensions but as a wholesale rejection of the vision of Taiwan as a militarized base within the U.S. strategic orbit.

By signaling that Washington is finally respecting China's territorial integrity, these reductions could, in turn, lead to verifiable force reductions by China, as well as to an end to its Taiwan-focused military attack drills. Removing Taiwan as a major player in the United States' Asian security strategy would have ripple effects on U.S. strategy in the region as a whole. Indeed, it is likely that Asian-only security organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, would increasingly take the lead in defining Asia's future security architecture.

The arguments in favor of Finlandization are stronger today than ever before: a Finlandized Taiwan would play a much more transformative role in China itself, thus improving the chances of a peacefully rising China. As was the case for Finland in its relations with the Soviet Union, Taiwan could create a model for the peaceful resolution of China's many resource, boundary, and military conflicts throughout Asia. More broadly, the Taiwan-China détente is a test of liberal approaches to international relations—specifically, the notion that a broad integration of domestic interests will pacify relations between states far more than a militarized balance of power.

Taiwan has always been a frontline state in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In the past, that meant the United States' fending off China's plans to invade Taiwan and defying Beijing's opposition to the island's democratic development. Today, with Taiwan's territory secure and democracy consolidated, Taiwan's role on the frontlines is changing again. It is now Washington's turn to confront and adapt to this historic shift. 🌐



Pakistan Regained




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LEADERSHIP FOR PROGRESS

When in 2008 the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept to power in the Pakistani general elections, it restored one of the world's most populous nations to democracy and civilian rule, fulfilling the legacy of its late party leader, Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in the run-up to elections. Her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, went on to win the presidency, with the promise of change for a country in distress. Faced with insurgency, economic failure, and a prolonged regional conflict, President Zardari has made Bhutto's politics of reconciliation his own, thus steering Pakistan out of an enveloping crisis.

"The democratic government on assuming power inherited a huge portfolio of challenges that confronted the nation," President Zardari explains. "Pakistan was facing both a political economic and a social crisis and both had to be addressed."

Pakistan is paying a heavy price for its border with Afghanistan. Domestic stability has been shaken by repeated terrorist attacks and a militant insurgency. Thousands have lost their lives and up to 2.5 million internally displaced persons have driven the direct costs of this conflict to an estimated US\$ 45 billion. And the poor state of the

country's economy and infrastructure only deepens Pakistan's predicament.

President Zardari's government has responded with wide-reaching reform and decisive military action that have stabilized the country and brought new legiti-

"Pakistan and the United States share a strategic relationship which is based on mutual interests. The democratic government of Pakistan is committed to building a long-term, broad-based relationship which benefits the people of both countries."

Asif Ali Zardari
President of Pakistan

macy to the state. International efforts in counterterrorism were at last given full support. "We have chosen to fight terror and to stand firm in this struggle alongside our allies," states Zardari. A large-scale military operation directed against insurgents, Taliban, and al-Qaeda operatives has been a major success, restoring government control to the Swat and Malakand valleys. Military attention has now shifted

to Waziristan, and security along the Pakistani-Afghan border has been tightened.

Crucially, President Zardari's actions have also won the support of his people. The judiciary has been restored to independence and a more inclusive style of policy-making, involving the consultation of diverse political interest groups including opposition parties, is gradually restoring Pakistan's democratic traditions and institutions. This, for Zardari is the central challenge of his administration, "to make democracy sustainable, indeed irreversible," a point that he made during a recent address at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London.

Economically the country has shown signs of improvement. Inflation has been reduced by half and Pakistani stock exchanges have recovered. But the country is still grappling with structural problems, notably a severe energy crisis, a water shortage, and unemployment, challenges which are now being addressed. For Zardari there is no rest. "Since taking office, my government has achieved tangible results during our first year in the office," he says. "But this is just a start; we have a long way to go."



STRENGTH LIES IN NUMBERS

>> IN SEARCH OF GREATER REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The success of regional objectives for peace, security, and the deterrence of militant extremism largely depends on Pakistan's role, making the immediate and lasting stabilization of the country imperative. Pakistan has been a trusted U.S. ally for six decades, supporting efforts to contain Soviet communism in Afghanistan, the shadows of which are now haunting Pakistan. "We are left to deal with the lingering after-effects of the Cold War which have plunged us into this war against terrorism and led us to pay such a heavy price," explains Zardari. The on-going war in Afghanistan and at home,

"I hope that I will be the catalyst that delivers a permanent peace to India and Pakistan."

Asif Ali Zardari
President of Pakistan



exacerbated by a precarious economic situation, has exhausted Pakistan, limiting its potential as a moderating power in the region and putting internal cohesion at risk.

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi is thus concerned about creating an environment that can prevent further radicalization and instability. "When eventually things are back to normal, when militancy is entirely flushed out, we will need resources for reconstruction and we will need the international community's help. In the long-term, we want to ensure that people are not drawn back to militancy," he explains.

International assistance has been forthcoming. A group of more than twenty states and international organizations, the so-called Friends of Democratic Pakistan, is lending important political support to Pakistan's democratic government, while an international donor conference in Tokyo resulted in pledges totaling more than US\$ 5 billion in aid and loans. The United States, aware of its privileged relationship with Pakistan, has added to an earlier aid package worth US\$ 1.9 billion by approving the so-called Kerry-Lugar Bill, tripling non-military aid to Pakistan to US\$ 1.5 billion annually, for a total of five years. The package, which Foreign Minister Qureshi called "an expression of commitment to Pakistan and the people of Paki-

stan," includes a range of measures for economic and social development, including the construction of schools, roads and clinics. Still, total aid payments fall far short of the estimated US\$ 38 billion the United States alone has made available to Afghanistan in the past nine years, a country with only a sixth of Pakistan's population.

Under the circumstances, Zardari's government urges a rapid dispensation of pledges made, to cover immediate needs and support Pakistan's economy. "Given the severity of the internal security challenge the country is facing, it is critical that the economy is provided a strong stimulus as quickly as possible so that the maximum number of jobs are created in the shortest time," says Zardari. "If international aid flows are delayed, the country will be forced to cut development spending as well as the provision of critical social services. This could be a big setback for the global war on terror."

Pakistan furthermore prefers a "trade over aid" approach by way of better access to U.S. and EU markets for Pakistani producers, which could bring long-term development opportunities.

Similarly, Zardari is committed to removing political barriers to intra-regional trade, including with India. The threat of ter-

"One of the ways to help Pakistan is to stabilize the economy. Once the economy is stabilized, the standard of living raised and poverty addressed, we will be able to change the mindset that lures people to extremism and terrorism."

Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister

rorism has united the two countries against a common enemy and opened the door to dialogue and peace. "Improved dialogue between Pakistan and India is the only way forward," says Zardari. Explaining his motivation he adds that "improved relations with India are an opportunity for Pakistan." If achieved, Pakistan and India stand to gain from the immense potential of creating a regional economic area as well as the dividends of a more peaceful relationship.

A stable and strengthened Pakistan could transform the entire region. "Pakistan is a difficult country to govern and there are always difficult choices to be made. But we will rise to difficult challenges," Zardari says and counts on the world's support. 🌍

ECONOMIC POWER IN THE MAKING

>> PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC RESOURCE-RICH MARKET OF 176 MILLION

In 2005 the global investment bank Goldman Sachs first developed the notion of the “Next Eleven” (N-11) – the next group of large-population countries that had the potential of growing to rival the G7 in economic power. The concept looked beyond the successful BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and included Pakistan, which has every intention of following this trajectory.

Pakistan is already South Asia’s second-biggest economy and, in its 60-year history, has never experienced negative growth, averaging more than five percent annually. It has a rich natural resource base, domestic industry, and famously fertile lands that have made Pakistan one of the world’s biggest agricultural producers. With investment, agricultural yields could be increased five-fold in a matter of years. Pakistan’s large population of 176 million is upwardly mobile and has a middle income class of 40 million, larger than most European countries. Furthermore, its unparalleled geo-strategic position makes it a natural hub for trade and investment. Pakistan connects the expansion markets of China and India with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Yet, Pakistan is hampered by a heritage of structural problems. “Pakistan’s economy has been involved in a series of boom and bust cycles for the last 60 years,” explains Shaukat Tarin, Minister of Finance. “We have been unable to restructure our economy, and due to poor decisions our economy has suffered.” Growth and competitiveness are being undermined by an informal economy representing as much as 100 percent of GDP and by shortcomings in infrastructure in the water, irriga-

tion, power, and transport sectors, as well as in public health, education, and labor market flexibility.

New government plans want to put Pakistan on a more sustainable footing. “Our first priority is to stabilize the econo-



“Once we entrench democracy and improve governance, with our natural resources, the quality of human resources, and unbeatable geo-strategic location Pakistan will be unstoppable in 10 to 15 years time.”

Shaukat Tarin, Minister of Finance



“If there were peace between Pakistan and India and the outstanding issues were resolved, Pakistan would take off like a rocket.”

Hillary Clinton
U.S. Secretary of State



my, but in the long run we want to create an enabling environment that is conducive to investment and growth,” says Tarin. While inflation and fiscal deficit have been brought under control, long-term competitiveness is to be guaranteed by a wide-ranging nine-point agenda for economic and social reform. The program is now under way and accounts for related factors of growth. It foresees a range of social measures as well as support to Pakistani manufacturing and agriculture, improvements in infrastructure and foreign direct investment (FDI).

This includes the strengthening of capital markets. Pakistan already boasts one of the largest exchanges in the region, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). Named “Best performing world stock market” in 2002, it has maintained this reputation since. “Average market return has been over 24 percent on the KSE-100 index in any ten-year period going back to 1958,” explains Adnan Afridi, Managing Director of KSE. He runs a modern integrated organization and importantly believes in the opportunities of a liberal market. “We are one of the few emerging markets so liberal and open to FDI,” says Afridi, while adding that still “at the best of times we trade at roughly 25 percent discount. Today we are standing at a 50 percent discount.”

FDI inflows mostly go to Pakistan’s major oil & gas, banking, and telecommunications sectors, the latter of which has experienced unprecedented growth in mobile phone subscriptions, ahead of any other market globally, raising the total number of subscribers to 100 million at present. But opportunities exist also in sectors such as real estate, construction and agriculture, and Minister Tarin believes there is substantial room for improvement. “If you consider the US\$ 3-3.5 billion in FDI coming to Pakistan and compare it to the size of the market of 176 million people, in my mind we can do much better,” he says, emphasizing that “assets are undervalued and there are great investment opportunities for FDI with far above average returns.”

Tarin concludes that if Pakistan persists with his reform agenda “we will restore not only growth but also faith in our economic development,” nudging Pakistan a step closer to economic leadership.



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
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TEXTILES – THE VERY TEXTURE OF PAKISTANI SOCIETY

>>GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIRE BETTER MARKET ACCESS

When Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, its textile industry consisted of precisely one cotton mill. This has since changed dramatically. Textiles have developed into an economic mainstay and the backbone of Pakistani industry and manufacturing. Today, textiles contribute 8.5 percent to GDP and provide employment to no less than 15 million people, a full 38 percent of the country's manufacturing workforce. "This is our success story," says Dr. Mirza Ikhtiar Baig, adviser to the government for textiles. At the same time, however, the current boom makes Pakistan sensitive to changes in the sector. 2007 exports valued at US\$ 10.62 billion, represented a staggering 46 percent of Pakistan's total productive output. Pakistani society and identity have grown inseparable from the textile sector.

For Pakistan, therefore, it is vital to defend its position as one of the world's largest exporters of textile products. Its limited world market share of 3.5 percent stands in stark contrast to the size of its cotton industry. Pakistan is the world's fourth-largest cotton producer, yet countries such as Bangladesh, with no comparable cotton industry, have grown to become serious competitors in textile production. Already more than US\$ six billion has been invested in higher-value addition and the modernization of Pakistan's textile sector over the past few years. But in the face of fierce competition by the world's textile giants, including China and India, an increase in cotton yields, further investment, and the creation of better market conditions are more essential than ever.

A domestic energy crisis and civil unrest only serve to compound serious structural challenges faced by the sector. "The way international trade is evolving is neither free nor fair. There is continued downward pressure of unit prices of textile goods, while

the raw material prices and cost of doing business are increasing drastically," explains Muhammad Iqbal Ebrahim, chairman of the All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). Pakistani textile exports dropped by US\$ one billion in 2008.



"Market access is critical for economic survival and growth."

Muhammad Iqbal Ebrahim
Chairman of the All Pakistan
Textile Mills Association


Market access is one of the most burning issues for Pakistan, and for its textile industry in particular. Repeatedly, Foreign Minister Qureshi has expressed that "better trade with the European Union and the U.S. can help our economy stabilize." Textiles are largely understood as a catalyst for further industrialization and employment creation. But despite the sector's importance for sus-

tainable growth and development, both the United States and the European Union have so far avoided granting free trade access to Pakistani textiles.

The United States is the single most important export destination for textiles from Pakistan. Seventeen other nations enjoy U.S. free trade relations in textiles, and the positive effect on countries such as Bangladesh and Vietnam has been tremendous. Bangladesh has achieved its growth on the back of preferential U.S. access, creating employment opportunities, in particular for female workers. This model could also apply to Pakistan, which ardently advocates similar levels of access, not least because its resources are exhausted from fighting a regional war on terror, alongside U.S. forces.

Draft legislation in U.S. Congress now proposes that import duties be lifted on Pakistani goods produced in specially dedicated Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs). The Pakistani government has welcomed the approach but is concerned that limiting ROZs to regions most troubled by conflict and insurgency will fail to attract investment. For greater effect, the concept should instead be extended to include either a larger area or the entire country of Pakistan.

Committed to reversing negative market trends and bolstering a sector of strategic importance, Pakistan also recently adopted its first-ever textile policy. It sets an export target of US\$ 25 billion by 2014, to be achieved by enhancing domestic capabilities, diversifying the product mix, and promoting new investment and better market access. Despite all, Dr. Baig is positive about his country's long-term potential. "In textile, Pakistan has some of the best and most modern facilities in the world," he says. "The \$25 billion target is not only achievable; if the international community supports it, Pakistan can exceed those targets." ●



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Babar Khan Ghauri
Minister for Ports and Shipping



PAKISTAN’S PORTS

>>GATEWAY TO MARKETS OF BILLIONS

Karachi, long known as the “Gateway to Asia” has from time immemorial been considered a safe harbor. President Asif Ali Zardari is unequivocal, “Pakistan is poised to serve as the regional hub of economic activity due to its strategic location.”

With billions spent on port infrastructure and with an abundance of development projects underway, including infrastructure facilities, and cargo and ship handling projects, Pakistani Ports namely Karachi, neighboring Bin Qasim and the new deep water port at Gwadar – are set to become the regional entrepôt; with the Chinese market of 1.2 billion on the doorstep and more than one billion Central Asians to the north, Pakistan can easily service the landlocked Central Asian republics and capture trade to the Middle East and Africa.

Given this geo-strategic advantage the proactive Minister for Ports and Shipping, Babar Khan Ghauri, is setting the tempo, declaring “the Government is committed to accelerate the economy by upgrading the nation’s ports.”

This has ushered an aggressive policy framework and the creation of a pro-business climate. The Government has played a supportive role whilst unleashing the private sector. It has set out to reduce red-tape establishing the National Trade Corridor

Improvement Program (NTCIP), ensuring each port facility complements rather than duplicates whilst assiduously courting foreign investment. Emblematic of this hyper-activity and can-do approach was the Implementation Agreement finalizing construction of a floating LNG terminal at Port Qasim within a brisk 24-hour time-frame.

The Karachi Port Trust (which handles some 60 percent of Pakistan’s trade) has an ambitious program of infrastructure development, encompassing a host of showcase projects underway constructed under either a Public Private Partnership (PPP) or a Build Operate Transfer (BOT) funding model. Several key projects have attracted hundreds of millions of dollars in FDI.

Foremost amongst these are: the dredging of the world’s first 18-meter container Port, set for completion by 2013, the construction of a 1947-foot high Port Tower, Asia’s largest Food Street, a leisure complex along a scenic coastal stretch, and eye-catching plans to connect the deep water container terminal with the cargo village via a cross harbor bridge spanning 300 meters, and a berth reconstruction plan giving the port the ability to accommodate the most modern of vessels.

The state-owned Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC) is profitable despite a difficult global environment

and has an extensive fleet modernization program. The company has recently tendered for several Aframax tanker and dry-cargo ships.

As the hub of a logistics chain that stretches across the country, Port Qasim Authority is Pakistan’s largest container handling and bulk cargo port and a crucial supply network interface. The port currently handles around 40 percent of the country’s seaborne trade and will expand its operational capability further by increasing its all-weather draught to 14 meters, enabling larger vessels to berth. Port Qasim has attracted large foreign direct investment to the amount of US\$ 600 million for the development of a second container terminal, a grain and fertilizer terminal, and a coal and cement terminal, construction of which is under way. The completion of these projects, combined with Port Qasim’s thriving industrial zone, will serve to improve the geo-economic profile of an entire region. Another estimated 400 industrial and commercial projects are in development that will contribute further to industrialization and employment creation. “We can expect to see an estimated US\$ 2.6 billion in upcoming projects, which are in the pipeline,” says Minister Ghauri. 



“If we can develop our capital markets to ensure we create the right leverage to propel our economy to the next level, this market will really take off.”

Syed Ali Raza

Chairman & President of the
National Bank of Pakistan

NATIONAL BANK SPREADS ITS WINGS

Amidst a storm in the global financial sector and a domestic security crisis, Pakistan’s banks have proven a rare exception of stability and growth. With little exposure to the fall-out that severely affected banks in developed economies, Pakistani banks have had the opportunity to continue strengthening their domestic and regional market penetration.

Full-scale privatization of the banking sector ten years ago has brought much development and improvement at institutional level, a change nowhere more apparent than in Pakistan’s largest commercial bank, the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP). Prevailing in a difficult environment, NBP has shed its past as a predominantly public lender and instead transformed itself into a modern commercial bank.

Governed by an independent board, with no interference from its largest shareholder, the government, NBP is now firmly established as one of the region’s leading financial institutions. Chairman and President, Syed Ali Raza, is widely credited for NBP’s growing success. A former executive of the Bank of America, he joined the bank in 2000. Following wide-reaching structural changes and the introduction of new banking products, he has managed to recast NBP as a highly competitive market player.

NBP profit increased from US\$ 12 million in 2000 to US\$ 335.5 million in 2007, a remarkable performance which has earned the bank much international recognition and a series of prestigious awards, including the recent “Best Foreign Exchange Bank 2008” by financial journal “Global Finance.”

Today, NBP is a powerful driver for the development of Pakistan’s private sector, even if current market conditions are far from optimal. A domestic energy crisis is hindering economic growth and the fight against terrorism has burdened Pakistani society with enormous costs. “The last few years have been very difficult,” says Raza.

But he remains resolutely optimistic about the future. “I think that our growth speaks volumes about the underlying potential of the country,” he explains. “This country has sheer size, talent, natural resources, and an unparalleled strategic location.”

NBP is building on these opportunities and on the growth of Pakistan’s large single market, an increasing export base, and Pakistan’s strategic location vis-à-vis the booming markets of China and India, Central Asia, and the Middle East. As Raza points out, “the reason why financial institutions are successful lies in their ability to find niches where there is huge demand but where banks have not yet created products to meet that demand.” Accordingly, NBP has in recent years established a presence in the wider region matched by no other bank. “NBP will be the only institution in the region to cover Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East,” says Ali Raza. “I think this is going to give us a huge competitive advantage.”

Beyond its international roll-out – NBP has an established presence in now more than 20 countries – NBP is continuously expanding its service offer, particularly in growth segments such as retail lending. “The retail business, from nearly zero percent of the business four to five years ago, now constitutes about 25 percent,” highlights Raza. Mortgage lending, investment banking, and an advisory business for mergers & acquisitions are other segments NBP is targeting for future development. Ali Raza is determined to take NBP’s business to the next level.

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The New Energy Order

Managing Insecurities in the Twenty-first Century

David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

THE LAST decade has seen an extraordinary shift in expectations for the world energy system. After a long era of excess capacity, since 2001, prices for oil and most energy commodities have risen sharply and become more volatile. Easy-to-tap local fuel supplies have run short, forcing major energy consumers to depend on longer and seemingly more fragile supply chains. Prices have yo-yoed over the last 18 months: first reaching all-time highs, then dropping by two-thirds, and after that rising back up to surprisingly high levels given the continuing weakness of the global economy. The troubles extend far beyond oil. Governments in regions such as Europe worry about insecure supplies of natural gas. India, among others, is poised to depend heavily on coal imports in the coming decades. For these reasons, governments in nearly all the large consuming nations are now besieged by doubts about their energy security like at no time since the oil crises of the 1970s. Meanwhile, the biggest energy suppliers are questioning whether demand is certain enough to justify the big investments needed to develop new capacity. Producers and consumers, each group unsure of the other, cannot agree on how best to finance and manage a more secure energy system.

A crisis is looming, and it will be difficult to resolve because it will strike as two radically new changes are making it harder for

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David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

governments to manage the world energy system. The first is a shift in the sources of consumption. The era of growing demand for oil and other fossil fuels in the industrialized countries is over; most of the future growth in demand will come from the emerging-market countries, notably China and India. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected that by 2030, China will depend on imports for at least two-thirds of its oil, and India, for even more. These countries, especially China, are choosing to secure their energy supplies less by relying on commercial interests—the standard approach for all the biggest industrial energy users over the last two decades—than by locking up supplies in direct bilateral deals with producing countries. For instance, China's push into Africa, Central Asia, and other energy-rich regions, which usually involves special government-to-government deals, is a rejection of the reigning market-based approach to energy security. And because oil, gas, and coal are global commodities, these exclusive, opaque deals make it harder for the markets to function smoothly, thus endangering the energy security of all nations. They also complicate efforts to hold energy suppliers accountable for protecting human rights, ensuring the rule of law, and promoting democracy.

The other big shift in the world energy system is growing concern about the environmental impact of energy use, especially emissions of carbon dioxide, an intrinsic byproduct of burning fossil fuels with conventional technology and the leading human cause of global warming. Worries about climate change are one reason why the major stimulus packages passed since the global financial crisis began in 2007 have included hefty green-energy measures: by some accounts, these have made up 15 percent of global fiscal stimulus spending. Some believe that such green-tinted stimulus measures will spur a revolution pushing for cleaner and more secure energy. Perhaps. But there is no doubt that energy systems are in for a major change. Curbing global warming will likely require cutting emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases by more than half over the next few decades, and that goal cannot be achieved by just tinkering at the margins.

In the face of these new realities, the international and national institutions that were created to help promote energy security over the last three decades are struggling to remain relevant. The most important one, the IEA, has made little headway in involving the new giant energy

The New Energy Order

consumers in its decision-making. That means that it is struggling even to fulfill one of its hallmark functions—to stand ready to coordinate government responses to energy shocks—because a large, and growing, fraction of oil consumers fall outside its ambit and are wary of market-based approaches to energy security. Other institutions are doing no better. European states that depend on gas imported from Russia have signed a treaty and created an organization aimed at making those supplies more secure, but the practical effect of both steps has been nil. It was a good thing for the G-20 to announce a cut in energy subsidies at a summit in Pittsburgh last September—energy subsidies encourage excessive consumption, harming both energy security and the environment—but the G-20 has no plan for actually implementing that policy, and it has too many competing issues on its agenda. The big oil producers in OPEC have mobilized around the goal of promoting what they call “demand security,” but the cartel has no power to guarantee demand for its products. Likewise, the institutions charged with addressing new environmental challenges are barely effective: the Kyoto Protocol has had little impact on emissions, and the disputes that arose at the international climate conference in Copenhagen in December over how to craft a successor treaty are making it hard for investors to justify spending the massive capital needed for cleaner energy systems. Despite the existence of many international institutions attending to energy matters today, dangerous vacuums in governance have appeared.

The traditional solution of creating big new institutions, such as a world energy organization to replace the more exclusive IEA, will not work. What is needed instead is a mechanism for coordinating hard-nosed initiatives focused on delivering energy security and environmental protection. To be effective, those measures will have to advance the interests of the most important governments, of importers and exporters alike, and they will have to align with the needs of the private and state firms that provide most of the investment in energy infrastructure.

Producers and consumers, each group unsure of the other, cannot agree on how best to finance and manage a more secure energy system.

David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

A model for these efforts exists in international economic law. Once saddled with too many institutions and too little governance, the world economic system developed a series of ad hoc arrangements during the last several decades that have evolved into an effective management system. Although the system is still imperfect, it now governs most international trade and a growing proportion of finance and banking. The Financial Stability Board, which issues standards for judging the adequacy of banks' capitalization, is a particularly apt example of the system's success. Its so-called Basel standards, created after the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, have been highly effective: many countries and banks have adopted them on the understanding that it is in their interests to run well-governed financial sectors that conform to widely recognized criteria.

A similar Energy Stability Board could be created to help governments and existing international institutions better manage today's energy problems. It could work with the major new energy consumers, such as China, to set investment standards that both align with their interests and are consistent with the market rules that govern most trade in energy commodities and have worked well for some time now. It could also help the governments that are spending the most on green energy coordinate their efforts; without better governance, these green stimulus programs risk triggering trade wars and wasting vast sums of money. Following the example of economic law, success with these initiatives would undoubtedly help the existing energy institutions do a better job and could also spawn broader norms for governing energy security.

ECONOMIC MODELS

THE LAST three decades have not been kind to efforts to create international institutions. One bright spot has been international economic law, now a set of useful general principles that has grown from practical, bottom-up experience. Its most successful aspects have been rooted in national interests: when governments find it pragmatic to comply with their obligations, broader sets of legal principles and institutions designed to ensure compliance develop.

The most visible of these institutions is the World Trade Organization. The WTO consists not only of rules that promote global trade but

The New Energy Order

also of mechanisms to clarify existing trade rules and encourage the creation of new ones. The WTO's members, be they weak or strong, tend to comply even with inconvenient WTO rulings because they usually have a greater interest in the orderly functioning of the global trade system, which the WTO's rules buttress, than in promoting their narrow interests. Even the sore points of the day, such as the stalling of the Doha Round of international trade talks, are signs of the institution's relevance. The WTO has been so effective at creating useful trade rules that the remaining barriers—such as agricultural subsidies on the Doha agenda—are the ones that are nearly impossible to clear, and this is because of political hurdles in some of the most powerful WTO members.

Governments have also built international institutions to govern finance and investment. The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 led to the creation of the Financial Stability Forum within the Bank for International Settlements in order to restore order in world banking. Despite a glut of global forums pretending to help, such as the G-8, there was no body that included all the key players. Notably, the Asian states were left out—precisely the countries that, despite strong economic fundamentals, were being destabilized by flows of speculative, short-term portfolio capital, which prevented them from setting credible exchange rates or managing their balance of payments and even threatened pivotal banks and firms with insolvency. The contagion quickly spread to Russia, Turkey, and Latin America, leading to the bailouts of various governments and even the large U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. The creation of the Financial Stability Forum was a quick response to the crisis. It explicitly included members beyond the G-8 and relied on the Bank for International Settlements, a credible forum for gathering central bankers, to coordinate the world's increasingly interlinked markets. After these efforts proved successful, the Financial Stability Forum was reconstituted as the Financial Stability Board and expanded to include all members of the G-20.

The Financial Stability Board's greatest achievement has been the creation of the Basel standards to assess the adequacy of bank capitalization. These have been widely adopted in emerging economies. Their application in China, for example, has helped reassure both foreign investors, who were wary of mismanagement by local banks, and the Chinese government, which was wary of intrusion on its sovereignty.

David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

And the benefits of adhering to transparent global standards were overwhelming: China launched a series of successful initial public offerings drawing foreign banks into investing widely in China's banking system. Today, these standards are honored throughout most of the world's banking system. Participants understand that since no country alone can regulate banking, it makes sense to entrust the Financial Stability Board with helping governments craft and implement sensible, workable guidelines that suit rich and poor nations alike. To be sure, the global financial crisis has exposed remaining governance problems. But the crisis would have been much worse if capital standards for banks had not been shored up and mechanisms for coordinating financial policy had not already existed.

One lesson from this experience is that any effort to coordinate global energy policy must include all the most powerful players. Yet today, the most visible institutions for governing energy do not do this. Efforts to expand the IEA have been hobbled by the requirement that the agency's members also belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD. Thus, the 28-strong IEA includes many countries with small and shrinking energy needs but excludes emerging giant energy consumers, such as China and India. Partial solutions have been devised—granting various states observer status, conducting joint studies with the IEA's highly competent secretariat—but they have not resolved the fundamental problem: when the IEA coordinates responses to an energy crisis, important players with large oil stockpiles, which could be the most helpful, have no voice. The only comprehensive solution would be to rewrite the IEA's membership rules. But this idea is a nonstarter partly because it would mean turning the organization into an even bigger forum, and existing members fear that their power would be diluted, as happened to the members of the G-8 when the G-20 grew more important.

Another lesson to be drawn from the success of global economic governance is that cooperation must have broad appeal, beyond the most important players. Global trade talks have made the most progress when they have focused on actions, such as the reduction of tariffs, that have a big impact on trade, are rooted in mutual interests, and are easy to enforce. Such successes then set the stage for governments to extend existing trade rules to many more countries and to take on harder tasks,



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The New Energy Order

such as building the WTO's dispute-resolution system. Similarly, the G-20's norms against tax havens have spread more widely following success in such states as Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Since the financial crisis broke, many governments have seen the benefit of curtailing tax havens, not least because these havens have supported a shadow banking system that is hard to govern. That awareness, along with pressure on a few holdouts, explains why the last two years have seen much more effective tax enforcement worldwide.

Applying these lessons to energy means realizing that no system will be effective unless it starts with the countries that matter most—the large consumers and the large producers—and serves their interests. Success will require both that those countries reap practical benefits from cooperation and that the rules be designed so that they can spread widely as their legitimacy increases.

THE IMPOTENT CROWD

THERE IS no shortage of institutions in today's energy markets; what is missing, however, is a practical strategy for setting effective norms to govern the global energy economy. The IEA plays an essential part, but it has had a hard time finding its voice. Although OPEC serves a special role for oil producers, it is not designed to take on broader functions. A promising dialogue between members of OPEC and members of the IEA, aimed partly at bringing more transparency to oil markets by providing data on oil production and trade, is under way through the ad hoc International Energy Forum, but so far this body has taken very few concrete actions. The International Atomic Energy Agency is tackling the difficult problem of nuclear proliferation with aplomb. Yet there is no path from success on that front to broader cooperation on distinct energy problems.

Beyond these specialized institutions is a landscape of wreckage. Europe's Energy Charter Treaty has had no practical impact on energy markets, despite its bold vision for integrating the energy systems of eastern and western Europe. One problem is that the treaty violates the first rule of effective institution building: it alienates the most important player. Russia, Europe's pivotal energy supplier, sees no benefit in subjecting itself to oversight by an intrusive Western institution and so has ensured the treaty's irrelevance.

David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

The institutions working on climate change, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, would do well just to survive going forward after the summit in Copenhagen last December. The G-8 has placed climate and energy issues high on its agenda nearly every year for the last decade, but it has not done much beyond issuing grand and often empty proclamations: it has announced a need to limit global warming to just a two-degree increase over the coming century, despite current trends that almost guarantee the planet will blow through that target. Although efforts to expand the G-8 to include the main developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa)—including the creation of the G-8 + 5—are well intentioned, they have been pursued entirely on the G-8's terms, and the G-8 has failed to seriously engage those pivotal countries. The G-20, which played the pivotal role in crafting new financial regulations after the Asian financial crisis, seemed to be a promising forum for addressing energy and climate issues as well, but topics such as the global economic meltdown of 2008 have crowded them out at the top of the agenda. A special forum for the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gases, which met in London last October, offered the hope of a flexible setting for negotiating limits on emissions, but that effort has also stalled: its most recent meeting ended in no new agreements nor any other progress.

INVESTORS ABHOR A VACUUM

FIXING THESE problems should begin not with grand attempts to build still more institutions but with a practical focus on filling the most important governance vacuums in the world's energy system: those regarding how to promote investment to develop urgently needed supplies of today's main energy sources, oil and gas, and how to support the climate-friendly technologies that will transform the energy system over the next several decades.

The security of oil and gas supplies is in question not only because the existing supplies are depleting quickly but also because investors are wary of pouring money into finding new resources. The problem is not geology: technological innovation is more than amply offsetting the depletion of conventional fossil fuels. The problem lies in the massive economic and political risks inherent in new projects, particularly

The New Energy Order

those that supply energy across national borders and thus face a multitude of political uncertainties. Suppliers worry that there will not be enough demand to justify the investments, especially now that growing concerns about climate change have cast doubt on the future of fossil fuels without offering a clear alternative.

Creating the right incentives to supply oil and gas requires efforts on several fronts. But the area in which governance is both the weakest and the most important concerns China, the world's fastest-growing energy user, and its major energy suppliers in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The grants, special loans, and infrastructure development projects that the Chinese government routinely offers to its resource-rich business partners have generated criticism in the West. That criticism, in turn, has fanned fears in China that the energy supplies essential to sustaining the Chinese economic miracle will be hard to obtain. So long as China and the West lock horns on this issue, it will be hard to convince China that its energy security, like that of the large Western energy consumers, is best ensured by transparent, well-functioning markets governed by effective international institutions, not opaque special deals.

Before they can engage China, the governments of the major Western countries will have to realize that the Chinese deals of today are neither exceptional nor necessarily bad. Throughout history, many of the biggest international energy supply projects stemmed from special agreements that tied financing to a particular customer who could guarantee demand over a predetermined period. When the Chinese bankroll the production of new energy resources—often at a cost that others are unwilling to bear—they are also bringing more supplies onto the global market, which generally benefits all consumers. As with banking, so with the global energy market: China, along with other states, has an interest in the existence of accepted and practical norms; when markets work smoothly, China's energy security improves. And China is learning that flows of new supplies will be more reliable if they come from countries with well-functioning governments; China's scramble for resources since the late 1990s has backfired in many places, including Sudan, which has become a political quagmire for Beijing rather than a reliable long-term supplier. The key task is for China, its major energy suppliers, and the other large players in the world energy


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market to craft investment standards that align China's interest in securing steady energy supplies with Western norms of well-functioning markets and good governance. This effort could begin with the creation of new standards for the next wave of Chinese investments in countries where the oil sector is well managed, such as Angola; that would set an example for what could be done elsewhere in the future.

Support for new green technology is a second area regarding which a vacuum in governance has made it hard for governments to achieve their common interests. The energy sector is one of the most exciting technological frontiers today. This is partly because climate change is transforming what societies expect from energy supplies, but it is also, and most immediately, because of the role that governments hope investments in energy infrastructure will play in economic recovery. Over the past year, governments have talked a great deal about coordinating their efforts to revive economic activity worldwide. Yet for the most part, each state is making decisions on its own, even though the International Monetary Fund, among other international institutions, has argued that a better-coordinated effort would do more to boost the global economy.

The problem is most obvious regarding the "green" part of the \$2.5 trillion that is being spent globally to stimulate the world economy. The United States and China alone are spending \$1.5 trillion, including a large fraction on energy projects. South Korea has devoted 85 percent of its stimulus package to green investments, promoting energy efficiency and low-emissions power plants. The British government has set aside hundreds of millions of pounds to support research and development in green industries. Coordination is needed, however, because the market for green-energy technology is global; ideas promoted in one country can quickly spread to the rest of the world through the marketplace. For example, U.S. spending on renewable sources of energy can invigorate U.S., Chinese, and European firms that supply solar cells and wind turbines, boosting all three economies at the same time. And Chinese spending on new power grids can benefit the Western companies, as well as the Chinese ones, that develop the requisite technology.

Coordinating these green-technology programs offers the prospect of a viable new global industry in clean technology, at least in theory. In practice, however, such stimulus plans are prone to economic nationalism. The United States' program, for example, includes rules that



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
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
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The New Energy Order

favor U.S. suppliers, and one of the results, to cite an ongoing example, is that a Chinese company trying to bring Chinese technology to a wind farm in Texas will find itself in a hostile investment climate. Yet a true energy revolution cannot happen if technologies are nationalized; indeed, all the best and most competitive energy technologies have been improved by global competition. One way to get coordination started would be to require the leading spenders on green technology—in decreasing order, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China—to offer periodic assessments of how their own programs are working and where new efforts, including joint ones, are needed. And with the right forum for coordination in place, such early endeavors could eventually spread more widely.

ABOVEBOARD

EXISTING INSTITUTIONS cannot fill these vacuums. A small, nimble body is needed: an Energy Stability Board modeled after the Financial Stability Board in the banking sector. The Energy Stability Board could gather together the dozen biggest energy producers and users. For its administration, it might rely on the secretariat of the IEA—by far the most competent international energy institution at present—much like the Financial Stability Board drew on help from the Bank for International Settlements to catalyze cooperation in the global financial markets. At first, the Energy Stability Board's activities would need to be ad hoc so that other institutions, such as OPEC and one or more of the Asian security organizations, could easily join its efforts; it would need to be especially welcoming to China, India, and the other important countries, which have been left on the sidelines of energy governance systems so far. Although the list of needed efforts is long, a priority should be engaging China (and other large new energy consumers) in developing standards for overseas investments and in coordinating the green-energy investments that constitute a large proportion of many governments' economic stimulus programs. In both those cases, initiatives by a small number of states, all rooted in these states' national interests, could have a large practical impact.

A key test for the Energy Stability Board would be for it to prove its ability to engage businesses. Firms will not provide the trillions of

David G. Victor and Linda Yueh

dollars needed to develop energy infrastructure in the coming decades without credible signals that governments are serious about instituting policies that will allow the private sector to cash in on such investments. One way to reassure these companies would be to allow them to cooperate with governments

The United States and China have long professed their common desire to cooperate on energy issues but have struggled to do anything practical.

in performing some of the Energy Stability Board's tasks. For example, leading firms could formally assess governments' green stimulus programs and identify those areas in which governments need to coordinate more effectively. (Governments usually are not effective coordinators of leading-edge technologies on their own because they have neither the necessary knowledge nor the necessary control over investment.) The Energy Stability Board could also become a forum for privately owned firms to work with state-owned companies, which control access to most of

the world's oil and gas resources and a large fraction of the world's electric power grid, especially in developing countries. These national enterprises are pivotal in the world energy system yet have not been well integrated into international energy institutions.

Success at these steps would create the right conditions to bring about cooperation in other important areas. Governments have repeatedly failed to establish a multilateral agreement on investment to govern foreign investments of all types, largely because they have taken on too many diverse and contentious topics. A sharper focus on energy infrastructure is more likely to succeed. Another disappointment has been the failure of the world's leading governments to invest adequately in energy research and development. (Despite the world's growing energy problems, the proportion of global economic output devoted to energy research and development is lower today than it was in the early 1980s.) Just as the Financial Stability Board, after it had proved itself, was asked to take on new tasks, such as devising internationally acceptable rules for bankers' compensation in light of the global financial crisis, the Energy Stability Board could be asked to issue guidelines for how to handle research and development and other issues that are difficult to keep on the agenda of existing institutions

yet crucial to the long-term development of the energy system. The board could also help build support for important initiatives, such as the new U.S.- and Chinese-led efforts to build a more secure system for nuclear fuel.

Getting started will require leadership. Only the United States and China can play the part, given their dominant roles as the world's largest energy consumers. But although the two countries have long professed their common desire to cooperate on energy issues, they have struggled to do anything practical. Moreover, strictly one-on-one dealings cannot solve the world's most pressing energy problems; the United States and China cannot set the agenda entirely on their own. Working in tandem through the Energy Stability Board, however, would give their bilateral efforts more credibility with other important actors and with international institutions. The United States and China know that such cooperation would serve their interests. Beijing's current strategy of locking up energy supplies is not sustainable without strong norms to make these investments seem less toxic politically to other important countries, especially the key Western ones. Working through the Energy Stability Board would serve the United States' interests, too: Washington will achieve very little of what it wants to get done in the world of energy, such as a more effective scheme for cutting greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, without giving a prominent role to other major energy consumers and other potential technology suppliers. An effective mechanism for engaging China would also give the Obama administration the political cover it needs to pass national legislation on global warming. One of the biggest hurdles in doing so has been its inability to convince a skeptical American public that China, India, and other major developing countries are also willing to play useful roles.

Although energy commodities and technologies are traded globally, the system for governing the markets for these important goods is fragmented and increasingly impotent. As the experience with global financial and trade regulation shows, that need not be the case. Nor is it necessary to devise grand new institutions to fix the problem. A nimble energy agency focused on practical approaches to the new realities of the world energy market can fill the gaps. 🌐

Nuclear Disorder

Surveying Atomic Threats

Graham Allison

THE GLOBAL nuclear order today could be as fragile as the global financial order was two years ago, when conventional wisdom declared it to be sound, stable, and resilient. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that he thought had one chance in three of ending in nuclear war, U.S. President John F. Kennedy concluded that the nuclear order of the time posed unacceptable risks to mankind. “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the president of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons,” he forecast. “I regard that as the greatest possible danger.” Kennedy’s estimate reflected the general expectation that as nations acquired the advanced technological capability to build nuclear weapons, they would do so. Although history did not proceed along that trajectory, Kennedy’s warning helped awaken the world to the intolerable dangers of unconstrained nuclear proliferation.

His conviction spurred a surge of diplomatic initiatives: a hot line between Washington and Moscow, a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, a ban on nuclear weapons in outer space. Refusing to accept the future Kennedy had spotlighted, the international community instead negotiated various international constraints, the centerpiece

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Nuclear Disorder

of which was the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Thanks to the nonproliferation regime, 184 nations, including more than 40 that have the technical ability to build nuclear arsenals, have renounced nuclear weapons. Four decades since the NPT was signed, there are only nine nuclear states. Moreover, for more than 60 years, no nuclear weapon has been used in an attack.

In 2004, the secretary-general of the UN created a panel to review future threats to international peace and security. It identified nuclear Armageddon as the prime threat, warning, "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation." Developments since 2004 have only magnified the risks of an irreversible cascade.

The current global nuclear order is extremely fragile, and the three most urgent challenges to it are North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. If North Korea and Iran become established nuclear weapons states over the next several years, the nonproliferation regime will have been hollowed out. If Pakistan were to lose control of even one nuclear weapon that was ultimately used by terrorists, that would change the world. It would transform life in cities, shrink what are now regarded as essential civil liberties, and alter conceptions of a viable nuclear order.

Henry Kissinger has noted that the defining challenge for statesmen is to recognize "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine a nation's security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears." The collapse of the existing nuclear order would constitute just such a change—and the consequences would make nuclear terrorism and nuclear war so imminent that prudent statesmen must do everything feasible to prevent it.

THE NUCLEAR CASCADE

SEVEN STORY LINES are advancing along crooked paths, each undermining the existing nuclear order. These comprise North Korea's expanding nuclear weapons program, Iran's continuing nuclear ambitions, Pakistan's increasing instability, al Qaeda's enduring remnant, growing cynicism about the nonproliferation regime, nuclear energy's renaissance, and the recent learning of new lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs.

Graham Allison

Most of the foreign policy community has still not absorbed the facts about North Korean developments over the past eight years. One of the poorest and most isolated states on earth, North Korea had at most two bombs' worth of plutonium in 2001. Today, it has an arsenal of ten bombs and has conducted two nuclear weapons tests. It is currently harvesting the plutonium for an 11th bomb and restoring its reactor in Yongbyon, which has the capacity to produce a further two bombs' worth of plutonium a year. In addition, Pyongyang has repeatedly tested long-range missiles that are increasingly reliable, has proliferated nuclear technology (including the sale of a Yongbyon-style reactor to Syria), and may be developing a second path to nuclear weapons by building a facility to enrich uranium.

From the perspective of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, two questions jump off the page. First, does Kim Jong Il imagine that he could get away with selling a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden or Iran? The fact that he sold Syria a plutonium-producing reactor suggests that he does. Second, what are the consequences for the NPT if one of the world's weakest states can violate the rules of the regime with impunity and defy the demands of the strongest states, which are those that are charged with its enforcement?

Already, North Korea's nuclear advances have triggered reflections in Seoul, Tokyo, and other regional capitals about options that were previously considered taboo. Although Japan's political culture is unambiguously against nuclear weapons, in 2002 then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi demonstrated how quickly that could change when he observed publicly, "It is significant that although we could have them, we don't." And because Japan has a ready stockpile of nearly 2,000 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and a well-developed missile program (for launching satellites), if Tokyo were to conclude that it required a credible nuclear deterrent of its own, it could adopt a serious nuclear weapons posture virtually overnight.

Meanwhile, Iran's nuclear odyssey is a moving target. Developments in the current negotiations may offer glimmers of hope. But it is unlikely that Iran will prove less obstinate and devious than North Korea has been. All the evidence suggests that Iran is methodically building up a widely dispersed array of mining, uranium-conversion, and uranium-enrichment facilities that could provide the infrastructure for nuclear

Nuclear Disorder

weapons. At this point, it has mastered the technologies to indigenously manufacture, build, and operate its own centrifuges. Already, Iran is spinning 4,500 centrifuges, which produce an average of six pounds of low-enriched uranium per day, and has installed an additional 3,700 centrifuges that are ready to begin operation. The country now has a stockpile of over 3,000 pounds of low-enriched uranium—enough, after further enrichment, to make two Hiroshima-type nuclear bombs. Moreover, as the outing of a previously secret enrichment facility at Qom makes evident, Iran has thought carefully about the threat of a military strike on its declared facility at Natanz. To hedge against that risk, it has likely constructed more than one covert enrichment plant—facilities that would also provide a potential sneak-out option.

If Iran conducts a nuclear weapons test sometime in the next several years, it is probable that over the decade that follows, it will not be the only new nuclear weapons state in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for example, has insisted that it will not accept a future in which Iran—its Shiite, Persian rival—has nuclear weapons and it does not. Given the technical prerequisites, Saudi Arabia would much more likely be a buyer than a maker. Indeed, some in the U.S. intelligence community suspect that there have already been conversations between Saudi and Pakistani national security officials about the sale or transfer of an “Islamic bomb.” In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia secretly purchased from China 36 CSS-2 missiles, which have a range of 1,500 miles and no plausible military use other than to carry nuclear warheads.

Egypt and Turkey could also follow in Iran’s nuclear footsteps. As former U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2009, “We’re on the cusp of an explosion of proliferation, and Iran is now the poster child. If Iran is allowed to go forward, in self-defense or for a variety of reasons, we could have half a dozen countries in the region and 20 or 30 more around the world doing the same thing just in case.”

Over the past eight years, the Pakistani government has tripled its arsenal of nuclear weapons.


THE NUCLEAR TERRORIST

AS MOHAMED ELBARADEI, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has noted, nuclear terrorism is “the most serious danger the world is facing.” In 2007, the U.S. Congress established the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. The commission, of which I am a member, issued its report to Congress and the new administration in December 2008. It included two provocative judgments: first, that if the world continued on its current trajectory, the odds of a successful nuclear or biological terrorist attack somewhere in the world in the next five years were greater than even, and second, “Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.”

Over the past eight years, as its stability and authority have become increasingly uncertain, the Pakistani government has tripled its arsenal of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons material. During this same period, the leadership of al Qaeda has moved from Afghanistan to ungoverned areas inside the Pakistani border, the Taliban have become a much more effective insurgent force within Pakistan, and the military leader who ruled Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, has been replaced by a fragile, fledging, splintered democracy.

Pakistan’s military has grown increasingly reliant on its nuclear arsenal to deter India’s overwhelming superiority in conventional arms. This strategy requires the dispersal of nuclear weapons (to prevent Indian preemption) and, especially in crises, looser command and control. In 2002, India and Pakistan went to the brink of war—a war that both governments thought might go nuclear. After Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists with links to Pakistani intelligence services killed 173 people in a dramatic attack in Mumbai in November 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh displayed exquisite restraint. But he has warned unambiguously that the next major terrorist attack supported or sponsored by Pakistan will trigger a sharp military response.

In October 2009, Taliban extremists wearing Pakistani army uniforms occupied the government’s military headquarters in Rawalpindi. Had they instead penetrated a nuclear weapons storage facility, they could have stolen the fissile core of a nuclear bomb. More troubling is



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


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

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Nuclear Disorder

the question of what would happen to Pakistan's estimated 100 nuclear bombs, and even larger amount of nuclear material, if the government itself were to fall. When asked about this, U.S. officials suggest that Pakistan's arsenal is secure: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated, "I'm quite comfortable that the security arrangements for the Pakistani nuclear capabilities are sufficient and adequate." History offers a compelling counter to these claims. In 2004, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A. Q. Khan, was arrested for selling nuclear weapons technology and even bomb designs to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Khan created what the head of the IAEA called the "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation." Khan was enabled by an extended period of instability in Pakistan. Could uncertainty and instability in Pakistan today provide similarly propitious opportunities for mini-Khans to proliferate nuclear technology?

That al Qaeda has been significantly weakened by the U.S. military's focused Predator and Special Forces attacks on its leadership in the ungoverned regions of Pakistan is good news. The bad news is that bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain alive, active, and desperate. On 9/11, al Qaeda demonstrated the capacity to organize and execute a large-scale terrorist attack more operationally challenging than detonating a nuclear weapon. As the 9/11 Commission documented, al Qaeda has been seriously seeking nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. The commission's report provides evidence about two Pakistani scientists who met with bin Laden and Zawahiri in Afghanistan to discuss nuclear weapons. These scientists were founding members of Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, which is ostensibly a charitable agency that was created to support projects in Afghanistan. But the foundation's board included a fellow scientist knowledgeable about nuclear weapons construction, two Pakistani air force generals, one Pakistani army general, and an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry.

Bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear weapons al Qaeda's "religious duty" and has announced the movement's aspiration to "kill four million Americans." As former CIA Director George Tenet wrote in his memoir, "The most senior leaders of al Qa'ida are still singularly focused on acquiring WMD [weapons of mass destruction]." "The main threat," he argued, "is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go."

Graham Allison

As the noose tightens around al Qaeda's neck, its motivation to mount a spectacular attack to demonstrate its prowess and rally its supporters grows. Bin Laden has challenged his followers to "trump 9/11." Nothing could realize that aspiration so successfully as a mushroom cloud over a U.S. city.

REGIME FATIGUE

GROWING CYNICISM about the nonproliferation regime also threatens to undercut the global nuclear order. It is easy to see why non-nuclear-weapons states view the regime as an instrument for the haves to deny the have-nots. At the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the United States and other nuclear weapons states promised to take 13 "practical steps" toward meeting their NPT commitments, but later, at the Review Conference in 2005, John Bolton, then the U.S. ambassador to the UN, declared those 2000 undertakings inoperable and subsequently banned any use of the word "disarmament" from the "outcome document" of the UN's 60th anniversary summit. In preparation for the 2010 Review Conference, which will convene in May, diplomats at the IAEA have been joined by prime ministers and presidents in displaying considerable suspicion about a regime that permits nuclear weapons states to keep their arsenals but prevents others from joining the nuclear club. Those suspicions are reflected in governments' unwillingness to accept additional constraints that would reduce the risks of proliferation, such as by ratifying the enhanced safeguards agreement known as the Additional Protocol or approving an IAEA-managed multinational fuel bank to ensure states access to fuel for nuclear energy plants.

At the same time, rising concerns about greenhouse gas emissions have stimulated a growing demand for nuclear energy as a clean-energy alternative. There are currently 50 nuclear energy plants under construction, most of them in China and India, and 130 more might soon be built globally. Concern arises not from the nuclear reactors themselves but from the facilities that produce nuclear fuel and dispose of its waste product.

The hardest part of making nuclear weapons is producing fissile material: enriched uranium or plutonium. The same setup of centrifuges

Nuclear Disorder

that enriches uranium ore to four percent to make fuel for nuclear power plants can enrich uranium to 90 percent for nuclear bombs. A nuclear regime that allows any state with a nuclear energy plant to build and operate its own enrichment facility invites proliferation. The thorny question is how to honor the right of non-nuclear-weapons states, granted by the NPT, to the “benefits of peaceful nuclear technology” without such a consequence. The answer is to provide an IAEA-governed international fuel bank that would guarantee a supply of nuclear fuel for states that would agree not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing activities. But persuading countries to forgo something others have for the greater good remains a stumbling block.

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES

FINALLY, RECENT lessons about the utility of nuclear weapons in international affairs have also eroded the global nuclear order. U.S. President Barack Obama has endorsed President Ronald Reagan’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and has enlisted the endorsement of many other leaders, including Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Most realists in the international security community, however, regard such thinking as a hazy, long-term, and probably unachievable aspiration.

In the meantime, France is modernizing its nuclear arsenal, which President Nicolas Sarkozy has called “the nation’s life insurance policy.” China continues the modernization and expansion of its limited nuclear arsenal. With the collapse of its conventional forces, Russia has renewed its reliance on nuclear weapons. In the United States, the release of this year’s Nuclear Posture Review, these reviews being a process meant to assess whether the U.S. nuclear arsenal is “reliable,” will spark debates about whether the United States is building a stealth version of the earlier proposed “reliable replacement warhead.”

Even more important than proposals for future programs are lessons learned from recent actions. The George W. Bush administration designated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as “an axis of evil” and then proceeded to attack the one state that demonstrably had no nuclear weapons and give a pass to the state that had two bombs’ worth of plutonium. The British strategist Lawrence Freedman summarized

Graham Allison

the lessons drawn by national security analysts around the world this way: “The only apparently credible way to deter the armed force of the US is to own your own nuclear arsenal.” Many Iranians, and even a few Iraqis, have wondered whether the United States would have invaded Iraq in 2003 had Iraq been armed with a nuclear arsenal as large as North Korea’s current one.

THE GEORGE MARSHALL QUESTION


AFTER LISTENING to a compelling briefing for a proposal or even in summarizing an argument presented by himself, Secretary of State George Marshall was known to pause and ask, “But how could we be wrong?” In that spirit, it is important to examine the reasons why the nonproliferation regime might actually be more robust than it appears.

Start with the bottom line. There are no more nuclear weapons states now than there were at the end of the Cold War. Since then, one undeclared and largely unrecognized nuclear weapons state, South Africa, eliminated its arsenal, and one new state, North Korea, emerged as the sole self-declared but unrecognized nuclear weapons state.

One hundred and eighty-four nations have forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and signed the NPT. At least 13 countries began down the path to developing nuclear weapons with serious intent, and were technologically capable of completing the journey, but stopped short of the finish line: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Four countries had nuclear weapons but eliminated them: South Africa completed six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and then, prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government, dismantled them. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine together inherited more than 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. As a result of negotiated agreements among Russia, the United States, and each of these states, all of these weapons were returned to Russia for dismantlement. Ukraine’s 1,640 strategic nuclear warheads were dismantled, and the highly enriched uranium was blended down to produce low-enriched uranium, which was sold to the United States to fuel its nuclear power plants. Few Americans are aware that, thanks to the Megatons to




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
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
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Nuclear Disorder

Megawatts Program, half of all the electricity produced by nuclear power plants in the United States over the past decade has been fueled by enriched uranium blended down from the cores of nuclear warheads originally designed to destroy American cities.

Although they do not minimize the consequences of North Korea's or Iran's becoming a nuclear weapons state, those confident in the stability of the nuclear order are dubious about the prospects of a cascade of proliferation occurring in Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. In Japan, nuclear neuralgia has deep roots. The Japanese people suffered the consequences of the only two nuclear weapons ever exploded in war. Despite their differences, successive Japanese governments have remained confident in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and in the cornerstone of the United States' national security strategy in Asia, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance.

The South Koreans fear a nuclear-armed North Korea, but they are even more fearful of life without the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops on the peninsula. Taiwan is so penetrated and seduced by China that the terror of getting caught cheating makes it a poor candidate to go nuclear. And although rumors of the purchase by Myanmar (also called Burma) of a Yongbyon-style nuclear reactor from North Korea cannot be ignored, questions have arisen about whether the country would be able to successfully operate it.

In the Middle East, it is important to separate abstract aspirations from realistic plans. Few countries in the region have the scientific and technical infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is a plausible buyer, although the United States would certainly make a vigorous effort to persuade it that it would be more secure under a U.S. nuclear umbrella than with its own arsenal. Egypt's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, meanwhile, is limited by its weak scientific and technical infrastructure, unless it were able to rent foreign expertise. And a Turkish nuclear bomb would not only jeopardize Turkey's role in NATO but also undercut whatever chances the country has for acceding to the EU.

Looking elsewhere, Brazil is now operating an enrichment facility but has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which outlaws nuclear weapons

Obama's mission is to bend the trend lines currently pointing toward catastrophe.

Graham Allison

in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has accepted robust legal constraints, including those of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Other than South Africa, which retains the stockpile of 30 bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium that was once part of its nuclear program, it is difficult to identify other countries that might realistically become nuclear weapons states in the foreseeable future.

Such arguments for skepticism have a certain plausibility. The burden of evidence and analysis, however, supports the view that current trends pose unacceptable risks. As the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which was led by former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, concluded in 2009, "The risks of a proliferation 'tipping point' and of nuclear terrorism underscore the urgency of acting now."

THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW

OBAMA HAS put the danger of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda. He has called it "a threat that rises above all others in urgency" and warned that if the international community fails to act, "we will invite nuclear arms races in every region and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine." Consider the consequences, he continued, of an attack with even a single nuclear bomb: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city—be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris—could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life."

Obama's mission is to bend the trend lines currently pointing toward catastrophe. Most of the actions required to achieve this mission must be taken not by Washington but by other governments around the world, which will act on the basis of their own assessments of their interests. But in an effort to encourage them to act and to demonstrate U.S. leadership, Obama has pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States' national security strategy, negotiate a follow-on arms control agreement with Russia to decrease U.S. and Russian nuclear armaments, ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear

Nuclear Disorder

Test Ban Treaty, endeavor to ban the production of fissile material worldwide, and provide additional authority and resources to the IAEA. In the hope of rolling back North Korea's arsenal and stopping Iran short of building a nuclear bomb, he has opened negotiations with both countries, signaling a willingness to live with their regimes, however ugly, if they forgo nuclear weapons.

These steps mark the most substantial effort to revitalize the nuclear order since Kennedy. From his first major address abroad, when he spoke to the EU's 27 heads of state in Prague, to his chairmanship of the UN Security Council in September, Obama has been attempting to transform conceptions of the challenge.

This is an extraordinarily ambitious agenda—easy to say, hard to do. And this important work will encounter serious obstacles and stubborn adversaries. As Obama noted at the UN, “The next 12 months could be pivotal in determining whether [the nonproliferation regime] will be strengthened or will slowly dissolve.” Indeed, the year ahead is crowded with dates and events that will move this agenda forward or leave it floundering. Optimists can take heart from the much more positive attitudes toward the United States evident in capitals around the world recently. Skeptics, however, can point to the objective forces propelling dangers along, as well as the disconnect between the aspirations and the daily actions of the president and of the cabinet officers charged with realizing these goals.

The international community has crucial choices to make, and the stakes could not be higher. Having failed to heed repeated warning signs of rot in the U.S.-led global financial system, the world dare not wait for a catastrophic collapse of the nonproliferation regime. From the consequences of such an event, there is no feasible bailout. 🌐

The Long Road to Zero

Overcoming the Obstacles to a Nuclear-Free World

Charles D. Ferguson

OVER THE past three years, a remarkable bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington regarding nuclear security. The new U.S. nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, revitalizing a strategic dialogue with China, pushing for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, repairing the damaged nuclear nonproliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in weapons. During the 2008 presidential campaign, the veteran foreign policy experts Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz successfully encouraged both major-party candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, to embrace the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons. In the past year, President Obama has made this goal a priority for his administration, although he admits that it is not likely to occur in his lifetime.

This presents a conundrum, however: In a world where the strongest conventional military power cannot envision giving up its nuclear weapons before all other nations have abandoned theirs, how will humanity ever rid itself of these weapons? In order to speed the reduction of its own nuclear arsenal and encourage other countries' disarmament,

CHARLES D. FERGUSON is President of the Federation of American Scientists. From 2004 to 2009, he was Senior Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he served as Project Director for the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy. For an annotated guide to this topic, see "What to Read on Nuclear Proliferation" at www.foreignaffairs.com/readinglists/nuclear-proliferation.

The Long Road to Zero

the United States will have to confront three daunting obstacles: the insecurities of nations, including some currently protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and others that see a nuclear capability as the answer to many of their security problems; the notion that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer in the realm of international relations; and the proliferation risk that inevitably arises whenever nuclear supplier states offer to build civilian reactors for nonnuclear states.

STOPPING THE CASCADE

THE UNITED STATES became the world's first nuclear power in 1945, but it enjoyed a monopoly for only four years. In August 1949, the Soviet Union staged its first atomic test and joined the nuclear club, giving the United Kingdom and France a rationale to follow suit. China, facing threats from the United States, began its nuclear weapons program in the 1950s with help from the Soviet Union. Despite the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, China proceeded with its nuclear program and tested its own weapon soon afterward, in 1964. The 1962 border war between China and India helped spur New Delhi to develop nuclear weapons, which in turn convinced Pakistan to do the same. Fearing for its survival among hostile states, Israel also developed nuclear weapons during the 1960s. And, quietly, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, South Africa's apartheid regime built simple Hiroshima-style nuclear bombs, which it later dismantled as the apartheid state began to crumble in the early 1990s. The most recent member of the nuclear club is North Korea, a small pariah state with a massive insecurity complex.

Although this list may seem ominous, the situation could have been much worse. Dozens of countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, South Korea, and Switzerland, have explored nuclear weapons programs. U.S. leadership has largely thwarted further proliferation. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, has been one of the most effective tools in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, but its reach is limited. Although the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all NPT signatories, the other four current nuclear-armed states are not. Israel, for example, never signed because it has never formally acknowledged that

Charles D. Ferguson

it has nuclear weapons, and Indian leaders have opposed the NPT because they believe it constrains the ambitions of the world's nuclear have-nots while allowing the original nuclear powers to maintain massive arsenals. Given the deficiencies of the NPT and the current nonproliferation regime more broadly, it is vital for the international community to develop principles of responsible behavior for countries with nuclear arsenals and for those with nuclear materials that could be used to make weapons.

The first principle must be that all states would benefit from a world in which no one ever again used nuclear weapons. This leads to the second principle: governments must declare that nuclear weapons are only necessary for deterring the use of other nuclear weapons—a shift that would enhance the security of all states and at the same time reduce the perceived strategic value of these weapons. As Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal argued in these pages (“The Logic of Zero,” November/December 2008), “only one real purpose remains for U.S. nuclear weapons: to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others,” meaning that they should not be used to respond to conventional, chemical, or biological attacks. The United States, however, has followed a policy of calculated ambiguity that leaves adversaries in doubt about whether it would employ nuclear weapons if attacked by nonnuclear means. So far, the U.S. government has been reluctant to state explicitly that it will not.

Washington must address several concerns before making such an explicit declaration. First, adversaries may fear that this decision could be reversed easily if, for example, the United States or its allies were attacked with biological weapons. Second, certain allies, such as Japan and South Korea, may doubt the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments because they fear a Chinese conventional attack or conventional, chemical, or biological attacks by North Korea. The United States currently has the strength to establish a new international norm against the use of nuclear weapons to respond to non-nuclear threats, and it should seize the opportunity to do so.

The third principle should be that every state that possesses nuclear weapons or materials and technologies that can be used in nuclear weapons must ensure the security of their arsenals and stockpiles. For example, many nonnuclear weapons states use highly enriched uranium

The Long Road to Zero

(HEU) to produce medical isotopes for diagnoses and cancer treatment. However, HEU can also be used to fuel basic nuclear weapons, and therefore states possessing HEU should replace it with less highly enriched materials that cannot be used in weapons or substitute it with alternative nonnuclear technology.

Although adopting these principles should make both U.S. adversaries and U.S. allies more comfortable, some nations would still have many lingering insecurities.

STATUS ANXIETY

CURRENTLY, Japan, South Korea, and the nonnuclear NATO countries do not feel compelled to acquire their own nuclear weapons because the United States provides a credible deterrent to nuclear attacks against them. Other states, however, seek to maintain or acquire nuclear arsenals because they do not benefit from any great power's nuclear umbrella and because they see nuclear arms as the great equalizer that will guarantee their security in a dangerous world.

Three types of states fit into this category: U.S. enemies, such as Iran and North Korea; U.S. rivals that share Washington's interest in curbing proliferation, such as China and Russia; and U.S. allies that have nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan. To deal with the first group, the United States and its partners have employed a combination of sanctions and incentives. If such packages fall short in turning back those countries' nuclear weapons programs, the United States should employ containment strategies to limit the leverage that these aspiring nuclear powers can gain. For example, in the case of North Korea, Washington must show Pyongyang that there is a viable path toward joining the international community while making it very clear that there will be consequences if it uses its nuclear weapons or transfers its nuclear technology to other states or to nonstate actors. The United States must also increase its economic and military support to its allies bordering these states.

The second group comprises major nuclear-armed powers that are already in a mutual-deterrent relationship with the United States. Because China and Russia are weaker than the United States from a conventional military standpoint, they have little incentive to agree to

Charles D. Ferguson

deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Therefore, conventional arms control—in the form of assurances that U.S. conventional forces and missile defense systems will not undercut Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents—must play a role in any future negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Washington has leverage over most of the countries in the third group because they are U.S. allies. Renewed U.S. engagement in helping resolve the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is one necessary step toward reducing nuclear tensions on the subcontinent. But this is not enough. Because Pakistan relies on nuclear weapons to counter India's conventional superiority, the United States needs to address this imbalance by recalibrating its policy of supplying armaments to both states, giving Islamabad enough assistance so that it feels sufficiently secure to free up more military forces to fight the terrorists who are threatening the Pakistani government and its nuclear arsenal. For Israel, meanwhile, a major prerequisite for considering nuclear dismantlement is a serious commitment from all the Muslim states in the region to honor its right to exist. The United States must, therefore, redouble efforts to work toward this recognition, which will require reaching a final-status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Even if the insecurities of these three groups of states are eased, Obama's dream of a world without nuclear weapons will remain just that until nuclear weapons cease to confer elevated status on the regimes that possess them. The fact that every permanent member of the UN Security Council possesses nuclear weapons has led many nations to believe that international clout is dependent on having a nuclear capability. Iran, which has been charged with violating the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and pursuing a nuclear weapons program, has repeatedly reminded the international community that the Security Council's permanent members have not lived up to their own NPT commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The permanent members of the Security Council still reflect the international balance of power that existed in the wake of World War II, even though the world has changed substantially since then and many rising regional powers crave recognition. Unlike the Security Council, the IAEA's Board of Governors has sought to reflect these changes by including the ten states with the largest peaceful nuclear energy

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
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
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
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programs, three major regional powers, and 22 other states on a rotating basis. Consequently, major nonnuclear weapons states (such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea) have continuing influence in shaping the IAEA's policies. Reforming the UN Security Council to admit nonnuclear weapons states that are regional powers, such as Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa, would bestow greater legitimacy on this body.

IKE'S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

CONCERNS ABOUT climate change and the concomitant likelihood of a substantial expansion of nuclear energy throughout the world pose additional obstacles to achieving nuclear disarmament. This problem is not new. In his December 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech to the UN General Assembly, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower proposed helping nonnuclear countries obtain peaceful nuclear energy technologies. He pledged that the United States would put atomic energy "into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace . . . for the benefit of all mankind." This proposal led the United States, the Soviet Union, and a few other states to provide hundreds of research reactors and other nuclear technology to dozens of countries through what became known as the Atoms for Peace program. Eisenhower also proposed the creation of what eventually became the IAEA, which is charged with helping its member states obtain peaceful nuclear technology, developing safety standards for nuclear power programs, and making sure these programs are not misused to build weapons.

Peaceful nuclear energy has, however, been a double-edged sword. On the one hand, nuclear power now produces about 15 percent of the globe's electricity and emits far fewer greenhouse gases than other power sources. On the other hand, agreements on nuclear cooperation have often been a precursor to the development of nuclear weapons programs because such deals provide ready access to technologies useful for developing weapons. As the University of South Carolina political scientist Matthew Fuhrmann argued in the summer 2009 issue of *International Security*, the initiation of peaceful nuclear cooperation is so strongly correlated with the development of weapons programs that "from 1955 to 2000, no country began a nuclear

Charles D. Ferguson

weapons program without first receiving civilian assistance” (although he also points out that the vast majority of states with nuclear energy have not developed weapons programs).

Nuclear aspirants tend to first buy research reactors, as was the case with India, Israel, and North Korea. This basic nuclear power infrastructure and the know-how absorbed by scientists can lay the foundation for a nuclear weapons program, especially if countries decide to develop uranium-enrichment plants or to reprocess spent fuel to make plutonium. Such facilities are inherently dual-use and can be employed to make either fuel for reactors or fissile material for bombs.

As countries today attempt to reduce their fossil-fuel consumption, many politicians, such as U.S. Senator McCain, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, are promoting the benefits of nuclear energy to counter climate change, increase energy security, and stimulate the economy. Since 2007, Sarkozy has traveled throughout the Arab world promoting nuclear power plants that would be built by the French nuclear giant Areva in exchange for commitments to purchase other French goods and services. This nuclear diplomacy has netted Sarkozy a deal to build a French military base in the United Arab Emirates, a state keenly interested in acquiring nuclear power plants. For France, exporting nuclear power is also big business—a single large reactor can cost several billion dollars.

The proliferation risk that comes with nuclear cooperation agreements does not mean that the supplier states should abandon them. Washington has already signed numerous such agreements, and even if it reversed course, other major suppliers, such as France and Russia, could easily continue to sign nuclear cooperation treaties to further their own commercial interests. Moreover, the United States would be accused of renegeing on the basic bargain of the NPT: that nuclear states will provide access to peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear states. Finally, Washington would be seen as creating a double standard by denying civilian nuclear power to states that do not have such capabilities while giving it to states that have not signed the NPT and already possess nuclear weapons, such as India.

Still, nuclear power is no panacea for the world's dependence on fossil fuels. In order to displace only one-seventh of the projected growth

The Long Road to Zero

in greenhouse gas emissions, the world would have to connect one large new nuclear reactor to the electrical grid every two weeks between now and 2050—a rate of growth not seen since nuclear energy’s heyday, in the 1980s. Because it typically takes eight to ten years to build a nuclear power plant, and because of the rising demand for scarce nuclear parts and the shortage of qualified personnel to build and operate these plants, almost all nations seeking their first nuclear power plants will not acquire them until 2020 at the earliest. Countries will have to deploy other technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions long before 2020 to have a meaningful impact, according to climate-change experts.

Rather than denying nuclear technology to nonnuclear states or relying excessively on nuclear energy to curb climate change, the United States should begin working cooperatively with its allies to provide balanced energy assessments to all countries in need of such assistance. This would entail determining each country’s availability of natural resources, examining its technological infrastructure, assessing the prospects for its employing energy-efficient technologies, and analyzing its financial resources. Title 5 of the 1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Act called for the United States to lead in providing these assessments, but this law has until now never been implemented or properly funded.

Certain states with sunny climates would be well suited for the major development of solar energy projects, along the lines of the German-led Desertec Industrial Initiative in the Sahara Desert. Many Middle Eastern states could benefit from assistance in using their natural gas resources to produce electricity more efficiently, and others would profit from wind-energy projects or carbon-capture and carbon-storage programs. States that are genuinely well positioned to carry out nuclear power programs could pursue them so long as they agreed to meet strict safety, security, and nonproliferation guidelines. Some states could still develop nuclear power programs for duplicitous purposes, but their ulterior motives would become obvious if they were to reject the advice provided in comprehensive energy assessments. Were the United States to provide energy assistance to countries across the world, it would bolster U.S. economic competitiveness and help in the global fight against climate change.

Charles D. Ferguson

GREENING THE GLOBE

JUST AS Eisenhower led the way toward greater use of peaceful nuclear energy through the Atoms for Peace program and the IAEA, President Obama should push for the formation of a global energy agency to promote the increased use of green-energy technologies throughout the world and should have the United States supplement the IAEA's work by assisting other countries in the development of nonnuclear energy. In 2006, Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA's director general, encouraged the international community to establish such an agency, which could help assess global energy needs and encourage the rapid development of a sustainable global energy system.

In addition to expanding the world's sustainable-energy infrastructure, such an agency would also present an opportunity for strengthening international security. The current nuclear security agenda is simply not sufficient to prevent further nuclear proliferation or to stop terrorists from obtaining fissile material. If there is any hope of creating a safer and more secure world, the international community must address regional powers' insecurities, seek to strip nuclear weapons of the excessive prestige they currently bestow, and quell nonnuclear nations' often irrational desires for atomic energy. 🌍

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
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



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
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



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Mind Over Martyr

How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists

Jessica Stern

Is IT possible to deradicalize terrorists and their potential recruits? Saudi Arabia, a pioneer in rehabilitation efforts, claims that it is. Since 2004, more than 4,000 militants have gone through Saudi Arabia's programs, and the graduates have been reintegrated into mainstream society much more successfully than ordinary criminals. Governments elsewhere in the Middle East and throughout Europe and Southeast Asia have launched similar programs for neo-Nazis, far-right militants, narcoterrorists, and Islamist terrorists, encouraging them to abandon their radical ideology or renounce their violent means or both.

The U.S. government would do well to better understand the successes and failures of such efforts, especially those that target Islamist terrorists. This is important, first, because, as General David Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command, has noted, the United States "cannot kill [its] way to victory" in the struggle against al Qaeda and related groups. Although military action, especially covert military action, is an essential part of the strategy against the Islamist terrorist movement, the United States' main goal should be to stop the movement from growing. Terrorists do not fight on traditional battlefields; they fight among civilians, which increases the risks of collateral damage. Indeed, Islamist terrorists provoke the governments they oppose into responding in ways that seem to prove that these governments want to humiliate or harm Muslims. Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and

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Jessica Stern

“extraordinary rendition” have become for Muslim youth symbols of the United States’ belligerence and hypocrisy.

Second, the effectiveness of deradicalization programs aimed at detained terrorists have direct and immediate effects on U.S. national security. This is especially true regarding the detainees at the detention center in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Because it is difficult to gather evidence that is usable in court, some truly bad actors, along with

For some terrorists,
jihad is just a job.

some not so bad ones who have been held unfairly, will inevitably be released. Effective deradicalization programs could help make such individuals less dangerous. Abdallah al-Ajmi, who was repatriated to Kuwait in 2005 on the order of a U.S. judge and was acquitted of terrorism charges by a Kuwaiti court, subsequently carried out a suicide bombing on Iraqi security forces in Mosul that killed 13 Iraqis. Had he received the kind of reintegration assistance and follow-up (including surveillance) now available in Saudi Arabia after his release, he might not have traveled to Iraq.

Third, the success, or failure, of terrorism-prevention programs outside the United States is important to Americans. For one thing, people who carry European passports can enter the United States relatively easily, and so the presence of terrorists in Europe can threaten U.S. national security. For another, terrorism-prevention programs presently under way in, for example, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, could be models for at-risk groups in the United States, such as the Somali community in Minnesota, from which some young men have been recruited to fight alongside al Shabab, the radical Islamist organization that controls southern Somalia and claims to be aligned with al Qaeda. These men do not seem to be plotting attacks in the West, but it is important to think now about how to integrate Somalis into American society more fully in order to reduce the chances that they will carry out attacks in the United States.

The fight against al Qaeda and related groups is not over: Saudi Arabia’s deputy interior minister was nearly killed by a terrorist posing as a repentant militant in August 2009; in September, U.S. government officials interrupted a plot in New York and Denver that they believed was the most significant since 9/11; and in October, the French police

Mind Over Martyr

arrested a nuclear physicist employed at the CERN accelerator, near Geneva, who reportedly had suggested French targets to members of the Algerian terrorist group al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. But in the long term, the most important factor in limiting terrorism will be success at curtailing recruitment to and retention in extremist movements.

Now is the moment to try. Counterterrorism efforts have significantly eroded al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia since the "war on terror" began in 2001. U.S. Predator strikes in Pakistan have killed top al Qaeda leaders, disrupting essential communications between the group's core and its affiliates and new recruits. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs last September, Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said that such activities were "potentially disrupting plots that are under way" and "leaving leadership vacuums that are increasingly difficult to fill."

Even though anti-American sentiment remains strong, especially in Pakistan, al Qaeda's popularity is waning. Polls continue to show that many people in Muslim-majority states doubt that the true aim of U.S. counterterrorism efforts is self-protection. A 2007 study by the Program on International Policy Attitudes of public opinion in Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, and Pakistan, for instance, found that majorities in each of the four countries believed that Washington's primary goal was to dominate the Middle East and weaken and divide the Islamic world. According to another PIPA poll, conducted last spring, anti-American sentiment remained high in Pakistan, where over 80 percent of respondents viewed the Predator strikes as unjustified. Crucially, the report also noted "a sea change" in popular attitudes toward al Qaeda and other religious militants: over 80 percent of the Pakistanis polled said they thought these groups were national security threats—representing more than a 40-percentage-point rise since 2007. Al Qaeda's reputation as the brave vanguard against Western oppression has been tarnished by the tens of thousands of Muslim civilians killed in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, and elsewhere since the "war on terror" began. Several Islamist leaders who once supported al Qaeda, including Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, the organization's ideological godfather, have publicly turned against it, as have many ordinary Muslims. If the deradicalization of Islamist extremists is ever going to work, now is probably the time to try.

Jessica Stern

DON'T KNOW MUCH ABOUT IDEOLOGY

I FIRST GOT involved in deradicalization efforts in 2005, soon after the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist militant. The city of Rotterdam recruited me to help develop a new concept of citizenship that would include Dutch natives as well as immigrants and their children; the city government worried that the idea of jihad had become a fad among not only Muslim youth but also recent converts to Islam. In 2007, a company under contract with Task Force 134, the task force in charge of U.S.-run detention centers in Iraq, asked me to help develop a deradicalization program for the 26,000 Iraqis held at Camp Bucca and Camp Cropper (Camp Bucca has since been closed). Last winter, together with a group of current and former U.S. government officials and analysts, I visited Riyadh's Care Rehabilitation Center, an institution that reintegrates convicted terrorists into Saudi society through religious reeducation, psychological counseling, and assistance finding a job. And in the spring of 2009, I visited a youth center supported by the Muslim Contact Unit, part of the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police in London, which works with leaders of the Muslim community there, including Islamists, to isolate and counter supporters of terrorist violence.

These experiences made one thing clear: any rehabilitation effort must be based on a clear understanding of what drives people to terrorism in the first place. Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to an injustice, real or imagined, that they feel must be corrected. Yet ideology is rarely the only, or even the most important, factor in an individual's decision to join the cause. The reasons that people become terrorists are as varied as the reasons that others choose their professions: market conditions, social networks, education, individual preferences. Just as the passion for justice and law that drives a lawyer at first may not be what keeps him working at a law firm, a terrorist's motivations for remaining in, or leaving, his "job" change over time. Deradicalization programs need to take account—and advantage—of these variations and shifts in motivations.

Interestingly, terrorists who claim to be driven by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. Our hosts in Riyadh told us that the vast majority of the deradicalization program's "beneficiaries," as

Mind Over Martyr

its administrators call participants, had received little formal education and had only a limited understanding of Islam. In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, second- and third-generation Muslim youth are rebelling against the kind of “soft” Islam practiced by their parents and promoted in local mosques. They favor what they think is the “purer” Islam, uncorrupted by Western culture, which is touted on some Web sites and by self-appointed imams from the Middle East who are barely educated themselves. For example, the Netherlands-based terrorist cell known as the Hofstad Group designed what one police officer described as a “do-it-yourself” version of Islam based on interpretations of *takfiri* ideology (*takfir* is the practice of accusing other Muslims of apostasy) culled from the Internet and the teachings of a drug dealer turned cleric.

Such true believers are good candidates for the kind of ideological reeducation undertaken by Task Force 134 in Iraq and by the prison-based deradicalization program in Saudi Arabia. A Saudi official told the group of us who visited the Care Rehabilitation Center in Riyadh last winter that the main reason for terrorism was ignorance about the true nature of Islam. Clerics at the center teach that only the legitimate rulers of Islamic states, not individuals such as Osama bin Laden, can declare a holy war. They preach against *takfir* and the selective reading of religious texts to justify violence. One participant in the program told us, “Now I understand that I cannot make decisions by reading a single verse. I have to read the whole chapter.”

PREJUDICE AND PRIDE

IN EUROPE, Muslim youth describe themselves, often accurately, as victims of prejudice in the workplace and in society more generally. Surveys carried out in 2006 by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (now subsumed by the Fundamental Rights Agency), an EU body, showed that minorities and immigrants in the European Union experience greater levels of unemployment, are over-represented in the least desirable jobs, and receive lower wages. After the van Gogh murder, the native Dutch, who are famously proud of their tolerance, grew visibly less so: they started complaining about rising rates of criminality among Dutch Moroccan youth and the rhetoric

Jessica Stern

of radical imams who preach that homosexuality is a sickness or a sin. Rightly perceiving that this growing prejudice against Muslims could become a source of social conflict, local governments and nongovernmental organizations put in place various programs to integrate young immigrants into broader Dutch society.

Group dynamics are as important as social grievances. Young people are sometimes attracted to terrorist movements through social connections, music, fashion, or lifestyle and only later come to understand fully the groups' violent ideologies and goals. Al Shabab, spurred by a member who calls himself Abu Mansour al-Amriki, and other groups affiliated with al Qaeda have begun using anti-American hip-hop—"jihad rap"—in their recruitment videos; the British rap group Blakstone and the defunct but still popular American band Soldiers of Allah promote violence against *kafir* (nonbelievers). The first- and second-generation Muslim children I interviewed for a study of the sources of radicalization in the Netherlands seemed to think that talking about jihad was cool, in the same way that listening to gangster rap is in some youth circles. Most of these children will not turn to violence, but once youth join an extremist group, the group itself can become an essential part of their identity, maybe even their only community. And so deradicalization requires finding new sources of social support for them. The Saudi program takes great pains to reintegrate participants into their families and the communities they belonged to before their radicalization by encouraging family visits and getting the community involved in their follow-up after they are released. The program rightly assumes that group dynamics are key to both radicalization and deradicalization.

Then there is economics. For some, jihad is just a job. According to studies by the economist Alan Krueger, now the U.S. Treasury Department's assistant secretary for economic policy, and Alberto Abadie, a professor of public policy at Harvard, there is no direct correlation between low GDP and terrorism. Nonetheless, poor people in countries with high levels of unemployment are more vulnerable to recruitment. Of the 25,000 insurgents and terrorist suspects detained in Iraq as of 2007, nearly all were previously underemployed and 78 percent were unemployed, according to Major General Douglas Stone, the commander of Task Force 134 at the time. Because these insurgents took up the "job" of fighting a military occupation, typically targeting

Mind Over Martyr

soldiers rather than civilians, at least some of them could conceivably be rehabilitated once foreign troops leave Iraq.

According to Christopher Boucek, an expert on Saudi Arabia and Yemen at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Advisory Committee, which helps run the deradicalization program in Saudi Arabia, has reported that most detainees are men in their 20s from large lower- or middle-class families; only three percent come from high-income backgrounds. Boucek says that according to Saudi officials, 25 percent of the detained terrorists who had participated in jihad had prior criminal records, approximately half of them for drug-related offenses; only five percent were prayer leaders or had other formal religious roles. For such individuals, job training and career counseling may be the best deradicalization strategy—or at least a strategy as important as religious reeducation.

ALL IN THE HEAD


PSYCHOLOGY ALSO matters. One element worth examining in particular is the potential impact of sexual abuse on radicalization. Much has been written about the role of radical madrasahs in creating terrorists in Pakistan and elsewhere, some of it in these pages. Outside of the Pakistani press, however, little note is made of the routine rape of boys at such schools. Also troubling is the rape of boys by warlords, the Afghan National Army, or the police in Afghanistan. Such abuses are commonplace on Thursdays, also known as “man-loving day,” because Friday prayers are considered to absolve sinners of all wrongdoing. David Whetham, a specialist in military ethics at King’s College London, reports that security checkpoints set up by the Afghan police and military have been used by some personnel to troll for attractive young men and boys on Thursday nights. The local population has been forced to accept these episodes as par for the course: they cannot imagine defying the all-powerful Afghan commanders. Could such sexual traumas be a form of humiliation that contributes to contemporary Islamist terrorism?

Similarly, one need not spend many days in Gaza before understanding that fear and humiliation, constants of daily life there, play at least some role in certain Palestinians’ decisions to become martyr-



murderers. If terrorism can be a source of validation, then surely helping adherents come to terms with the humiliation they have experienced could help bring them back into the fold. To that end, the Saudi rehabilitation program includes classes in self-esteem.

Aside from the question of preexisting personal trauma, consider the impact of a terrorist's lifestyle on his psychology. Exposure to violence, especially for those who become fighters, can cause lasting, haunting changes in the body and the mind. Terrorists are "at war," at least from their perspective, and they, too, may be at risk of posttraumatic stress disorder. Moreover, those who have been detained may have been subjected to torture and left with even more serious psychological wounds. The Guantánamo detainees sent back to Saudi Arabia have



posed a particular problem for the Saudi government, for example. One graduate of the facility in Riyadh told me privately that although he was taking psychotropic medications, which helped, he was still suffering from terrible nightmares and feeling hypervigilant.

(He claimed to have been tortured with electrodes in Afghanistan, prior to being moved to Guantánamo.) It will be critically important to incorporate some of what the medical community learns about posttraumatic stress disorder. This is not because terrorists deserve sympathy—they do not—but because understanding their state of mind is necessary to limiting the risk that they will return to violence.

Some individuals join terrorist movements out of conviction but evolve over time into professional killers. Once that happens, the emotional, or material, benefits of belonging can overtake the spiritual benefits of believing. This suggests that some terrorists might develop enduring reasons—perhaps even a compulsion—to pursue violence. Such individuals should be detained preventively and the key thrown away, as some governments do with sexual predators. But in cases in which the law precludes indefinite detention, governments may be

Jessica Stern

forced to release suspects. In those instances, officials will have to choose whether to ignore the threat posed by these people or work with other governments to develop tools to reduce the chance that they will resume being terrorists. Regarding lower-level operatives, governments must consider risky tradeoffs. On the one hand, how great is the chance that graduates of deradicalization programs will return to terrorism or other forms of violent crime? On the other hand, are incarcerated terrorists recruiting in prison among the ordinary criminals or the guards, or can preventive detention, or the prison itself, become a symbol of injustice to potential recruits?

REHABILITATION AND RECIDIVISM

AFTER PARTICIPATING in a 1974 survey of 231 case studies of rehabilitation programs for criminals in prisons, the sociologist Robert Martinson wrote that “with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.” This observation sparked a “nothing works” movement throughout the United States. Academics continued to study the rehabilitation of criminals, however, and there is now a fairly broad consensus that some measures do work. The most successful rehabilitation models focus on the motivations of individual offenders. The ideal approach includes three components: prison-based rehabilitation programs, services to help released prisoners reintegrate into society, and postrelease services. The community’s involvement in the postrelease services, in particular, is essential to reducing recidivism rates.

Terrorists are different from ordinary criminals in many ways, of course, but it is worth noting that according to the Saudi government, its deradicalization program—which relies on prison-based rehabilitation programs, transitional services, and postrelease services—has been extraordinarily successful. The Saudi government has not disclosed the total number of people who have completed its program, but as of 2009, 11 graduates had ended up on the country’s most-wanted terrorist list. Still, according to official statistics, the rate of recidivism is 10–20 percent, far lower than that for ordinary criminals. In order to gain a more complete understanding of what works, and



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what does not, in deradicalization efforts, it will be important for the Saudi government to give outsiders greater access to the program and to statistics regarding it.

That said, some of the Saudi program's main features, and thus its results, may be difficult to replicate elsewhere. The project is extremely expensive; it is constantly being updated, based on input from the staff and participants. It includes psychological counseling, vocational training, art therapy, sports, and religious reeducation. Former Guantánamo detainees who graduate from the program are given housing, a car, money for a wedding—even assistance in finding a wife, if necessary. They receive help with career placement for themselves and their families. There is an extensive postrelease program as well, which involves extensive surveillance. The guiding philosophy behind these efforts, the program's leaders explained, is that jihadists are victims, not villains, and they need tailored assistance—a view probably unacceptable in many countries.

Could aspects of the program nonetheless be replicated elsewhere? The U.S. government has been trying to persuade the Saudi government to assist in reintegrating into mainstream society 97 Yemeni terrorist suspects who remained in Guantánamo as of October 2009. According to Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings Institution, these Yemenis “include many of the worst of the worst.” Repatriating them to Yemen, Wittes adds, is not an attractive option because of the fragility of the Yemeni state and its notoriously leaky jails: ten terrorist suspects escaped in 2003; in 2006, 23 suspects did. And because the Saudi program depends on relatives to police the behavior of the detainees once they are released, Boucek, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, describes the U.S. proposal to send the Yemenis to the Saudi program as “a catastrophically bad idea,” unless the detainees grew up or have relatives in Saudi Arabia. Boucek favors giving U.S. assistance for a new program in Yemen that would be modeled in part on the one in Saudi Arabia.

The recidivism rate for graduates of the Saudi terrorist-rehabilitation program is far lower than that for ordinary criminals.

Jessica Stern

GANGPLANK

BOTH RADICALIZATION and deradicalization typically involve several steps, including changes in values and changes in behavior. The changes in values do not necessarily precede the changes in behavior, John Horgan, director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University, has found. Individuals often join extremist groups in the same way that they might join gangs—through social connections, to gain a sense of belonging—and only later do they acquire extremist views. The literature on gangs, for its part, suggests that the most productive time to intervene in this process is before an individual joins the group.

It is based on this understanding that, alongside their deradicalization projects, several governments are devising programs to forestall radicalization altogether. Youth programs developed by the Institute for Multicultural Development (also known as FORUM), in the Netherlands, help adolescents and young adults in the country resist radicalization and recruitment into terrorist groups by encouraging them to “express their possible disappointments and (justified) feelings of exclusion in peaceful and democratic ways and turn their genuine concerns into positive social action.” FORUM focuses on “problem neighborhoods,” namely, ethnic neighborhoods with high levels of unemployment.

The Saudi government also runs a terrorism-prevention program, which monitors religious leaders, schoolteachers, and Web sites. It recently arrested five individuals for promoting militant activities on the Internet and recruiting individuals to travel abroad for what the government called “inappropriate purposes.” Meanwhile, it also supports a nongovernmental organization called the Sakinah Campaign (*sakinah* means “tranquility”), which helps Internet users who have visited extremist sites interact with legitimate Islamic scholars online, with a view to steering them away from radicalism.

Such projects may serve as models or at least as a source of inspiration for similar efforts elsewhere. Washington should study them, even though the United States has so far been relatively immune from the kind of homegrown Islamist terrorism that has afflicted Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and other European countries. This may

Mind Over Martyr

be because American Muslims tend to be more fully integrated into American society and tend to be better educated and have higher-paying jobs than the average American. In the last few years, however, a small number of Somali immigrants who had settled as refugees in the United States, especially in Minnesota, have joined al Shabab in Somalia. (One of them is the first known American to become a suicide bomber.) These immigrants have less in common with other American Muslims and more resemble Pakistanis in the United Kingdom and Moroccans in the Netherlands, who face discrimination in school and on the job market. Unlike previous waves of Muslim immigrants to the United States, these Somalis arrived with little knowledge of English or the United States. Partly as a result, they have had difficulty assimilating into American society: according to the most recent census, Somali Americans have the highest unemployment rate among East African diasporas in the United States and the lowest rate of college graduation.

U.S. officials devising social programs for Somali American youth can learn not only from previous anti-gang efforts in the United States but also from the experiences of European governments and their efforts to lure lower-achieving immigrant youth away from gangs and terrorist groups. As part of these efforts, it makes a great deal of sense to back anti-jihadi Muslim activists. But that is also a risky move. Antifundamentalist groups that get official backing risk being perceived not just as opposing violence but also as opposing Islam. The Quilliam Foundation, an anti-extremism think tank in the United Kingdom that was started by two former members of the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, has received nearly one million pounds from the British government—and has lost credibility among ordinary Muslims.

But there are hopeful signs: Hanif Qadir, together with his brother and a former member of a local gang, created the Active Change Foundation in 2003, an organization that runs a youth center and a gym in Waltham Forest, a culturally diverse and gang-infested borough of northern London, and is supported by the Metropolitan Police. Qadir told me that he had been recruited by al Qaeda in 2002 and was on his way to Afghanistan expecting to fight when he changed his mind after hearing that volunteers were being used as “cannon fodder.”

Jessica Stern

Now, he explained to me, he encourages youth to express their rage about the mistreatment of Muslims in Iraq, Palestine, and elsewhere and channel it into peaceful political action. Having been involved in its gangs or violent extremist groups themselves, he and the other program leaders know the community well. The foundation's ambition, as it puts it, is to "work behind the 'wall of silence'" with people who are marginalized by mainstream British society.

Terrorism continues to pose a significant threat to civilians around the world. If every terrorist could be killed or captured and then kept locked up indefinitely, the world would be a safer place. But there are limitations to this approach. Often, the only evidence implicating captured terrorists is not usable in court, and some terrorists will inevitably be released if they are returned to their countries of origin. The destructive ideology that animates the al Qaeda movement is spreading around the globe, including, in some cases, to small-town America. Homegrown zealots, motivated by al Qaeda's distorted interpretation of Islam, may not yet be capable of carrying out 9/11-style strikes, but they could nonetheless terrorize a nation.

Terrorism spreads, in part, through bad ideas. The most dangerous and seductive bad idea spreading around the globe today is a distorted and destructive interpretation of Islam, which asserts that killing innocents is a way to worship God. Part of the solution must come from within Islam and from Islamic scholars, who can refute this ideology with arguments based on theology and ethics. But bad ideas are only part of the problem. Terrorists prey on vulnerable populations—people who feel humiliated and victimized or who find their identities by joining extremist movements. Governments' arsenals against terrorism must include tools to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable populations. These tools should look more like anti-gang programs and public diplomacy than war. 🌐

The Best Defense?

Preventive Force and International Security

Abraham D. Sofaer

AFTER 9/11, U.S. President George W. Bush announced his determination to do whatever was necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States. Following the lead of several countries that had recently come to similar conclusions after their own bitter experiences—including India, Israel, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom—the United States tightened its immigration laws; increased the protection of its borders, ports, and infrastructure; criminalized providing “material support” for terrorist groups; and tore down the wall between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies, which had crippled counterterrorist efforts for decades. Washington did not authorize preventive detention, as other countries had, but it used other measures to hold persons against whom criminal charges could not be brought—thereby preventing terrorist attacks. The U.S. government also led or joined various international efforts aimed at warding off new dangers, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, through which over 70 states cooperate to interdict the movement of nuclear materials across international borders.

ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, George P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and National Security Affairs at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, served as Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department from 1985 to 1990. This essay draws on a report, titled “The Best Defense? Legitimacy and Preventive Force,” prepared for the Stanford University Task Force on Preventive Force, which will be published by Hoover Press on February 1, 2010.

Abraham D. Sofaer

But the Bush administration's call for preventive action went further: it endorsed using force against states that supported terrorism or failed to prevent it. This was a particularly controversial position, since using (or threatening to use) preventive force across international borders is generally considered to be a violation of international law: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and most international legal authorities currently construe the United Nations Charter as prohibiting any use of force not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, with the exception of actions taken in self-defense against an actual or imminent state-sponsored "armed attack."

Now that the Bush administration is no longer in power, some argue that its approach to this subject should be shelved. But the objective of preventing terrorist threats before they are realized—rather than primarily treating terrorism as a crime warranting punishment after the fact—is now established as an essential element of U.S. national security. Indeed, in 2008, Barack Obama, then a presidential candidate, told the American Society of International Law that "the preventive use of force may be necessary, but rarely." And Vice President Joe Biden announced in February 2009, "We'll strive to act preventively, not preemptively, to avoid whenever possible the choice of last resort between the risks of war and the dangers of inaction." Other senior officials have made similar statements, both before joining the Obama administration and since.

ACCOUNTING FOR MODERN THREATS

THE CASE for considering preventive force stems largely from the threat posed by terrorists, especially their potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But it is justified by other threats as well, including the proliferation of WMD to irresponsible or fanatical regimes; the spread of criminal activities, such as piracy and drug and human trafficking; and genocide or other massive violations of human rights.

The UN, NATO, other regional organizations, and many individual countries agree that these threats exist and need to be countered. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, concluded in December 2004 that "in the world of the twenty-first century, the international community

The Best Defense?

does have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent.”

Preventive action seeks to counter threats before they are imminent. It is thus distinguished from preemptive action, which, in Daniel Webster’s classic formulation, is taken when a government has “a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” In contrast, preventive action seeks to head off dangers that are further in the future and therefore less tangible, less likely to occur, and possibly more avoidable through diplomacy. Prevention is not considered an act of self-defense under the UN Charter. But although these distinctions are valid and significant, they can be overstated.

Many contemporary threats do not involve conventional forces that can be observed as they prepare to attack; rather, they involve unconventional uses of force that remain invisible until their sudden deployment. Such unconventional uses of force can seldom be preempted at their moment of imminence.

Moreover, many contemporary threats do not qualify as “armed attacks” under current international law, since they come from nonstate actors, are aimed at a state’s citizens or interests outside of its territory, or are considered insufficiently substantial to entitle a state to resort to the full range of actions allowed in cases of recognized self-defense. Some threats stem from criminal activities, not “armed attacks,” and some involve governments targeting

their own populations via massive deprivations of human rights. All these unconventional threats can be very serious and may result in great potential harm. Although international uses of force to counter such threats would be considered illegal without Security Council approval, such actions could be as vital to maintaining international peace and security as the actions of domestic law enforcement are to maintaining domestic security.

Some threats to international security are so potentially harmful that preventing them in advance is preferable to remedying their effects.

Abraham D. Sofaer

Preventive actions pose serious risks. Rather than deterring a state from attacking, the prospect of being targeted by preventive action may provoke it to strike first. Moreover, since preventive actions are based on predictions of future conduct, they are subject to error. The use of force always causes human suffering, intended and unintended, but the costs are more difficult to justify if they result from an action later revealed to have been unnecessary. And preventive action can do more harm than good, opening attackers to condemnation and alienating the public in the states that are attacked. But a decision must be made one way or the other, and either option may prove in retrospect to have been wrong. Although being wrong is an unavoidable risk, it can be limited through the disciplined and effective collection and analysis of intelligence.

INTERNATIONAL OPINION AND ILLEGALITY

DESPITE THE illegality and the risks involved, states have used unauthorized force for preventive purposes in well over 100 instances since the UN Charter was signed in 1945. This has happened in part because during the Cold War stalemate, the Security Council failed to perform its duty to maintain international peace and security. Instead of cooperating on the council, the two superpowers competed to support proxies, which, in turn, sought power and territory across the world. In some cases, parties used unauthorized force to overthrow colonial regimes. These coups (which had no preventive purpose) demonstrated the unwillingness of states to be bound by narrow legal limits on the use of force, including the requirement of Security Council authorization. Other unauthorized uses of force were preventive, including hostage-rescue operations, abductions of criminals and terrorists, targeted killings, attacks on terrorists and their infrastructure, actions to prevent the subversion of established governments, the disruption of WMD development, actions to prevent gross violations of human rights, preventive cyberattacks, and preventive war.

Although virtually all these were technically illegal, they elicited different reactions from the international community depending on their purpose, duration, and consequences. Some unauthorized actions

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


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The Best Defense?

have been condemned, many have been accepted without comment, and some have even been widely praised or formally supported.

Uses of force whose purpose has seemed inconsistent with the UN Charter have generally been opposed. For example, whereas countries' efforts to protect their citizens have generally been tolerated, they have been opposed when colonial powers have exploited them in order to continue exercising control in former colonies (such as in the British and French seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956). Sometimes, the same type of action has been tolerated in one set of circumstances and condemned in another. Israel's abduction from Argentina of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in 1960, for example, was formally criticized but effectively condoned, whereas the United States' 1990 abduction of a doctor from Mexico for cooperating with drug dealers was widely viewed as an improper extension of national law enforcement.

Although interventions have often earned criticism when they have seemed to advance national interests rather than objectives based on the UN Charter, the motive has often mattered less than the result. Consider two events from the 1970s. In late 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to remove the Khmer Rouge from power and to limit China's control in Southeast Asia. And in 1979, the Tanzanian army deposed Idi Amin in Uganda in order to prevent him from attempting to capture part of Tanzania. Ultimately, Vietnam was criticized more for occupying Cambodia too long than for having overthrown the murderous Pol Pot regime. And although Amin rightly complained that he was attacked before any of his forces had even entered Tanzania, the UN Security Council and then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim simply ignored his complaints, no doubt recognizing the benefits of his removal from power.

Likewise, international responses to unauthorized interventions (preventive and otherwise) have depended on the credibility of the intervening states' justifications. For example, Israel's 1976 operation to rescue Israeli and Jewish passengers from a hijacked plane at Uganda's Entebbe airport was deemed acceptable, since Amin had embraced the cause of the kidnappers and the involvement of Israel was tailored to the narrow objective it had claimed. The United

Abraham D. Sofaer

States' 1983 invasion of Grenada, on the other hand—which was also a hostage-rescue operation, in that over 500 U.S. medical students were being barred from leaving the island—was widely opposed because in addition to rescuing the students, the United States used the opportunity to oust the country's new leaders and to eliminate all Cuban political influence.

International attitudes toward some categories of actions have changed over time, which further complicates the task of evaluating the acceptability of these actions. For example, the UN Security Council at first condemned Israel's 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. But a decade later, after Iraq repeatedly attacked other countries and used chemical weapons at home and abroad, Israel's strike received widespread praise. And in 2007, by which time the world had grown increasingly concerned about the proliferation of WMD, Israel's attack on what seemed to be the foundations of a nuclear reactor in Syria was barely criticized.

The use of force to prevent humanitarian disasters (or halt their escalation) also elicits more support today than it would have when the UN Charter was adopted. The movement to establish a "responsibility to protect" reflects a growing acceptance of the need to prevent gross violations of human rights, even those taking place within another country's borders. The 1999 U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo was technically illegal because the UN Security Council did not approve it, but it was sanctioned by NATO and widely supported. Similarly, regional organizations in Africa—including the Economic Community of West African States, its cease-fire monitoring group, and the Southern African Development Community—have authorized the removal of coup leaders on the continent to prevent the suffering that these groups have concluded regularly follows the overthrow of democratically elected regimes.

Preventive force, in other words, has been used widely even though it is generally regarded as illegal. This discrepancy poses a challenge for international law, whose strength and credibility depend partly on consistency and objectivity. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to develop criteria for identifying and approving those uses of force that enhance the values enshrined in the UN Charter while devising ways to constrain more effectively those that do not.

ESTABLISHING A NEW STANDARD

THE EXISTENCE of a UN Security Council with the will and the means to prevent threats to international peace and security would help reduce the need for unauthorized preventive action. But although the council has sometimes undertaken specific peacekeeping operations, responded to aggression, and adopted important rules regarding terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and human rights, it has often failed to enforce its own resolutions to prevent threats from being realized.

One way to remedy such inadequacies is to make sure that the existing rules serve the UN Charter's purposes. Some aspects of the law governing the use of force—including the concepts of necessity and proportionality—remain universally accepted. But other aspects are seldom taken seriously and deserve review and amendment. For example, states could read Article 2, paragraph 4, of the charter more literally—as prohibiting the threat or use of force when it is employed to undermine the territorial integrity of states “or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” They could also recognize an exception to Article 2, paragraph 4, permitting compelling humanitarian interventions or the use of force for objectives approved as proper by the Security Council. Also, the right of self-defense under Article 51 could more often be treated as “inherent” (as is written in the article) and thereby consistent with the historic right to use force for that purpose. And, as suggested by the British Foreign Office, states could understand the meaning of “imminent” to include situations in which a known terrorist group had both the intent to carry out attacks and the ability to do so without being detected. This would expand the concept's meaning to fit a world in which grave threats can be realized at a time and a place impossible to anticipate in advance.

Instead of accepting such changes, which increasingly reflect actual state practice, the ICJ has continued to support and craft rules that effectively protect terrorists, proliferators, and irresponsible states. In 1986, for example, the ICJ rejected El Salvador's claim to self-defense against Nicaragua, which was aiding rebels seeking to undermine the elected Salvadoran government. By doing so, the ICJ effectively denied El Salvador the right to cooperate with the United States in

Abraham D. Sofaer

an exercise of collective self-defense. In 2004, the ICJ found that Israel's right of self-defense did not apply to protecting itself against attacks on its population (including suicide bombings) by nonstate actors. This meant that Israel could not legally build a fence or take other self-defense measures on any territory beyond its internationally accepted borders. Similarly, the next year, the court ruled that Uganda had no right to self-defense against rebels attacking it from the Democratic Republic of the Congo because the attackers had not been sent by the Congolese government, even though that government had failed to stop them, as international law requires. These decisions—along with the ICJ's refusal to treat as precedents those uses of force that the international community has widely accepted as just, such as NATO's intervention in Kosovo—have undermined, rather than enhanced, the objectives of the UN Charter.


One possible reaction to international law's failure to deal effectively with current threats would be to treat it as irrelevant and regard national self-interest as the only reliable guide for when to use force, preventive or otherwise. But the United States cannot and should not respond this way. It is obliged to abide by the UN Charter's rules, and it has a strong interest in having other states do so as well. Disregarding international law would free all states to act as they please when the goal should be to encourage them to act in ways that advance universally accepted objectives.

The 2004 report of the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change suggested a far better approach to enhancing international security. The panel was unwilling to abandon existing international legal norms, but—recognizing both that the UN Security Council does not always act when it should and that the legality of a use of force does not assure its wisdom or utility—it proposed that the Security Council adopt “a set of agreed guidelines, going directly not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a matter of good conscience and good sense, it should be.” The panel, in other words, rightly acknowledged that the legitimacy of an action can differ from its legality.

Legality is relevant in determining an action's legitimacy, but so are other values and norms, including the propriety of dealing effectively with substantial threats to charter-based values. The UN Security



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
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
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The Best Defense?

Council's decision to deny weapons to victims of ethnic and religious abuse in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, for example, was legal but arguably illegitimate, whereas NATO's unauthorized use of force to prevent abuses in Kosovo was illegal but arguably legitimate.

Using legitimacy as a guide in determining whether to use preventive force would allow states to take into account a broader range of considerations than current international law typically dictates. Such states would weigh not only their own views regarding possible uses of preventive force but also the views of other states, nongovernmental organizations, and knowledgeable or interested groups and individuals (including UN agencies, regional organizations, religious leaders, and others). Legitimacy is not a yes-or-no proposition but a matter of degree; it does not demand the definitive conclusions required of legal opinions.

The concept of legitimacy, moreover, can be made more concrete through the establishment of a process to judge state conduct according to various important standards, such as the seriousness of a perceived threat, the necessity of using force to counter the threat, the proportionality of the force used, the extent of international support for the action in question, the action's consistency with the values of the UN Charter, the strength of the evidence supporting the intervention, and whether the action meets the chief criterion of "just war," that is, whether its expected benefits outweigh its potential costs.

In addition to subjecting potential preventive actions to these standards, states should take procedural steps to help establish the actions' legitimacy. Although preventive actions must sometimes be secret in order to be effective, their causes are often well known and should be discussed within the UN Security Council in advance. In all instances, a state that has taken preventive action should report the action to the council after the fact in order to justify its conduct. And states that use force preventively should accept accountability for errors; they should conduct thorough inquiries of their actions and seriously consider paying compensation to the victims of their mistakes.

The UN's denial of weapons to victims of abuse in Yugoslavia was legal but illegitimate; NATO's intervention in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate.

Abraham D. Sofaer

THE BENEFITS OF LEGITIMACY

SOME THREATS to international peace and security are so potentially damaging that preventing them in advance may be preferable to remedying their effects. Prevention can often be achieved by means short of force (including diplomacy, sanctions, and deterrence), and the unauthorized preventive use of force should be considered only as a last resort, when all alternatives to force have been exhausted and UN Security Council authorization for the use of force cannot be secured. When such a case arises, states should evaluate possible courses of preventive action based on standards of international legitimacy.

Some argue against using the concept of legitimacy to evaluate the use of force on the grounds that its criteria are broad, subjective, and too permissive and so its application would undermine current international law. But relying on legitimacy is unlikely to result in less adherence to international law, since the current use-of-force rules are already routinely disregarded as impractical or unsound. Other critics argue that the notion of legitimacy is no more likely to govern the use of force effectively than are current legal standards. But the utility of legitimacy lies, partly, in the modesty of its claims. Unlike traditional legal arguments, which purport to rely on established rules to vindicate or condemn state behavior, arguments based on legitimacy claim only to guide complicated decision-making by subjecting that process to a survey of the full range of relevant international opinion.

States have much to gain and little, if anything, to lose by subjecting their decisions to use preventive (or other) force to systematic legitimacy tests. Encouraging such disciplined examination should enhance the prospect that states will use preventive force in ways consistent with the goals of the UN Charter—and that their actions will, thanks to the international support they receive, stand a greater chance of succeeding. A state that disregards this process, on the other hand, is more likely to fail, or to pay higher costs in achieving its objectives. 🌐

Reviews & Responses



If the conditions for aid's proper use do not prevail, that aid is more likely to harm than help the world's poorest nations.

Banned Aid *Jagdish Bhagwati* 120

The Better Half *Isobel Coleman* 126

An Elegy for Journalism? *Peter Osnos* 131

Recent Books on International Relations 137

Letters to the Editor 160

Review Essay

Banned Aid

Why International Assistance Does Not Alleviate Poverty

Jagdish Bhagwati

Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa.

BY DAMBISA MOYO. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009, 208 pp. \$24.00.

If you live in the affluent West, no public policy issue is more likely to produce conflicts in your conscience than foreign aid. The humane impulse, fueled by unceasing televised images of famine and pestilence in the developing world, is to favor giving more aid. But a contrasting narrative has the opposite effect: Emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa of the Central African Republic used Western aid to buy a gold-plated bed, and Zaire's dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, spent it on personal jaunts on the Concorde. Such scandals inevitably lead many to conclude that most aid is wasted or, worse still, that it alone is responsible for corruption.

These debates have largely been the province of Western intellectuals and economists, with Africans in the developing world being passive objects in the exercise—just as the 1980s debate over the United States' Japan fixation, and the consequent Japan bashing, occurred among Americans while the Japanese themselves stood by silently. Yet now the African silence has been broken by Dambisa Moyo, a young Zambian-born economist with impeccable credentials. Educated at Harvard and Oxford and employed by Goldman Sachs and the World Bank, Moyo has written an impassioned attack on aid that has won praise from leaders as diverse as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Rwandan President Paul Kagame.

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Banned Aid

Moyo's sense of outrage derives partly from her distress over how rock stars, such as Bono, have dominated the public discussion of aid and development in recent years, to the exclusion of Africans with experience and expertise. "Scarcely does one see Africa's (elected) officials or those African policymakers charged with a country's development portfolio offer an opinion on what should be done," she writes, "or what might actually work to save the continent from its regression. . . . One disastrous consequence of this has been that honest, critical and serious dialogue and debate on the merits and demerits of aid have atrophied." She also distances herself from academic proponents of aid, virtually disowning her former Harvard professor Jeffrey Sachs, whose technocratic advocacy of aid and moralistic denunciations of aid skeptics cut no ice with her. Instead, she dedicates her book to a prominent and prescient early critic of aid, the development economist Peter Bauer.

Moyo's analysis begins with the frustrating fact that in economic terms, Africa has actually regressed, rather than progressed, since shedding colonial rule several decades ago. She notes that the special factors customarily cited to account for this tragic situation—geography, history, social cleavages, and civil wars—are not as compelling as they appear. Indeed, there are many places where these constraints have been overcome. Moyo is less convincing, however, when she tries to argue that aid itself has been the crucial factor holding Africa back, and she verges on deliberate provocation when she proposes terminating all aid within five years—a proposal that is both impractical (given existing long-term commitments) and

unhelpful (since an abrupt withdrawal of aid would leave chaos in its wake).

Moyo's indictment of aid, however, is serious business, going beyond Africa to draw on cross-sectional studies and anecdotes from across the globe. Before buying her indictment, however, it is necessary to explore why the hopes of donors have so often been dashed.

THE CHARITY TRAP

Foreign aid rests on two principles: that it should be given as a moral duty and that it should yield beneficial results. Duty can be seen as an obligation independent of its consequences, but in practice, few are likely to continue giving if their charity has little positive effect. Beginning in the years after World War II, those who wanted the rich nations to give development aid to poorer ones had to address the challenges of building domestic support for greater aid flows and ensuring that the aid would be put to good use. But their unceasing efforts to produce higher flows of aid have led aid advocates to propose the use of tactics that have ironically undermined aid's efficacy, virtually guaranteeing the kind of failures that understandably trigger Moyo's outrage.

At the outset, aid was principally driven by a common sense of humanity that cut across national boundaries—what might be called cosmopolitan altruism. Aid proponents in the 1940s and 1950s, such as Gunnar Myrdal and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, were liberals who felt that the principle of progressive taxation—redistribution within nations—ought to be extended across international borders. This led to proposals such as those to set an aid target of one percent of each donor nation's GNP, playing off the Christian

Jagdish Bhagwati

principle of tithing (giving ten percent of one's income to the church) or the Muslim duty of *zakat* (which mandates donating 2.5 percent of one's earnings to the needy).

How was the one percent figure arrived at? According to Sir Arthur Lewis, the first Nobel laureate in economics for development economics, the British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell had asked him in the early 1950s what figure they should adopt as the United Kingdom's annual aid obligation and Lewis had settled on one percent of GNP as a target because he had a student working on French colonies in Africa, where French expenditures seemed to add up to one percent of GNP. Such a target, of course, implied a proportional, rather than a progressive, obligation, but it had a nice ring to it.

The problem was that the one percent target remained aspirational rather than practical. Outside of Scandinavia, there was never much popular support for giving away so much money to foreigners, however deserving they might be. So aid proponents started looking for other arguments to bolster their case, and they hit on enlightened self-interest. If one could convince Western legislatures and voters that aid would benefit them as well, the reasoning went, the purse strings might be loosened.

In 1956, Rosenstein-Rodan told me that then Senator John F. Kennedy, who bought into the altruism argument, had told him that there was no way it could fly in the U.S. Congress. A case stressing national interest and the containment of communism was needed. And so the argument was invented that unless the United States gave aid, the Soviet Union would provide it and, as a result, the Third World

might tilt toward Moscow. In fact, the Soviets had already funded the construction of Egypt's Aswan Dam, a project the United States had turned down. The only catch was that if the Cold War became Washington's rationale for giving aid, it was inevitable that much of it would end up in the hands of unsavory regimes that pledged to be anticommunist—regimes with a taste for gold-plated beds, Concordes, fat Swiss bank accounts, and torture. By linking aid payments to the Cold War, proponents of aid shot themselves in the foot. More aid was given, but it rarely reached the people it was intended to help.

FROM ALTRUISM TO SELF-INTEREST

When the Cold War began to lose its salience, the search began for other arguments to support aid. The World Bank appointed two successive blue-ribbon panels to deliberate on ways of expanding aid flows, the Pearson Commission, in 1968, and the Brandt Commission, in 1977. The group led by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, although emphasizing that there was a moral duty to give, fell back nonetheless on an enlightened self-interest argument based on a Keynesian assertion that made no sense at all: that raising global demand for goods and services through aid to the poor countries would reduce unemployment in the rich countries—an argument seemingly oblivious to the fact that spending that money in the rich countries would reduce unemployment even more.

Other feeble arguments related to immigration. It was assumed that if aid were given wisely and used effectively, it would reduce illegal immigration by decreasing the wage differentials between

the sending and the receiving countries. But the primary constraint on illegal immigration today is the inability of many aspiring immigrants to pay the smugglers who shepherd them across the border. If those seeking to reach El Norte or Europe earned higher salaries, they would have an easier time paying “coyotes,” and more of them would attempt illegal entry.

Lewis, who was a member of the Pearson Commission, therefore despaired of both the altruistic and the enlightened self-interest arguments. I recall him remarking in 1970, half in jest, that development economists should simply hand over the job of raising aid flows to Madison Avenue. Little did he know that this is exactly what would happen 20 years later with the advent of the “Make Poverty History” campaign, supported by Live Aid concerts and the sort of celebrity overkill that many Africans despise. Of course, this has meant the revival of the altruism argument. Aid targets have therefore returned to the forefront of the debate, even though they are rarely met: in 2008, there was a shortfall of \$35 billion per year on aid pledged by the G-8 countries at the Gleneagles summit in 2005, and the shortfall for aid to Africa was \$20 billion.

One of the chief reasons for the gap is not just miserliness but a lack of conviction that aid does much good. Aid proponents today try to overcome this doubt by linking aid-flow obligations to worldwide targets for the provision of primary education and health care and other laudable objectives enshrined in the 2000 UN Millennium Development Goals (which are uncannily reminiscent of the Brandt Commission’s proposals). But the question Moyo and other thoughtful critics properly insist on raising is whether aid

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Jagdish Bhagwati

is an appropriate policy instrument for achieving these targets.

And so one returns to the old question of what Rosenstein-Rodan termed “absorptive capacity”: How much aid can be absorbed by potential aid recipients and transformed into useful programs? Arguments that aid can and should be used to promote development seem reasonable but have run into problems—not just because corrupt dictators divert aid for nefarious or selfish purposes but because even in reasonably democratic countries, the provision of aid creates perverse incentives and unintended consequences.

The disconnect between what development economists thought foreign assistance would achieve and what it has actually done is best illustrated by a close look at the earliest model used to formulate development plans and estimate aid requirements. The model was associated with two world-class economists, Roy Harrod of Oxford and Evsey Domar of MIT. In essence, the Harrod-Domar model used two parameters to define development: growth rates were considered a function of how much a country saved and invested (the savings rate) and how much it got out of the investment (the capital-output ratio). Aid proponents would thus set a target growth rate (say, five percent per annum), assume a capital-output ratio (say, 3:1), and derive the “required” savings rate (in this case, 15 percent of GNP). If the country’s domestic savings rates fell below this level, they reasoned, the unmet portion could and should be financed from abroad.

Economists also assumed that aid recipients would use fiscal policy to steadily increase their own domestic savings rates over time, thus eliminating the need for

aid entirely in the long run. With such matching efforts by the recipients to raise domestic savings, so the logic went, aid would promote growth and self-reliance.

The problem with this approach, widely used throughout the 1970s, was that although aid was predicated on increased domestic savings, in practice it led to reduced domestic savings. Many aid recipients were smart enough to realize that once wealthy nations had made a commitment to support them, shortfalls in their domestic efforts would be compensated by increased, not diminished, aid flows. Besides, as Moyo notes, the World Bank—which provided much of the multilateral aid flows—faced a moral hazard: unlike the International Monetary Fund, which lends on a temporary basis and has a “good year” when it lends nothing, the World Bank was then judged by how much money it disbursed, not by how well that money was spent—and the recipients knew this.

PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS

Similar problems involving the mismatch between intentions and realities are present in today’s battles over aid. Now, as before, the real question is not who favors helping the poor or spurring development—since despite the slurs of aid proponents, all serious parties to the debate share these goals—but rather how this can be done.

Many activists today think that development economists in the past neglected poverty in their quest for growth. But what they miss is that the latter was seen as the most effective weapon against the former. Poverty rates in the developing countries did indeed rise during the postwar decades, but this was because growth was sporadic and uncommon. And that was because

Banned Aid

the policy framework developing countries embraced was excessively *dirigiste*, with knee-jerk government intervention across the economy and fears of excessive openness to trade and foreign direct investment. After countries such as China and India changed course and adopted liberal (or, if you prefer, “neoliberal”) reforms in the last decades of the century, their growth rates soared and half a billion people managed to move above the poverty line—without question, the greatest and quickest progress in fighting poverty in history.

Neither China nor India, Moyo points out, owed their progress to aid inflows at all. True, India had used aid well, but for decades its growth was inhibited by bad policies, and it was only when aid had become negligible and its economic policies improved in the early 1990s that its economy boomed. The same goes for China.

If history is any guide, therefore, the chief weapon in the “war on poverty” should be not aid but liberal policy reforms. Aid may assist poor nations if it is effectively tied to the adoption of sound development policies and carefully channeled to countries that are prepared to use it properly (as President George W. Bush’s Millennium Challenge program recently sought to do). Political reform is important, too, as has been recognized by the enlightened African leaders who have put their energies into the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which aims to check the continent’s worst political abuses.

But unfortunately, despite all these good intentions, if the conditions for aid’s proper use do not prevail, that aid is more likely to harm than help the world’s poorest nations. This has been true in the past, it is true now, and it will continue to be true in the future—especially if some

activists get their wishes and major new flows of aid reach the developing world simply because it makes Western donors feel good.

Moyo is right to raise her voice, and she should be heard if African nations and other poor countries are to move in the right direction. In part, that depends on whether the international development agenda is set by Hollywood actresses and globetrotting troubadours or by policymakers and academics with half a century of hard-earned experience and scholarship. In the end, however, it will be the citizens and policymakers of the developing world who will seize the reins and make the choices that shape their destiny and, hopefully, soon achieve the development progress that so many have sought for so long. 🌍

Review Essay

The Better Half

Helping Women Help the World

Isobel Coleman

Half the Sky: Turning Oppression Into Opportunity for Women Worldwide. BY NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF AND SHERYL WUDUNN. Knopf, 2009, 320 pp. \$27.95. When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton toured Africa in August 2009, she went out of her way to meet with women's groups—female farmers in Kenya, rape victims in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, microfinance entrepreneurs across the continent. In South Africa, she spent twice as long visiting a women's housing project near Cape Town as she did meeting with the country's president, Jacob Zuma. Some quietly sniped that Clinton was devaluing her office by meeting with so many grass-roots female activists; others applauded the fact that a

U.S. secretary of state had made women's rights a critical foreign policy issue. Clinton defended her agenda, noting that such attention serves to “change the priorities” of governments.

Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn's new book, *Half the Sky*, should convince any reader of why those priorities do, in fact, need to change. Kristof and WuDunn argue that “the brutality inflicted routinely on women and girls in much of the world” is “one of the paramount human rights problems of this century.” Their statistics are numbing: every year, at least two million girls worldwide “disappear” due to gender discrimination. Given little societal value, girls are not vaccinated, not treated when they are sick, not educated, and

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The Better Half

often not even fed. Women between the ages of 15 and 44 are more likely to be maimed or killed by male violence than by war, cancer, malaria, and traffic accidents combined. More women have been killed by neglect and violence in the last 50 years than men have by all the wars of the twentieth century. The cost to the world is staggering—not only in human terms but also in economic terms: lost IQ, lost GDP, cyclical poverty.

But Kristof and WuDunn do not simply fall into moral outrage. Instead, they acknowledge the difficulty of eliminating the deeply rooted social practices underlying gender discrimination, while also presenting a series of colorful vignettes that demonstrate the resilience of the human spirit. Many of the characters will be familiar to regular readers of Kristof's *New York Times* columns: for example, Srey Neth and Srey Momm, the young Cambodian girls Kristof bought from a brothel and set free (only to see Momm make her way back to prostitution); Mukhtar Mai, the illiterate Pakistani woman who was gang-raped but defied tradition by refusing to commit suicide and instead opened a local school for girls; and Mahabouba Muhammad, a young Ethiopian girl who was sold as a second wife to a 60-year-old man and who then suffered terrible fistula injuries when she tried to deliver a baby by herself in the bush (an obstetric fistula is a hole between a woman's birth canal and her internal organs caused by obstructed childbirth, and it often results in permanent incontinence; fistulas can also be caused by sexual violence).

The story of Muhammad—like many of the stories in the book—is one of a woman who is brutalized by a misogynistic

culture but whose will to survive leads to greater societal good. After her fistula left her stinking of leaking waste, villagers took her to an exposed hut on the edge of town to be eaten by hyenas. She dragged herself to a hospital, where doctors cared for her injuries. (The World Health Organization estimates that there are about two million women with untreated fistula conditions worldwide—most in sub-Saharan Africa—many of whom could be treated with a relatively uncomplicated surgery that costs several hundred dollars.) At the hospital, Muhammad learned to read and write. She now works there as a nurse's aide, helping new patients who suffer from the same condition. Kristof and WuDunn see such local women—with international women's groups providing critical sources of money and expertise—as the backbone of an emerging global movement to “emancipate women and girls.” *Half the Sky* is an unabashed call to support them: in other words, to get on the right side of history.

GIRL POWER

This movement has gained some influential supporters in recent years. By the early 1990s, development economists had produced a substantial body of research that quantified the economic benefits of empowering women. In particular, the funding of girls' education came to be seen as a highly effective way to improve economic growth and to overcome cyclical poverty. Educated women provide better nutrition, health care, and education to their families, in addition to having fewer children and lower rates of maternal mortality, than those women with little or no education. The result is a virtuous cycle for the entire community.

Isobel Coleman

Swayed by such evidence, major development organizations, such as the World Bank, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and CARE, now target their resources toward women. Today, most microfinance organizations also explicitly focus on women—not only because women are statistically more likely to be poor than men but also because women tend to use any marginal increases in their incomes to invest in their families' nutrition, health, and education.

Corporations, too, have realized the benefits of engaging women. The Nike Foundation funds projects that support adolescent girls; ExxonMobil has invested more than \$20 million in its Women's Economic Opportunity Initiative. In 2008, Goldman Sachs launched one of the private sector's most ambitious initiatives: a \$100 million commitment to provide 10,000 women in emerging economies, such as India and Nigeria, with a business education. The firm is not motivated by altruism alone: when Goldman's CEO and chair, Lloyd Blankfein, speaks about the program, he never fails to mention that the company's own research has shown that educating women leads to greater labor-force participation, higher productivity, and higher returns on investment. Put simply, directing resources to women is good for business. Around the world, many governments have similarly recognized that investing in the futures of women and girls makes good economic sense and have moved to close gender gaps in education, health and nutrition, and economic opportunity.

As the stories in *Half the Sky* make clear, however, this is a daunting task. In too many places—particularly sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—the oppression

and marginalization of women lead not only to tragic human suffering but also to lost economic potential and greater instability and violence. In some instances, these problems continue to get worse: the globalization of trade and communication has created new demand and opened up new channels for sex trafficking, and it has spread contagious forms of violence against women. In the Middle East and South Asia, women deemed insufficiently conservative in their dress are attacked with acid. Across Africa, the use of mass rape as an instrument of war has jumped from one conflict to another.

Some countries have made explicit choices to unleash the productive capacity of women. Kristof and WuDunn point to China as one example. A century ago, China was a brutal place to be a woman: foot binding, child marriage, and concubinage were all commonplace, and newborn girls were regularly left out to die. But for all his ruthlessness, Mao Zedong recognized, as one of his favored proverbs went, that “women hold up half the sky.” Accordingly, he forced a more modern role for women on the country. Today, educated young women are powering the Chinese economic miracle by working in export-oriented factories and by raising a generation of Chinese children who will be better educated than their parents.

Rwanda is another example. The 1994 genocide killed off a disproportionate number of men, leaving the population 70 percent female. Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, recognized that women would be critical to getting the country back on its feet. The country, as Kristof and WuDunn write, “was obliged to utilize women.” Kagame supported a new constitution that reserved 30 percent

The Better Half

of the parliamentary seats for women; he also appointed women to many high-level posts, including president of the supreme court, minister of education, and mayor of Kigali. Today, Rwanda is the only country in the world where women comprise a legislative majority—55 percent in the lower house. And as Kristof and WuDunn write, Rwanda “is also one of the least corrupt, fastest-growing, and best-governed countries in Africa.” Several studies have shown that as the proportion of female representatives in a country’s parliament rises, corruption falls—even when controlling for other factors, such as income, education, and ethnic division.

It is worth noting, however, that much of the credit for Rwanda’s success lies not with its high-profile reliance on women but with Kagame’s own role as a benevolent dictator, which allows him to tightly manage much of the country’s economic and political life. It is unclear if Rwanda’s upward trajectory will continue after Kagame’s rule. If it can, then Rwanda’s carefully constructed political and economic dynamic could serve as a model for the many countries across the continent that are struggling with chronic corruption.

The cases of China and Rwanda show that the role of women in a society can change in a relatively short period of time. The problem with these models, however, is that in each case, gains for women were largely brought about by a brutal dislocation: Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China and genocide in Rwanda. Neither is exactly an inspiration. Fortunately, there are other options. Although violent and turbulent change can offer a country the chance to carry out a swift and sweeping reassessment of its cultural values, the experience of the Asian economic powerhouses—especially

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—shows that significant investments in education can change attitudes toward women almost as swiftly as large-scale social trauma.

But traditions die hard. In China, as Kristof and WuDunn acknowledge, the preference for boys remains so strong that millions of families choose to abort female fetuses—reflecting an old prejudice that has been aided by new technology, in the form of cheap and widely available ultrasounds. A generation of Chinese boys is growing up in which many will have no hope of ever marrying—a potentially dangerous skewing of the population that many sociological indicators suggest may lead to a rise in crime and other aggressive behavior, as well as future demand for trafficked girls.

THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS

At the peak of the slave trade in the 1780s, about 80,000 Africans were brought to the New World each year. Today, estimates by the U.S. State Department suggest that between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked across borders as bonded laborers or sex slaves each year, most of them women. In the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom pushed to end the slave trade—an effort that Kristof and WuDunn hold up as the ideal model for a new movement to empower women. They cite the British abolitionist movement as “a singular, shining example of a people who accepted a substantial, sustained sacrifice of blood and treasure to improve the lives of fellow human beings living far away.”

Indeed, over 60 years, the United Kingdom’s commitment to abolishing the slave trade caused it to suffer the deaths

Isobel Coleman

of 5,000 soldiers, diplomatic conflict, and reduced GNP. One study Kristof and WuDunn quote suggests that the United Kingdom's commitment to ending the slave trade resulted in a loss of nearly two percentage points of GNP a year for 60 years. It is hard to imagine any country today making such an effort in order to empower women in faraway places. The United States' commitment to women's rights as a rationale for the continued U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan has hardly been sufficient to sustain public support for the war.

Unfortunately, the challenge of empowering women throughout the world has less in common with the challenge of ending the slave trade than with that of ending slavery itself. More than a century ago, the United Kingdom used its unrivaled control of the seas to end the trade in slaves, but the institution of slavery and the underlying racism that made it possible continued well into the twentieth century (Saudi Arabia abolished slavery only in 1962; Mauritania, in 1981).

The fundamental challenge, then, is cultural. Many people in the West too often ignore the problems confronting women in other parts of the world by dismissing, or even condoning, the oppressive practices there as those of a different culture. With its stories of brave women—and men—who are challenging local practices, *Half the Sky* forces the reader to rethink this position. Culture, in fact, is contested in every country, and societal norms are far from immutable.

As Kristof and WuDunn note, the push to reshape cultural attitudes and practices toward women must come from the developing world itself. Examples such as Edna Adan's maternity hospital in

Somaliland and Sakena Yacoobi's school for girls in Afghanistan show such initiatives are happening. Many of the most powerful stories in *Half the Sky* are about the intrepid women and men who refuse to go along with tradition, sometimes risking their lives in the process. The most effective Western organizations are those that partner with local groups in their efforts to provide critical moral, financial, and technical support. Governments and individuals in the developed world can make their aid more efficient and effective by providing women with education, leadership training, access to income, and a political voice.

Cultural change, meanwhile, can come from some unlikely places. Kristof and WuDunn cite a study that examined what happened after a rural village in India received cable television. Local women gained autonomy: they became able to leave home without permission from men and to participate in household decisions, more likely to send their daughters to school, and less likely to say they preferred a son over a daughter. Just from people watching soap operas about "modern" families, attitudes changed.

At the end of this moving and thought-provoking book, Kristof and WuDunn call on Washington to focus on a few specific policies, most important, investing in girls' education. It will take many generations before all girls around the world are enrolled in school. In the book's final chapter, Kristof and WuDunn walk the reader through how he or she can shorten that process by becoming involved in organizations that support women's empowerment around the world. One can only hope that *Half the Sky* indeed sparks the global movement of which its authors dream. 🌍

Review Essay

An Elegy for Journalism?

The Colorful Past and Uncertain Future of Foreign Reporting

Peter Osnos

Losing the News: The Future of the News That Feeds Democracy. BY ALEX S. JONES. Oxford University Press, 2009, 234 pp. \$24.95.

Journalism's Roving Eye: A History of American Foreign Reporting. BY JOHN MAXWELL HAMILTON. Louisiana State University Press, 2009, 655 pp. \$45.00.

The twenty-first century has been a traumatic one for journalism. Changes in how people consume news, combined with the great recession of 2007–9 and the business equivalent of reckless driving by some proprietors (such as the real estate mogul Sam Zell's steering the Tribune Company into bankruptcy), have produced an era that in retrospect will seem, at best, severely chastening and, at worst, catastrophic.

In *Losing the News*, Alex Jones, who won a Pulitzer Prize while at *The New York Times* and is now director of the

Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University, addresses how the rise of the Internet and the precipitous decline in advertising have left print journalism, especially big-city newspapers, in desperate straits. Jones' book is a *cri de coeur*. John Maxwell Hamilton's *Journalism's Roving Eye*, meanwhile, is a prodigious account of a specific form of newsgathering—foreign correspondence—that has long been buffeted by pressures to cut costs and waning public interest in what happens abroad, even before the more recent challenges posed by the Internet. Journalism has a raffish and colorful past, but the annals of foreign reporting are particularly suited to the storytelling that Hamilton provides. His book is an expansive narrative that also underscores serious questions about what is happening now.

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Peter Osnos

Journalism is the craft of newsgathering. Over time, it has evolved to encompass a set of standards and practices that make it—when it is done well—a reliable provider of facts and interpretation. Anyone can report what he sees happening around him, but there is a premium on the experienced judgment of professional writers and editors. And this is what is at stake today.

For all its shortcomings and excesses, journalism is an essential—even indispensable—element of any functioning democracy. Traditionally, society's other great estates—government, education, medicine, the arts—have had a revenue model based on taxes, fees, insurance, or philanthropy. Journalism, however, has been supported overwhelmingly by advertising and circulation—a model that assures an ongoing tug of war between the need to cultivate the public interest and the duty to antagonize society's most powerful pillars through careful scrutiny. News organizations are civic assets as much as are universities, libraries, museums, and hospitals, but unlike these institutions, the media have never been able to count on guaranteed public support.

Nonprofit media may yet turn out to be a savior. Yet significantly, Jones and Hamilton barely mention National Public Radio or local public radio and television, despite the fact that NPR, in particular, has emerged in recent years as one of the United States' most significant sources of quality news, with more correspondents stationed abroad than all of the broadcast networks put together—a development without precedent in journalism's history. Listeners pay for most of the cost of public radio; the rest comes largely from under-

writers (in effect, corporate sponsors) and, less so, from the government. But the understanding of nonprofit media is still limited in the United States because most Americans continue to expect their news to come from businesses. Even if nonprofit journalism does not get much attention from Jones and Hamilton, this is a model deserving of more focus in the future.

PAPERBOYS

Hamilton, once a foreign correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor* and ABC Radio, is the dean of the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University. As such, he feels admiration and affection for fellow practitioners of the correspondent's craft. Hamilton tracks the delivery of news from its origins among Colonial printers, who first incorporated correspondence from abroad, laying the foundation for all the foreign reporting that has followed. Next came the fiercely partisan press of the post-Revolutionary period, when newspapers were more manifestoes than chronicles of events. By the late nineteenth century, newspapers had developed into the recognizable antecedents of the template that dominates today: they published a mix of news and opinion, some from reporters they had sent abroad. Perhaps the most celebrated foreign correspondent of the time was Sir Henry Morton Stanley, who, in 1869, was dispatched by James Gordon Bennett, Jr., the irreverent and innovative publisher of *The New York Herald*, to find the explorer David Livingstone on the shores of Lake Tanganyika.

The early twentieth century was the age of media moguls such as William Randolph Hearst, Robert McCormick, and Joseph Pulitzer and of newspapers

An Elegy for Journalism?

that reflected these men's swashbuckling demeanor, political perspective, and taste in reporters and stories. Hearst, as Hamilton describes in entertaining detail, made the *New York Journal* into a high-profile cheerleader, if not a catalyst, for the Spanish-American War; McCormick declared his *Chicago Tribune* the "world's greatest newspaper"; and Pulitzer favored attention-getting stunts, such as the *New York World's* expedition "to save 24 white slaves from bondage in the Yucatan."

The modern era has been framed by illustrious families—the Sulzbergers, the Grahams, the Chandlers, and the Luces—who gave foreign reporting its most sustained period by stationing highly regarded correspondents in permanent bureaus abroad. These reporters were given the time and the means to do more than sweep in for a "scoop," to borrow the title of the iconic 1938 Evelyn Waugh novel that captured the personas of newspaper owners and their intrepid reporters.

The characters in Hamilton's book—including Richard Harding Davis, famous for his travel writing and war dispatches in the early years of the twentieth century; Nellie Bly, who set out to beat the record set in Jules Verne's novel *Around the World in Eighty Days* (she did, making the trip in 72 days); and Edward R. Murrow, the legendary pioneer of broadcast journalism—were celebrities whose outsized lives matched their adventurous calling. Most of these figures came in what Hamilton calls "the golden age" of American journalism, "the period between the two world wars when outlets for foreign news swelled and a large number of experienced, independent journalists circled the globe. Radio, which emerged during that golden age, and later television made news more immediate,

more dramatic and more personal."

Hamilton's stars all had personalities suited to the task of conveying the excitement of the places from where they were reporting. Davis, for example, combined hard work with a zeal for self-promotion. "Mindful of how he looked to his audience," Hamilton writes, "Davis complemented his square-jawed manliness with specially tailored uniforms and was never shy about being photographed or handing photos out."

If there is a hero in Hamilton's pantheon, it is Victor Fremont Lawson, the now largely forgotten owner of the *Chicago Daily News*. Lawson, whose family made a fortune in Chicago real estate and other businesses in the nineteenth century, took control of the *News* in 1888, when it was still a small paper. He decided to invest in international coverage, and by the turn of the century, according to Hamilton, he had "virtually invented the ideal of a high-quality American newspaper foreign service."

The ambitions of Lawson's correspondents were formidable: "Our men," said Edward Price Bell, Lawson's first major envoy, who went to London, "are journalistic intellectuals, with definite personalities, with considerable personal reputations and charged with duties in the highest realm of newspaper work." Over time, a number of other newspapers subscribed to the *Chicago Daily News'* foreign report.

The problems Lawson faced in maintaining a foreign staff suggest that today's difficulties are not all that new. In 1924, Hopewell Rogers, in charge of increasing efficiency in the paper's business office, decided to involve himself in expense accounts. According to Hamilton, "among Rogers' ideas for improvement was

Peter Osnos

elimination of the category “incidental.” Bell, then back in Chicago working as an editor, told Lawson that “there should be no detailed scrutiny as to how our men spend their money.” There is no doubt about who would win that debate if it took place today; Lawson, however, promised the newsroom that such a discussion would never happen again. But he died the next year, and although the *Chicago Daily News* maintained a foreign staff through a succession of owners almost until the paper closed, in 1978, its glory days largely ended after World War II. Other major newspapers once regarded as leaders in foreign reporting, especially the *New York Herald Tribune*, were forced to cut back as their overall financial resources dwindled in the early 1960s.

THE LAST BUREAU

The number of U.S. correspondents abroad reached its peak in the 1980s, when—by my count, using Hamilton’s statistics—a couple hundred journalists were reporting from around the world for newspapers, magazines, and television. Recent cutbacks have been deep. Hamilton cites a 2008 study of 250 U.S. newspapers that concluded that foreign news was “rapidly losing ground at rates greater than any other topic area.”

The underlying question raised in *Journalism’s Roving Eye*, then, is whether the kind of foreign reporting that Hamilton chronicles is in inexorable decline. And if so, how much does this matter to the broader craft of journalism and to the greater public good?

In recent years, newspapers and magazines that once enjoyed substantial and well-funded bureaus abroad have been forced to cut back, if not shutter entirely,

their overseas operations. In the glory days, a bureau chief stationed abroad for a major U.S. publication had perquisites and accommodations comparable to those afforded high-level diplomats. Most news bureaus nowadays consist of a reporter; a local “fixer,” who handles logistics and interpretation; a laptop; a cell phone; and a modest apartment that doubles as an office. U.S. television correspondents based abroad are few in number, except for those who work for CNN, which serves an extensive international audience, and the cadre of young network reporters and stringers who carry their own webcams.

News organizations have sharply scaled back their coverage in Iraq. Some correspondents who were stationed there have been redeployed to Afghanistan as the violence and the U.S. troop presence there have increased. Given the substantial stakes of these conflicts for the United States, the consistency and depth of reporting from both places seem too low—especially compared to what they would have been a couple decades ago.

But there is a flip side to this admittedly glum assessment: the English-language wire services—the Associated Press, Reuters, and, for financial and economic news, Bloomberg—have large on-the-ground presences nearly everywhere in the world, with reporters and editors capable of providing more than just the spot news that is the wires’ traditional purview. The best of these reporters produce interpretive features that match the work traditionally produced by newspaper correspondents. The BBC, meanwhile, has scores of reporters around the globe, particularly in Africa and Asia, where other broadcasters are sparse. *The Economist*, a much-praised—and, from

An Elegy for Journalism?

all indications, financially successful—magazine, uses stringers, relatively few staff reporters, and expert editors to deliver an impressive weekly survey of the world that justifies the publication's relatively high price.

All this suggests that as some opportunities and outlets for international reporting have narrowed, others have widened—any young reporter with modest cash reserves and a willingness to live simply still has a fair shot of becoming a stringer in remote but roiling places. GlobalPost, for example, is a new Boston-based Web site that employs both young reporters and more seasoned correspondents. Much like the old *Chicago Daily News*, it hopes to syndicate its foreign reportage to news organizations that cannot afford their own.

The Washington Post, *The Wall Street Journal*, and the *Financial Times* produce excellent foreign reports, but the epitome of global coverage comes from *The New York Times*, which has around 35 foreign correspondents, supported by local employees and stringers. Although the financial constraints at the *Times* have been intense—resulting from debt and the industry-wide advertising depression—the Sulzberger family is pursuing a strategy that aims to expand the paper's readership among elites, charge more for the print newspaper, attract more advertising when the economy recovers, and cultivate a Web site that can become a major source of profit when, as seems likely, ways are found to start charging for access to it. The descendents of Vincent Sheean and John Gunther—two writers and travelers from the early and mid-twentieth century—are such columnists as Thomas Friedman and Nicholas Kristof at the *Times* (as well

as Fareed Zakaria at *Newsweek*). Their articles and books deliver facts and context with flair and serve as proof that the combination of reporting and punditry can still be an influential force in shaping how international issues are perceived.

Today, anyone with enough interest to make the effort can be well informed about the world. But is the situation better or worse than it was in Hamilton's golden age, 75 years ago? In 1969, as he neared the end of his career, C. L. Sulzberger, the *Times'* chief foreign correspondent, wrote, "When young men ask me for advice on how to become a foreign correspondent, I tell them: 'Don't.' It is like becoming a blacksmith in 1919—still an honorable and skilled profession; but the horse is doomed."

Nonetheless, the long view offered in Hamilton's book suggests that today's culture of foreign reporting is shaped by both historical techniques and the capabilities of the Internet age. Although no one is required to file in "cablese"—the often indecipherable shorthand long used to save money and transmission time—there are blogs and Twitter feeds that amount to the same thing: they sketch the news in real time, although on mobile devices instead of ticker tape.

The rigor and rewards of being a foreign correspondent remain, as do the dangers. The videotaped murder of *The Wall Street Journal's* Daniel Pearl and the kidnapping, jailing, and harassment of other reporters in crisis zones are modern versions of what has always happened when reporters are caught in the crossfire or ignore caution. But, as Hamilton shows, the lure of correspondence is stronger than the vicissitudes of funding or even public interest. There will always be young men and

Peter Osnos

women eager to go abroad and make their names as reporters, and the best of them will make an impact whatever the technology of the time. For all its turmoil, journalism's current chapter is not its last. Appropriately, the last line of Hamilton's book is "Not the end . . ."

JOURNALISM'S CORE MUSCLES

The decline in the fortunes of print newspapers does suggest the end of an era, however. Jones' book presents what is at risk of being lost: what he calls "the iron core" of journalism, which comes from shoe-leather reporting, experience, and, often, courage. Jones calls this particular brand of journalism "accountability news" because, as he writes, "it is the form of news whose purpose is to hold government and those with power accountable." Democracy in the United States has been strengthened by the oversight provided by watchdogs covering everything from the smallest municipality to the White House.

This genre of reporting stands apart from flip, glib, and entertaining opinion-driven commentary—the fast food that nourishes much of the blog culture, which is relatively cheap to produce compared to in-depth investigations and systematic coverage of local and national beats.

And yet the future of such news is in danger. Jones argues that Americans must recognize and respond to this growing crisis. Entrenched business and political leaders, for whom journalism has often been an infuriating nuisance, cannot be counted on to save it, especially not in large cities, which is where newspapers are in the most trouble.

To replace what is being lost, resources must be found from the private sector, philanthropists, and even the government.

On this point, Jones' book, as well as Hamilton's, offers another, more hopeful message: innovation and entrepreneurship never end, and in the future, journalists will gather the news using methods not yet created.

It is a human impulse to collect and disseminate information. The means of delivering news will change but not the need for gathering it. And so journalism will always exist in one form or another. Yet those who see journalism as a calling are right to worry about the pressures imposed by those who see it only as a moneymaker and by those determined to limit its intrusive qualities. Some battles are never over. 🌐

Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

The Perils of Global Legalism. BY ERIC A. POSNER. University of Chicago Press, 2009, 296 pp. \$29.00.

This book is a spirited attack on “excessive faith in the efficacy of international law.” Posner focuses on the thinking of American and European legal intellectuals who see international law as normatively good for the world regardless of whether it serves specific state interests. These “global legalists,” he claims, have “long since dropped the conventional view that international law is based on the consent of states; international law transcends the interests of states and holds them in its grasp.” Posner sees global legalism as utopian—built on unsustainable premises about human nature and the practicality of transferring domestic legal traditions to the international level. Several chapters take an interesting look at the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, arguing that these legal venues have performed better than other international bodies partly because they have limited jurisdictions that can be controlled by states. Posner may be right that international law matters when it serves nation-states’ interests. But in a

world of shared values and common problems, it should not be surprising that many states want to build global systems of laws and institutions that go beyond his minimalist vision.

Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. BY BETH A. SIMMONS. Cambridge University Press, 2009, 468 pp. \$90.00 (paper, \$28.99).

Over the last half century, the body of international law that enshrined the sovereign independence of states has given way to new legal understandings that obligate governments to protect human rights. But does this emerging framework really constrain states? Simmons says yes, and proceeds to offer an extraordinarily rich and sophisticated argument about why, when, and how. Skeptics argue that governments sign agreements that obligate them to follow principles to which they already adhere or that they can easily ignore. Simmons agrees that governments pick and choose treaties, but over the long term, she sees human rights agreements changing the politics inside countries. They influence legislative agendas, alter political coalitions, and define the terms of acceptable state action. Simmons marshals impressive empirical data to test her argument and to distinguish

Recent Books

it from alternative stories, examining the record in areas such as civil rights, the equality of women, and the humane treatment of prisoners. Her pathbreaking book explains much about the relationship between international law and national politics, but it also provides an inspiring glimpse of human progress in action.

Hierarchy in International Relations. BY DAVID A. LAKE. Cornell University Press, 2009, 272 pp. \$39.95.

Scholars tend to think of international relations as taking place in a world of anarchy—a decentralized system in which sovereign states are the masters and rulers of their realm. But much of the globe has historically been a world of hierarchy, where powerful states build order and weaker states submit to it. This is the world of empires, tributary systems, hegemonic orders, spheres of influence, and patron-client relations. In this pioneering work, Lake argues that hierarchical relations are best seen as bargained relationships in which the dominant state provides “services”—such as order, security, and governance—to subordinate states in return for compliance. What distinguishes the various forms of hierarchy, from colonialism to modern alliances, is the amount of sovereignty signed over to the leading state. Lake uses this insight to explore patterns of U.S.-led hierarchy in the security and economic realms, relying on measures such as the presence of U.S. military bases, exchange-rate linkages, and trade dependence. The danger in this sort of work is that it is easy to confuse willing subordination with coercion. Lake argues that because some states—both small and large—are subordinate to the United States and others are not,

hierarchy is based on voluntary “contracts,” not just power. His theory does not illuminate hierarchies that are a mix of coercion and consent, but it offers new thinking about the complex interactions between the United States and its junior partners.

Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives. EDITED BY

PETER J. KATZENSTEIN. Routledge, 2009, 248 pp. \$125.00 (paper, \$34.95).

Samuel Huntington’s famous essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” set off a decade-long debate about culture and identity in world politics. In Huntington’s bold rendering, civilizations were primordial entities that would replace ideology and geopolitics as the animating sources of cooperation and conflict in the post-Cold War world. In this illuminating new collection of essays, Katzenstein and his colleagues hold that civilizations are not global conflict groups so much as malleable cultural identities that orient the ideas and practices of states and peoples. James Kurth argues that American civilization has transformed from its Protestant and British Enlightenment roots into a more fragmented, secular, and multicultural array of traditions and values. Susanne Rudolph explores the different facets of Hindu and Indian civilization, finding multiple identities and traditions ebbing and flowing in and out of South Asia. The most interesting arguments in the book deal with the “inter-civilizational” encounters—diplomacy, commerce, cultural exchanges—that are shaping global order. Huntington was deeply skeptical of anything that might be called a universal civilization, Western, liberal, or otherwise. In contrast, Katzenstein

Recent Books

argues that civilizational “clashes, encounters, and engagements” are giving shape to a “civilization of modernity” that draws on values and aspirations of all the world’s cultural groups, even if the precise content of this modern universalism remains unclear.

Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global

Governance. EDITED BY JEFFREY L. DUNOFF AND JOEL P. TRACHMAN. Cambridge University Press, 2009, 430 pp. \$95.00 (paper, \$36.99).

This fascinating volume poses the question, Is it useful to think of the sprawling system of global governance as a sort of “constitution” for the world? None of the contributors believes that states have spun a web of laws and agreements that add up to a world government. Nonetheless, the legal scholars assembled here do see aspects of constitutionalism in global rules and institutions. David Kennedy explores the connections between law and the search for governance among states, Michael Doyle finds constitution-like aspects in the UN Charter, and other chapters probe the constitutional features in the World Trade Organization and the European Union. These treaty-based organizations, the authors argue, are more than just cooperative agreements among members; they are also perpetual institutions whose ongoing authority does not require continuing consent from member states. Skeptics will question the extent to which there is coherence and force in today’s global rights and laws. But the volume succeeds in showcasing the evolving connections among rights, democracy, legitimacy, and international cooperation.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities. BY JOHN CASSIDY. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009, 400 pp. \$28.00. Much has been written about the failures of bankers, rating agencies, and regulators leading up to the financial crisis of 2008. This highly readable book focuses on the ideas that informed the actors who contributed to the debacle. It heavily implicates the profession of economics of recent decades, with its discovery and refinement of notions such as perfect financial markets (all available information is reflected in the current prices of financial assets) and rational expectations (all actors accurately know how the economy works and have unbiased forecasts of the future), along with its claim that all markets are stable and self-equilibrating. This ideology questioned the need for government regulation. And it resonated strongly with parts of the business and financial communities—and with some legislators—leading to the extensive deregulation of financial markets. Cassidy offers a clear and occasionally colorful exposition of the evolution of relevant economic thought in a way that is accessible to non-economists.

Keynes: The Return of the Master. BY ROBERT SKIDELSKY. PublicAffairs, 2009, 256 pp. \$24.95.

The author of the authoritative three-volume biography of John Maynard Keynes provides here a welcome short introduction to Keynesian economics, which he argues is

Recent Books

still relevant to the modern U.S. economy. Keynes specified three important contentions. First, uncertainty needs to be taken seriously in modern economics, and this fundamental uncertainty—the unknown unknowns—cannot be adequately captured with the statistical techniques fashionable in the study of economics. Second, once dislodged from a satisfactory state, modern economies cannot be relied on to return smoothly and automatically to that state—at least not quickly enough to be politically tolerable. Third, civilization cannot thrive if efficiency and moneymaking are held as its highest values. The book offers clear and cogent critiques of modern macroeconomic thought, along with a brief but useful summary of what went wrong in 2007–9.

The Idea of Justice. BY AMARTYA SEN.

Belknap Press, 2009, 496 pp. \$29.95. Political philosophers since Aristotle have wrestled with the concept of justice; although justice is universally desired, it is difficult to agree on exactly what it is. In this book, the Nobel Prize-winning Harvard economist and philosopher Sen departs from much of the recent philosophical discourse on this vast subject, usefully drawing not only on Western philosophy but also on the wisdom of ancient Asian thinkers. Sen rejects the social-contract approach to justice in favor of a results-based one that relies on an understanding of generally acknowledged injustices—without attempting to design a perfectly just society, as the social-contract approach typically does. Also, he accepts that there may be different but equally legitimate views of what is just or unjust in particular cases. Instead of trying to adjudicate definitively among them, Sen encourages reasoned discourse about the

different ethical principles involved. This discourse becomes an important element in moving toward a more just society.

The Aid Trap: Hard Truths About Ending Poverty. BY R. GLENN HUBBARD AND WILLIAM DUGGAN. Columbia Business School Publishing, 2009, 212 pp. \$22.95.

The authors, both from the Columbia Business School, have a strong thesis: that the best way, really the only effective way, to reduce poverty around the world is by fostering private business. They allow much room for charity, but they argue that charity should not be confused, as it frequently is, with economic development. The foreign aid establishment, both bilateral and multilateral, too often makes this error and, by operating through government bureaucracies, impedes the growth of a robust business sector in country after country. So do the activities of now-fashionable non-governmental organizations, which provide free goods and services that could be provided by local businesses. The authors call for trimming back conventional aid and substituting it with a new Marshall Plan, mainly for Africa. The original Marshall Plan worked in the late 1940s by providing dollar loans to European businesses to help them get back on their feet; the repayment of the loans to governments kickstarted investments in infrastructure. Hubbard and Duggan make a case that their program would work in a similar way.

U.S. Pension Reform: Lessons From Other Countries. BY MARTIN NEIL BAILY AND JACOB FUNK KIRKEGAARD. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009, 384 pp. \$26.95.

The debate over medical care in the United

Recent Books

States has crowded out the debate over Social Security, but the future fiscal viability of the latter has yet to be solved. With increasing longevity everywhere, often accompanied by low birthrates, the viability of public pension systems is a serious concern in all rich countries. This book compares the U.S. system to others (it fares rather well) and explores whether reforms in other countries are applicable to the United States. The authors conclude, partly on the basis of international experience, that the U.S. system can be made fiscally viable by gradually increasing the age of eligibility for retirement (including early retirement), by increasing payments into Social Security by the wealthy, and, as necessary, by increasing taxes. They also support a voluntary, government-sponsored, and privately managed retirement-savings program for low- and middle-income families—as an addition to, not a substitute for, Social Security.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

Terrorism: How to Respond. BY RICHARD ENGLISH. Oxford University Press, 2009, 188 pp. \$24.95.

Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement From Radical and Extremist Movements. BY JOHN HORGAN. Routledge, 2009, 216 pp. \$135.00 (paper, \$36.95).

Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. BY ELI BERMAN. MIT Press, 2009, 280 pp. \$24.95.

The development of the field of terrorism studies has, in recent years, appeared to

outpace the development of actual terrorism. Now may be the era of diminishing marginal returns. One conclusion from English's thoughtful, informed meditation on the state of terrorism research is that there is not a lot new to say (and even here the field could have been spared another disquisition on the problems of terminology). It is not evident that the general lessons for counterterrorism that have come to the fore in dealing with Islamist terrorism are that different from those that emerged from dealing with Northern Ireland (on which English has written extensively). The basic need is to maintain a sense of perspective and understand that although particular campaigns come and go, political violence is a continuing possibility. English argues that governments must accept that the military has a limited role to play when dealing with the violence but that good intelligence will always be necessary.

Another author with an Irish background is Horgan. His topic, asking why terrorists disengage, is a good one, and is far less explored than the question of why they engage in the first place. Unfortunately, as a pilot project for something bigger, this book has a rather interim and tentative feel. After an earnest section on methodology and a decent overview of the current debates over deradicalization, there are eight case studies of individuals, representing only a small sample of the interviews Horgan has conducted, and these are only moderately interesting. It is hard to discern a single pattern of disillusion. What does come across is that whatever terrorists' commitment to an underlying ideology, their actual experience of perpetrating violence affects them in different ways and can lead to disaffection.

Recent Books

The real gem of recent releases is Berman's brilliant analysis of religious terrorism. The value lies not only in what is learned about this form of violence but also in the elegance of the analysis. This is first-rate social science, with a compelling theory, strong evidence, and an accessible style. The conventional explanations for the success of religious terrorist groups point to the nature of the theology and perhaps fanatical cultural predispositions. Berman identifies the need to avoid defection as essential for the survival of these organizations, a weakness that the authorities can often exploit by making irresistible offers to individual members, in the form of either bribes or threats. To understand why defection is less frequent than might be expected, he explores the nature of religious communities that tend to insist on distinctive dress and social codes, encourage religious education even though it limits opportunities for outside advancement, and provide charitable services to their adherents. They use whatever extra revenues they can get to boost these services and distance members from the most likely alternative culture. In most cases, these religious communities have nothing to do with terrorism—for example, ultra-Orthodox Jews—but should such groups become inclined to violent strategies, the tight communal bonds help solve the problem of defection. Their loyalty to their communities, and the aid that will go to their families, helps explain the readiness of some to become suicide bombers and also why the nonsuicidal members of terrorist teams stick with their tasks.

Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security. BY GREGORY D. KOBLENTZ. Cornell University Press, 2009, 256 pp. \$35.00.

Breeding Bio Insecurity: How U.S. Biodefense Is Exporting Fear, Globalizing Risk, and Making Us All Less Secure. BY LYNN C. KLOTZ AND EDWARD J. SYLVESTER. University of Chicago Press, 2009, 272 pp. \$27.50.

Koblentz provides an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of biological weapons as a strategic problem that should become the standard text in the field. He is alive to the paradoxes of the topic: these are weapons that cause disease yet arise from efforts to discover cures, they are absolutely prohibited by an international treaty that nobody seems to think has removed the danger they pose, and they are presumed to be widely available but are rarely used. They are compared to nuclear weapons, but, as he notes, they do not work for deterrent purposes. They did not help Iraq, for example, in 1991. At the core of the book are detailed case studies of what is and was known about Iraqi, Soviet/Russian, and South African programs. The book draws lessons about intelligence, verification, and oversight, and also about what strategic value the offending countries sought to extract by pursuing such weapons. (Its analysis of the failure to get an accurate reading of the Iraqi position in 2002 is withering.) Through a careful examination of actual cases, Koblentz has done his best to get the true measure of the bioterrorist threat.

A point made by Koblentz on how biodefense programs might advance offensive knowledge is fully developed in the forceful analysis by Klotz and Sylvester, whose message is contained in its subtitle:

Recent Books

that U.S. efforts at biodefense are counter-productive. The authors do not deny the inherent nastiness and danger of biological weapons. Their claim is that by talking up the threat, policymakers have caused a vast network of high-security laboratories to spring up, which dabble in the most dangerous biotechnologies—theoretically to improve defenses but in practice creating new risks of accidents and leakage while making the rest of the international community suspicious about what is really being planned. The authors make a plausible and disturbing case, arguing for a reduction in the number of laboratories that are allowed to handle the most dangerous organisms, far more oversight and transparency, and greater international cooperation.

The United States

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism. BY JULIAN E. ZELIZER.

Basic Books, 2009, 592 pp. \$35.00.

In this eminently readable book, Zelizer has provided an admirably balanced account of the politics of U.S. foreign policy that will be useful to teachers and students of the subject, as well as general readers with an interest in it. Although the complexity of the subject matter sometimes defeats the author's best efforts to keep the big themes in view, *Arsenal of Democracy* highlights the intricate interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy during the last 60 years. It gives structural realists much to chew on; Zelizer makes a powerful case that domestic political debates, rather than the inter-

national environment, have frequently shaped U.S. foreign policy on issues of great strategic importance. He also discusses the proper balance between the executive and legislative branches, whether Republicans or Democrats have the "security advantage," the proper size of the national security state, and the choice between unilateral and multilateral approaches to security. These are useful questions, and the book uses them to shape a powerful and rewarding study of U.S. foreign policy in modern times.

Muslims in America: A Short History.

BY EDWARD E. CURTIS IV. Oxford

University Press, 2009, 168 pp. \$12.95.

Less useful as a conventional history than as a glimpse into the process of how American Muslims are developing their identity, Curtis' book never quite manages to define its subject or tell a coherent story. In part, this is because the story is so inscrutable. Fragments of Islamic practice survived among slaves, but records are scarce and their meaning is hard to untangle. Many of the early Muslim immigrants to the United States either abandoned their religion or failed to pass it on to their offspring. And the earliest movements among African Americans to claim the title "Muslim" had little in common with recognized forms of Islam. All this changed in the 1960s, when Malcolm X helped lead a movement toward orthodox Islam among African Americans and new immigration laws opened the door to mass immigration from Muslim-majority countries. Unfortunately, Curtis' treatment even of this later era is scattered and unfocused. How many Muslims live in America? Where? What is the current relationship among Muslim immigrant groups—and between African

Recent Books

American Muslims and Muslim immigrants? Even though it dodges these questions, *Muslims in America* does provide an interesting and diverse sampling of Islamic theological reflection in the United States today.

Getting Out: Historical Perspectives on Leaving Iraq. EDITED BY MICHAEL WALZER AND NICOLAUS MILLS. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, 168 pp. \$29.95. A surprisingly large number of U.S. policymakers appear to agree with Henry Ford's famous observation that "history is bunk." Strong on theory and assumptions drawn from disciplines such as economics and political science, but largely ignorant of the facts on the ground, Americans repeatedly get into trouble when theory meets praxis and bullets start to fly. *Getting Out* is a healthy corrective to this national flaw. In this slender but illuminating volume, Walzer and Mills have assembled essays on past military withdrawals and on the tasks facing Americans designing an exit from Iraq. From Stanley Weintraub's crisp essay on Great Britain's withdrawal from the Colonies after its defeat in the American Revolutionary War to studies of much more recent disengagements, the contributions offer a variety of useful and stimulating perspectives on the complex problems involved in orderly withdrawals. George Packer's essay on Iraq best summarizes the consensus here: slow and careful withdrawals work best, although there are no guarantees.

A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War.
BY DANIEL E. SUTHERLAND.
University of North Carolina Press,
2009, 456 pp. \$35.00.
The sesquicentennial of the onset of the

American Civil War will arrive in 2011; this engagingly written and beautifully researched study of the role of guerrilla warfare in the conflict will serve as a helpful antidote to the sentimentality and nostalgia sure to attend the event. For historians, *A Savage Conflict* opens a new window onto the Civil War, portraying the anarchy and conflict that gradually enveloped the South and showing why, once the Confederates' major armies were defeated in the field, neither the Confederate government nor its supporters were willing to fight on as guerrillas. For students of contemporary politics, Sutherland's dispassionate but horrifying study of partisan warfare in the United States will illuminate many of the challenges faced by modern militaries and diplomats in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Sutherland's sober depiction of the moral and human costs of such conflicts, as well as his accounts of the terrifying rapidity with which civil peace disintegrated as anarchy spread, provides much food for thought.

Flannery: A Life of Flannery O'Connor.
BY BRAD GOOCH. Little, Brown,
2009, 464 pp. \$30.00.

Anyone who seeks to understand U.S. politics must come to grips with the South; anyone who wants to know the South must read Flannery O'Connor. Gooch's biography breaks new ground, providing the most complete look at this mysterious and devastating writer available. It portrays O'Connor as an eccentric literary figure, well placed on the southern side of a flourishing postwar literary culture. Although the distinctive form of Catholicism that shaped O'Connor is well documented and influenced a host of other major

Recent Books

American writers and thinkers as well, Gooch is curiously unwilling to bring this body of thought to bear on her life, her choices, or her work, instead focusing on the parts of her life that she herself considered the least important—her travels, her involvement in the literary life of the day. Similarly, while treading gingerly through O'Connor's sometimes pungent and swampy racial attitudes, Gooch fails to give readers O'Connor as a southerner. They will be grateful for what they have but greedy for more; the definitive study of this great literary light has yet to be written.

One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy. BY ALLISON STANGER. Yale

University Press, 2009, 242 pp. \$26.00. As if the reality of U.S. President George W. Bush's foreign policy record were not problematic enough, dystopian caricatures of it usually add a raft of nefarious characters offscreen pulling the strings. In an earlier era, these would have been supervillains or arms manufacturers; today, they are often government contractors, such as Halliburton or Blackwater. Outsourcing has gone so mainstream, in other words, it even shows up in conspiracy theories. If the delegation of governmental functions to private companies has become standard practice, however, the scope, implications, and wisdom of it remain unclear, which is why *One Nation Under Contract* is so useful. Stanger gathers together information on outsourcing in three different spheres—security, diplomacy, and development—and in the process shows just how integral the phenomenon has become in establishing and maintaining the United States' global role in the twenty-first century. She also shows just how little thought and

oversight have accompanied the use of contractors, with predictably unfortunate consequences. The status quo is unacceptable, she argues, and turning back the clock is impossible, so the answer is more transparency and accountability. Officials need to better understand and manage public-private partnerships so that they can serve national interests rather than undermine them.

GIDEON ROSE

Western Europe

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Europe's Promise: Why the European Way Is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age. BY STEVEN HILL. University of California Press, 2010, 456 pp. \$60.00 (paper, \$24.95).

In this timely and provocative book, Hill, known primarily as an analyst of U.S. state and local reform, argues that the “social capitalist” policies of European countries represent best practices in handling most of the challenges modern democracies face today. By contrast, the United States is often dysfunctional. When indirect fees, private out-of-pocket costs, and taxes are all included, Americans pay as much as Europeans for public services but end up with much less. Europe's health care, social welfare, environmental policies, labor rights, “smart power” projection, and multiparty parliamentary governments are consistently more efficient, more just, and less fractious than the United States' libertarian, militaristic, two-party, money-driven, separation-of-powers alternatives. Hill can be breathlessly wordy, and, like some other Europhiles, he occasionally indulges in armchair social psychology—but the

Return to Table of Contents

Recent Books

overall argument rests on solid data. It explains why in most areas, it is Europe's constitutional forms, economic regulations, and social values, not those of the United States, that are the most popular models for new democracies. The oldest one should take note.

Why the Dreyfus Affair Matters. BY LOUIS BEGLEY. Yale University Press, 2009, 272 pp. \$24.00.

L'Affaire Dreyfus was the most widely debated European political event of the generation before World War I. Alfred Dreyfus, a French artillery captain and a Jew, was falsely accused of spying for Germany, for which he spent over four years in solitary confinement on the remote and tropical Devil's Island. To this end, top French military officers forged documents, suppressed information, perverted the military tribunal system, and abused their subordinates. They were backed by right-wing and clerical anti-Dreyfusards, who mobilized anti-Semitic riots, spread nationalist propaganda, marshaled conservative obstruction—even planned a political assassination. Liberal and socialist Dreyfusards, sparked by Émile Zola's heroic polemic "J'Accuse," supported the innocent man with an ultimately successful press campaign to pressure government officials and civilian courts to intervene. Begley, a lawyer, novelist, and historian, struggles to make it all relevant today. He dwells on anti-Semitism, which is less relevant to Western politics now than then. He invokes analogies to the Iraq war and the George W. Bush administration's policies on human rights, but in an oddly disconnected manner. All this misses the deeper point: the Dreyfus Affair cast the "red-versus-blue" mold of much modern

politics, pitting conservative nationalists, soldiers, farmers, and religious interests in a partisan ideological battle against liberal journalists, academics, civilian professionals, urbanites, and cosmopolitans. In thousands of political battles—including those over the Iraq war—Western publics have relived the Dreyfus Affair ever since.

The Narcissism of Minor Differences: How America and Europe Are Alike. BY PETER BALDWIN. Oxford University Press, 2009, 336 pp. \$24.95.

Whether considering health care, human rights, the death penalty, or government regulation, Americans often look to the "European social model" as a point of comparison. Depending on one's partisan predilection, Europe is held up as an example either of just and generous state intervention or of un-American socialism. In this provocative polemic, Baldwin, an economist, claims that the European social model does not exist. In most things, he says, the United States resembles, at least in statistical terms, an average European state. Yet a surprising amount of Baldwin's evidence actually supports the stereotype: the United States has a free-market system with little labor protection, an adversarial legal system, high murder rates and plenty of guns, an enormous prison population, inequitable and expensive health care, and widespread poverty. The book is a must-read nonetheless—and not just because it is filled with intriguing facts that add nuance to what can often be a black-and-white debate. Baldwin is right to point out that although the distance between the European left and the American right is extreme, the difference between the average positions of Europe and the United States is less than is often believed.

Yet he all but ignores that the U.S. government is far less equitable than its European counterparts. It is often surprisingly active in social matters, yet its policies benefit primarily the middle and upper classes. In the end, the old question remains: Why is there no socialism in the United States?

Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. BY GIANDOMENICO MAJONE. Cambridge University Press, 2009, 266 pp. \$99.00 (paper, \$37.99). The EU has been a remarkable success in recent years, enlarging to 27 members, establishing a single currency, removing border controls, moving toward a unified foreign policy, and now, finally, ratifying the Treaty of Lisbon. Majone, among the most knowledgeable and insightful analysts of EU regulatory policy, remains unimpressed. The EU, he believes, has become a self-perpetuating Brussels-centered system of elitist governance that privileges further integration over sound policy and democratic representation. The evidence of inadequacy lies in referendum defeats, slower economic growth, tensions within the Eurozone, and the failure to further liberalize regulation. Majone's solution is to renounce the rhetoric of "ever-closer union" and encourage issue-specific "coalitions of the willing" among EU members—which might even spark greater regulatory competition. Some will disagree with the diagnosis; others will counter that the EU has already, in practice, renounced ambitious plans in favor of a constitutional settlement akin to what Majone prescribes. No matter what one's view, however, this provocative, sophisticated, and informed book must be confronted.

COUNCIL *on* FOREIGN RELATIONS

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Recent Books

The European Court's Political Power: Selected Essays. BY KAREN ALTER. Oxford University Press, 2009, 280 pp. \$75.00. Over the last half century, with little or no black-letter mandate, the European Court of Justice has single-handedly asserted the supremacy of European Community law over national law, the right of individuals to invoke European Community law in court, and its own ultimate responsibility to adjudicate that law's meaning. What is surprising is not that the ECJ handed down these decisions but that national courts—and with them the nation-states of Europe—assented to them, even though they were often seen as undermining national sovereignty. Alter is a hardheaded political scientist who recognizes the centrality of traditional factors such as economically self-interested litigants and politicians who support integration, yet she is also a keen legal analyst who acknowledges the ways in which lawyers and judges have forged a limited autonomy for the law. No social scientist has done more to probe the reasons why this evolution has occurred as it has.

Western Hemisphere

RICHARD FEINBERG

The Silence and the Scorpion: The Coup Against Chávez and the Making of Modern Venezuela. BY BRIAN A. NELSON. Nation Books, 2009, 355 pp. \$26.95. On April 11, 2002, a massive peaceful opposition march in downtown Caracas suddenly veered from its authorized route and headed toward the presidential palace. In response, as Nelson painstakingly documents, government gunmen opened

fire. Fearing further bloodshed, the military high command deposed President Hugo Chávez. But the improvised civilian government blundered while key generals vacillated—allowing Chávez's more decisive military and civilian loyalists to quickly engineer his dramatic return. Nelson's minute-by-minute reporting vividly recreates the infectious excitement of mass participation, and his well-sketched mini-portraits illuminate the deeper currents of Venezuela's polarized politics. Was the United States involved in the coup? On the contrary, concludes Nelson, the U.S. embassy was caught off-guard and was ineffective—there was a “complete lack of U.S. policy toward Venezuela.” Once the smoke cleared, the big winner was Chávez, who rewrote the history of the march as a skirmish between two equally matched groups of armed extremists. He seized the opportunity to purge opponents from the military and the metropolitan police and consolidate his grip over other national institutions.

Growing Pains in Latin America: An Economic Growth Framework as Applied to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Peru. EDITED BY LILIANA ROJAS-SUAREZ. Center for Global Development, 2009, 303 pp. \$26.95.

Latin America's volatile mix of deepening democracy and chronic inequality is a fertile breeding ground for unscrupulous populists. To build a stout analytic framework for the next generation of market-oriented reforms that will secure and continue past progress, the Center for Global Development has pooled the talents of some of the hemisphere's leading social scientists in this cutting-edge synthesis of “lessons learned.” The

Recent Books

contributors seek a reasonable middle ground between simplistic one-size-fits-all prescriptions and a circumstance-specific “it all depends” approach, and between a paralyzing laundry list of proposals and a narrowly focused single-constraint diagnosis. The volume singles out five solid foundations for growth: sustained macroeconomic stability, a more equitable sharing of benefits, secure property rights, equal opportunities, and economic and political competition. Sophisticated country chapters explain what must be done to support political constituencies that favor market reform and encourage more rapid, sustainable growth. Tough institutional reforms—of judiciaries, regulatory bodies, civil-service systems—feature prominently.

Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State?

BY GEORGE W. GRAYSON.

Transaction, 2009, 275 pp. \$34.95.

No, the United States’ southern neighbor, with its many sophisticated institutions and complex social networks, is not the next Afghanistan. But as the veteran Mexico watcher Grayson documents in lurid and depressing detail, powerful drug traffickers have corrupted the country’s political and law enforcement establishments at all levels. The cartels simply have too much money, and the U.S. government, despite four decades of waging its “war on drugs,” has utterly failed to stem the cross-border drug flows and the distribution networks that continuously replenish criminal coffers. Grayson seems to approve of recent U.S. programs transferring equipment and technology to Mexican security forces, and he respects Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s bold,

forceful counterattacks against the criminal gangs. But Grayson’s bottom line is pessimistic: “It is extremely difficult—probably impossible—to eradicate the cartels. They or their offshoots will fight to hold on to an enterprise that yields Croesus-like fortunes.” More out of desperation than desire, Grayson proposes that the United States begin “thinking about the unthinkable: decriminalization.”

Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin America. EDITED BY JANE S.

JAQUETTE. Duke University Press, 2009, 272 pp. \$79.95 (paper, \$22.95).

Women’s movements in Latin America have recently suffered a certain loss of momentum following their success in obtaining greater legal equality, enlarged political representation, and better social services. This welcome update on the current state of the feminist agenda in the region is full of strong contributions. Marcela Ríos Tobar skillfully describes the enduring contradictions of women’s lives in the social democratic Chile of President Michelle Bachelet. Flávia Piovesan explains how Brazilian women leveraged the legitimacy of international institutions—by successfully appealing to the Organization of American States—to alter national laws and practices regarding violence within families. Well worth the price of admission is the brilliant concluding chapter, in which Jaquette champions professional women working within their democratic political systems—to build bridges to government agencies, win legal redress through the courts, and provide life-sustaining social services. “Feminists must be committed to the institutional means, as well as the

Recent Books

utopian ends, of social justice,” Jaquette soberly declares.

Consolidating Mexico's Democracy: The 2006 Presidential Campaign in Comparative Perspective. EDITED BY JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ, CHAPPELL LAWSON, AND ALEJANDRO MORENO. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, 384 pp. \$70.00 (paper, \$35.00).

Political-campaign junkies will relish this numbers-rich review of the last Mexican presidential election, in which the conservative candidate, Felipe Calderón, overcame the early lead of the populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, to the great relief of Washington. Leading U.S. and Mexican political scientists, with National Science Foundation funding, ran a series of preelection polls whose results provide the fodder for each of the volume's 15 smartly argued essays. Unsurprisingly, the analysts concur that the winner ran a sharper campaign, successfully identifying himself with competence and prosperity while deploying negative advertising to tarnish the image of his opponent. With far-reaching implications, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Federico Estevez, and Beatriz Magaloni find that conditional cash transfers to very poor households (requiring that their children attend school) helped the incumbent party; paradoxically, the “right-wing” Calderón won as a result of antipoverty programs. The collection's authors dispute the degree to which ideological cleavages continue to divide Mexican voters, even as there is general agreement that the Mexican left faces difficult times ahead. Overall, these top experts paint a reasonably optimistic picture of a gradually maturing Mexican democracy.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Trotsky: A Biography. BY ROBERT SERVICE.

Belknap Press, 2009, 648 pp. \$35.00.

Trotsky: Downfall of a Revolutionary.

BY BERTRAND M. PATENAUDE.

HarperCollins, 2009, 384 pp. \$27.99.

In the recent profusion of books on Stalin's Soviet Union, Leon Trotsky has seemed almost forgotten, but now along come two new biographies—one a full-life study, the other a detailed tale of his Mexican exile. To a large degree, the same man emerges from both: in each account, he is a figure more of fascination than admiration—quite in contrast to earlier biographies written by his devotees. He is a compelling crowd rouser but remote and cold personally, puritanical but more than a little lascivious, and the object of fervid political devotion yet ruthless in the pursuit of his compassionless notion of revolution. Service deals with Trotsky's life from boyhood to the end but concentrates on the critical period from his days as a youthful revolutionary and foe of Bolshevism through the 1920s and the dramatic arc from his ascendancy to his defeat. The writing is trim and unadorned, allowing Service to march expeditiously over new ground: Trotsky's early political affinity with Stalin, the smug self-confidence that worked against him in the post-1923 maneuvering, and his moments of striking political insight, which were matched by those of disastrous misjudgment.

Recent Books

Patenaude's style is much richer, leaving a more vivid impression of the man—his personality, the petty dramas of his life in exile, and the immensely complicated web of relations with his wife, family, patrons, friends, aides, and followers. Patenaude also ably captures the intensity and far-flung nature of the "Old Man's" ongoing struggle with Stalin. Maybe it is the way Trotsky mingled with familiar American figures—such as the philosopher John Dewey, the writer Saul Bellow, and the novelist James Farrell—that makes him seem within arm's reach and much less larger than life.

Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East From the Cold War to the Present. BY YEVGENY PRIMAKOV.

Basic Books, 2009, 432 pp. \$29.95.

No living Russian knows more about Soviet and Russian policy in the Middle East than Primakov, and none has known more key figures from the region better. From his days as a *Pravda* correspondent in Cairo in the mid-1960s through his time as Russian foreign minister and then prime minister in the 1990s—a career stretching from Leonid Brezhnev to Vladimir Putin—he has been personally involved in every major Middle Eastern event, from the wars of 1967 and 1973 to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and in between the turmoil in Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen. He has interviewed and negotiated with every major Middle Eastern leader, from Syria's Hafez al-Assad to Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Much of the book is, indeed, "behind the scenes," as he lets the reader in on his conversations with Yassir Arafat (whom he admired), Golda Meir (he led secret negotiations with the Israelis from 1971 to 1977), Saddam, and many

others. But he also inserts these accounts into thoughtful reflections on the sources of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab nationalism, the failure of communism in the Middle East, and the many missed opportunities to break the cycle of violence.

Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-Long Struggle for Justice.

BY MICHAEL BOBELIAN. Simon & Schuster, 2009, 320 pp. \$26.00.

Much has been written about the deportation and slaughter of the Armenians by the Ottomans in 1915, but much less has been written about what followed in the years after—which is odd given that the event is so deeply seared into the memories of Armenians everywhere and remains an immense burden on modern Armenian-Turkish relations. At every turn, Bobelian argues, from the post-World War I peace to the failure of the U.S. Congress to pass genocide resolutions in the 1990s, the Armenian cause has fallen victim to broken Western promises and been sacrificed to the priorities of others. He carefully unwinds three entwined threads, starting with the hopes for an independent homeland that were dissolved when Armenia was absorbed into Soviet Russia. The second thread emerges from the 1920s onward, when Atatürk's Turkey made denial of the episode an element of the country's emergent nationalism. The third thread is the quest to have the events of 1915 recognized as genocide, efforts that have been thwarted by U.S. administrations concerned with protecting relations with a NATO ally.

Lenin's Brother: The Origins of the October Revolution. BY PHILIP POMPER.

Norton, 2010, 304 pp. \$24.95.

Lenin's older brother, Alexander Ulyanov,

Recent Books

is only a footnote in history. Hence, this book's subtitle seems an overly large claim. Pomper justifies it in a dual sense: Ulyanov's political and intellectual milieu contained important antecedents of the movement to follow, and his life's twisted tragic-heroic turn heavily shaped Lenin's personal psychology. In March 1887, on a date timed to mark the successful assassination of Tsar Alexander II six years earlier, Ulyanov and 14 others plotted the same fate for Tsar Alexander III. They never got to throw their bombs at the target, and Ulyanov was hanged two months later. The psychological reading that Pomper renders—that Lenin, in some significant degree, made the revolution to avenge what the tsarist regime had done to his brother and his family—may not be entirely convincing in the absence of direct testimony from Lenin or those who knew him. But the canvas that Pomper so richly fills with the details of Ulyanov's precocious teenage intellectual interests and his path from a preoccupation with zoology to revolution and, ultimately, to terrorism makes for very engaging reading.

Hijacked Justice: Dealing With the Past in the Balkans. BY JELENA SUBOTIC. Cornell University Press, 2009, 192 pp. \$35.00. How the blood-soaked states that emerged from the horrors that befell the Balkans in the 1990s should go about reconciling victims, punishing victimizers, and coming to terms with their pasts has become a sad challenge in the post-Cold War world. Alas, Subotic argues, the progress made in moving from an-eye-for-an-eye politics to due process in international and national courts and truth commissions is deceptive. It turns out, as her Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian cases show, that local political

actors, rather than dealing with history, have used the exercise for their own more immediate ends: to dispose of political opponents, secure economic assistance, or grease the way into the European Union. How this has happened and what those committed to making the new norms stick should do about it drive this book. Subotic goes about her study in an exceedingly clearheaded fashion; not only is she in full command of the relevant theoretical literature, but she deploys and then extends it in compact, crystal-clear paragraphs. The writing and argumentation are a model of what social science should be.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

The Arabs: A History. BY EUGENE ROGAN.

Basic Books, 2009, 553 pp. \$35.00.

The title of this big book evokes memories of Philip Hitti's *History of the Arabs*, which first appeared 82 years ago, and Albert Hourani's *A History of the Arab Peoples*, which was published in 1991. But whereas Hitti and Hourani traced Arab history from earliest times, Rogan tackles a mere half millennium. His is the story of Ottoman rule throughout Arab lands from early in the sixteenth century, its replacement by diverse European colonies starting some three centuries later, decolonization, the rise and fall of Arab nationalism, and the discovery of oil during this past century. The organizing theme is the constant efforts of political elites to cope with change, which was often imposed from outside. Readable and reliable, this sweeping survey balances the unity of a coherent story with due attention to detail. As

Recent Books

such, Rogan's contribution belongs in the company of the earlier classics by Hitti and Hourani.

Israel and Palestine: Reappraisals, Revisions, Refutations. BY AVI SHLAIM. Verso, 2009, 352 pp. \$34.95.

This collection of 30 articles by Shlaim that have appeared over the past two decades in journals such as the *London Review of Books* and the *Journal of Palestine Studies* ranges chronologically from the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to the present and topically from individuals to governments and from wars to peace processes. That many of the articles are book reviews gives the book the bonus of also offering a historiographical survey. Shlaim, a pioneer of the revisionist school of "new historians" that emerged in the 1980s, provides a realpolitik reading of the history, demolishing the heroic and innocent image of Israel in its relations with the Palestinians. In his accounting, up to the June 1967 war, Israel acted much like other struggling new nations—no better, no worse. After 1967, Israel became a colonialist power occupying others and steadily taking over their lands. The Israeli side of the story (viewed critically) is dominant in most of the articles, but Shlaim, a historian of Israeli-Jordanian relations and biographer of the late King Hussein, has a good grasp of the Palestinian and Jordanian dimensions. He also presents several sharp observations on how the United States fits into this history.

Negotiating With Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History. BY JOHN W. LIMBERT. U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009, 200 pp. \$40.00 (paper, \$14.95).

Using four crises spread over four decades,

from just after World War II to the 1980s, Limbert appraises the negotiating style of Iran and of those it confronts. The 1945–47 Azerbaijan crisis pitted Iran against the Soviet Union, with the United States playing a limited role. The 1951–53 oil nationalization crisis and the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq marked the moment the United States replaced the United Kingdom as the dominant Western power in Iran. The last two crises—the 1979–81 Iranian hostage crisis and the U.S. effort throughout the 1980s to free Americans held hostage in Lebanon—were bilateral confrontations between Washington and Tehran. Drawing on these four cases and more, Limbert offers advice on negotiating with Iran and addresses the need to overcome "mutual myth-perceptions" in U.S.-Iranian relations. Now serving as a senior official on Iran in the State Department, Limbert was one of those held hostage in Tehran from 1979 to 1981. Yet as this splendid study of U.S.-Iranian relations demonstrates, he emerged from that bitter experience with an ability to bring to his appraisal a rare combination of insight, dispassion, and empathy.

Jewish Terrorism in Israel. BY AMI PEDAHZUR AND ARIE PERLIGER. Columbia University Press, 2009, 264 pp. \$29.50.

Jewish Terrorism in Israel, the second book to appear in the Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare series, sets a high bar for subsequent works. After a brisk treatment of terrorism in ancient Israel (which often inspires today's terrorism), it moves to modern times, documenting not just the well-remembered examples, such as the 1948

Recent Books

assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, Baruch Goldstein's 1994 mass murder in Hebron, and the 1995 assassination of Yitzhak Rabin but seemingly every terrorist act by Israeli Jews realized or aborted from 1948 to 2007. Avoiding the pitfalls that generally confront the study of terrorism—either expressing outrage at such inhumane behavior or dismissing one man's terrorist as another man's freedom fighter—the authors dispassionately study the backgrounds, social networks, and motives of the terrorists. Several of these case studies are based on interviews with perpetrators quaintly labeled as “retired.” Comparing Jewish terrorism to that of Islamists, the authors show that “religious terrorism is not a one-faith phenomenon.”

Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf.

EDITED BY JOSHUA TEITELBAUM.
Columbia University Press, 2009,
288 pp. \$75.00.

This multiauthored survey of all the Persian Gulf states begins with a region-wide appraisal, followed by short country studies. The separate chapters treating those oil-rich and small Persian Gulf monarchies whose citizens are a minority of those living in each country—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—show the considerable liberalization and institution building that is taking place, but without disrupting the ruling families' holds on power. The portrayal of the United Arab Emirates as more like a corporation than a state is suggestive for the others as well. Of the chapters on the three big Persian Gulf states, two focus narrowly on the role of the *ulama* (Islamic clergy). The chapter on Saudi Arabia paints a bleak appraisal

of the Wahhabi *ulama*, whereas the one on Iran sees much more ideological nuance, concluding that “democracy has a better chance in Iran” than in Sunni countries. The chapter on Iraq, after setting out the differing “visions” of democracy there, concludes that Iraq is no longer a nation-state but a “diffuse” country whose contending entities “have yet to take their final shape.”

Asia and Pacific

ANDREW J. NATHAN

Japan's Remilitarisation. BY

CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES.

Routledge, 2009, 188 pp. \$19.95.

For 40 years, Japan has incrementally raised its defense budget, extended its security perimeter, improved its armaments, and raised the bureaucratic status and operational ambit of the Self-Defense Forces. Do these trends, which accelerated after 2001, represent remilitarization or just the maintenance of a defensive posture in a more challenging security environment? Hughes argues for the former interpretation, based not just on data about budgets and weapons but also on contextual factors, such as the erosion of civilian control over the military, the strengthening of the military-industrial complex, the Liberal Democratic Party's promotion of constitutional changes, and Japan's acceptance of new tasks within the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance. Such trends validate the wariness of Japan's neighbors, such as China. But as Hughes acknowledges, Japan is nowhere near having the capacity to go to war without support from the United States. With Japan's government now

under a new ruling party, this book provides a useful baseline from which to measure the future evolution of Japanese defense policy.

Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy. BY RAJIV SIKRI. SAGE, 2009, 336 pp. \$39.95.

India and the United States in the Twenty-first Century: Reinventing Partnership. BY TERESITA C. SCHAFFER. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009, 264 pp. \$22.95.

India's interests stretch far beyond its immediate periphery, covering several wide arcs from the Middle East through Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia all the way to Japan, and they intersect at every point with the interests of Russia and the United States. No wonder New Delhi aspires to great-power status—and has begun to earn it with economic growth, a naval buildup, and smarter diplomacy. Sikri, a retired Indian diplomat, expresses the Indian perspective straightforwardly. The major obstacles to India's ambitions, he says, are an unjust suspicion of its motives on the part of its immediate neighbors and the rise of China. Blaming Afghanistan's ungovernability on Pakistan, he recommends pressuring Islamabad by announcing construction projects that would cut the flow of desperately needed water from the Indus River. He counsels cooperation with Beijing even while suggesting how India might weaken its acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, where the Chinese presence constitutes a permanent threat to Indian security. India's ambitions in every theater encounter other actors already present. In this sense, Sikri is right to say that India is not a status quo power, even though its goal is to join, not overturn, the great-power system.

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Schaffer, a retired U.S. diplomat, explores how India's interests relate to those of the United States. Common interests include increased economic ties, a desire to promote democracy, a commitment to stability in the Middle East, and the need to hedge against China. Even where their interests coincide, however, coordination is hampered by India's insistence on "strategic autonomy." In some important areas, their priorities diverge. In Afghanistan, the United States views Pakistan as more of a helper than a spoiler; in Iran, India's needs for energy and access to Central Asia require cooperation rather than confrontation; and when it comes to China, the Indians are more wary than the Americans. Schaffer counsels that a U.S.-Indian partnership holds great promise but will require a lot of diplomatic cultivation to pay off.

The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. BY JAMES C. SCOTT. Yale University Press, 2009, 464 pp. \$35.00.

Scott has put rural and marginal people at the center of his previous studies, and here he offers a history of the estimated 100 million people who live in a vast hill and mountain zone that runs across southwest China, northeast India, and parts of five Southeast Asian countries. These populations fled into the hills over the course of two millennia, he argues, to avoid the imposition of slavery, indentured labor, and taxes by expanding states. There they evolved languages, economies, and ways of life designed to keep the state at bay. Outside of Asia, too, such fugitive populations define the "ungovernable" territories and "minority" or "tribal" identities usually thought of as exceptions to the norm.

Scott often returns to the complex example of Myanmar (also called Burma) to explain how states mapped terrain, classified populations, and acquired resources as they expanded—and to show how the Kachins, the Hmong, and others resisted. He believes that the uplanders' strategies of avoidance are approaching an endgame as new technologies give the modern state a longer reach. But the news from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as from Myanmar, suggests that these ungoverned groups may hold out longer than Scott thinks.

Honorable Survivor: Mao's China, McCarthy's America, and the Persecution of John S. Service. BY LYNNE JOINER. U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2009, 450 pp. \$37.95.

John Service was one of several China hands fired from the U.S. State Department for questionable loyalty in the early 1950s. His trouble started when he got entangled in the inquiry into the leaking of classified documents by federal employees to the academic journal *Amerasia*, a spy case that turned out to be more about FBI misconduct than Soviet espionage. He was not indicted, but the investigation led to his interrogation before a series of State Department and congressional committees and to his firing. The deeper cause of his downfall was that he had challenged more powerful officials by arguing that Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang was too corrupt to survive—and he turned out to be right. (Less correct was his view that Mao's Communists were potentially pro-American pragmatists.) Service was eventually vindicated by the Supreme Court, but his diplomatic career had been ruined. Joiner traces the story in engrossing political and personal detail, based on interviews with

Recent Books

Service and his wife and files from the State Department and the FBI obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. It is a cautionary tale about the harm of persecuting diplomats who tell the truth as they see it, but also, as Joiner acknowledges, about the dangers of a security culture so lax that extensive leaking had become habitual even for honorable officers.

Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know. BY DAVID I. STEINBERG.

Oxford University Press, 2009, 256 pp. \$74.00 (paper, \$16.95).

Steinberg gives a pointed briefing on what ails Myanmar (also called Burma) and finds the causes mostly in history. The kingly past bequeathed a zero-sum concept of power; the colonial era, irrational borders and a toxically unequal distribution of wealth among ethnic groups; and postindependence military rule, a decline in state capacity and a turn to predation. The international environment is also damaging: as former Prime Minister U Nu said, the country is “hemmed in,” between China, India, and the distant but looming United States, “like a tender gourd among the cactus.” This has caused successive leaders to close off Myanmar from the West and lean toward China. As in other predatory states, an advantaged military caste, in this case comprising four percent of the population, lives off everyone else. Many want to join, but few are chosen; once admitted, the price of survival is loyalty. The layering of ethnic, economic, and legitimacy crises has trapped the country in a tragedy with no near-term resolution, to which the U.S. policy of unremitting sanctions has contributed nothing productive.

China and the Transformation of Global Capitalism. EDITED BY HO-FUNG HUNG. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, 224 pp. \$50.00 (paper, \$25.00).

This symposium uses the Marxist-inflected theory of globalization known as world-systems theory to view some familiar topics through a fresh lens, although it is often blurred by jargon. Subjects addressed include how China’s engagement with global capitalism has contributed to the rise of far-flung production networks, the shift of manufacturing to the East, the growing Asian resource hunger, and new geopolitical rivalries. Richard Appelbaum argues that the market power of mega-retailers, such as Wal-Mart, is counterbalanced by less well-known but similarly gigantic suppliers owned by enterprises from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea that command integrated production facilities. Stephanie Luce and Edna Bonacich explore nascent opportunities for the U.S. labor movement to cooperate with Chinese workers instead of treating them exclusively as competitors. And Beverly Silver and Lu Zhang suggest, with more hope than evidence, that labor unrest in China might invigorate the labor movement worldwide.

Africa

NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower. BY MICHELA WRONG.

HarperCollins, 2009, 368 pp. \$25.99. Wrong has written a perceptive and deeply troubling account of corruption in Kenya and of one anticorruption crusader’s failed attempts to curtail it. John Githongo

Recent Books

became permanent secretary for governance and ethics after the democratically elected president Mwai Kibaki took office in 2002 promising great change. Naive, but persistent and principled, Githongo soon uncovered massive corruption at the apex of the state, within a Kikuyu ethnic mafia around the presidency whose members believed that, after years out of power, it was time for their ethnic group to benefit. A fellow Kikuyu, Githongo had been expected to play along, and when he went public with detailed evidence, he was fired, discredited, and threatened. (He fled the country in 2005.) In the process of telling this story, *Wrong* covers a wide swath of contemporary Kenya with great precision and telling details, from the dynamics of ethnicity to the grinding poverty of the Nairobi slums and the cushy lifestyle of the country's establishment. The book trenchantly analyzes the complacency of Western donors and accuses the World Bank of actual complicity in Kenya's corruption. Amazingly, successive country representatives from the bank rented a house from and shared a garden with Kibaki in Nairobi, which was maintained at taxpayers' expense. For his troubles, Githongo was briefly feted in various feel-good international forums, but the Kibaki regime was barely admonished, and aid continued to flow into the country.

The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. BY DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM. Oxford University Press, 2009, 300 pp. \$29.95.

Brautigam situates the current relationship between China and Africa within a historical framework that goes back to the 1960s. Bucking the conventional wisdom that China's substantial increases in

aid to the region are motivated by short-term commercial and strategic interests, Brautigam's lively and thoroughly documented account emphasizes that Chinese motivations are broader and more long term. The book starts with a revealing history of Chinese involvement in the region, beginning with agricultural and infrastructure projects in the 1960s. It outlines China's current aid activities and investments in the region, providing the most authoritative data available on both. The book's most intriguing argument is that China is genuinely interested in extending to Africa the lessons it learned from its own development and that what may appear to be crass commercial moves are actually the result of careful thinking about mutually beneficial activities. Brautigam is clearly impressed with what she views as the breadth and sophistication of China's Africa policy and contrasts it with the self-serving and nearsighted thinking of the West's.

The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. BY RENÉ LEMARCHAND. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, 344 pp. \$59.95 (paper, \$27.50).

A longtime observer of the Great Lakes region of Africa, Lemarchand has conducted an incisive study of the Hutu-Tutsi violence in Rwanda and Burundi and the conflict it helped propagate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the mid-1990s. He emphasizes the evolution of the region's ethnic conflicts over long periods of time, revealing a dynamic in which episodes of violence force certain groups to migrate, which then puts them in conflict with other groups. That, in turn, eventually creates another cycle of violence and forced migration. Quite convincingly,

Recent Books

Lemarchand argues that the Tutsi army's now-forgotten slaughter of Hutu civilians in Burundi in 1972, which resulted in between 150,000 and 300,000 casualties, was a watershed event that forever shaped Hutu-Tutsi relations. His analysis of the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1996 skillfully untangles the web of shifting ethnic alliances and explains how the very real grievances of desperately poor communities are exploited by rapacious patrimonial warlords and their militias.

Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies. EDITED BY JOEL D. BARKAN. Lynne Rienner, 2009, 277 pp. \$59.95.

Most observers would concur with Barkan's view that democracy cannot thrive without an effective and influential legislature to balance the power of the executive. Since most of the recent defects in governance in Africa can be blamed on unaccountable leaders, this view seems particularly germane to democracy there. Yet, oddly, the evolution and current state of legislatures in Africa have attracted little attention. This collection of case studies of the legislatures in Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda begins to rectify this oversight. Barkan's central empirical thesis is that all over Africa, a young, educated, and professional class of parliamentarians has begun to advance the power of legislatures, pressuring presidents to accept more democratization. As the case studies show, this has meant that legislatures have begun asserting their constitutional prerogatives—notably, the oversight of government spending and activities. It also appears to have meant that legislators have voted themselves

salary increases and other perks, and the experiences of Kenya and Nigeria, for instance, certainly suggest that legislators' commitment to democratic values is uneven at best. The book's real lesson is that the legislative branch can balance the power of the executive branch even when the former's members are not particularly virtuous.

Poverty in Africa: Analytical and Policy Perspectives. EDITED BY AUGUSTIN FOSU, GERMANO MWABU, AND ERIK THORBECKE. University of Nairobi Press, 2009, 504 pp.

This collection of essays by leading development economists provides an excellent introduction to the causes and effects of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Although some of the papers are dated, they remain useful. One section of the book includes several contributions about the nature of poverty in the region, with a particularly informative chapter on poverty in the African countryside. Another section questions the conventional wisdom that economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s aggravated poverty, painting a more nuanced picture. Although poverty in the region worsened during this period, it does not appear to have increased more in countries that implemented reforms than in those that did not. Because the available economic data on Africa are mired by low quality and major gaps, however, the conclusions of several chapters are limited. 🌐

Letters to the Editor

*Michael Humphreys, Andrew Radin, and Obrad Kesic and
Steven Meyer on Bosnia; Phongthep Thepkanjana on
Thaksin Shinawatra; and others*

BOSNIA ON THE BRINK?

To the Editor:

In their analysis, Patrice McMahon and Jon Western (“The Death of Dayton,” September/October 2009) omit any significant critique of the failed window of opportunity in Bosnia between 2002 and 2006. For a short time, circumstances were favorable: there was a proactive high representative for Bosnia, and there were pragmatic leaders in the country committed to the EU’s agenda.

During this period, significant progress was made. Defense reforms put in place a single army command-and-control structure for Bosnia, replacing what had effectively been three armies: Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb. The creation of the Indirect Tax Authority brought in the first state-level taxation service and unified the customs and excise services. And the establishment of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council paved the way for significant improvements in the rule of law.

Unfortunately, this period came to an end with the fall of the Republika Srpska (RS) government led by the Party of Democratic Progress. This was followed by an overambitious attempt at police reform artificially linked to inflexible EU standards. The subsequent defeat of the

constitutional reform process in April 2006 consolidated the position of Prime Minister Milorad Dodik in the RS and brought back Haris Silajdzic as the Bosnian Muslim member of the presidency of Bosnia.

Bosnia has indeed shown, as McMahon and Western write, that “state building is not a problem to be solved but a process to be managed.” Policymakers should try to draw lessons from the failure in 2005 to consolidate the progress made in the previous years—namely, the need to temper ambition with realism, the difficulties of imposing reforms with limited local ownership, and the limitations of the EU’s drawing power.

MICHAEL B. HUMPHREYS

Head of the European Commission Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002–6

To the Editor:

Patrice McMahon and Jon Western describe Bosnia as a state on the brink of collapse and claim that the international community must now return its attention to it lest it disintegrate. In fact, it is past time for Bosnians to run their own country.

War is almost certainly not going to return, even though political factions that benefit from continued international intervention want to encourage the view that it could. None of the three main

Letters to the Editor

ethnic groups has the desire or the international support to start one. There is no Bosnian Serb military, and Serbia is highly unlikely to support a revisionist Bosnian Serb war. Its desire to join the EU has forced Serbia into accepting the de facto independence of Kosovo, which is an issue far closer to the hearts of Serbs than Bosnia. Bosnian Serb leaders and observers also indicate that they are largely satisfied with their autonomy under the Dayton agreement, and most Bosnian Serbs see the Republika Srpska (RS) as legitimate.

Nor are the Bosnian Croats or the Bosnian Muslims inclined to instigate a conflict. The Bosnian Croats are far too weak to challenge the status quo, comprising only around ten percent of the population. Their only goal would be their own entity, but they have little support abroad for such revisionist aims. It is likewise inconceivable that the Bosnian Muslims—even though they are the largest group and some of them retain their conviction that the RS is founded on genocide—would initiate a war. They continue to stress their victimhood in the civil war, which they correctly believe is critical for continued international support.

Critics suggest that the international community must reinforce its postwar intervention in Bosnian domestic affairs because the national government is too inefficient and its political leadership is too nationalist. But 14 years of international governance have done little to change this.

In fact, the international community's involvement gives all the parties incentives to be recalcitrant. For the Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, the continued presence of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia provides a

visible threat to the prerogatives of the RS, which he can easily turn to his benefit. For his Bosnian Muslim opponent, Haris Silajdzic, the continued presence of the OHR offers the hope of a renegotiated Dayton. Without international demands and the involvement of international powers, these politicians would have to focus on issues that more directly benefit their constituents' quality of life, such as infrastructure, education, and moving toward EU accession.

The international community can help Bosnia only by focusing on incremental reforms related to economic development and to the technical requirements for European integration. Changing the state's institutions may be essential for long-term growth, but it will take time and can only be done by the country's elected leaders.

ANDREW RADIN

Doctoral candidate, Department of Political Science, MIT

To the Editor:

Patrice McMahon and Jon Western offer a formula to revive the moribund Dayton agreement, but their recommendations would only leave the Dayton process dead. They argue that the United States needs to appoint a special envoy to help mitigate the influence of the nationalist parties that have flourished in the face of a divided and complacent international community. In fact, it has been years of ham-handed and arbitrary governance imposed by outsiders that has fed the nationalist parties and reinforced the notion that the ethnic communities must protect themselves if they are to survive. At best, reengagement by the international community would ensure

Letters to the Editor

that Bosnia continues to be a poverty-stricken, ethnically divided ward of the West. At worst, it would foment the kind of violence the authors want to avoid.

McMahon and Western seem to think that current EU policy provides some kind of silver bullet for Bosnia. Certainly, EU membership could benefit the region. But the Bosnians know that the accession process is a long and painful ordeal, that membership is no guarantee of economic or political viability, and that the EU will punish states that do not live up to its standards. Moreover, expansion exhaustion within the EU means that the body is unlikely to extend membership to the economically disadvantaged Bosnians, who would flood Europe in droves if they could. That Bosnians are being denied the right to travel to EU countries without visas says more about Europe's attitude than do platitudes about the unspecified benefits of eventual EU membership.

If Bosnia is to exist as a state, it must do so on its own terms—terms that would necessitate painful compromises by the people and leaders of all three ethnic groups. Pressure from the outside will only undermine any impetus by the local stakeholders to find a solution.

OBRAD KESIC

President, TSM Global Consultants

STEVEN E. MEYER

Professor of Political Science and National Security Studies, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University

COOLING THE CLIMATE

To the Editor:

Jessica Wallack and Veerabhadran Ramanathan ("The Other Climate Changers," September/October 2009) make a strong case for why governments

should be concerned about climate-forcing agents other than those regulated by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. To address this important issue, in April 2009 the U.S. government raised the subject within the Arctic Council—a high-level forum of the eight Arctic nations—and now, with Norway, co-leads the newly established Arctic Council Task Force on Short-Lived Climate-Forcing Agents.

The goal is for the Arctic states to take the lead in slowing the deterioration of the Arctic cryosphere through practical, affordable action to reduce the sources of black carbon and ground-level ozone. If they do, other regions of the world where these pollutants are emitted may follow suit. It is important for the scientific community to continue focusing on short-lived climate-forcing agents and for policymakers to educate the public about the benefits of limiting their emissions. Through the Arctic Council, scientists and policymakers are doing just that.

DAVID A. BALTON

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries

To the Editor:

Jessica Wallack and Veerabhadran Ramanathan correctly argue that reducing emissions of light-absorbing carbon particles ("black carbon") is an effective way to address climate change. They write, "Crop waste, dung, wood, coal, and charcoal are the cheapest, but also the least efficient and dirtiest, fuels, and so households tend to shift away from them as soon as other options become reliably available."

But this line of thinking leaves out the difficulties in changing behavior. The community I work with in rural Morocco

as a Peace Corps volunteer faces the threat of deforestation. I have tried, with little success, to persuade people to use more efficient wood-burning stoves to address the issue. Gas ovens have been distributed to replace wood-fueled ones, yet they are not used. The technology is available; the change in behavior lags behind.

Although Wallack and Ramanathan acknowledge this, they sweep the concern aside by citing the speed with which technology spread through the developing world during the “green revolution” in agriculture in the second half of the twentieth century. This is a poor analogy. The benefits of adopting new technologies then were immediate and obvious for farmers in the developing world. In the case of black carbon, what is expected is radical change for the benefit of preventing climate change, which is neither immediate nor obvious.

Still, reducing black carbon emissions is an obtainable goal. Technologies will have to be adapted to meet different communities’ needs, which will require an intimate knowledge of various cultures and customs. And most important, the benefits from using the new technologies must be immediate, and the appropriate incentives must be in place to make them cost competitive.

DUNCAN GROMKO

Peace Corps volunteer, Morocco

THAKSIN ON TRIAL

To the Editor:

In his portrayal of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (“The Battle for Thailand,” July/August 2009), Bertil Lintner appears to have been influenced by the powerful and persistent propaganda in Bangkok.

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Return to Table of Contents

Letters to the Editor

Lintner is right that Thaksin's 2003 "war on drugs" ended up being controversial and that there were instances of police excesses. But drug trafficking was a major social problem that Thaksin inherited from earlier, more tolerant administrations. And to state that "in each province, the police (and in some cases, the army) followed quotas on the minimum number of drug dealers to kill" is to give voice to mere hallucination. There were no such quotas. On the other side of the war on drugs, during the Thaksin administration, drug addicts were treated for the first time as patients, not criminals. Several hundred thousand drug addicts underwent rehabilitation instead of serving jail terms.

Lintner also repeats lies propagated by the executive director of the Thai Journalists Association, who wrote that "Thaksin constantly interfered with Thailand's printed and broadcast media." This, too, is untrue, and no radio station, tv program, or Web site was shut down during the Thaksin years. In fact, Thailand saw a mushrooming of new publications and radio stations. It was only after Thaksin left office that 67 Web sites were closed down and a government spokesperson announced that the authorities would jam sites considered offensive.

In 2002, one year after Thaksin took office, and in 2006, just four months prior to the coup that forced him out, the Asian Barometer research project

conducted nationwide polls in Thailand. They found that the vast majority of Thais were satisfied with the way democracy worked in Thailand and with the Thaksin government. Between 2002 and 2006, the proportion of respondents who believed that government officials were corrupt actually declined.

"If Thailand is to become truly stable," Lintner concludes, "its democratic institutions will have to be strengthened through more grass-roots participation in the decision-making process at all levels." By decentralizing decision-making within the administration and encouraging villagers to make their own choices, this is precisely what Thaksin tried to do.

PHONGTHEP THEPKANJANA

Former Minister of Justice of Thailand

Foreign Affairs (ISSN 00157120), January/February 2010, Volume 89, Number 1. Published six times annually (January, March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. Subscriptions: U.S., \$44.95; Canada, \$56.00; other countries via air, \$79.00 per year. Canadian Publication Mail-Mail # 1572121. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at additional mailing offices. **POSTMASTER:** Send address changes to *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 62040, Tampa, FL 33662-0408. From time to time, we permit certain carefully screened companies to send our subscribers information about products or services that we believe will be of interest. If you prefer not to receive such information, please contact us at the Tampa, FL, address indicated above.



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
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