


palgrave
macmillan

A Paradigm for the New World Order

A Schools-of-Thought Analysis of American Foreign
Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

John C. Hulsman



A PARADIGM FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER

This page intentionally left blank

A Paradigm for the New World Order

**A Schools-of-Thought Analysis of
American Foreign Policy in the
Post-Cold War Era**

John C. Hulsman





First published in Great Britain 1997 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-349-40063-8 ISBN 978-0-230-37507-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230375079



First published in the United States of America 1997 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

ISBN 978-0-312-1600-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hulsman, John C., 1967–

A paradigm for the new world order : a schools-of-thought analysis
of American foreign policy in the post-cold war era / John C.
Hulsman.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-312-1600-7 (cloth)

1. United States—Foreign relations—1993– 2. Yugoslav War, 1991–
—Bosnia and Hercegovina. 3. Yugoslav War, 1991– —Diplomatic
history. I. Title.

E885.H85 1997

327.73—dc20

96–35138

CIP

© John C. Hulsman 1997

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1997 978-0-333-68388-0

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE.

Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97

For my parents, who never gave up on my life, and
to Ollie, who taught me how to live it

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

<i>List of Charts</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	x
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xi
1 Theoretical Introduction	1
Derivation of Schools-of-thought Analysis	2
Definitional Approaches to Schools-of-thought Analysis	8
Methodological Approaches to Schools-of-thought Analysis	12
First Principles of Schools-of-thought Analysis	18
2 The Democratists	21
First Principles of Democratism	22
General Democratist Perceptions	24
Majority Democratist Policy Positions	28
Strains within Democratism	32
Criticisms of Democratism	33
3 The Neo-realists	38
First Principles of Neo-realism	39
General Neo-realist Perceptions	40
Majority Neo-realist Policy Positions	50
Strains within Neo-realism	55
Criticisms of Neo-realism	56
4 The Institutionalists	58
First Principles of Institutionalism	59
General Institutional Perceptions	61
Majority Institutional Policy Positions	71
Criticisms of Institutionalism	74
5 Schools-of-thought Orientations of Central Legislative and Executive Decision-makers	78
Specific Democratist Decision-makers	78
Specific Neo-realist Decision-makers	85
Specific Institutional Decision-makers	97

6	The Overall Schools-of-thought Orientation of the Clinton Administration Regarding the Bosnian Crisis	114
	General Administration Policy Regarding Russia	114
	General Administration Policy Regarding Europe	117
	General Administration Policy Regarding Bosnia	120
7	Political Analysis of the American Response to the Bosnian Crisis	135
	The Schools-of-thought Stance of the Executive Branch during the 103rd Congress	144
	The Schools-of-thought Stance of the Legislative Branch during the 103rd Congress	156
	The Interaction of the Executive and Legislative Schools-of-thought Stances during the 103rd Congress	161
8	Schools-of-thought Analysis and the Culmination of the Bosnian Crisis	165
	Events Leading to the Dayton Accord	165
	The Dayton Accord	174
	A Reassessment of Schools-of-thought Analysis	183
	<i>Notes</i>	188
	<i>Select Bibliography</i>	205
	<i>Index</i>	209

List of Charts

Chart 1.1	Schurmann's Currents of Cold War American Foreign Policy	4
Chart 1.2	Current American Foreign Policy Schools of Thought	15
Chart 2.1	The Belief System of the Democratists	21
Chart 3.1	The Belief System of the Neo-realists	38
Chart 4.1	The Belief System of the Institutionalists	58
Chart 5.1	Specific Democratist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues	110
Chart 5.2	Specific Neo-realist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues	111
Chart 5.3	Specific Institutionalist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues	112
Chart 6.1	Key Diplomatic Events Early in the Bosnian Crisis	121
Chart 7.1	A Flowchart of the Clinton Administration's Bureaucratic System Leading to Foreign Policy Outputs	154
Chart 8.1	The Culmination of the Bosnian Crisis	168
Chart 8.2	Results of the Schools-of-thought Boxing Process	187

Acknowledgements

I used to think that the acknowledgements page of a book was just a chance for an author to gratify his friends by giving them a 'plug' in print. (In other words it served a purpose about as meaningful as an Academy Awards speech!)

I now realize how very wrong I was. Writing a book is such an all-consuming task that all those mentioned here have had to put up with this odd extension of my personality for much of the past four years. As they are all still speaking to me, I thank them generally for their forbearance which has enabled me to give this project the fanaticism that is essential to do anything one can be proud of.

I would like to thank the offices of Senator Mitchell and Representative Hamilton. I would especially like to thank the office of Senator Biden, which gave me so much of its valuable time.

John and Carol Davey have been a second family to me. They have always been a great port in the storm and for this and their good humor and love I am eternally grateful.

Simon 'Stumpy' Gaffney, my old debating partner and best man, has continued to pull me out of more scrapes than I can count. Beyond keeping me sane, and providing stimulating relief from the hard work, he loaned me his computer when I desperately needed it. Thanks!

My good friend Mike Wesley has also played a large part in both my book and my life for the past few years. Always there with ready wit and penetrating insights, he helped me to clarify some of the more difficult intellectual constructs I have grappled with in the work. More than that, he has made 'Saturday nights' some of the most enjoyable of my life.

My parents, Carl and Jane Hulsman, have also been tremendous. Without them my interest in politics might itself never have developed, as our family holidays were geared almost exclusively around educating me about my country, which I've come to love so much.

Finally, I have to thank my wife, Ollie. I met her the week after I started this mammoth undertaking, so she has never known me without the book dangling over me. She has been at turns editor, confidante, adviser, and far more even than all of this to me. It is to her that this work is gratefully dedicated.

J. C. H.

List of Abbreviations

APEC	Asian-Pacific Economic Community
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DoD	Department of Defense
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
G-7	Group of Seven Advanced Industrial Countries
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
IHT	International Herald-Tribune
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITT	International Telephone and Telegraph
MFN	Most Favored Nation
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSC	National Security Council
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
WEU	Western European Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Theoretical Introduction

Valentine, the hero of Tom Stoppard's excellent play, 'Arcadia', aptly sums up the situation political scientists now find themselves in. 'It makes me so happy. To be at the beginning again, knowing almost nothing A door like this has cracked open five or six times since we got up on our hind legs. It's the best possible time to be alive, when almost everything you know is wrong.'¹ So it is also for the United States. The victory parade celebrating American triumph in the Gulf War was one of the great moments of hubris in modern American history. One and a half million people gathered in Washington to celebrate the fact that, at last, the ghost of the Vietnam War had been laid to rest. This, coupled with the astounding surprise of 1989, was certainly cause for rejoicing. The United States had, many felt quite brilliantly, won the Cold War. Kuwait had been the first test of George Bush's New World Order and it had been a resounding success. Yet just a year on from this idyllic day Los Angeles was on fire, suffused in racial hatred and despair. Both of these seemingly paradoxical events are part of a new epoch, a new world.

This book will explore different conceptions of the post-1989 world by identifying and analyzing schools of thought that underlie the policy positions of decision-makers in the new era. It will also examine the debate regarding general American foreign policy options in the post-Cold War era, with particular reference to the Clinton administration. The end of the Cold War changed many things. Among them the 45 years of largely bipartisan consensus over foreign policy issues, symbolized by the adoption of the containment doctrine by President Truman and Senator Vandenberg, has come to an end. There are now serious differences of opinion, both within and between the Democratic and Republican Parties, as to what should be the general, overarching foreign policy of the US. This book will analyze the nature of this debate through the use of schools-of-thought analysis, pointing out the assumptions behind the various schools of thought and then relating them in detail to the Bosnian crisis. A given upon which this endeavor rests is that it is crucial to specify the first principles underlying each school of thought's analysis of the world, and to illustrate that these overarching foreign policy viewpoints, or schools of thought, can be

shown to lead to specific policy prescriptions regarding the central foreign policy issues confronting America in the post-Cold War era.

DERIVATION OF SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT ANALYSIS

While others have attempted similar projects, it was Franz Schurmann who inspired me to attempt a schools-of-thought analysis of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.² In *The Logic of World Power*, published in 1974, Schurmann persuasively attempted nothing less than a systemic, if general, understanding of the US perspective on the workings of the post-1945 world. Schurmann's analysis of the early Cold War era stands alone precisely because of his use of a theoretical, ideational construct that he related directly to specific outcomes in American foreign policy.

Yet for all the brilliance of Schurmann's work, it is a fundamental flaw in his argument that inspired the genesis of schools-of-thought analysis. Schurmann incorrectly viewed political leaders as not having ideational orientations of their own to motivate their policy prescriptions. This was particularly true of Schurmann's analysis of the presidency. He explained,

When challenged to make innovative policy, the leader senses certain currents of thought, feeling, and aspiration, which are commonly held by most or all members of the constituency. Using these currents as inspiration and adding a scheme made up of real capabilities of the organization, the leader comes up with a new policy which will gain him support from his constituency on both ideological and practical grounds.³

While Schurmann was correct that political thinking, organization, and constituencies turn ideas into ideological fixtures, he was incorrect in assuming that such notions come from the mass public and that leaders somehow manipulate these currents to their political advantage, while remaining immune to the contagion of sub-ideological impulses. The notion of currents of thought must be improved upon as leaders reflect more than merely manipulate the beliefs of the rest of society. To use one of Schurmann's analogies, it is certainly true that, "The clever general knows the shared sentiments of his soldiers and can use them to implement a new course

of action.⁴ Yet what the concept of currents of thought ignores is that the *general's* course of action is itself largely determined by his/her *own* belief system. This is a flaw schools-of-thought analysis hopes to correct by looking at the sub-ideologies of central foreign policy actors involved in the decision-making process, as not even the president comes to the White House all manipulator, no believer.

Yet despite this major weakness, Schurmann's model has much in it that is directly adopted into the concept of schools of thought. Firstly, Schurmann identified the centrality of the bureaucratic position of the leader in affecting the ideological discourse of the day. He correctly noted that, 'policies, whatever their roots, are set only at the apex of the organization.'⁵ His conviction is reflected in this book's methodological use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model, which posits the central role bureaucratic leaders play in determining policy outputs.

Schurmann also foreshadowed the use of Allison in observing that bureaucracies themselves have collective ideological leanings.⁶ Both his notion of currents of thought and the idea of schools of thought advance the point of view that the beliefs of large governmental organizations such as the Congress, the State Department, and the military are building blocks in analyzing the construction of American policy outputs. As Schurmann, right and wrong, is a major inspiration in the development of the schools-of-thought concept, it is instructive to now paraphrase his argument about the development of an overriding current of thought in the post-1945 era. For in his analysis are many of the same constructs that will be employed in a schools-of-thought assessment of the competing orientations in post-Cold War era US foreign policy.

Schurmann identified three basic currents of thought in American opinion regarding post-war foreign policy (see Chart 1.1). Schurmann felt that imperialism was the overarching current of the era. It was a hybrid of the older orientations of nationalism and internationalism. All three currents were embedded in the bureaucracy in Washington, with the nationalist bastion being the military, the internationalist current dominating the State Department, and the imperialists, men such as Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, dominating the executive branch itself. Schurmann looked at how the basic currents related to American political parties. The dominant imperialists, symbolized by Truman and Vandenberg, created a bipartisan consensus between the Democratic Party (except for its

Chart 1.1 Schurmann's Currents of Cold War American Foreign Policy (inspired by Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power)

Current	Tend in Crisis	Primary Area of Concern	Bureaucratic Bastion	Key Concern	Program	Symbol
Nationalists	War	US	Military	National Interest	Asia-First	Taft
Imperialists (The Dominant Current)	Cold War	Free World	Presidency	National Security	Containment	Truman
Internationalists	Peaceful Coexistence	Universalists	State Department	International Economy	Europe-First	Wallace

In Asia during the Cold War, US foreign policy was either Imperialist or Nationalist; in Europe, either Imperialist or Internationalist.

Wallaceite left-wing) and liberal Republicans such as Willkie, Dewey, and Eisenhower. Schurmann illustrated that both the nationalists and internationalists were politically minority currents, with the internationalists being far too elitist to gain mass support and the nationalists being a minority even within their Republican Party stronghold. Schurmann noted that bureaucracies represent interests, with historical individuals symbolizing various ideological tenets. The internationalist bastion was the State Department, where most of the Foreign Service Officers were from Ivy League backgrounds. Interest-wise, the State Department had long represented East Coast corporate business interests. Obviously this East Coast elitism would not culturally generate vast popular support in the rest of the country. The internationalists' grand champion was FDR himself. With his death their power declined but never disappeared, as is illustrated by the continuing career of Henry Wallace. In fact in their belief that the international economy was crucial to the workings of the new order and in their enthusiasm for multilateral institutions, the internationalists were the forefathers of the institutionalists, a major school of thought of the present day.

The nationalists were another old and powerful force in American foreign policy. Primarily Republicans, the nationalists were epitomized by Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Their failure to control the Republican Party was a central factor in the development of imperialism as the dominant foreign policy current in the post-war world. If Taft had controlled the Republicans, the bipartisan consensus that it was essential for containment to attain if it was to become the dominant post-war policy would have been made impossible, as Taft would have led the Republican Party to espouse his nationalist convictions. 'The nationalists felt powerless even within their own preferred Republican Party. In 1940, 1944, 1948, and 1952 the liberal wing of the Republican Party managed to nominate its own Presidential candidates.'⁷ The nationalists grew increasingly alienated from the American political process. The bastion of nationalist support was small-town, small-time American business, a force that would logically be alienated from both the New Dealism of the internationalists and the imperialists, as well as the East Coast, corporate, liberal Republicans. Their sense of loss, the illuminating metaphor is the *loss* of China, acquired grotesque form with the McCarthy hearings. Their alliance with the military, particularly the conservative Navy, established them as a

permanent, if minority, current on the American foreign policy scene. With the dawn of the atomic age the Navy found itself in bureaucratic budgetary peril as its rival, the Air Force, was the logical vehicle for nuclear weapons and thus seemed certain to have its budget increased at the Navy's expense. The Navy was the most conservative of the armed forces, as can be seen by its protracted struggle to prevent its racial integration, and was essentially a Pacific fleet in the inter-war era as the Atlantic was the preserve of the British navy. The Navy's conservative, nationalist tendencies made it a logical choice for an alliance with the right-wing of the Republican Party.⁸

It was precisely because the Navy's interests lay in the Pacific that the right-wing Republicans adopted their Asia-first policy. The war in the Pacific had been largely a nationalist, unilateralist show as compared with the internationalist cooperation in Europe.⁹ It was the fusing of nationalist, expansionist, unilateralist, and essentially anti-internationalist elements that led to calls for an Asia-first policy. 'The big bankers of Wall Street were internationalists—so were the Communists with their Marxist doctrines, and so were the British with their empire.'¹⁰ These three groups were anathema to the nationalists explicitly because of their internationalist orientation. It was in the Pacific that the nationalists, with their Navy allies, hoped to implement their policy of *America first*.

While NSC-68 reaffirmed the primacy of the Europe-first approach developed by Roosevelt in World War II, Schurmann noted that the process was more complicated than this. Sometimes victorious currents as well as schools of thought, and the bureaucracies that espouse them, have to compromise to an extent with their vanquished foes. Schurmann illustrated that this was exactly what happened in the post-war era. 'Whereas American actions in Europe were an ever-changing mix of containment and peaceful co-existence [the policies of the imperialists and internationalists respectively], in East Asia they were a mix of containment and rollback [the policies of the imperialists and nationalists].'¹¹ An example of this process was post-war US policy to China. After the Korean War the US extended its containment policy, demarcating both Korea and Vietnam. However unlike American policy regarding the USSR, the US engaged in no official contact with the Chinese for 25 years. This was a sop to the nationalists. It is this mixture of the various foreign policy currents, and the interests that they represent, that ultimately helped determine general foreign

policy outputs. It is suggested that this process will hold true for a schools-of-thought analysis of the post-Cold War era as well.

The dominant current in the post-war era was that of imperialism. It was symbolized by men such as Harry Truman and George Kennan, with the presidency itself as its bureaucratic bastion. Imperialists believed that if the US was to learn from the errors of 1918, an activist, vigorous, foreign policy was essential. Such a policy would, of course, cost money, supplied largely by business, which was not a core New Deal constituency, and make the government, particularly the Chief Executive, the primary actor in the post-war era. The president, and the officials clustered around the executive branch, had a virtual monopoly over national security issues, particularly with the advent of the atomic bomb. It was through the use of national security issues that the presidency, and the imperialist current it adhered to, became ever more dominant in American foreign policy. Containment led to and justified this increase in executive power and illustrated the supremacy of the imperialist current in the post-war era.

For Schurmann, containment had three basic precepts. Firstly, it wished to maintain American nuclear superiority. Secondly, it endeavored to draw demarcation lines between the free and communist worlds. Thirdly, it was to bolster the free world, with the priority going to those states near the demarcation lines. As Schurmann stated, 'the basic goal of containment policy was the creation of a Pax Americana, which would prevent a new world war from erupting, unify the free world under an American aegis, and give the member nations economic growth and political stability'.¹² It is the great success of this policy which has paradoxically led to the need for a new overarching direction in American foreign policy following the destruction of the Berlin Wall. President Truman succeeded in establishing imperialism as the dominant current by capitalizing on the specter of the Russian bear. For instance, in lobbying Congress to support the Truman Doctrine in 1947, he quieted both his nationalist (Taft) and internationalist (Wallace) opponents by highlighting the threat of the communist menace to Greece and Turkey. Today the threat of Russian adventurism beyond the boundaries of the former USSR is simply not tenable. It is the loss of this unifying enemy and the fundamental structural change in the world away from the bipolarity of the Cold War era that are the main reasons that new overriding principles of American foreign policy are needed.

DEFINITIONAL APPROACHES TO SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT ANALYSIS

While Schurmann's analysis is excellent, new research into the present ideological state of American foreign policy is essential and is a major *raison d'être* of this work. Time has not stopped, and events have eroded Schurmann's analysis, which was more applicable to the late 1940s-early 1950s than to the 1990s. Also, Schurmann's classification system is too broad to explain much that goes on in international affairs. For example, Schurmann categorized FDR as an imperialist, an internationalist, *and* a nationalist. Such all-pervasive classification at some point ceases to have meaning. Therefore, an updating and improvement upon Schurmann's work is necessary.

So definitionally what is a school of thought, and how does it relate contextually to ideas about ideology, belief systems, and elite consensus? Schools-of-thought analysis, while intimately connected to these three concepts, is a unique attempt to eradicate theoretical flaws that currently limit the impact of the link between beliefs and action.¹³

A major flaw of the concept of ideology is that it is too broad to adequately explain the notion of *praxis*, the unity of thought and action. The main social science limitation of the notion of ideology is that it is too far removed from the reality of policy preferences. The schools-of-thought concept is grounded in some of the general precepts usually ascribed to ideological thought, while at the same time functioning as a link between ideological beliefs and specific policies. As such a school of thought can be seen as a sort of sub-ideology.¹⁴

Francis Fukuyama's belief that liberalism has won the ideological contest of the twentieth century illustrates that the notion of ideology is often too vague to be of much use in International Relations, particularly at the crucial domestic level. Fukuyama implicitly regards liberalism as a single all-encompassing ideology, without explaining what the policy outcomes are of adhering to such a creed (beyond advocating free market economics and representative democracy), how these outcomes are reached, or accounting for the various policy positions held by different liberal states. Ben Wattenberg illustrated the intellectual flaw in viewing liberalism as an undifferentiated creed. He contrasted liberalism in the US with liberalism in Western Europe, believing them to be largely distinct

phenomena. He saw American democracy as having 'distinctive features ... individualism, pluralism, opportunity, dynamism, and the absence of a rigid class structure',¹⁵ contrasting it with the more corporatist version of the European Open Market and its democratic institutions. Wattenberg demonstrates that Fukuyama's overly broad conception of what constitutes an ideology obscures more than it reveals about the workings of the international system.

While Schurmann rejected the standard overly broad conception of ideology, currents of thought are not sub-ideologies as are schools of thought, but rather are separate ideologies themselves. Schurmann observed, 'The more clearcut and explicit they become [currents of thought] the more they take on certain qualities of doctrine and so become ideologies.'¹⁶ For Schurmann, the bureaucratic conflict that was played out in the American foreign policy decision-making process was between wholly different ideologies, whereas schools-of-thought analysis sees the concept of ideology as farther away from direct involvement in the decision-making process. While agreeing with Schurmann that ideas directly influence policy outputs, schools-of-thought analysis posits that this process is performed at a lower analytical level. It refines the standard view of ideology by positing a sub-level where the various impulses within liberalism are prioritized in such a manner as to directly affect policy outputs. For example, while agreeing with Fukuyama that liberalism is the dominant ideology of the day and agreeing that this is certainly true in the US, this fact in and of itself does not explain how beliefs influence American foreign policy. However within the liberal ideology of the US are the schools of thought sub-ideologies of democratism, neo-realism, and institutionalism which, when integrated with bureaucratic politics analysis and objective international and domestic conditions, lead to genuine foreign policy outputs in the post-Cold War era. Thus, while Schurmann's paradigm is undoubtedly the basis for much of schools-of-thought analysis, the two concepts are clearly different.

Methodologically, there are also differences between Schurmann's construct and schools-of-thought analysis. Unlike Schurmann, schools-of-thought analysis does not view the executive branch as the sole ideological battleground. Schools-of-thought analysis takes the view that both the executive and legislative branches, as well as the foreign policy bureaucracies clustered around the presidency, reflect and promote sub-ideological impulses as well as interests, and thus can all be classified and analyzed by

use of the schools-of-thought method. Schurmann's overly simple focus on the executive branch, as the key to understanding how beliefs are translated into policy in the American government, will be replaced in this work by the bureaucratic politics method linked to a schools-of-thought analysis of key Cabinet and Congressional leaders, as well as the president. This process will accurately reflect the complexity of the US foreign policy decision-making process.

A final point needs to be made about the relationship between ideologies and schools of thought. While both relate directly to belief systems, they do so in very different ways. As Hinich and Munger observed, 'ideologies unite personal belief systems in the population, even though individual schema will be different'.¹⁷ While it is true that ideologies serve to transform personal belief systems into a larger collective belief system (with some allowance for individual variation), this is done in only the most general way. Schools-of-thought analysis is predicated on the concept that there is another stage in the process, that of the schools-of-thought sub-ideology, which unites personal belief systems to a more specific collective point of view that does have direct policy repercussions when combined with other decision-making variables.

Thus for both the concepts of ideology and schools of thought, belief systems are a central factor.¹⁸ The best specific definition of *belief system* is probably Ole Holsti's. He stated that a belief system may be thought of as, 'the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying its salient characteristics'.¹⁹ Holsti noted that a belief system implies a construct in which priorities are formed, choices made. He argued, 'In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behavior, the belief system has the function of the establishing of goals and the ordering of preferences'.²⁰ This process of establishing priorities at the belief system level is continued at the higher analytical plane of schools-of-thought analysis. Indeed many of the differences between the various schools of thought boil down to differences of priority, differences first articulated at the individual belief system level. As schools of thought are merely the collective expression of the political aspects of the belief systems of individual members of the foreign policy elite, this is not surprising.

Belief systems, like ideologies, cover a broader philosophical area than does the notion of schools of thought. Barber defined a belief system as a world view which consists of an individual's, 'primary,

politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and central moral conflicts of the time. This is how he sees the world and his lasting opinions about what he sees.²¹ Belief systems are the building blocks for schools-of-thought analysis, which refines these politically relevant beliefs into a collective belief system complete with concrete policy outputs.

The idea of elites and elite consensus is the last major concept that gives schools-of-thought analysis contextual value.²² A major assumption of schools-of-thought analysis is that it is elite belief systems that need to be assessed if foreign policy outputs are to be analyzed. This is because it is the elites who have both a more coherent position than the general public and due to the fact that elites largely control the information flow of foreign policy the masses receive. Based on his analysis of the relationship between masses and elites in America regarding foreign policy, Jennings observed, 'it is patent that political party elites have a vastly more constrained and stable set of political preferences and perspectives than does the mass public in general'.²³ Part of the reason for this heightened coherence *vis-à-vis* the general public is that elites, both opinion-makers and decision-makers, have the interest and the expertise across the spectrum of issues in International Relations that the general public lacks, qualities that are conducive to integrating coherent belief systems into policy preferences.

Elites have a far greater level of power over foreign policy issues *vis-à-vis* the general public than they do over domestic policy. As Jennings stated, 'they [elites] serve as major sources of political information for the citizenry, through the media and other communication channels. This two-way flow of communication has a very asymmetrical quality'.²⁴ It is generally recognized that in most cases, foreign affairs issues are the preserve and interest of a tiny minority of the American population. For example, exit polls taken by the *Washington Post* during election day, 3 November 1992, show that only one voter in 12 cited foreign policy concerns as a significant issue that affected their vote.²⁵ That is not to say that on some foreign policy issues, particularly those involving war and peace, the general public does not make itself heard. Indeed even on less salient issues for the American public, such as the Bosnian crisis chronicled in this work, it exerts a powerful if indirect influence, particularly regarding what it will *not* countenance. Still, schools-of-thought analysis, while accepting that the mass public is a factor in understanding foreign policy decision-making, posits that

its role is indirect, largely ideologically unfocused, and thus the concept of schools of thought applies primarily to the foreign policy elite of the United States.

Schools-of-thought analysis can be understood in terms of its relationship to the concepts of ideology, belief systems, and elite domination of the foreign policy decision-making process. Definitionally, it can be defined as a sub-ideology that can be directly linked to concrete policy preferences in American foreign policy. Schools-of-thought analysis is predicated on the Greek notion of *praxis*, the unity of thought and action. Unlike the concept of belief systems, schools-of-thought analysis relates directly to a group or individual's *political* philosophy, rather than to a general philosophical point of view, and this political philosophy has discernible policy implications. Unlike Schurmann's currents of thought paradigm, schools-of-thought analysis advocates that all key foreign policy actors themselves have a schools-of-thought orientation, including the Congress and the foreign policy bureaucracies clustered around the presidency. These organizations' schools-of-thought orientations are determined by the power struggles that take place between individuals within organizations, each of whom adheres to one of the major schools of thought. Schools-of-thought analysis posits a foreign policy arena where several competing schools of thought battle for primacy as they have throughout American history, and that periodically, such as after 1945, such battles lead to a new dominant school of thought emerging. It is also predicated on the idea that it is the orientation of American foreign policy elites that is the key factor that helps explain how foreign policy outputs are arrived at. Schools-of-thought analysis is just one variable in explaining foreign policy outputs, as like Schurmann's model, it acknowledges that objective conditions of American society (particularly what is politically possible, a factor arrived at partly by mass public opinion) and the nature of the international political arena are other factors that need to be taken into account to explain foreign policy outputs.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT ANALYSIS

It is necessary to explain the first principles behind each school of thought. These general predilections form the prism of analysis

through which decision-makers view policy questions.²⁶ It is the contention of this book that if the first principles of each school of thought can be discerned and analyzed, their adherents' general policy prescriptions can be determined largely as a function of these underlying analytical and philosophical predilections. It is in linking these first principles to specific policies and policy-makers that forms the basis of the schools-of-thought classification system adopted in this book. This linkage, as well as noting the parameters in each school of thought, helps give one a thorough understanding of the American response to the post-1989 era. Some of the schools of thought engender policies that are complementary, some are in friction, and all have political, economic and military dimensions. This book will classify and analyze the various American foreign policy schools of thought grappling with the post-Cold War era.

After first outlining the methodological approaches behind this work, the first principles of the present schools of thought in American foreign policy will be assessed in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 will deal with the democratists, a major contemporary school of thought, who advocate increased American involvement in the world. Chapter 3 will focus on the neo-realists, traditionally the most influential school of thought. The institutionalists will be examined in Chapter 4: they are the heirs of the internationalist vision of Franklin Roosevelt. In Chapter 5 this work will assess the schools-of-thought orientations of central decision-makers in the executive and legislative branches of the US government, and in Chapter 6 the overall schools-of-thought orientation of the Clinton administration regarding the Bosnian crisis will be discussed. Armed with the data from Chapters 2–6, Chapter 7 will analyze outputs of present-day American foreign policy using a fusion of schools-of-thought analysis and the bureaucratic politics method and relating it to the Clinton administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis. In conclusion, Chapter 8 will utilize the schools-of-thought analytical tool to assess the American response to the climax of the Bosnian crisis, the Dayton Peace Accord.

Schools-of-thought analysis will be further divided into majority and minority strains and analyzed in Chapters 2–4, in an effort to add precision to schools-of-thought thinking that Schurmann's fine analysis lacked. While it is extremely useful to analyze a school of thought as a coherent whole, a narrower level of analysis is also possible, looking at majority and minority strains within each school of thought, before placing individual decision-makers into the general schools-of-thought paradigm. Majority strains within a school

of thought can be defined as both intellectually and politically more popular than minority strains. For example in Chapter 3, it will be shown that realist-internationalists are more powerful than realist-isolationists. Only those advocating majority strains as their overall schools-of-thought orientation will be assessed in the charts in Chapter 5. In looking at the schools of thought as a whole, it is important to keep in mind that not all positions in the paradigm are intellectually equidistant. For instance, realist-internationalists and moderate democratists are intellectually closer than realist-isolationists and institutionalists. Also not all schools-of-thought have equal intellectual or political power. For example, democratists are not as potent a force in Washington as are institutionalists. These factors should be kept in mind when comparing schools-of-thought (see Chart 1.2). Having delineated the givens underlying each school of thought and further divided them into majority and minority strains (where minority strains exist), a school of thought's general policy prescriptions regarding the important foreign policy issue areas of the day can be ascertained. Having assessed these schools-of-thought policy prescriptions, it will be possible to later place specific decision-makers into an overall school of thought.

To do so, it is necessary to look at the general schools-of-thought policy prescriptions regarding five important issue areas in the post-Cold War era, that have been discerned from analysis of the first principles underlying each school of thought, and compare them to individual decision-makers' policy preferences. If they broadly match the general schools-of-thought prescriptions (in this case three correlations out of five issue areas) the individual will be labelled as belonging to that particular school of thought. The general classification of each decision-maker into the school of thought proposed here will not necessarily reflect the complete views of any single individual, as many espouse characteristics of more than one school of thought. Ultimately however each actor will have one dominant orientation, and that is where he will be placed in the schools-of-thought model. In an effort to add further precision to this endeavor an actor's minority views will also be classified. That is, if a decision-maker has a significant schools-of-thought orientation that correlates to a general school of thought's policy prescriptions two out of five times, it will be noted and analyzed after the individual's majority schools-of-thought orientation is discussed. For instance, as will be illustrated in Chapter 5, George Mitchell espouses majority democratist views, while having

Chart 1.2 Current American Foreign Policy Schools of Thought

	Democratists	Neo-realists	Institutionalists
Goal	Promote Democracy	Promote National Interests, stop appearance of a hegemonic rival.	Promote economic liberalism through international institutions.
Declinist/Triumphalist Schurmann Code	Triumphalist NATIONALIST/ IMPERIALIST	Declinist IMPERIALIST/ NATIONALIST	Declinist INTERNATIONALIST
Assume	Democracies have common values (i.e. democracies do not go to war with one another).	Nations have fundamentally different values. International Relations is a zero-sum game.	Capitalist states are inherently linked and have common interests. Multilateral institutions are the cornerstone for facilitating the world system.
Variations within the currents	HYPER- DEMOCRATISTS/ MODERATE DEMOCRATISTS The difference is in degree but it is qualitative.	REALIST- INTERNATIONALISTS/ REALIST- ISOLATIONISTS The difference is vast, yet the same ideological roots.	NO MINORITY CURRENT
Academics Political Actors Level of Analysis	Allison, Fukuyama Neoconservatives Domestic Concerns	Kissinger, Nixon DoD, CIA, Republican Party Systemic Factors, Balance of Power Considerations	Nye, Keohane Democratic Party, Presidency International Economy

significant minority institutionalist beliefs, particularly regarding Bosnia. The examination of minority views adds needed precision to the schools-of-thought paradigm, reflecting the reality that rarely is an individual's belief system uniform.

While it is true that if there are too many exceptions to general schools-of-thought precepts the categorizations cease to have meaning, a less than perfect fit (at worst in this case three out of five policy prescriptions conforming to the school of thought's general view) does not negate the overall classification. There is a difference between acknowledging that a decision-maker's overall orientation is a major factor in foreign policy decision-making, and advocating a construct that becomes a deterministic strait-jacket. There are certainly other major factors in foreign policy decision-making that must be taken into account if the reasons for specific policy initiatives are to be understood. These include economic factors, the dynamic of domestic political struggles, cultural factors, and the nature of the international system, among others. Thus it is not sufficient to just abstractly assess the schools of thought of the post-Cold War era. To understand foreign policy outputs the factors of political power and electoral restraints that change, inhibit, and limit the role of a decision-maker's belief system must be explored. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will do just this. The political variable must be mixed with a decision-maker's general schools-of-thought orientation if foreign policy outputs are to be truly understood.

The decision-maker sample was selected using three principles gleaned from Allison's bureaucratic politics model: 1) Does the decision-maker hold a central position regarding foreign policy decision-making?; 2) Does the decision-maker exhibit personal characteristics, such as closeness to the President or a widely acknowledged mastery of his brief, which give him influence in foreign policy decision-making?; 3) Does the decision-maker exhibit ideational fervor regarding specific foreign policy issue areas which makes him influential regarding these individual issues? For a decision-maker to be included in the sample, he had to exhibit at least one of these bureaucratic power variables.

A problem of using rhetoric to determine an individual decision-maker's place in the model is that, for electoral reasons, most decision-makers generally favor all positive foreign policy outcomes, even if they know the outcomes come into conflict with each other or are not likely to be achieved. While agreeing with Friedman and Karsh that, 'despite the proclivity of those in public office to

propoganda, rhetoric, chicanery, and lies, on the whole even they usually end up saying what they mean and meaning what they say',²⁷ rhetoric alone is not sufficient to ascertain an individual actor's schools-of-thought orientation. Almost all foreign policy decision-makers in the US desire to promote democracy throughout the world, to protect US national interests, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival, and foster world economic capitalization. It is the way these goals are advanced, and most importantly, their *priority vis-à-vis* one another that helps determine foreign policy. This is what makes a concentration on the five specific issue areas in the post-Cold War world so valuable a part of the schools-of-thought paradigm. It is an analysis of specific prescriptions that is made with the notions of pragmatism and rhetoric included. For example, while most policy-makers may favor both hounding China over its human rights abuses and expanding trade with Deng Xiaoping's government, the question over what to do about MFN with China makes the underlying priority of these two goals evident, depending on the policymaker's specific prescription. Thus by analyzing the specific policy preferences of decision-makers relating to the five issue areas their genuine priorities and schools-of-thought orientation can be apprehended. Specific policies reflect a school of thought's prioritization of the above mentioned foreign policy benefits. The advocacy of specific policies removes the confusion rhetorical flourishes often bring to discerning an actor's genuine foreign policy priorities.

Many academics and decision-makers would argue that analyzing belief systems simply does not matter, as beliefs and ideas are not essential for understanding foreign policy formulation. It is a major given of this book that ideas do matter, matter enormously, and that the theoretical underpinnings of belief systems is a vastly ignored field. It is essential for all who study International Relations, as even those who contend they have no theoretical underpinnings, unwittingly, by this stance, espouse theoretical underpinnings. As Robert Keohane commented, "The choice for practitioners is not between being influenced by theory or examining each case "on its merits": its rather between being aware of the theoretical basis for one's interpretation and action and being unaware of it."²⁸ Schools-of-thought first principles influence the decision-makers who create foreign policy outputs. This process exists, whether admitted or not, and as all agree it is crucial to understand action (foreign policy outputs), so it is essential to comprehend sub-ideological motiva-

tions, a contributing variable to foreign policy inputs. Keohane argued, 'we must understand the context of action before we can understand the action itself'.²⁹ Schools-of-thought analysis provides part of this crucial context by assessing the intellectual reference points of hard-pressed decision-makers.

A basic answer as to why this book is being written is that the overall orientation (school of thought) a decision-maker espouses has not been accorded sufficient weight in thinking about International Relations. Part of the purpose of this book is to raise the level of consciousness about the importance of this variable in the decision-making process. It is to see not only what the specific orientations of certain individuals are regarding foreign policy schools of thought, but also to determine to what extent it is useful to put decision-makers into a general schools-of-thought classification system that gives this process meaning.

Schools-of-thought analysis is also a necessary tool in order to examine what the overarching American foreign policy precepts will be in the new era, as Schurmann has shown that belief orientations are crucial building blocks in analyzing this process. Ultimately, as Schurmann illustrated was the case after 1945, the dominant new voice in American foreign policy could either be a new intellectual construct, though undoubtedly it would be a hybrid of today's schools of thought, or the new era could be dominated by one distinctive, already discernible school of thought. The dominant voice in American foreign policy must be a program around which bipartisan support can coalesce. The academic argument now raging about the American role in the post-Cold War order and its foreign policy goals, largely based on schools-of-thought disputes, far from being esoteric, will be played out in the corridors of power and will help determine US foreign policy well into the next century. This book contends that schools of thought can be established in post-Cold War American foreign policy and that knowledge of this decision-making variable is crucial in understanding the Clinton administration's foreign policy outputs.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT ANALYSIS

What good does it do to place people into a schools-of-thought box? By putting decision-makers into the paradigm, one is able to say

what their foreign policy prescriptions are in the post-Cold War era, and most importantly, what, in general, are the theoretical first principles they use to arrive at their specific policy prescriptions. The schools-of-thought variable provides part of the answer to the crucial questions, why do decision-makers believe what they do, and how do these beliefs affect foreign policy formulation? Also by boxing decision-makers it is easier to compare their general foreign policy formulations, and to examine and contrast the schools-of-thought first principles that provide each policymaker with a prism of perception, a general way of viewing the world, whether they acknowledge it or not.³⁰ Thus the boxing process provides an explanatory element that is crucial to any paradigm's validity.

There are three primary differentiating embarkation points for studying the present three schools of thought in American foreign policy. Firstly, the three schools-of-thought orientations roughly relate to different political groupings, with the neo-realists being primarily Republicans, the institutionalists–Democrats, and the democratists–neoconservatives in both parties. Secondly, regarding priorities, each has a different primary foreign policy goal. The democratists see the promotion of democracy around the world as central to their thinking, while neo-realists wish to protect and further the American national interest, whereas institutionalists feel the promotion of capitalism around the globe should be the central factor in determining America's post-Cold War foreign policy. Thirdly, these differences in priorities are matched by a fundamental conflict between all three major schools of thought over what should be the primary level of analysis used in studying global conditions. Democratists feel a state's policy is motivated primarily by domestic concerns, neo-realists feel systemic factors and balance of power considerations are central, and institutionalists believe the workings of the international economy are the prime determinant of a state's foreign policy. As this book will illustrate, from these different first principles shall flow distinctive schools of thought, which will lead to policy-makers having very different ways of looking at the world. From here, it follows that general, broad differences over policy are likely to emerge.

With the passing of the Cold War, it is evident that the US needs to establish new guiding principles for the conduct of foreign policy. The schools-of-thought paradigm provides the building blocks needed to analyze how this process will evolve. It is an ideal tool for relating theory to political processes. It explains the intellectual

context of decision-makers' policy preferences, and helps to answer the crucial question, which is why certain policy-makers hold specific policy positions. The schools-of-thought model is an attempt to both classify and understand the intellectual nature of the post-Cold War era, and to begin to apprehend the contours of the strange new epoch we find ourselves in.

2 *The Democratists*

Chart 2.1 *The Belief System of the Democratists*

1	Background:	Kant
2	Goal:	Promote global democracy.
3	Assume:	Liberal democracies have common values and do not go to war with one another. Democracy is a universalist creed and is ultimately universally applicable. Democracy leads to economic liberalism, not vice-versa.
4	See state:	Run primarily by internal politics.
5	Key analytical orientation:	Ideological
6	Declinist/Revivalist:	Revivalist
7	World structure:	Unipolar
8	Preferred mode of action:	US-dominated multilateral force. Unilateral action to be taken if necessary.
9	Basis of force:	Organizations like Nato.
10	World policeman:	US, with like-minded states.
11	Key areas and foci:	Newly democratic states of Eastern Europe and especially Russia; human rights.
12	Schurmann classification:	Mix of Imperialists and Nationalists (especially in Asia).
13	Political supporters:	Neoconservatives
14	Political actors:	Former Senator Mitchell, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott.
15	Bureaucratic bastions of support:	Think-tanks, lower levels of the State Department.
16	Policy toward Western Europe/European defense system:	Pro-European integration, especially pro-Nato. Do not see a politically integrated Europe as threatening, due to shared values (there is no need to fear the Germans). Favor US-dominated Nato. An extension of Nato is not advocated, due to concerns about Russia. Want Nato to engage in out-of-area missions.
17	Policy toward Bosnia:	Interventionist; favored lifting of embargo and Nato bombing raids to bolster Bosnian government, even advocated limited US military involvement on the Muslim side of the conflict.
18	Policy toward trade (NAFTA and GATT):	Generally favor, but not a priority.
19	Policy toward Russia:	Strongly for large-scale aid, as it is a chief area of concern.
20	Policy toward China:	No MFN, or MFN with strict conditions.
21	Variations within the school of thought:	HYPER-DEMOCRATIST (Minority)/ MODERATE DEMOCRATIST (Majority); difference is in degree but it is important.

This chapter is devoted to democratism, one of the three major schools of thought in the post-Cold War era. After further outlining the first principles that underlie the democratist position, this chapter will conclude by describing the majority democratist policy prescriptions toward five crucial issue areas.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATISM

The democratist creed claims the German philosopher Kant as its father. In *Perpetual Peace*, written in 1795, Kant stated that a league of democratic states was the key to universal peace. The simple, overriding priority of the democratists is to promote democratic movements around the globe. Democratists fundamentally believe that American geopolitical and strategic interests are best served by encouraging and nurturing like-minded democratic states.

There are four underlying assumptions behind democratism. Firstly, democratists assume all democracies share basic values. Among these are: respect for the individual and individual freedoms, governments having limited power, political pluralism, and free and regular elections.¹ It is these common democratic values that are the essential reason for the democratists' strongest assumption, that is the second assumption, namely that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another. As Francis Fukuyama stated in *The New Republic*, 'those that disrespect the rights of their own citizens are much more likely to disrespect the rights of neighboring states as well'.² This is the common sense basis to democratism, that the internal nature of a state is an essential guide to its external behavior. Further, as Michael Doyle noted, 'even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, *constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another*'³ (emphasis added). This is a bold assertion, and is the single most important point in the democratist case.

It can be disputed. Peru and Ecuador were both democracies when they went to war in the nineteenth century. The Nixon administration certainly played a role in the toppling of the democratically elected government of Allende in Chile in the early 1970s. Even Wilhelmine Germany was a semi-democratic state immediately prior to World War I. Yet the farfetchedness of these counter-examples and their paucity serve to highlight how strong a case the democratists have on this issue. Peru and Ecuador were both

nascent democracies when they went to war, neither having a strong democratic tradition. The Nixon administration helped topple Allende by means of covert operations. Given the climate engendered by the Vietnam War, it is highly unlikely that at that time the US could have sustained a prolonged, public war with another democratic state. While Wilhelmine Germany was an evolving constitutional monarchy over domestic issues, foreign affairs was still very much the preserve of the Kaiser and factions of the army in the early twentieth century. So while one can quibble, Doyle's general point seems beyond dispute.

For a democratist, a state's democratic orientation overrides all of the other major variables in the state system. Doyle noted, 'politically more significant, perhaps, is that when states are forced to decide by the pressure of an impinging world war, on which side of the world contest they will fight, liberal states wind up all on the same side, despite the real complexity of the historical, economic and political factors that affect their foreign policies'.⁴ For a democratist, other factors do not obviate the key determinant of a state's behavior in the international arena; whether it is (or is not) a democracy. Democratists then believe world peace is inevitable if and when all in the states around the globe are democratic. Thus US policy should be to encourage and enlarge the world's democratic zone.

The third basic democratist assumption is that there is a link between democracy and the free market, but not necessarily vice-versa. While some economically liberal states, such as Malaysia and Singapore, have not become genuinely democratic while evolving into capitalist states, never has a truly democratic state been economically anything other than a member of the capitalist world. Wattenberg stated the general development formula for democratists, 'Liberty yields peace, and peace yields prosperity, in exactly that sequence. Elections come first.'⁵ For democratists, the stability engendered by the rule of the people is essential to long-term economic success. For example, the popular, personal moral authority of Havel enabled his reformist efforts to endure the immediate unpopularity of necessary austerity measures. Democratists believe the causation here is one-sided. While democracy may enhance the stability necessary for free market success and protect newly-capitalizing states from revolution, the urge for democracy is seen as emanating from non-economic sources. This belief is in direct contradiction to that of the institutionalists, who see democracy as being largely the result of a developing free-market society.

The fourth and final precept of democratism is that not only do all democracies espouse universal values, democracy itself is seen to be universally applicable. Democratists shun the fashionable view of cultural relativism. They do not see their creed as being ideologically alien to certain civilizations. As Samuel Huntington, stated, 'some support undoubtedly exists in almost every society for liberty, equality, democracy, and the rights of the individual'.⁶ When democratists see newly democratic states struggling to succeed, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, they see a continuation of the struggle of Washington, Jefferson and Adams. This democratist predilection to extrapolate from the American experience was noted by Stanley Hoffmann, who argued that 'Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from their experience are of universal applicability'.⁷ Democratists believe, as the patriot Thomas Paine did 200 years ago, the world can be remade in America's image.

GENERAL DEMOCRATIST PERCEPTIONS

For democratists, it is logical that as their focus is on the democratic nature of a regime, a state's internal political character is seen to be analytically crucial. Democratism differs from neo-realism over the matter of the crucial primary level of analysis in International Relations. Doyle illuminated this notion, through the use of the old neo-realist staple game, *the prisoner's dilemma*. The game is crucial for neo-realists as it is supposed to point out that uncertainty and anarchy lead each prisoner (state) to pursue its own limited self-interest in order to attain the best (or in the case of the game, the assured, but second-best) outcome. Doyle turns the game on its head and in so doing highlights the democratists' belief that a state's actions can only truly be understood by analysis at the domestic level. 'The 'prisoners' are presumed to be felonious, unrelated except by their partnership in crime, and lacking in mutual trust-competitive nation-states in an anarchic world. A similar game between fraternal or sorroral twins-Kant's republics-would be likely to lead to different results.'⁸ For democratists, intentions and not capabilities are crucial. This flies directly in the face of the neo-realist belief that decision-makers should evaluate capabilities over intentions. Democratists would point out that the US does not fear France or Britain, although both have a nuclear capability, because

their domestic orientation and history point to their pacific intentions.

Likewise the democratist analytical orientation differs greatly from the other two schools of thought. Whereas neo-realists particularly value the military component of the overall power equation and institutionalists heavily weight economic factors, democratists stress the ideological components of power. Fukuyama's critique of the neo-realist concept of the national interest is a good example of the strong democratist weighting of ideology. He argued, 'threat perception and concepts of national interest aren't objective conditions established by the international system, but are dictated by ideology'.⁹ Democratists thus see ideology, not some sort of concrete national interest, as a primary part of the motive force of history. Indeed Allison defines American national security, the ultimate yardstick of national interests, as largely protection of America's intangible benefits. 'America's basic national security objective has remained unchanged for four decades: to preserve the US as a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact.'¹⁰ These values are now seen by democratists to be not only safe but also expanding their influence throughout the world. US dominance in the area of ideas is of great importance to democratists, and helps explain the triumphalist nature of the school of thought. As Wattenberg stated, 'never has the culture of one nation been so far-flung and potent'.¹¹ Democratists see encouraging the continued spread of American culture and democratic ideals as the best general policy to follow in the new world order. For them the spread of democracy can only be ensured through continued American leadership in global affairs. Democratism is an involved, interventionist, internationalist creed. It is a recipe for a vigorous American involvement in the world.

Triumphalism then is the democratists' response to the declinist/revivalist debate. There is an obvious link between democratism's triumphalism and the urging of an aggressive interventionist foreign policy. As democratists are unambiguously up-beat about both the state of the US and its global structural position, it is logical they should be so missionary. Ironically, to paraphrase Khrushchev, democratists believe that history is on our side. Fukuyama stated, 'the single most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the past generation has been the global crisis of authoritarianism, and the spread of liberal democracies in its wake'.¹² He pointed out that democracies have increased in number from three in 1790, 13 in

1900, 27 in 1919, to 62 in 1991. Not only have democratic states emerged, Fukuyama believes that, 'All of the major systematic alternatives to liberal democracy have collapsed, one by one. This, and the resulting homogeneity of world politics forces us to once again take up the study of democracy as the central issue of any true political science.'¹³ Allison, as with so many other democratists, sees in this process the unique triumph of the United States. 'Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-in the wake of the Cold War and hot battle America's goals in the Declaration of Independence now seem ascendent around the globe The political values of freedom and market inspire the world.'¹⁴ The democratist analysis of the post-Cold War world as being increasingly favorable for America explains their desire to aggressively promote democracy.

Democratists see the world structure as unipolar, unlike their neo-realist and institutionalist counterparts. This democratist assertion is based on their argument that the US is the only state in the world with a multidimensionality of power. As Nixon noted, 'Today, as the only nation that possesses global economic, military and political power, the US stands at the apex of its political power.'¹⁵ As the US is the only genuine great power in the world, democratists believe that American policy will largely determine the type of world order that emerges.

When obligated to use force or to come to grips with a crucial issue, democratists would ideally like the US to be part of an American-dominated multilateral force. Democratists believe that such a situation occurred in the Gulf War. Fukuyama observed,

the UN served merely as window dressing for US unilateralism during the Gulf crisis and would have been impotent were it not for US leadership . . . collective action through the UN is not an alternative but a complement to American leadership. It is foolish to think, however, that action through the UN can substitute for American leadership when even bodies of like-minded states such as Nato and the EC have had trouble making tough decisions.¹⁶

For democratists, multilateralism provides a useful diplomatic facade, but should never be confused with the real motive force of International Relations in the new world order, American unilateralism. Here democratists differ greatly from institutionalists, who

see the renewed efficacy of the UN as a sign of a new order. The UN, with its bloated bureaucracy, lack of an enforcement mechanism (army), security council vetoes, and cacophony of voices, is seen as far too unwieldy to be a power unto itself. It is US leadership of like-minded democratic states that must form the focus of international power in the new world order. When consensus among even such like-minded states is impossible, democratists have a clear prescription, unilateralism. This impulse marks a crucial difference with their fellow neo-Wilsonians, the institutionalists, who invariably favor a true multilateralist approach.

Democratists' structural analysis and imperatives find their institutional outcome in organizations like Nato. A defense organization composed solely of democratic states, Nato has a long record of success and is a democratist favorite. Ironically, democratists agree with de Gaulle that Nato is basically a creature of the United States. America's dominant position in Nato is bureaucratically expressed by its supreme military commander always being an American. The multilateralism of like-minded states led by the US finds its focus in Nato. However for democratists, there is no doubt who the world policeman is. Krauthammer put it succinctly, 'If America wants [international] stability, it will have to create it.'¹⁷

Obviously all regions of the world and all major issue areas are important to a global power such as the US. But all the schools of thought have particular areas of vital interest. These lead to the prioritizing that goes on in foreign policy, whether consciously or not. Priorities are largely determined by the first principles of each school of thought. For instance, the democratists' major concern with human rights can be directly traced back to their valuing democratic values above all else. Among these values is respect for the rights of the individual, a right contravened by human rights violators. Today emphasis on human rights is seen as more plausible due to seismic changes in the international order. Democratists see the new world order as the time, when bereft of enemies, America can push forward its own liberal democratic values.

Regionally the democratists focus on the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, especially Russia. In 1993, as internal disturbances led by Khasbulatov, Rutskoï and the recalcitrant apparatchik-laden Russian parliament pushed the survival of Yeltsin's generally democratic government into doubt, democratists led the American rally to Yeltsin's defense. The former

superpower, still far and away the most powerful state in Eastern Europe, still possessing nuclear warheads, has become the key democratic test case for democratists. They see the success of Yeltsin's plans for democratization as essential for the continued flourishing of democracy throughout all of Eastern Europe. It is their highest regional priority.

The democratists relate to Schurmann's classification system as both imperialists and nationalists. They are imperialist in their triumphalist, interventionist view of the United States and nationalist in their missionary zeal to promote and protect American values across the globe. These two currents of thought are the intellectual forebears of democratism.

Democratism seems to be very much a minority position. Neither major party espouses democratism as its dominant position on foreign policy issues. Rather, there seem to be democratists in both major parties. William Pfaff makes the crucial link between the neo-conservative movement and the new democratist viewpoint. He argued, 'the neo-conservatives of the 70s and 80s have assumed the part played in the past by liberal institutionalists. They want the US to lead a crusade for global democracy little different in inspiration from the 14 points of Wilson or the Atlantic Charter, or the UN as originally envisaged by Franklin Roosevelt and his associates.'¹⁸ Although democratism is an active force in the political debate regarding the overarching direction America should take in the post-Cold War era, it has yet to find a large number of concrete political backers, though there are some such as former Majority Leader George Mitchell and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.

MAJORITY DEMOCRATIST POLICY POSITIONS

Regarding Western Europe and the reorganization of the European defense system with the end of the Cold War, democratists can be described as generally pro-European. They do not see a politically integrated Europe as threatening, as a united EU would certainly share America's democratic values. As Brzezinski stated, 'It has been the widely held American view that a united Europe, even though a potent (and now increasingly so in fact) economic rival, will have a major contribution to make to world peace. The common intellectual and philosophical heritage of the Atlantic world

has doubtless much to do with the American desire for and confidence in European unity.¹⁹ Democratists see the European–American alliance as based on common values, not security concerns. For this reason democratists expect the close European–American connection to continue, even without the Soviet threat. As former President Nixon noted, ‘real bonds of history and culture extend from Europe to America ... the values of the Western tradition, the steadfast adherence to democratic principles and the belief in the fundamental dignity of the individual create philosophical ties that bind’.²⁰ Likewise, unlike some neo-realists, democratists have no latent fear of a unified Germany, again the strongest state in Europe. Democratists see ‘the German problem’ as having been resolved through West Germany’s long association with Western institutions, states, and the democratic values they espouse. If democratists are in favor of increased European political integration, they are even more enthusiastic about revitalizing the Nato alliance. As has already been noted, the concept of Nato, a US-led multilateral organization of like-minded democratic states, is the democratists’ preferred *modus operandi* in the international theater. Democratists favor the expansion of Nato’s role to perform in out-of-area missions. However they are not for any extension of Nato eastwards, as they fear this might antagonize or destabilize Russia. Democratists believe America ought to continue to dominate the alliance. They see an expanded Nato as the linchpin of the new post-Cold War security order.

The carnage in Bosnia provoked a strong reaction from democratists. With their emphasis on human rights, democratists were particularly appalled by the specter of ethnic cleansing, enough to advocate American military intervention to end the horrendous human rights violations being propagated. After tough campaign rhetoric, the Clinton administration pursued a cautious, multilateralist policy toward Bosnia, saying that the US should not unilaterally intervene in the conflict. Democratists were outraged by this decision, feeling the US had failed to stop ethnic cleansing, despite there being no real checks on American power. Failure to end the slaughter in Bosnia became the greatest sore point for democratists in the new world order, and their main foreign policy criticism of the Clinton administration.

On the issue of expanding free trade (GATT and NAFTA), democratists favored both initiatives but saw them as corollary to their primary foreign policy goals. They generally favor free trade

but, as in the case of the MFN controversy with China, not at the expense of their humanitarian and democratic priorities.

Large-scale aid to Russia's fledgling democracy is the single most important policy issue for democratists. They see it as essential both practically and ideologically. Democratists are acutely interested in the democratic success of Russia as its very manner of democratizing is methodologically congruent with democratist theory. That is, the USSR under Gorbachev began political reforms before economic change was implemented, just as democratists would prescribe for developmental success. During the Cold War, democratists, with their emphasis on ideology, found true *rapprochement* with the USSR impossible, as the US and USSR avowed largely antithetical creeds. Only with the advent of true democrats like Yeltsin confirming ideological victory for the West, symbolized by Russia adopting western political structures and democratic values, was a true alliance possible. As it has been so long in coming, democratists do not wish to fritter away the opportunity ideological congruence brings.

Democratists feel that pursuing a peace made durable by the Russian adoption of common democratic values would be the crowning prize of victory in the Cold War. Allison pointed out, 'Having spent some 5 trillion dollars to meet the military challenge of the Soviet Union around the globe, is the US (and its allies) to opt out now when the Soviet future is being formed?'²¹ Democratists believe that investment in Russia makes sound economic sense. If Yeltsin fails and is replaced by a leadership more antagonistic to the US, America would be forced to raise defense spending again which would sabotage major domestic initiatives, such as attempting to lower the federal budget deficit and to provide some form of universal health care. While American aid is small compared with Russia's vast economic needs, democratists argue that it is significant. With Russia at a crossroads, democratists feel that President Clinton should do even more than he has to bolster democratic institutions in Russia.

Over China, democratists are in many ways the ideological heirs of Schurmann's nationalists, having a missionary, anti-communist zeal for the region. China is particularly crucial for institutionalists and democratists. These two schools of thought, both neo-Wilsonian, both critical of the traditionalist neo-realist view of the world, are often categorized as part of the same creed. That they are not identical can be seen in their vastly different policy prescriptions

over China. In many ways, China is the litmus-test case between democratists and institutionalists. Keith Bradsher framed the policy options nicely, 'President Clinton finds himself forced to decide if the US should risk its access to China's booming economy for the sake of political freedom there.'²² The specific policy debate was over whether Clinton should renew China's most-favored-nation trading status with the US. Without MFN, tariffs on Chinese goods to the US would increase 8–40 per cent and make most of their exports uncompetitive in the US market. Such a move would have derailed the increasingly booming trade between the two countries. This trade was crucial to a US just beginning to show signs of coming out of recession. However, democratists rejected this institutionalist argument.

Democratists see the communist-led government of Deng Xiaoping as being the butchers of Tiananmen Square, murderers of the pro-democracy movement, and an administration with an extremely dubious human rights record, particularly regarding Tibet. Democratists argue that part of the reason that Chinese goods are so competitive is that a number of them are made with slave labor, which of course eliminates a worker's wage enabling costs to be drastically cut. The slave-labor camps are composed of political prisoners and are an affront to democratists, who champion both human rights and political freedom. The US is running its second largest trade deficit with China (totalling \$18 billion) and the communist government has been resistant to narrowing the gap.²³ Crucially, unlike institutionalists, democratists do not see China's new capitalistic advances as leading eventually to a more pluralistic regime. Rather they see China's economic success as strengthening a despotic, malevolent government. As the US finds itself the only superpower in the world, democratists feel strong pressure should be put on the Chinese as they need the West far more than the West needs them, especially economically. Winston Lord, a long-time critic of communist China and now US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stated the democratist position. The end of the Cold War, 'decreases the pressure to muffle consensus about unsavory governments for the sake of security'.²⁴ While China is not as important to the democratists as Russia, they see no long-term practical reason to support an authoritarian government which holds inimical values to those of the US. Democratists feel the US should take a hard line with China which may hasten the end of the regime and bring about the victory of demo-

cratic values expressed poignantly by the Chinese students and workers in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

STRAINS WITHIN DEMOCRATISM

Up until now general democratist precepts, assumptions and policy prescriptions have been discussed. While these are essential to understand, there are of course variations within each school of thought as well as the inevitable differences between individuals. While it is the basis of this book that it is extremely useful to analyze schools of thought as a coherent whole, a narrower level of analysis is also needed, looking at majority and minority strains within each school.

Within the democratist school of thought there are two strains, the dominant moderate democratists and the hyper-democratists. Their differences are based on degree but they are large. These differences of degree center around the questions posed by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington. Fukuyama noted that a belief in democratism 'begs the question of where and when to promote democracy and at what cost?'²⁵ Huntington asked, 'to what extent should the US attempt to make the institutions and policies of other societies conform to American values?'²⁶ Hyper-democratists are likely to promote democracy more often, in more places and at a higher cost to the US than are moderate democratists. They see the replication of America's unique society and its values as not only desirable but essential to world stability. Moderate democratists are apt to be cautious in choosing the instances to support democracy and are more likely to attempt to replicate Western rather than specifically American values in other societies. As their differences are those of degree, there is no neat dividing line between the two strains, but these differences are no less real for this fact.

Ben Wattenberg is an adherent of hyper-democratism. His primary democratist work is entitled *The First Universal Nation*, published in 1991. Wattenberg believes that the US is the first of a new type of state that will be the prototype for the world. He believes that as all ethnic groups that have come to the US have been imbued with democratic values, these values are somehow both uniquely American and universal, and that the US pattern of democratic acculturation should be spread to the rest of the world. This is the bold and controversial hyper-democratist message. They

feel that American values are superior to those of the rest of the world. In fact they are deemed so superior by the hyper-democratists, they feel it is necessary for the US to propagate their spread as a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Hyper-democratism is a minority viewpoint within a minority creed. It is difficult to identify a single member of the Cabinet or the International Affairs or Foreign Relations Committees that is a hyper-democratist. Wattenberg illustrates that hyper-democratists tend to be doyens of think tanks/writers/academics, but are hardly ever decision-makers themselves. Hyper-democratism lies at the fringe of the debate over America's foreign policy direction in the new world order. Its power, though quite limited, lies in the boldness and clarity of its position. Hyper-democratism provides a coherent, alternative neo-Wilsonian theory for those dissatisfied with the more mainstream foreign policy views of the day.

Moderate democratists, while staking out many of the same general positions as the hyper-democratists, do so with less fervor and, they would say, less recklessness. They would agree with A. M. Rosenthal's moderate democratist viewpoint that, 'Mostly freedom fighters plead not for US troops, but for food, medicine, and a political arm around them.'²⁷ Moderate democratists feel democracy is usually best promoted by non-military means. This sets them apart from the hyper-democratists who are more vague about when they would use force to promote democratic change. Caution toward military force and a more restrained embracing of democratic opportunities than hyper-democratists would countenance are hallmarks of the moderate democratist majority strain.

CRITICISMS OF DEMOCRATISM

There are numerous criticisms of the general democratist viewpoint. Firstly, this is definitely a minority school of thought and has few significant political supporters. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau reported the results of the foreign policy leadership project. This is a survey of 2312 opinion-leaders that has taken place every four years since the presidential election of 1976, attempting to gauge the general mood on foreign policy of major American opinion-leaders in the press, the clergy, business, and academia, as well as government. They found 'fewer than 1 in 5 [of those surveyed] favored intervention in the domestic affairs of other

countries in support of a more democratic world order'.²⁸ As the precept of some form of intervention (even if by largely economic and ideological means) in the affairs of other states to promote democracy is central to the democratist creed, it is obvious democratist views have not found anything like majority favor. Without adoption by elites, and especially the political elite who have the power to turn theory into practice, democratism may be doomed to be seen as interesting, but esoteric. As over the question of a vast increase in foreign aid to help Russia, democratists do not seem to acknowledge the domestic political limits on American foreign policy. This is strange as democratists see the domestic level of analysis regarding decision-making as crucial. Perhaps democratism's relative political irrelevance cuts both ways. Not only has the school of thought yet to strike a popular chord among decision-makers, its outsider status blinds its adherents to the political realities imposed upon theory by the day to day governing of a state. Whatever the reason, democratist prescriptions, even if sensible and desirable, often seem to fly in the face of what is politically possible.

There is a moral question about democratism as well. Is it morally correct to try to mold other societies and cultures? Samuel Huntington is one of democratism's most prescient critics, both ethically and practically. As he pointed out, 'to intrude from outside is either imperialism or colonialism, each of which violates American values'.²⁹ Huntington highlights a crucial paradox of democratism. It is a creed that can by its methods easily nullify the principles for which it stands. In promoting democracy, in exporting the American revolution to the rest of the world, democratists can only too easily use authoritarian tactics, coercion and other anti-democratic means of 'persuading' other states to become more democratic. If this were to happen, democratists would seem to have missed the forest for the trees, to have forgotten that successful democracy is largely an organic political development that cannot be easily or crudely transplanted. If democracy is imposed by some sort of coercion, critics of democratism feel the United States would tragically lose some of what innately makes it democratic in the attempt to spread its creed. This apparent contradiction may be a stumbling block to democratism's political viability as a majority school of thought. The missionary zeal to extend democracy worldwide is traditionally an American, Wilsonian, left-wing attribute. Yet the semi-colonial imposition of American values that could

easily result as practical policy from following democratist prescriptions greatly dampens support on the American left for the democratist position. In uniquely and creatively linking the messianic, globalist, democratic zeal of the American left with the willingness to intervene in other states' domestic affairs, a traditional attribute of the American right, democratism has become an interesting and coherent intellectual hybrid. But this very fusion of left and right may disenchant many potential democratist decision-makers, who see democratism as attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable.

Beyond its political limitations and potential intellectual contradictions, there are questions about whether democratism fulfills the ultimate political test of any school of thought; can it be implemented as a successful policy? Many would say no. As Huntington stated in his influential article, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', 'Most importantly, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values ... engender countering responses from other civilizations.'³⁰ The process of democratism does not involve merely an aggressive, confident United States inflicting its values on an inert *tabula rasa*. Huntington feels democratism can easily lead to the 'reaffirmation of indigenous values as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a universal civilization is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another.'³¹

Like any self-contained cell, critics of democratism feel non-Western civilizations will forcibly reject Western notions such as the universal applicability of democracy. Tommy Thong-Bee Koh continues with the organic analogy, 'Western democracy is a fragile flower that can not be easily transplanted to the soil of some Asian countries, such as China, that have no democratic tradition.'³² It is likely that such countries will see the American zeal for universal democracy as another thinly disguised attempt at imperial domination. Michael Richardson pointed this out in a neo-realist critique of democratism. Democratists, 'apply what are seen by many Asian officials as alien Western principles that ride roughshod over national sovereignty and threaten the integration of the state'.³³ Richardson is correct in that democratism poses an unapologetic assault on the state whose sanctity is crucial for the neo-realist school of thought. If one state can intervene in another to promote democracy, the sanctity and notion of sovereignty upon which the

state system has rested since 1648, neo-realists contend, would be obliterated, heralding an era of major chaos, before another competing notion led to stability. Neo-realists see democratism as nothing less than a revolutionary challenge to the primacy of the state, the triumph of ideology over stability, and therefore greatly dangerous.

Critics of democratism would argue that even if all these political, ideological, and methodological problems could be dealt with, a strict following of democratism would lead to the problems of success. As Huntington observed, 'In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces.'³⁴ The Algerian case is an extreme example of this problem. There is little doubt that the 1992 Algerian elections, if completed, would have led to the ascendancy of the FIS, the main Islamic fundamentalist party in Algeria. Yet such an election, which until halted was generally free and fair, would have quite possibly been the last in Algeria for the foreseeable future. The FIS is an avowed anti-Western, anti-democratic party that was attempting to use democratic means to achieve coercive power. Even if the FIS had for some reason agreed to allow elections once in power, it is questionable as to whether it is in the interests of the US to promote elections that would almost certainly bring anti-Western and particularly anti-American forces to power in the Maghreb, an area important to the US's geopolitical interests. This would certainly be the neo-realist argument against free elections in Algeria. Elections have not proven to be a panacea in other parts of the world either. As Michael H. Posner stated, 'the Reagan administration stressed the holding of elections as a defining difference between US and Soviet alliances. Unfortunately the crises in Liberia, Guatemala, Serbia and Haiti have proved elections don't guarantee respect for human rights'.³⁵ This is a claim democratists would like to make, though most would say that the link is durable only in established democracies which certainly none of these cases are. Brutality did not end in Haiti with the election of Aristide, or in Angola with the election of dos Santos, nor with the triumph of the ethnic cleanser, Milosevic. In fact in the short run, elections probably led to an intensification of brutality in all three cases. Elections do not magically end human rights violations, rather in established democracies their absence reflects the political cultural traits of toleration, of a *loyal opposition*, that are inimical to sustained brutality. Critics of democratism argue democratists place too much

faith in the ability of free elections to solve deep-seated social problems.

Despite these general theoretical criticisms and its lack of anything like majority support, democratism remains a viable major school of thought of American foreign policy in the new world order. It offers a coherent view of the new era, and a bullish triumphalist defense of the democratic values its adherents believe led to Western victory in the Cold War. It audaciously, amid all the fashionable talk of American decline and limits, argues for a robust extension of America, hoping to recreate the world in America's image to build a league of democracies that will make Kant's visionary title of 1795, *Perpetual Peace*, a reality. This mix of the missionary spirit as well as the calling for the export of values that almost all of America embraces, are familiar and potent themes for Americans in foreign policy. Democratism may be the relentlessly optimistic message that renews a country renowned for its relentless optimism.

3 *The Neo-realists*

Chart 3.1 *The Belief System of the Neo-realists*

1	Background:	Hobbes
2	Goal:	Promote national interests, stop the appearance of a hegemonic rival.
3	Assume:	States have fundamentally different values. Ultimately, International Relations is a zero-sum game. They greatly value stability. See increasing world contact as exacerbating global divisions. Do not see development as following universal stages.
4	See state:	Well represented by the billiard ball/rational actor theory, feel the structure of the world system is largely the key factor in determining a state's foreign policy.
5	Key analytical orientation:	Military/Geopolitical
6	Declinist/Revivalist:	Declinist
7	World structure:	Multipolar
8	Preferred mode of action:	Multilateral if possible, Unilateral if necessary.
9	Basis of force:	American troops.
10	World policeman:	None, the balance of power is self-regulating.
11	Key areas and foci:	US, Europe secondarily.
12	Schurmann classification:	Imperialists
13	Political supporters:	Primarily the Republican Party.
14	Political actors:	Senators Dole, Biden, Lugar.
15	Bureaucratic bastions of support:	DoD, CIA.
16	Policy toward Western Europe/European defense system:	Nato-firsters, but fear it won't last. Wish to extend Nato membership to Eastern Europe but keep it as a primarily military alliance. Ambivalent regarding European unity.
17	Policy toward Bosnia:	Non-interventionist, as no vital US interests at stake. However, for lifting of the arms embargo.
18	Policy toward trade (NAFTA and GATT):	Tactically favor both agreements.
19	Policy toward Russia:	Against large-scale aid, as they fear renewed authoritarian rule and activation of vast capabilities. Want to enhance contacts with non-Russian States of former USSR.
20	Policy toward China:	MFN with possible conditions, feel it is too important to isolate.
21	Variations within the school of thought:	REALIST-ISOLATIONIST (Minority)/REALIST-INTERNATIONALIST (Majority); the difference is vast, yet same theoretical starting point.

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF NEO-REALISM

The neo-realists see a very different world from that of the democratists. For them the anarchic nature of the international system, characterized by its lack of authority over states (the absence of world government), consigns the international system to being a Hobbesian jungle. It is to this English philosopher and not Kant that neo-realists turn to affirm their philosophical background. In *The Leviathan*, published in 1651, Hobbes characterized the anarchic international system as itself leading to conflict. Power was the motive force of Hobbes's international system for with it a state could ensure its survival in a lawless world.¹ To survive, states must constantly think of their immediate welfare.

Neo-realists still see the promotion of a state's immediate selfish interests as the supreme goal in foreign policy. They acknowledge that the concept of national interest is ambiguous and changeable. As that arch neo-realist Henry Kissinger commented, the national interest, 'must be adapted to changing circumstances'.² A hallmark of neo-realism is this tactical flexibility. As circumstances and not ideology or consensus determine policy, neo-realists pride themselves on promoting practical policy initiatives. Kissinger further illuminated the neo-realist notion of strategic flexibility being the key to protection of national interests in his seminal thesis, *A World Restored*. Here Kissinger noted that the British foreign minister Castlereagh 'demonstrated his awareness that no policy, however successful, can be an end in itself'.³ Ultimately, the only end for neo-realists is the practical consideration of a state's survival.

Though the concept of national interest is slippery at best, it can be defined with some precision in practice. As Nixon stated regarding US national interests, 'an American interest is vital if its loss, in and of itself, directly endangers the security of the US'.⁴ Neo-realists feel that since 1945, American national interests compel the US to see that no rival hegemon appears to counter American power. Beyond this general definition, national interest can also be defined by what it is not. Neo-realists believe that both democratists and institutionalists generally pursue policies that are not in the American national interest. James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense and head of the CIA, castigates democratists regarding their crusading zeal. He commented, 'Traditional diplomacy would suggest that we not pick fights, but rather base our stance towards

others on whether they are antagonistic or friendly toward us—and not on their internal arrangements.⁵ Thus neo-realists and democratists differ sharply over American support for dictatorial regimes, with neo-realists contending that as long as they are friendly toward American interests they should be supported. For neo-realists the Hobbesian jungle does not allow the US the luxury of having only morally pristine allies. For them, American interests override desires for universal democracy as a goal of foreign policy.

Likewise neo-realists believe that the institutionalists' multilateral views are too confining. To return to the Hobbesian jungle metaphor, to survive in the jungle a state must be quick, and unencumbered by anything as onerous as multilateral consensus. Kissinger has urged the Clinton administration not to follow the multilateralist path. 'What it must not do is to permit its objectives and missions to be defined by invocations of international consensus.'⁶ Rather a sober evaluation of American national interests must always be the yardstick by which neo-realists feel any specific US policies are measured.

The neo-realists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's imperialists, the men who designed the Cold War system and led the US to unparalleled success after 1945. These men: Truman, Acheson, Vandenberg, Kennan, and Marshall shared many of the same foreign policy views as today's neo-realists. Gaddis stated, 'there is in Kennan's approach a set of propositions so obvious that they often escape notice: that there are limits to power; that there are no commitments without costs . . . that as strategy needs to be informed by policy, so policy needs to be informed by a clear vision of the national interest'.⁷ Neo-realists see these basic tenets as still crucial to running American foreign policy. For them, the end of the post-war era did not erase the verities taught to them by their imperialist forebears.

GENERAL NEO-REALIST PERCEPTIONS

Unlike democratism, neo-realism is implicitly a declinist school of thought. As Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz pointed out, 'Realists believe that the US can and should act as an ordinary great power.'⁸ Given the absolutely central position America occupied in the Cold War system this must be seen as a demotion. The practical result of this declinist view is that neo-realists urge the

careful selection and reevaluation of vital American interests in the post-Cold War era, as the US faces both internal and external limits on its ability to influence world events. The majority of neo-realists believe the United States should play an active role in the world, while at the same time recognizing that American power has limits and should only be used when genuinely vital American interests are at stake. Neo-realists, to a much larger extent than democratists, believe that circumstances themselves limit even a great power's options.

While some neo-realists see the US as the only great power left in the world, none view it as able to exert the type of world domination democratists claim is possible with the demise of the Soviet Union. For many neo-realists the limits on American foreign policy initiatives are primarily the result of internal decline. The neo-realist view toward burden-sharing is a case in point. Since the 1970s, America has called on its Nato allies to assume a greater proportion of the defense burden within the alliance. These calls for increased allied defense expenditure are a direct result of what neo-realists feel is the relative economic decline of the US since the immediate post-war period. Increasing American economic difficulties have made the vast American commitment to Nato more painful as the years have worn on. As the arch declinist Paul Kennedy observed regarding the issue of burden sharing within Nato, 'burden sharing also implies sharing influence'.⁹ Neo-realists take his point that if the US wants increased burden-sharing, it must be prepared to give up a share of its preponderant power. They see relative American decline as the precursor of a multipolar world where the US will be just one of many powers, a world not unlike that of Castlereagh and Metternich, a world where neo-realist principles are still valid.

Unlike democratists, neo-realists believe nations have different values. If democratism is a universalist creed, neo-realism is very much a relativist, nationalist school of thought. Neo-realists do not feel that American moral viewpoints, grounded as they are in a specific historical, cultural, and structural situation, have universal validity. However they go far beyond merely disagreeing with democratists over whether nations inherently have different values. They feel these different values lead to differing degrees of receptivity toward democracy. This view is further extrapolated in Samuel P. Huntington's article, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' Huntington argued,

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world won't be primarily ideological [democratist view] or primarily economic [institutionalist view]. The great divisions among humankind and the dominant source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.¹⁰

This updating of the neo-realist creed not only argues for the non-universality of Western democratic ideology, it stresses the fact that nation-states' different values are expressed in their being part of distinctive cultural groupings larger than their individual states. These cultural groupings, or civilizations, are likely to come into conflict along their respective fault lines. For instance, Huntington's thesis would explain the Bosnian conflict as the result of Bosnia being on the border of the Western, Islamic, and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations. Huntington turns the Wilsonian view held by both democratists and institutionalists, that increased interactions between societies leads to interdependence and a global culture, on its head. "The interaction between peoples of different civilizations are increasing, these increased interactions intensify civilization consciousness."¹¹ Neo-realists see interaction between societies as cementing differences, not similarities. It is hard to imagine a starker contrast between neo-Wilsonianism and neo-realism than over this issue. From the notion of the non-universality of Western values logically flows the next neo-realist assumption, the idea that development does not occur in the same way everywhere.

While democratists and institutionalists would argue about whether democracy should succeed a market economy or vice-versa, both Wilsonian schools of thought implicitly believe that there is a general, universal route that states follow toward modernization. This Wilsonian view is antithetical to neo-realist beliefs. As neo-realists do not accept the democratist position that democracy comes from a single, universal source and that all states have some citizens determined to become democratic, neither do they accept the institutionalist variation of development theory. While granting that economic modernization leads to the destruction of traditional economic and political institutions, neo-realists do not believe that modernization, particularly economic modernization, is necessarily congruent with a single easily replicated Western

model of development for all states to imitate. For example the frenetic pace of modernization certainly played a part in the Shah's ouster from power in 1979. However rather than modernization leading to the replacement of a despotic regime with a democratic one, the collapse of the Shah led to the advent of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution in Iran. Indeed the backlash from the forced, harsh, lightning pace of Iranian modernization was a principal cause for the emergence of the virulently anti-Western government of the Imams. Neo-realists feel that while institutionalists are correct in emphasizing the revolutionary aspect modernization plays in developing nations, a rational democratic outcome for all societies undergoing the modernization process is never a foregone conclusion.

Neo-realists assume that power, the motive force of the international system, can be measured, if only generally. A further distinguishing feature of the neo-realist school of thought is its adherents' propensity to see power as a relative phenomenon. This is antithetical to the institutionalist school of thought which sees power as an absolute. Trade is a key illustrative issue for both schools of thought regarding the notion of power. Neo-realists scorn the institutionalist view that as all gain from free trade, its advancement should be self-evident to every state. They point to the fact that free trade, as it enables some states to do better than others, should never be adopted as more than a temporary tactic. For instance, if neo-realists felt that America's chief economic rivals, Germany and Japan, did significantly better out of the GATT talks than the US, they would feel that America should derail them, even if in absolute terms the US would also benefit. For neo-realists the key point is that states do not exist in a vacuum. As Grieco observed, 'driven by an interest in survival, states are certainly sensitive to any erosion in their relative capabilities'.¹² Neo-realists believe that for a state to feel itself successful, by definition it must be more successful than others.

A final, unique assumption of the neo-realist school of thought is its controversial yearning for the bipolar world. Lawrence Eagleburger put it most bluntly in a speech while Secretary of State to the Council on Foreign Relations, 'My good friend Peter Tarnoff [then head of the Council on Foreign Relations, now Assistant Secretary of State] was quick to take me to task in *The New York Times* for having demonstrated nostalgia for the Cold War... . But today, Peter, I have a confession to make: I *am* truly nostalgic for the Cold

War'¹³ (my emphasis). In light of all the obvious injustices wrought in the name of the Cold War era, that neo-realists should pine for it is a mark of how highly they value stability in the international system. Structurally the bipolar Cold War era is seen by most neo-realists as more conducive to stability than the multipolar system, such as that which preceded World War II. James Schlesinger sees trouble arising with the end of bipolarity. 'With the end of the Cold War—and the passing of its unique disciplines—the world is becoming more rather than less anarchic.'¹⁴ Many neo-realists yearn for the simplicities of bipolarity, where American preponderance made American leadership inevitable. It is this lack of leadership in a new world order premised on multipolarity that is a major reason for the increased level of global instability, in the eyes of the neo-realists. They do not miss the Cold War out of some warped nostalgia for the past. Rather neo-realists miss the bipolarity that they feel was a prime factor in attaining the international stability that they value so highly.

Joseph Grieco in his excellent article, 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation', outlined five basic neo-realist views regarding the state's role in the international order. Firstly, neo-realists still see states as the major actors in world affairs, despite the rise of international organizations such as the UN and EU. The billiard-ball theory of International Relations, with the interaction of entities (balls hitting one another) still centered at the state level, is seen by neo-realists as accurately expressing the international political scene. Secondly, states behave as unitary rational agents. Despite the rise of fashionable theories such as bureaucratic politics, neo-realists still believe that states basically act coherently and can define their own best interests. Thirdly and fourthly, states exist in a system of international anarchy predicated on power relations, which preoccupies them. Fifthly, and in direct contradiction to institutionalist assertions, neo-realists believe that international institutions have only marginal importance in the global system. Neo-realists still see the state and its interests as central to the study of International Relations.

Neo-realists believe that the key to determining a state's foreign policy is divining its structural place in the international system. This can often be expressed in geopolitical terms. For instance they believe that the key to understanding relations between Lithuania and Russia will generally be the same no matter the ideology of either government. The crucial fact is that Russia is a large, great

power and Lithuania is a small, relatively powerless state. For neo-realists these geopolitical power realities matter far more than the belief systems of either the leadership of Russia or Lithuania. In opposition to the democratists, neo-realists value material power relations over ideology in the overall equation of power. In the neo-realists' structural view, only states with complimentary interests can pursue agreements, whatever the ideology or personal chemistry of the two leaderships. Former President Nixon, a neo-realist, illustrated this idea comparing his diplomatic style to that of George Bush. Nixon observed, 'Bush believes, far more than I, in the effectiveness of personal diplomacy. He believes that if you have a good personal relationship, it helps on substance. I believe that unless leaders interests are compatible, a personal relationship doesn't mean a thing.'¹⁵ Once again, this highlights the centrality of the notion of the national interest for the neo-realists. It is a concept at least partly determined for them by a state's structural position in the international system, as well as the structural nature of the system (the polarity) itself. As Mearsheimer observed, 'the keys to war and peace lie more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of individual countries'.¹⁶ For neo-realists it is largely the nature of the world order that determines an individual state's actions.

Neo-realists share similar views with democratists over what should be the preferred mode of American action in foreign policy implementation. However neo-realists are more reserved about the use of force to further American goals than are the optimistic democratists. Indeed as Weinberger observed, 'We should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our vital interest'.¹⁷ Yet though neo-realists are reluctant to use force except to defend perceived vital national interests, once decided, American forces are not to be encumbered by multilateral organizations. As Nixon stated, 'When vital US interests are threatened, the US should act with the UN where possible but without it if necessary'.¹⁸ National flexibility, a key factor in the international system for neo-realists, must not be abandoned in the pursuit of some multilateralist utopia.

Despite being prepared to act unilaterally on the international stage to defend national interests, neo-realists would prefer to act within an informal concert of great powers if possible. This concert, be it for military or peaceful purposes, is similar to the Concert of Vienna so well described by Henry Kissinger in *A World Restored*.

Neo-realists feel that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar. Thus it may hold more opportunities to use again such an informal great power structure as existed in the multipolar Metternichean world. Unlike democratists, who believe international organizations should be forged around a common purpose growing out of a common ideology and values, neo-realists feel that informal international cooperation will arise organically due to shared global interests. Huntington sees such an informal concert as already forming, based on the new global power structure. He envisions the US as the chairman of the board of a great power directorate that has a shifting membership depending on the issue under discussion. Huntington stated, 'Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the US, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the US, Germany, and Japan.'¹⁹ Neo-realists see a concert of powers, united by shared national interests, as the most promising form of international cooperation to emerge in the new world order. They shun the more rigid international constructions of the institutionalists.

Neo-realists feel that the key area to focus on in the international system should be the United States itself, with Europe also being a large concern. As neo-realists believe that the national interest is the key to foreign policy, this nationalistic assertion is far from surprising. As Gaddis stated, 'the chief objective of US foreign policy has been to maintain an external environment conducive to the survival and prosperity of the nation's domestic institutions ... in this the US has differed little from other great powers: sovereign nations, to be secure, have always required climates in which their institutions could flourish'.²⁰ It is instructive that Gaddis, a neo-realist, sees the survival of the nation's *institutions* to be a central concern of American foreign policy, unlike the democratist Allison who sees the survival of the nation's *values* as crucial. This standard concentration on 'America first' has been given a new twist in the new world order. Neo-realists have echoed President Clinton in seeing the interconnectedness between foreign and domestic policy. As its focus on the US remains central for neo-realists, increasingly they see the need to alleviate America's domestic ills as a source of enhancing American power. Implicit in their desire to concentrate more on domestic matters with the end of the Cold War, is the neo-realist wish to *rebuild* America. Obviously if America needs to be built again (the strict definition of the word rebuild) this neo-realist tenet shows their declinist tinge, although

clearly they believe measures can be taken to arrest America's decline.

Neo-realists see Europe as the United States' second concern. For like their forebears, Schurmann's imperialists, they remain committed Atlanticists. Gaddis fleshed out this historical affinity. 'For the US, in the twentieth century, the most important requirement for a congenial international environment has been that Europe not fall under the domination of a single, dominant nation. Concern over the European balance of power dates back at least to the turn of the century.'²¹ Neo-realist reasons for valuing Europe are very different from democratist motivations. Mearsheimer stated the reasons for Europe's importance to neo-realists, 'Europe's important geographic position, not to mention those raw power assets like manpower and GNP that it controls, make it hard to see how one can separate European security from American security.'²² Unlike democratists, neo-realists value Europe for what it possesses and how that relates to American interests, rather than for what it is ideologically.

Unlike democratists, neo-realists do not see the US as the chief global policeman. For many neo-realists Vietnam displayed the very dangers that the US could avoid by relinquishing the role of global cop. As Nixon stated in 1967 at the height of the Vietnam conflict, 'other nations must recognize that the role of the US as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future'.²³ Following this policy of limiting American commitments, Nixon began the negotiating process that eventually ended the war in 1975. Likewise he took the US off the gold standard, thereby removing the dollar as the single guarantor of the international monetary system. *The Economist* summed up the Nixon doctrine precisely as the notion, 'that America could not act as world policeman'.²⁴ Nor is this strongly held view merely the preserve of the realist-internationalist majority. If anything, realist-isolationists feel even more strongly about America not taking on the role of global policeman. Their champion, Pat Buchanan, put it bluntly, 'We aren't the world's policeman, nor its political tutor.'²⁵ If neo-realists feel that America should not be world cop, they unanimously feel the UN has no right to the job. For them the sanctity of the state is central and if the UN were to become world policeman, there would then be an international organization with true primacy over all states.

For neo-realists no world policeman is needed as the international system will maintain itself naturally through a balance of power. Kissinger stated the neo-realist case. Peace, he feels, 'is the

expression of certain conditions and power relationships. It is to these relationships – not to peace – that diplomacy must address itself.²⁶ The balance of power is seen by neo-realists as the mechanism that leads to general stability, if not to an absence of war. It is a system that leads states to, 'know few permanent enemies and few permanent friends'.²⁷ This is because regardless of ideological affinities, balance of power politics leads states to always attempt to stop the emergence of a hegemonic power. While this is easily envisaged in a bipolar system where lesser states group around the two superpowers, such as when the Nato and Warsaw Pact countries grouped around America and the USSR respectively, it becomes slightly more complicated in a multipolar system; but the end result is the same. In the eternal effort to stop the emergence of a dominant state or states, two or more roughly equal alliances will form. As these alliances are predicated on power and not shared values as they are for democratists, neo-realists see defections within alliances as common in a multipolar system. Thus as neo-realists believe all states follow their natural, rational interests, the balance of power becomes a self-correcting mechanism as states defect from alliances to correct the inevitable imbalances in power that occur over time with the rise and decline of all great states. Neo-realists see the balance of power as the chief guarantor of stability in the international system.

Neo-realism's two key analytical orientations are military power and geopolitics. As noted earlier, neo-realism is a structural creed with an emphasis on the idea that foreign policy outputs are largely the result of the geopolitical situation that states find themselves in. As Kissinger's neo-realist alter-ego Metternich wrote to Castlereagh, 'the strongest laws governing states are those of geography'.²⁸ In direct contrast to democratists, neo-realists feel the permanence of geography outweighs any values nation-states may transiently share, and as such is a more important factor in the overall power equation. For neo-realists it is power, particularly military power, that is the key to foreign policy analysis. They feel military power is essential for a state to survive due to the anarchic nature of the international system. To preserve the state, neo-realists put their faith in the tangible components of power, unlike the democratists. The tangible components of power: GDP, military strength, geopolitics, are less likely to swiftly change and are also easier to measure in calculating the balance of power in a way intangibles like ideology and trade organizations are not. This emphasis on tangible

components of power illustrates the essentially conservative nature of neo-realism.

Neo-realists also believe that the interdependence caused by international trade is no substitute for military power in preserving international stability. As Nixon observed, 'If an issue affects vital national interests, a major power will throw even the strongest economic ties overboard in order to prevail.'²⁹ Neo-realists use history to bolster this contention. Despite a great degree of interdependence in la belle *époque* and the inter-war period, World Wars I and II were not prevented. Indeed much contemporary criticism by neo-realists of the last two Democratic presidents centers on their over-reliance on economic instruments and their aversion to force. Samuel Huntington served under Brzezinski in Carter's National Security Council from 1977 to 1978. Like Brzezinski he is a Democratic hawk. In reviewing Brzezinski's book, *Weighing Power and Principle*, Huntington stated, 'Carter didn't see that at times the shedding of some blood may be necessary to avert more disasters.'³⁰ This neo-realist criticism is often aired regarding the institutionalist administration of President Clinton. Here neo-realists agree with democratists that institutionalism's hesitancy to use force in the international arena may be a fatal flaw to its foreign policy initiatives. Despite all the changes in the international system, military force is still seen by neo-realists to be the single most important component in the overall power equation.

The neo-realist school of thought has been traditionally dominant in International Relations study since 1945, and despite coming under sustained attack by neo-Wilsonianism, especially since the early 1970s, probably still is. Neo-realists control numerous bastions of power as well as having a strong hold on the public's way of looking at the world. The very terms most people use to discuss foreign policy; 'America', 'Britain', 'China' are implicitly part of the billiard-ball theory of International Relations, and thus are part of the neo-realist construct. As Holsti and Rosenau point out in their survey of American public opinion leaders, 'a strong majority expressed the view that the nature of international affairs will continue to be dominated by traditional definitions of national interests'.³¹ Yet despite this enduring power, neo-realists such as Henry Kissinger have long bemoaned the fact that an unfettered neo-realist foreign policy is unsustainable in the US, as it ignores the crusading, missionary streak so long apparent in the American psyche. He stated, 'The drawback of this [neo-realist] approach was its dearth

of emotional resonance among the American people. Though President Nixon frequently spoke of a structure of peace, structures are instruments that do not of themselves evoke commitments in the hearts and minds of a society – especially one imbued with America's tradition of exceptionalism.³² Despite Kissinger's best efforts, the US has remained traditionally opposed to the balance of power guiding American policy. While neo-realists have often run American foreign policy (witness Nixon and Kissinger), and neo-realist thought has until recently dominated International Relations discourse, it is questionable if a purely neo-realist American foreign policy is sustainable.

Neo-realism's bureaucratic bastions are the Republican Party, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the old Bush administration. Neo-realists dominate the Republican Party, a phenomenon that will be looked at in detail in the concluding chapters of this work. Neo-realists dominate the CIA and DoD, as both organizations are symbols of the tangible components of power that figure so prominently in their thinking. It is not surprising that individuals working in such institutions would value a school of thought that gives their organization such a central role in American foreign policy formulation and implementation. The DoD's continued neo-realist adherence can be seen in its strong objections to President Clinton's plan to help in establishing a UN rapid deployment force. On the issue of giving some increased military power to the UN, it is not surprising the Pentagon was opposed, as it was the bureaucratic group that actually would have lost a degree of power if such a plan had been implemented. Also, the Pentagon displayed its habitual neo-realist suspicion of the UN. The Pentagon was able to scuttle this institutionalist initiative. In the end, as questions of force are still largely the bureaucratic preserve of the DoD, its neo-realist argument carried the day. It had more bureaucratic weight with President Clinton than his like-minded institutionalist colleagues at NSC and State, who traditionally try to expand UN power. It is apparent that the DoD is still very much dominated by neo-realist thinking.

MAJORITY NEO-REALIST POLICY POSITIONS

Regarding policy toward Western Europe and Nato, neo-realists tend to favor retaining Nato as the key Atlantic security structure, at least for an interim period. They see the OSCE, with over fifty

members each with a veto, as both cumbersome and unreflective of the balance of power. Despite favoring Nato, American neo-realists are pessimistic about its long-term future with the demise of the Soviet Union. They expect that the European role in Nato *vis-à-vis* the US will increase, making it ultimately an institutional vehicle for great power concerts rather than a symbol of American dominance. The neo-realists' view of Nato again implicitly illustrates their declinist orientation.

Despite continued advocacy of Nato as the key to the Atlantic alliance, few neo-realists feel Nato in its present form is likely to long endure. This is because of the classic neo-realist approach to alliances, that they are made because of common interests. With this limited view of alliances it is easy to see why neo-realists feel that Nato should have no greater political role. Neo-realists feel Nato should not expand from the military into the political realm precisely because the various states in Nato have distinctly different political agendas. This is a major difference from the democratist view that the members of Nato have a common political position based on their shared espousal of a democratic culture. For neo-realists differences between the European and American pillars of the alliance are rooted in their different structural position in the international spectrum. This is explained by the fact the US was a superpower in the Cold War system and that individual European countries were at best regional powers. Further, Huntington believes there are cultural differences that divide rather than unite the Atlantic alliance. He noted, 'Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American.'³³ For neo-realists, these cultural differences limit policy commonalties between the two pillars of the Atlantic alliance. Kissinger concurred,

It was naive of Americans to take for granted that a federal Europe would be more like us, that a unified Europe would automatically help carry our burdens, and that it would continue to follow American global prescriptions as it had in the early postwar years of European recovery and dependence. That can't be so American support for European unification was therefore an expression of self-interest even if it was paraded under the banner of altruism.³⁴

For Kissinger the divisions between Western Europe and America were always there, and that with Europe's relative rise, symbolized

by the increased vigor of the EU, relations between Western Europe and America were bound to be more equal and conflictual. Neo-realists feel that this hidden, underlying change in power relations between the two was revealed for all to see with the end of the Cold War. Ultimately they believe that the end of the Cold War has forced the reconfiguration of Nato at best and its abolition at worst, due to the lack of a common European-American military threat. It is as an attempt to reinvigorate Nato without changing its mission that neo-realists advocate the quick admission of the Eastern European states of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into the alliance.

Without the shared interest of collective defense against the possibly adventurist, definitely despotic Soviet regime, neo-realists feel Nato has lost its *raison d'être*. This assessment differs sharply from the democratist view that Nato can be a vital politico-military institution promoting European-wide democracy in the new world order. Joffe sums up neo-realism's bleak assessment of Nato in the post-Cold War world, 'If the Cold War is truly over, then the Atlantic alliance will not survive in its traditional shape ... no alliance has ever lived past victory: logically the idea of alliance requires the idea of a foe and a threat.'³⁵ Neo-realists point to the already differing views toward key European issues advanced by the victors of the Cold War. The often acrimonious accusations of blame in the wake of the Bosnian disaster have, as Jim Hoagland observed, 'demonstrated that American and European security interests no longer coincide as fully as they did during the Cold War'.³⁶ However neo-realists do feel a two-pillar Nato may ultimately serve as a useful political vehicle for the concert of great powers that they believe will come to dominate the world in the post-Cold War era. Therefore for now neo-realists maintain their strong support for the alliance.

Regarding Bosnia neo-realists were staunchly non-interventionist, as they saw no vital American interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia. While accepting that there were humanitarian outrages in Bosnia, neo-realists did not believe that this was a reason for American intervention. Rather they believed that, 'moral outrage is a poor guide to America's interests and goals'.³⁷ As the former Yugoslavia is not a center for American trade or business and as it has little strategic significance, neo-realists felt that while the atrocities committed in Bosnia were appalling, they alone should not compel a massive and potentially dangerous intervention. For

largely institutionalist reasons (due to a lack of allied consensus), President Clinton followed neo-realists' desire to stay out of the morass in Bosnia. However political neo-realist decision-makers such as Senators Dole and Lugar, were at the forefront of the American attempt to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. They adhered to the standard neo-realist view that while America ought not to intervene, the Bosnians ought to be allowed to defend themselves against Serbian tyranny. For it was also a neo-realist contention that if adventurism remained unchecked in Bosnia it could lead to greater problems for the US in the future.

The standard neo-realist position on trade was a nuanced tactical favoring of both NAFTA and GATT. Neo-realists do not believe that free trade is the panacea that institutionalists see it to be, rather viewing it as useful in promoting the national interest in certain circumstances. Kenneth Waltz, an eloquent neo-realist, argued, 'whether free trade serves a nation's interest depends on its situation'.³⁸ This neo-realist view is underpinned by their belief in a zero-sum world. In fact, many neo-realists see trade competition as replacing military conflict as the battleground of states, as like military power, trade figures are also illustrative of a zero-sum game. Yet regarding the specific instances of NAFTA and GATT the majority of neo-realists favored both pacts, seeing neither as leading to the relative diminution of American economic power. This is illustrated by the fact that neo-realists are generally members of the Republican Party, and it was the Republicans who ironically provided the backbone of support for President Clinton's near-perilous NAFTA success, particularly in the House (234–200). Republicans have long been the party of business, a group expected to do better out of NAFTA than America's blue-collar workers. This internal party dynamic undoubtedly affected Republican feelings about the trade pact. In this case the pro-business slant of the Republican Party reinforced the general neo-realist belief that NAFTA would not do American economic power any long-term harm. Thus neo-realists supported NAFTA and GATT, but not unconditional free trade.

Neo-realists feel that the beleaguered Yeltsin experiment in democracy should be helped, but not too much. They have nowhere near the enthusiasm for a democratic Russia that democratists possess, nor are they optimistic about its future. As John Gray noted, 'Western policy, under American leadership, would be wiser if it prepared for the likelihood, not the possibility, of authoritarian rule

in Russia, without making a fetish of democratic institutions.³⁹ This pessimism toward Russia's democratic chances leads neo-realists to advocate increased aid and security offers to the former Soviet satrapies of Eastern Europe. Yet while most neo-realists would agree with Stephen F. Cohen's criticism of the Clinton administration, that it has shown, 'excessive support for Yeltsin's "special regime"',⁴⁰ most still feel Russia merits some American help. It is the neo-realist view that the US should mediate conflicts and provide political support and limited economic assistance only to those places in the former USSR where America has major interests. This would mean help for Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan because of their vast and untapped resources, and little help for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan where the US has few military or economic interests. Regarding aid to Russia, Cohen said, '[help] of course we must. The main reason is that if Russia, with all its unprecedented potential for nuclear and ethnic holocaust, lurches into chaos or despotism, no international security will be possible.'⁴¹

Neo-realists may believe Russia's chance for democratic success to be slim, but they feel it is too important a state not to attempt to marginally improve Yeltsin's prospects. However Russia's recurring regional assertiveness strikes neo-realists as a bad sign that it may soon again be inflicting its overbearing regional predominance on the former republics of the USSR. Neo-realists fear Russia because a central part of their creed is not to believe that ultimately the professed ideology of the leadership in Moscow matters as much as the geopolitical reality that Russia is a great state and its former Soviet neighbors are minor states (except for Ukraine) in determining foreign policy outputs. This structural assertion leads neo-realists to be quickly suspicious of Russian actions and motivates their desire for the Clinton administration to be tougher with the Yeltsin regime about its increasingly adventurous policies toward the 'near abroad'.

Like the institutionalists and unlike the democratists, neo-realist policy toward China encourages following a conciliatory line. This is due to China's geostrategic importance and booming economy. Neo-realists feel China is just too important to ignore or isolate as was the American policy in the early Cold War years until Nixon's historic visit. For the neo-realists it is the power and importance of a region to the international system that matters above its internal characteristics. Twenty years later Nixon still advocated an open

policy toward China characterized by the renewal of MFN. He argued China should not be quarantined because it is 'a voice in the world that can't be ignored and a force in the world that can't be isolated'.⁴² For neo-realists, the realities of power compel the US to continue to engage China as the best way to integrate it within the international system and enhance global stability, regardless of its human rights abuses and anti-democratic regime. Neo-realists agree with Clinton's soft-line policy toward China, but allow that possible conditions may be placed on China's MFN status.

STRAINS WITHIN NEO-REALISM

Neo-realism contains two currents, the majority realist-internationalists and the realist-isolationists. The differences between the two strains are often so great that they do not follow even a vaguely general line in policy prescription. However they begin from the same starting point, that the promotion of the national interest is essential and that foreign policy should concentrate on enhancing conditions in America itself. Robert Keohane defines the essence of the realist-internationalists by relating what they are not. He said they are, 'critics of zeal [in International Relations as is espoused by the neo-Wilsonian schools of thought] without being advocates of isolationism'.⁴³ The realist-isolationists have a long history as a permanent, if minority, view in American foreign policy. Many isolationist adherents trace their creed back to Washington's farewell address, in which he urged the young republic to beware of entangling alliances, saying, 'The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *Political* [his emphasis] connection as possible'.⁴⁴ The present isolationist incarnation, under the leadership of Pat Buchanan, has made clear its controversial policy prescriptions in the new world order. David Gergen stated their general views, 'bring home US troops; stay out of foreign wars; eliminate foreign aid; end support for the IMF and World Bank; treat Japan and Europe as economic predators and concentrate on "America first"'.⁴⁵ Of these general prescriptions the majority realist-internationalists would agree only with the last wholeheartedly.

Pat Buchanan espouses a strict 'America first' version of isolationism, and wants to radically limit America's involvement with the rest of the world. He advances an utterly pragmatic view of other

states, taking the extreme view of the neo-realist position about the lack of importance of the internal nature of other countries. Buchanan exhorted, 'Whether the man who rules in Bujumbura or Buenos Aires wears a business suit or a military blouse isn't our concern, so long as he does not make of his nation an enemy of the US.'⁴⁶ As Buchanan firmly believes that the US should not involve itself in the affairs of other states, he considers the democratist creed particularly anathema. Buchanan quoted John Quincy Adams in explaining his opposition to internationalism. He feels America should be 'the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.'⁴⁷ To restore America (Buchanan is implicitly a declinist), he takes an extreme version of the neo-realist view that America should promote its own national interests above all else. This is the essence of the minority realist-isolationist creed.

CRITICISMS OF NEO-REALISM

An attack of neo-realist precepts is made by both neo-Wilsonian schools of thought. Democratists point to the lack of place for values and ideas in the neo-realist framework. Gaddis points out that values and ideas are as omnipresent in the international system as the presence of conflict has been. He stated, 'The simple persistence of values in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls.'⁴⁸ By concentrating on structural relations at the expense of ideas, and advocating the beguilingly simple billiard-ball theory of the international system, democratists charge that neo-realists have oversimplified International Relations, leaving out the realm of ideology and other complexities in the international arena. Further, democratists charge that this conceptual error leads to practical policy mistakes. For advocates of neo-realism, there is always the danger of exalting technique over purpose. This criticism leads to a further existential reproof of the neo-realist position. For instance despite the obvious tactical brilliance of Metternich's policy, in the end he merely played the cards of a declining power well, he did not reverse Austria's slow decline. There are limits to the gains to be made by exploiting the objective international conditions a policymaker finds himself/herself in, however brilliantly done, if the statesman does not attempt to transcend such conditions.

Institutionalist critiques of neo-realism take a similar tack to the democratists', emphasizing the over-simplicity of the neo-realist model. Institutionalists believe that in the new world order there are more balls on the table (to continue the billiard-ball analogy) in the international system than merely states. For institutionalists states are affected by international institutions, particularly international economic institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT. Institutionalists believe international organizations have become too important to be excluded from the billiard table, as they are in neo-realist formulations. Thus institutionalists see important complexities omitted by neo-realists at the supra-state level of analysis.

Lastly institutionalists believe that neo-realism's structural rigidity makes its proponents unable to see that major internal and external changes to states make 1996 more than simply a replay of earlier multipolar periods. As Jack Snyder noted, neo-realism 'exaggerates the inevitability that international conflict and national excesses will follow from the erosion of the bipolar division of Europe. Its assumption, that profound changes in the domestic character of countries since the inter-war period will be readily reversed as a consequence of changes in the structure of the international system, is untenable.'⁴⁹ By their overvaluation of the effect the international structure has on determining an individual state's foreign policy, neo-realists undervalue the changes in the international system, such as free trade leading to greater prosperity and the increased democratization of the world, which make 1996 unlike 1936. Whatever brush fires may rage, institutionalists see the international system as being more secure than during the Cold War, regardless of what neo-realists might believe. Yet despite these neo-Wilsonian criticisms, neo-realism has proved remarkably resilient in the new era as has the state, which lies at the heart of its analysis.

4 The Institutionalists

Chart 4.1 The Belief System of the Institutionalists

1 Background:	Montesquieu
2 Goal:	Promote economic prosperity through the spread of international institutions which advocate free-market policies.
3 Assume:	Due to interdependence, capitalist states have common interests, this fact leads to international cooperation. Multilateral organizations facilitate cooperation in the world economic system (GATT, IMF, World Bank). Absolute rather than relative economic success is crucial for a state, so increased free trade is almost always welcomed. They see democratic change as predicated by the modernization of a state (its capitalization) as development follows universal stages. Increased world contact between states is seen as leading to increased interdependence and cooperation.
4 See state:	Billiard-ball theory is too simplistic, especially with the increased importance of multinational corporations and international organizations in the world political arena.
5 Key analytical orientation:	Economic
6 Declinist/Revivalist:	Declinist
7 World Structure:	Multipolar (Tripolar)
8 Preferred mode of action:	Almost always multilateral action, based on international consensus.
9 Basis of force:	UN Security Council, and other international multilateral institutions.
10 World policeman:	UN
11 Key areas and foci:	International organizations, trilateral powers (US, Europe, Japan), and Asia.
12 Schurmann classification:	Internationalists
13 Political supporters:	Primarily Democrats
14 Political actors:	Secretary of State Christopher, the Clinton administration in general.
15 Bureaucratic bastions of support:	The State Department, and currently the Presidency.
16 Policy toward Western Europe/European defense system:	Especially favor better and increased ties with the EU, as they do not see it turning protectionist. Favor increased Europeanization of Europe's defense both in and out of Nato (through the WEU). Want a more egalitarian Nato, modelled along the lines of JFK's 'twin pillars'. Favor increased European political, security, and foreign policy integration.
17 Policy toward Bosnia:	Non-interventionist, unless there was an international consensus to intervene.
18 Policy toward trade (NAFTA and GATT):	Strongly favor both.
19 Policy toward Russia:	Foreign aid should be coordinated by multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Want to engage Russia in the Western economic community, favor increased trade over aid. Less pro-aid than the democratists and more so than the neo-realists. Unlike democratists, they want no easing of tough transition to the capitalist system.
20 Policy toward China:	MFN under almost all circumstances, even more pro-MFN than the neo-realists. Wanted to delink MFN from human rights considerations.
21 Variations within the school of thought:	There is little variation, as there are no real supranationalists (radical institutionalists who advocate and foresee world government), only moderate institutionalists (who still see the state as central to the international system).

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONALISM

Although both are heirs of Wilsonianism, institutionalism has a different philosophical heritage than democratism. Institutionalists look to the 18th century French philosopher Montesquieu as their founder. They adhere to his view that, ‘The state of things in Europe is that all states depend on each other’,¹ or in other words, institutionalists see the international arena as characterized by interdependence. Their primary goal is to promote economic liberalism through the use of international institutions. This view has a long pedigree in American political thinking. Institutionalists see prosperity as the central factor leading to general domestic stability and through stability to international peace. This view follows the common sense notion that people whose material needs are met are far less likely to become politically radicalized. This outlook explains the efforts of Herbert Hoover with European refugees after 1918, and the Marshall Plan after World War II. In both cases the US did not want the economic devastation wrought by world war to bolshevize Europe. In order to avoid this political crisis, America sought to attack the economic malaise afflicting Europe.

Far more than aid is required to make institutionalist policy work. For institutionalists, free trade is the key to fostering both global economic prosperity and political stability. As Gaddis noted, ‘It has long been a central assumption of liberal political philosophy that if only one could maximize the flow of ideas, commodities, capital, and people across international boundaries, then the causes of war would drop away.’² As capitalism is seen by institutionalists as the most modern and most successful economic system present, it is not surprising that institutionalists see its extension as crucial to the growth of the economic prosperity that they believe is essential for a stable international system to emerge. Institutionalists believe that in promoting capitalism they will stoke the central engine that propels the motive force of history.

Unlike neo-realists, institutionalists believe states are motivated by absolute rather than relative gains in setting out their policy agendas. They feel that this is particularly true in the economic sphere. This is because electorates largely measure absolute rather than relative economic gains in deciding who to vote for. As Nye and Keohane argued, “‘doing better than the past’ is more important to governments than “‘doing better than other countries” in economic activities... . The political processes domestically will

certainly push governments towards a willingness to sacrifice relative power, if necessary, for the sake of real economic gains that can be translated into votes and jobs.³ The Uruguay Round of the GATT provides a good illustration of this process. Most economists predicted that the approval of the pact would add billions to the world economy. Relatively, the Third World stood to gain more out of the agreement than the G-7 states. However none of the advanced industrial states, many then mired in recession, thought to reject the accord because relatively the Third World gained more out of it as a percentage of GDP than they did. Rather they saw an opportunity to obtain crucial economic advantages for their countries, advantages that could spell the difference between victory and defeat at the next election. Thus free trade pacts are almost always welcomed by institutionalists, even if they relatively favor other states.

Institutionalists are the direct heirs of Schurmann's internationalists, as their primary concerns reflect the internationalists' emphasis on international systems, and a primary belief in the centrality of free trade in promoting prosperity and stability. As with the neo-realists, the institutionalists are the direct descendants of an element of Schurmann's classification system.

World economic processes are crucial inputs for subsequent institutionalist analysis and policy prescriptions, as institutionalists view the economic variable in the overall equation of power as a pivotal factor in assessing a state's strength. One of the factors institutionalists cite as a reason for the relative rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power (and the corresponding decline in the relevance of the military variable) is the static nature of the military system in the Cold War era. Nye and Jones argued, 'a strong case can be made that in a world of nuclear stalemate, economic dimensions of power become more important'.⁴ As the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers became lethal enough to threaten the very existence of life on the planet, these destructive capabilities proscribed their use and, institutionalists would argue, their efficacy as an instrument of power greatly diminished.

Institutionalists believe that economic factors can be seen as the single most important variable in the overall equation of power in their effect on a state's domestic politics. The political truism has long been acknowledged that domestic economic concerns in democracies almost always outweigh military and international concerns for the electorate, except in times of warfare directly

involving the core interests of the state. Brzezinski suggested, 'For the average citizen the imperatives of consumption [a chief institutionalist concern] are now more important than those of territory [a primary neo-realist concern], or ideology [a central democratist concern].'⁵ To win reelection, a political decision-maker must put domestic economic concerns in a central position in his/her conduct of foreign policy. While this has always been true, the 1992 presidential election provided a classic example of the importance of this process. George Bush, despite an overwhelmingly favorable poll rating for his conduct of foreign policy, was defeated by Bill Clinton, who pledged to make domestic economic prosperity a central focus of his foreign policy. For institutionalists, economic considerations largely determine political outcomes in most democratic states.

GENERAL INSTITUTIONALIST PERCEPTIONS

Unlike the democratists, institutionalists are convinced declinists. They see American decline as partly engendered by the rise of the economic variable in the overall equation of power. Institutionalists believe that this shift hurts the US as it is far more dominant in the military sphere than in the economic, and thus the shift itself is bound to lead to a diminution of American power. To rectify American domestic decline, institutionalists offer a far different program from the realist-isolationists. While institutionalists agree with the realist-isolationists that America is in decline, to halt this process they urge more multilateralism and international contact and not less. To avoid permanent decline, institutionalists believe America needs an era of domestic retrenchment, thus collective security and an increasing reliance on international organizations, such as Nato and the UN, are essential to preserve some sort of order in the international system as the US sets about dramatic domestic reform. Increased internationalism has become a strategy to keep the US engaged in the international system while at the same time allowing America to retrench and deal with its domestic ills. This notion is an undergirding principle of the foreign policy of the Clinton administration.

With the increase of American involvement in international organizations goes a corresponding decreasing American say in these institutions. As Bergsten commented, 'The US has to make

the difficult adjustment from hegemon to partner.⁶ While institutionalists advocate America increasingly relying on international organizations, they readily acknowledge that due to decline, America cannot expect to have the same influence in multilateral institutions that it once had. For instance, institutionalists believe (unlike democratists) that for Nato to survive it must become an organization modelled on President Kennedy's conception of 'twin pillars', with an increasingly assertive Europe playing a roughly equal role with the US in Nato decision-making. With the US military commitment down to 100,000 troops, for institutionalists it no longer follows that the military head of Nato ought necessarily to be an American general.

Institutionalists see the world as generally multipolar and specifically tripolar, with Japan and Germany (or Western Europe) being the other poles of power besides the US. Obviously this structural analysis flows directly from the fact that economics is the key factor in institutionalism's analytical orientation. It is not surprising that the three major economic powers of the post-Cold War era are seen by institutionalists as *the* three powers of the world, so heavily do they weight economic might in determining a state's overall power.

A belief in a fundamental change in the nature of the international system is a core tenet of institutionalism. Brzezinski argued, 'Though America is today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too complex and America's domestic health too precarious to maintain a worldwide Pax Americana.'⁷ So while like democratists institutionalists see the US as the sole superpower, unlike the democratists the institutionalists feel that changes in the nature of the international system limit American preponderance. Institutionalists believe that the relative power of the state itself is in decline in the international arena as more non-national actors (that is, Multinational Corporations and International Organizations) gain power at the international level. To return to the billiard-ball analogy, institutionalists believe that states are not the only balls now on the table.

According to institutionalists, this erosion of state authority will also occur at the sub-state level. As the new global agenda will make the need for increasingly specialized governmental agencies apparent, they will have to go outside state parameters to receive current information on transnational issues. For example the US Department of Health and Human Services will have to attend a WHO seminar on the latest AIDS research and the Treasury Department

will speak directly to the Bundesbank about European interest rates. Institutionalists feel that this process is making the world both more fragmented and complicated. Nye and Keohane note that one of the effects of this process is the further erosion of national sovereignty, as transnational coalitions form. They argued that one important result of increased interdependence, 'is that subunits of governments are provided greater opportunities for transnational contacts and coalitions'.⁸ These coalitions will form partly because of the great affinities that are likely to exist between individuals that meet as a result of this transnational process. For example individuals that work for the Department of Health and Human Services are likely to have much in common with officials from the WHO. They share a concern for stopping the spread of disease (as both have devoted their working lives to this cause, it is safe to assume that for them it is probably a higher priority than for others outside the field), and a technical understanding of medicine that laypeople would not possess. In many cases, these affinities will lead to shared sympathies (such as a common understanding of fighting losing budget battles with their executives, who place health care as a lower priority than they are apt to) and even to informal shared bargaining positions *vis-à-vis* their superiors. For instance, in the 1960s an American military attaché was concerned about the slow-down in negotiations to return Okinawa to the Japanese. As both he and his opposite Japanese number feared the effect the delay was having on US-Japanese relations, he helped his Japanese counterpart draft memos to Washington in such a way that they would be received by sympathetic American officials and the talks could be successfully concluded.⁹ Institutionalists believe that the increased interdependence brought about by the new global agenda will both facilitate increased international cooperation and accelerate the decline of the notion of sovereignty being indivisible.

In many ways then the institutionalist view of the state is an uneasy compromise between the neo-realist conception of the state as supreme, and the democratist notion that it is at the lower, fragmented, domestic level that policy is generally formed through bureaucratic political tussles and local political considerations. Institutionalists see the other significant actors on the world stage as being divided into two large sub-categories, international organizations and multinational corporations. It is the great increase in power of the MNCs that is the single greatest reason institutionalists believe the international arena has been fundamentally altered.

There is no doubting the economic clout of the MNCs. Nye and Keohane detailed the great financial power of MNCs, noting, 'In 1965 some 85 business enterprises each had annual sales larger than the GNP's of some 57 voting members of the UN.'¹⁰ Clearly a good many MNCs have greater financial wherewithal than most Third World states. Nor do institutionalists (unlike neo-realists) believe that these corporations are largely instruments of a particular state. They are in the business of satisfying their shareholders, not furthering the national interests of the state where their headquarters happen to be. They are in many respects corporations without states, as their officials' primary loyalty is to the MNC. Institutionalists believe that the geometric proliferation of MNCs since the 1960s has radically altered the international arena, by greatly reducing state sovereignty. As Keohane and Ooms argued, MNCs are, 'creating large and politically significant areas of activity not controlled by any government'.¹¹ Institutionalists believe that the MNC is the final nail in the coffin of the mirage of state sovereignty. Nye and Keohane suggested, 'We have just noted that transnational relations may make all states dependent on forces none of them control.'¹² For institutionalists, this is particularly true in the economic sphere.

However institutionalists do not believe that MNCs will displace the state as the primary actor on the international stage any time in the near future. Rather they see the process as both more subtle and complicated than this. Keohane and Ooms argued that the new world will be one in which, 'the role of states is not so dominant as it may have been regarded in the past. For the foreseeable future, however, it is not the multinational business enterprise in itself that will be decisive for world politics but relations between enterprises and states.'¹³ For example for every case where MNCs successfully cajoled states into action to protect their interests (such as: the United Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 1950s, Union Miniere in Katanga in the 1960s, ITT in Chile in the 1970s), there are more where governments did not do what was in the MNCs' interests (such as American agribusiness failing to stop the US from applying sanctions on the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Institutionalists, unlike Marxist critics of capitalism, do not see capitalist states as merely serving the interests of its dominant business class. Rather they see a subtle process whereby MNCs influence states and vice-versa.

A central institutionalist assumption is that international organizations facilitate the transnational cooperation that increased global

interdependence has made so imperative. Institutionalists feel that this is particularly true of the world economic system where the GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank are essential for the smooth running of the global financial order. Like neo-realists, institutionalists believe states use international institutions to further their own objectives. Yet institutionalists, unlike neo-realists, see the relationship between international organizations and states as more complicated than merely one whereby a state pursues its ends through multilateral means. Institutionalists see the relationship between states and international institutions as a two-way process. Keohane and Nye commented on this critical difference between neo-realism and institutionalism, 'At the broadest level the issue is whether states view institutions purely instrumentally—as a means to given ends—or whether they come to redefine their own interests in light of the rules or practices of the institutions.'¹⁴ Nye and Keohane illustrate how institutions can develop a life of their own. They suggested that, 'Institutions that have become successful tend to create interests that support them: even if Nato and the GATT could not have been formed *de novo* under the conditions of today, they were able to persist under these new conditions.'¹⁵ If Nato were merely an instrument created for its component states to pursue their individual interests, which were primarily to defend Western Europe from Soviet attack, as this is no longer an immediate danger neo-realists argue that Nato may shortly disband. However just the reverse has occurred, with much of the former Warsaw Pact clamoring to join. This example supports the institutionalist contention that successful international organizations are more than the sum of their parts. Institutionalists believe that international institutions are themselves actors in the international arena. They believe that international organizations, in promoting states' shared interests, have fundamentally altered the character of the international system from the Hobbesian jungle neo-realists envisage.

Institutionalists, while recognizing that increased interdependence can have adverse consequences (for example the exporting of stock market crashes that occurred in October 1987), generally think that the process of increased interdependence, for all its implications, is a favorable international development. An example of the beneficial aspects of interdependence lies in their belief that the communications revolution, which made access to media coverage across state boundaries far more prevalent in the last decade, helped to topple the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. As

subjects of totalitarian states were no longer dependent on the state for all of their information, totalitarian regimes lost an essential control over their people. This is just one example of the general institutionalist belief that increased global interdependence is a basically favorable phenomenon.

A major assumption underlying the institutionalist school of thought is that due to interdependence, capitalist states share interests, and that these shared interests lead to increased international stability. *Shared interests* is the catchphrase for institutionalists, just as *shared values* is a crucial notion for democratists, and *national interests* is an essential thought underpinning neo-realism. The key idea here is that as increasingly advanced industrial states have large economic interests in other large industrial states, the competition that neo-realists see as at the heart of the international system is joined and to an extent superseded by the notion of cooperation present in institutionalist thinking. These shared economic interests militate against conflict, be it economic or martial. As Rosecrance suggested, 'the interpenetration of investment in industrial economies provides a mutual stake in each other's success'.¹⁶ For instance institutionalists believe that the more money Japan invests in the US, the more Japanese investors will want the American economy to flourish. As politicians in a democracy need to be mindful of the economic interests of their people, it is unlikely that the Japanese government would pursue new policies that would actively attempt to harm the American economy. Thus interdependence creates interests that discourage conflict. This is a very different view of foreign investment from that of the neo-realists, who see increased foreign penetration as a threat to the autonomy of a particular state.

Institutionalists feel that interdependence will also hasten increased global cooperation. They believe that as states coordinate societal interdependence as a response to the new transnational issue areas such as: the environment, AIDS, terrorism, monetary rates, and free trade, which cannot be effectively dealt with by a single state, the process will lead to increased policy interdependence. Institutionalists see that as the new issue areas can only be successfully dealt with multilaterally, the interdependence that this creates will logically lead to the formation of new international organizations and/or increased levels of transgovernmental relations to deal with the new global agenda. Increased interdependence will thus change the nature of the state, limiting its ability to

act unilaterally by the very nature of the new global issues it encounters.

Another major institutionalist assumption is that, unlike the democratists, they believe capitalism and not democracy should be the preeminent goal of a state's modernization policy. Indeed institutionalists support capitalizing states, such as China, that as yet show no signs of democratic political organization. Another illustration of the fact that promoting democracy is not the primary institutionalist goal, is that unlike the democratists, institutionalists believe that strong support for international organizations should not depend upon its members having a democratic orientation. For example, institutionalists see the UN as a major actor on the international stage and strongly support it having an increased global role, despite the fact that many member states of the UN are dictatorships. Instead institutionalists believe American interests are best served by promoting the growth of the market economy across the globe.

As the promotion of capitalism is central for institutionalists, it is advocated even if it comes into conflict with democratic considerations. As Keohane argued, 'In some countries, democratic institutions and modern capital may be compatible, but there is no guarantee that this will be the case everywhere.'¹⁷ A codicil should be added to Keohane's statement. That is, *in the short run*, institutionalists feel promoting capitalism and democracy can be at odds, but that in the longer run there is seen to be a link between the two. One of the reasons that institutionalists support the promotion of capitalism over democracy is precisely because in the long-term they see the free market leading to modernizing states' increased democratization. They feel that although the promotion of capitalism will eventually lead to the adoption of democracy, an indeterminate time lag is to be expected. In line with Wilsonian universalism, institutionalists believe that there is a single path for a state to follow toward modernization. However institutionalists, unlike democratists, argue that there is an enduring link between capitalism and democracy. They feel that this process is inevitable because of the nature of the free enterprise system itself. That is because the very attributes needed for success in capitalism: freedom of thought, the ability to adapt, and the propensity to take risks are not qualities that are valued in a totalitarian state or dictatorship. Thus eventually institutionalists believe that dictatorships attempting economic reform will end up with a renewed dictatorship and economic retrenchment away from capitalism; or the political

nature of the regime will become more pluralist to keep it in line with the newly-instituted free market reforms. Institutionalists point to South Korea as an example of where the latter process occurred, as its political focus gradually shifted in the 1980s from the military, so that now it is a *bona fide* democracy. The difference in opinion between democratists and institutionalists over whether the US should principally promote capitalism or democracy is one of the major reasons the two neo-Wilsonian schools of thought ought to be considered as separate entities.

Institutionalism's preferred mode of action in the international arena is almost always of a multilateral nature. This is in accordance with institutionalism's analysis of the nature of the issues affecting the international community, their belief that the world structure is multipolar, and their assertion that America is in decline. As most institutionalists are tripolarists, they believe that to come to grips with the global agenda all the major poles of power need to be consulted. A multilateral approach should be developed by American decision-makers, in the institutionalist view, because it jibes with the polar realities of world power. Thus a US intent on addressing its domestic problems will have neither the resources nor the focus to conduct an aggressive, unilateralist policy, such as the democratists advocate. The formula for renewal at home leading to a cautious, multilateralist foreign policy has been generally adopted by the Clinton administration. As Daniel Williams and John Goshko reported, a Senior White House official said, 'that unlike the Cold War, when Washington paid lip service to the notion of collective security, the new administration really believes in the concept'.¹⁸ Just how central multilateralism is conceptually for institutionalists will become apparent when their specific policy prescriptions are examined.

Institutionalists' three key areas of concern are with renewing the American commitment to international organizations, strengthening the trilateral alliance, and boosting the American presence (particularly economically) in Asia. As institutionalists believe that international organizations facilitate the world economic system, it is not surprising that they see wholehearted participation in such organizations as a crucial American interest in the post-Cold War era. Nye, who feels American policy under President Reagan became too unilateralist, urged the US to, 'renew the American commitment to multilateral institutions that fell into abeyance in the 80s'.¹⁹ A second major institutionalist concern is that

America strengthen coordination between the three major poles of power: the US, Japan, and Western Europe (especially Germany). Institutionalists believe that increased trilateral coordination is essential as tripolarism accurately reflects the primary power distribution in the world today, and that only international institutions that reflect the realities of power can have true efficacy in the new post-Cold War era.

A final key area of institutionalist concern is Asia and the Pacific Rim, with its booming economy. It has long been a dream of American business to introduce the Asian and Latin American markets' billions of people to American goods. At last the time seems propitious for the dream to be realized, with the Pacific Rim booming and increasingly seeing the US as a crucial trading partner. As economics is the key analytical orientation for institutionalists, their turn toward Asia is hardly surprising. As Stephen Rosenfeld noted, 'With the summit of 15 Pacific Rim countries in Seattle, President Clinton audaciously positions the US for a fateful post-Cold War turn from Europe to Asia, from preoccupation with security to pursuit of economic advantage.'²⁰ While this may be overstating the case somewhat, certainly APEC can be viewed as a nascent international organization specializing in economics, or in other words, it is greatly to the institutionalists' liking. If institutionalists generally advocate increased trilateralism, it seems they wish to become relatively ever closer to the Asian pole, even if it is at the short-term expense of the European axis.

Institutionalists feel that sanctions will increasingly take the place of force in the international system. This general prescription is in line with the institutionalist belief that economics ultimately drive domestic politics and thus a government's foreign policy. Institutionalists believe that if an aggressor state is hit hard by the international community with sanctions, it will either, due to domestic pressure, ultimately cease its aggression, or if it persists, be internally overthrown. If international force has to be used, institutionalists want it to be as part of as broad-based a multilateral coalition as possible. It is important to note that due to the obvious restraints collective security poses for decisive decision-making, institutionalists are not nearly as likely to advocate the use of force as are either democratists or neo-realists. It is a cornerstone of institutionalism that most problems can be favorably resolved without recourse to force.

Institutionalists see the UN as the global policeman, the guarantor of the post-Cold War era. As the UN is the primary global

multilateral institution, institutionalist enthusiasm for it is understandable. With the end of the Cold War, institutionalists were cheered when the previously hopelessly deadlocked Security Council (due to Cold War vetoes by the superpowers) began to become increasingly effective, especially in repelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. To some extent proponents of the UN saw it as merely filling a power vacuum left by an increasingly introspective America. Barton Gellman reported that the Clinton administration initially shared this feeling, 'Its strategy is to share the military and financial burdens by encouraging the UN to become the world policeman that America does not want to be.'²¹ The Clinton administration, and even other institutionalists, have since cooled to the idea of the UN as global cop after the *débâcles* in Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia. Still, many institutionalists feel that a properly financed UN will soon be seen as the best bet to fashion some sort of order out of the increasing chaos that is so characteristic of the post-Cold War era.

Currently institutionalism's political power in America is great, both with the public and in the corridors of power. Three key tenets of institutionalism: the multipolarity of the world system, the belief the US is in decline, and the need to increasingly pursue American economic advantage through foreign policy initiatives are all broadly supported by the American public. As Holsti and Rosenau noted in their survey of American opinion leaders, 'when asked to describe the contemporary international system, about 90% of respondents to the 92 leadership survey agreed that it was multipolar'.²² Horvitz added that the 650 affluent Americans who responded to a September-October 1993 poll constructed by The Times Mirror Centre for The People and The Press, 'As a group, [they] believe the US now plays a less important role in the world than it did a decade ago, but should be first among equals as it shares global leadership with other nations.'²³ Broad public support for institutionalist tenets has been reinforced by the election of a president who, as a candidate, pledged to put American economic interests at the center of his foreign policy. Yankelovich's analysis of the 1992 presidential election concluded that President Clinton's victory signifies that, 'when it comes to setting actual priorities, support for democracy and other worthy foreign policy goals are subordinate to economic concerns'.²⁴

Yet despite broad public support for institutionalist beliefs and the election of a largely institutionalist administration, it is difficult to name a single currently popular institutionalist policy initiative. As

Paul Lewis argued, the US is \$1 billion in arrears for UN peacekeeping operations and that this, 'reflects congressional hostility to the mounting cost and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations'.²⁵ In November 1993, the Clinton administration devised a new set procedure regulating US participation in UN peacekeeping operations that sharply limited the possible deployment of US troops. There have been disputes between the US and the UN over dues payments, Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti.

So why is a supposedly institutionalist administration, backed by public support, constantly bickering with the largest international organization? The institutionalist school of thought is currently generally supported and politically popular, but when issues become specific (that is become policy prescriptions) almost immediately problems arise if the policy is not quickly successful, because the administration and particularly the public have little fervor for the current form of institutionalism. As shall be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, decision-makers in the administration may be convinced institutionalists, but the public they serve is as yet not. Institutionalism has still to win the intellectual debate over what should be the general American orientation in the post-Cold War era, as the containment doctrine signified the qualified intellectual triumph of Schurmann's imperialists in the Truman White House. As of now, institutionalism's political and intellectual hold on the American public in the new world order is very precarious.

Institutionalism's bureaucratic bastions of support, are, in the long term, the State Department, and currently the Presidency. The best example of this is that Secretary of State Christopher (as shall be discussed in Chapter 5) is an avowed institutionalist. As the institutionalists' forefathers, Schurmann's internationalists, also controlled the State Department, this is a remarkable example of how slowly orientations change in the large bureaucratic fiefdoms that comprise the American government. It appears that the State Department rank and file has not changed its general belief orientation in the past 40 years, despite the notable careers there of Dulles and Kissinger.

MAJORITY INSTITUTIONALIST POLICY POSITIONS

Institutionalists favor increased American ties with Western Europe. They especially favor closer links with the EU, as long as it does not

become more protectionist. A major reason institutionalists favor the EU is because it shares institutionalism's economics-first philosophy. Unlike the neo-realists, institutionalists warmly favor increasing European integration, seeing the EU as primarily a multilateral partner rather than a rival. Institutionalists, unlike neo-realists, do not fear that Nato's efficacy is coming to an end. They feel the economic linkages that so bind Western Europe to the US will bolster continued politico-military ties such as Nato. This is another example of institutionalists believing that economic processes largely determine political and military policies.

Institutionalists wish to see an increased European defense role both inside and outside of Nato, particularly regarding the expansion of the WEU into something like the defense arm of the European Union. Institutionalists do not fear that the expansion of the WEU will lead to the obsolescence of Nato, which would predicate an American military withdrawal from the continent. Rather they see it as a multilateral tool to free US resources previously spent on the defense of Western Europe to instead combat American domestic problems. As institutionalists are declinists, it follows that they should advocate a lessening American defense commitment to Europe in order to concentrate on domestic reform. For the institutionalists, it is logical (and not to be feared or opposed) that the Europeans should fill the partial security vacuum left by an America that, with the end of the Cold War, wishes to arrest its domestic decline.

Unlike democratists, institutionalists advocate a more egalitarian Nato, rather than seeing it as an instrument of US dominance. They envisage Nato at last resembling President Kennedy's conception of a 'twin pillars' arrangement, with the European stake in and decision-making powers both equal to the American commitment. With the end of the Cold War, many believe Nato is moving in this direction. Among them are General Oakes, former Commander in Chief of Allied Air Control in Nato, who stated, 'There is a significant watering down of the US leadership position.'²⁶ Institutionalists believe that this process should be furthered. Also, institutionalists favor the Partnership for Peace initiative, which expresses the contentious goals of allowing Eastern Europe under Nato's security blanket, while at the same time stating that such a process will be slow as the entire alliance has to agree to such a radical change in its composition. For institutionalists institutional cohesion takes precedence over the expansion of Nato.

The general institutionalist view of Bosnia was a belief that the US should not intervene there unless an international consensus called on it to do so. As with all other questions of force, institutionalists were inherently cautious. This caution was reinforced because Bosnia was not a key issue area for them, as it is not an area of extensive US business interests. For institutionalists, maintaining ties with the European pole of power far outweighed Bosnia as a primary American foreign policy consideration. Unilateral armed action in Bosnia would have violated many of the institutionalists' core precepts. Not only would it have opened a rift with America's European allies, it was a case of using force (which institutionalists are always comparatively reluctant to do), acting alone (a position institutionalists are generally against), and all for an area that was not seen as a primary concern.

Institutionalists see increased global trade as a crucial issue area and were strongly in favor of congressional passage of both NAFTA and GATT. Even though all three majority schools of thought generally favored congressional passage of both NAFTA and GATT, neo-realists and democratists do not have the same depth of feeling about trade issues that institutionalists possess. Institutionalists argued that NAFTA and GATT confirmed a major shift in the American emphasis on trade that has taken place over the past twenty years. As Martin Walker noted in 1993, 'In the course of a generation, the US has gone from being the world's most self-reliant economy into the world's biggest exporter, with a GDP that is these days more dependent than Japan on exports. Japan exports only 9% of its GDP. Last year, the US exported 11.7% of GDP, and should exceed 12% this year.'²⁷ Institutionalists felt that both NAFTA and GATT were merely a logical response to this changing world. For institutionalists GATT was a particularly crucial issue. A GATT economists estimate, would increase world trade by \$213 billion by 2002. In the view of institutionalists, this increase was essential for the recession-plagued first world and important to help stimulate American economic recovery. The granting of primacy to economics in foreign policy is a hallmark of institutionalism.

Institutionalists advocate giving aid to Russia coordinated by multilateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. However they see trade and not aid as the crucial factor needed to integrate Russia into the Western economic community. Institutionalists are for more aid to Russia than the neo-realists, and less than the

democratists. Like the neo-realists they advocate that the IMF employ the usual strict loan conditions it generally imposes when a state requests economic assistance. Institutionalists will only support Russian reform if the market system is introduced. They see the perils of the Russian situation, unlike the democratists, as largely resulting from economic and not political dislocation.

Institutionalists are the strongest supporters of China's radical economic reforms. They generally favored extension of MFN under almost all conditions, being even more pro-MFN than the neo-realists. The fact that Deng Xiaoping followed a path of economic over political reform, in line with standard institutionalist precepts, is a major reason institutionalists are so vocal in their support for Deng's policy. Conflicts over US policy to China present perhaps the starkest policy differences between democratists and institutionalists, as the argument underlying extension of MFN to China was really over whether economic or political factors should have pre-eminence in American foreign policy decision-making. China's economy, the second largest in Asia after Japan's, increased 11 per cent in 1992 and increased its imports 22 per cent. This booming new market was vital to cultivate if the institutionalists' export-driven recovery strategy was to be implemented.

Unlike the democratist and neo-realist schools of thought, institutionalism contains no genuine minority current, as there are no real supranationalists, radical institutionalists who advocate and foresee a world government, in decision-making circles. Instead, there are only moderate institutionalists, who still see the state as central to the international system. As a result of not having a significant minority current, there is less variation in the institutionalist school of thought than there is in either neo-realism or democratism.

CRITICISMS OF INSTITUTIONALISM

After the heady days of the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it seemed that a new world order based on institutionalist precepts might effortlessly appear, there has been increasing criticism of institutionalism. Critics note that several of its basic precepts seem seriously flawed. Firstly, both democratists and neo-realists criticize institutionalism's reliance on multilateralism as its preferred mode of action. At the best of times the apparatus of collective security

inherently leads to problems regarding acting consistently and decisively. To act consistently, international organizations need a long-term political consensus. As a *Washington Post* editorial observed, such consistency is a rarity in the multilateral framework. It commented on US policy regarding the Bosnian crisis, noting,

The actual starting point of American policy appears to lie in the phenomenon called 'multilateralism'. This means consulting everyone—alleges, even in a sense adversaries, national governments and International Organizations. It makes for an elaborate system of all checks and no capacity for movement and initiative. It takes the worthy purpose of consultation and converts it into a farcical invitation to doubters everywhere to paralyze American policy.²⁸

In an effort to preserve multilateral unity, institutionalists inherently hamper their own ability to act decisively. Both neo-realists and democratists feel that institutionalism's firm adherence to multilateralism could cripple American foreign policy by generally removing the possibility of decisive action (that is, acting unilaterally). To use force in a multilateral setting becomes so difficult as to be a rarity (for example, the Gulf War was the first genuine case where all the members of the Security Council [except China] agreed on the use of force in 45 years). As a result institutionalists look to sanctions as their main instrument of coercion, with their debatable utility. Neo-realists and democratists charge the institutionalists with underrating the efficacy of force in international politics, thus dooming themselves to impotence.

Critics also believe institutionalists overrate the role of economics in the international system. Like Marxists institutionalists see economics as the basis for many social and political phenomena, and as a motive force of history. Also like Marxists, they are sometimes accused of being determinists. John Lewis Gaddis picked up on this argument, criticizing Wilsonians as, 'certain that they have exposed an engine that drives history forward, they never seem to ask whether there might be others'.²⁹ Also there is an existential critique of this economics above-all approach, articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. At its extreme Brzezinski reasons that institutionalist policy merely exhorts the world toward greater materialism, a position that he and many others do not think should be the primary focus of American policy initiatives.

Critics of institutionalism believe that the flaws in institutionalist precepts help explain the failure of several key institutionalist bastions to perform as well as they had been expected to in the new world order. The crises in Bosnia and Somalia made a mockery of Boutros-Ghali's aspirations for the UN to become the global policeman. The UN, hopelessly underfinanced and beset by intractable international problems, has begun to try to scale back its role in the world. Neo-realists feel institutionalists have always overrated international organizations, which they see as little more than tools of states. Leslie Gelb alluded to the UN paradox, 'Without US leadership and power, the UN lacks muscle. With it, the UN loses its independent identity.'³⁰ In light of the UN's failures, it is generous to say that international institutions are obviously not yet ready to take on a world ordering role without the wholehearted support of the great state powers.

Likewise the EU, the centerpiece of institutionalist calculations about Europe, has not become anything like as cohesive as institutionalists believed that it would be in the post-Cold War era. The furor over passage of the Maastricht Treaty alerted many around the world to the fact that increased integration was not the historical inevitability that had been supposed. The crisis over increased integration was heightened by the EU's failure to stop the fighting in Bosnia, a war which was ironically claimed by Jacques Delors to be the test of the EU's greater foreign policy and security role in Europe. One of the main reasons institutionalists favor increased contacts with the EU is that it exhibits an economics-first approach within its own organization, for example favoring economic sanctions over military coercion. The Bosnian war illustrated the drawbacks of such a stance. The Serbs often cared more about nationalism than their own economic well-being and as such were incomprehensible to the average Eurocrat. Sanctions only work if the aggressor places a great value on economic prosperity relative to other goals. For an institutionalist, or EU Commissioner, economic prosperity is the crucial goal of initiatives in the international sphere. In applying sanctions, institutionalists threaten to take away from an aggressor what they themselves value most. Sanctions do not work if an aggressor state, in this case Serbia, places a greater value on other priorities besides prosperity, such as religion, ethnic ties, nationalism, or ideology. The Bosnian conflict showed both Western Europe and institutionalism unable to grasp the limits of their primary instrument of coercion.

Also, economic rates of growth in Western Europe and Japan have not matched their course in the 1970s and 1980s when institutionalists first envisaged a tripolar world. Ironically it is the US that has achieved by far the highest rates of growth among the G-7 in the early 1990s. Worse, at least in the case of Western Europe, its recession seems to be partly structural as the EU's safety net has to be paid for despite European productivity rates that lag far behind those of Japan and America. Even in their own (economic) terms, it is open to debate as to whether Europe and Japan can continue to gain relative power, predicated for institutionalists above all by economics, at the expense of the US. The world structure may not be moving inexorably toward tripolarity after all. Still, despite such criticism, the institutionalist school of thought represents the dominant foreign policy view of the Clinton administration. At least for the moment institutionalist prescriptions seem politically in the ascendant.

5 *Schools-of-thought Orientations of Central Legislative and Executive Decision-makers*

It is essential to classify the schools-of-thought orientations of major political actors by looking again at general schools-of-thought policy prescriptions regarding five important issue areas in the new world order and comparing them to individual decision-makers' policy preferences. Where a decision-maker's policy stances coincide with a school of thought's policy preferences three out of five times, the decision-maker will be classified as belonging to that particular school of thought. Once specific decision-makers have been placed in a schools-of-thought box, and the reasons for their classification have been analyzed, it will be possible to ascertain how the schools-of-thought orientation helps determine how overall American foreign policy outputs are arrived at. This will be done by tracing the classified decision-makers as they operate throughout the bureaucratic political processes that are the arena for the formulation of American foreign policy outputs. Having identified the overall American foreign policy preferences on Bosnia (the outputs), and the schools-of-thought orientation of crucial foreign policy decision-makers (the inputs), it will be possible to assess American political and bureaucratic processes which determine policy outputs using the schools-of-thought paradigm.

SPECIFIC DEMOCRATIST DECISION-MAKERS

Strobe Talbott – Deputy Secretary of State

Strobe Talbott is not wholly a democratist, having a significant institutionalist minority current. This minority institutionalist predilection can be seen in both his policy preference for Bosnia and his position on MFN renewal for China. Over China, Talbott explicitly attacks the position of his democratist cohorts. As he

stated while an editor of *Time*, regarding Congress's decision to impose conditions on MFN for China in the final days of the Bush administration, 'Once again, those would-be statesmen on Capitol Hill are trying to micromanage American foreign policy and legislate morality in another country – something Congress does often and badly.'¹ Here the soon to be Deputy Secretary of State attacks the legislation of morality regarding China, which is precisely what the democratists in Congress were trying to accomplish by levying conditions on the regime of Deng Xiaoping. Talbott follows this attack by asserting that, in true institutionalist style, if MFN is withdrawn the wrong people in China will be hurt, namely the entrepreneurs and emerging middle-classes, those most likely to spearhead a drive toward increased liberalization in Chinese society. Thus Talbott advocates the classic institutionalist position on China.

Talbott's stance on Bosnia is a reflection of his fundamental democratist conviction that nothing should be allowed to jeopardize Yeltsin's democratic experiment. Talbott's democratist championing of Russian reform is his primary policy concern both by inclination and title, as he was Special Adviser to Secretary Christopher regarding the newly independent states of the former USSR. In that role he was instrumental in crafting the administration's democratist policy regarding Russia. Thus a possible cleavage over Bosnia, with Yeltsin supporting the Serbs and America the Bosnian Muslims, had to be avoided at almost all costs for Talbott, who saw Russian reform as the most crucial foreign policy issue facing the US. Talbott's strongest call for punishing Serb aggression in Bosnia consisted merely of an initiative to tighten existing economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs by sealing the border with Serbia proper more effectively,² as he was intent on avoiding alienating the pro-Serb Yeltsin regime. Deputy Secretary of State Talbott predicated his institutionalist Bosnia policy on America's democratist Russia policy.

Indeed Talbott displayed classic democratist predilections in explaining and justifying his views on America's policy toward the Yeltsin regime. Like almost all democratists, he believes US aid is crucial to the survival of the Russian democratic experiment. Talbott stated, 'Only with international help, marshalled by the US, could Russia, Ukraine, and the other former republics of the USSR make the transition from totalitarianism to democracy.'³ Like most democratists, Talbott felt the neo-realist position on

Russia could lead to a damaging self-fulfilling prophecy. He argued, 'To put it bluntly: if we base our policies on the persistent presumption that Russia will regress rather than evolve, then we would have committed, in the final years of this century, a strategic blunder equal to the one committed in the opening years at Versailles and afterward.'⁴ By comparing the neo-realists' relatively passive position on Russian reform with the disastrous foreign policy inactivity of the Harding and Coolidge presidencies, Talbott illustrated not only his advocacy for an activist democratist initiative toward the former USSR, but also the central importance such a policy assumes for democratists in general.

The success or failure of Yeltsin's reforms in Russia are viewed as the key to this process. Regarding Russia, Talbott stated, 'What happens there will have a major, perhaps decisive, effect on the future of reform in all the former Soviet republics.'⁵ Thus in the wake of the December 1993 election, which saw Yeltsin's opponents gain control of the Russian parliament, Talbott followed the standard democratist course in blaming the IMF for failing the Russian people. As Cox noted, he angrily argued, 'there had been too much imposed "shock" and not enough "therapy" in Russia'.⁶ Talbott felt that the US-led IMF should have relaxed its strict conditions on borrowing so as to allow the Yeltsin government more aid, even if it did not meet all the usual economic conditions for such assistance. Talbott and most democratists feel that economic short-sightedness should not be allowed to stand in the path of the most crucial democratic experiment going on in the world.

As with Bosnia, Talbott's European policy prescriptions are also largely determined by his democratist commitment to Russian reform. A senior official at the State Department observed Talbott's stance regarding Europe as being 'that the worst thing to do would be to draw a new line across Europe which would preclude Russia from the security community'.⁷ In such circumstances, an isolated Russia would be more likely to turn to hyper-nationalist, anti-democratic solutions to its security dilemmas.⁸ In accordance with the democratist position on the expansion of Nato, Talbott felt any extension of Nato eastwards would alienate Russia, whereas neo-realists believed a quick expansion of Nato was necessary to maintain continental security in the post-Cold War era. As Ives observed, for neo-realists, 'The immediate charge against Talbott is that he persuaded President Clinton to overrule his boss, Warren Christopher, by keeping Poland, the Czech Republic, and

Hungary out of Nato. If talk about a Soviet invasion of the West, was, in Talbott's words, a "paranoid fantasy" so, in his view, is talk of a revived Russian army marching West.⁹ Even if the Yeltsin government gave way to an adversarial, nationalist regime, Talbott believed the US could easily counter such a Russian drive, with or without a formal security arrangement with the Central European states. As this was so it was far more important, in Talbott's view, to do nothing that might lead to the destabilization of the democratic Russian regime. Talbott believed that Russia's continued democratic nature was a better source of security for the Central Europeans than formal Nato membership. As Talbott stated, 'with each passing year, it becomes increasingly apparent that the proposition "democracies don't go to war with one another" is not just a bromide—it's as close as we are likely to get in political science to an empirical truth'.¹⁰ This central democratist tenet then lay at the heart of Talbott's prescription for American policy regarding the European security structure (he has since changed his mind). This is due to the fact that democratists believe that if Russian democratic reform succeeds, the Central Europeans need not fear their massive neighbor to the east, as democracies do not make war against one another.

As befits most democratists regarding trade Talbott favored both NAFTA and GATT, yet this issue is not a central democratist concern. In Talbott's case this is true by virtue of both his schools-of-thought orientation and his bureaucratic specialization on Russia. As opposed to the institutionalist school of thought, Talbott acknowledged the frailties of GATT. He noted, 'GATT is the imperfect, sputtering yet indispensable engine of globalization.'¹¹ This specific statement perfectly encapsulates the general democratist position on trade issues. Like most democratists, Talbott did not see GATT as a panacea for global problems, as befits a follower of a school of thought which ultimately values democracy over free market institutions, yet still views the extension of trade as an important initiative in the new world order.

George Mitchell – Senate Majority Leader

Like Talbott Senator Mitchell is a democratist with an institutionalist minority current. However Mitchell's majority democratist viewpoint can be seen primarily in his approach to economic policy questions, and less in the security realm where he has maintained

an institutionalist position both on the Bosnian crisis and on the proposed structure of the new European security architecture.

Regarding Bosnia, like his close political ally President Clinton, the Senate Majority Leader held a strong institutionalist position. Mitchell believed containing the conflict to be a primary objective, a goal that would be threatened by the US unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He noted, 'Those horrors [of the war] will be multiplied thousands of times over if the war widens. Yet that will be the inevitable result of the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the US.'¹² Here Mitchell uses a humanitarian argument against those holding the democratist position on Bosnia, knowing that humanitarian concerns are of great importance for democratists. Mitchell feared the Russians would bolster the Bosnian Serbs with weaponry if the US came to the military aid of the Bosnian government. With both sides then having virtually unlimited stockpiles of arms, Mitchell believed that war would likely spread throughout the Balkans and with it the savagery that characterized the Bosnian conflict. Thus the Senate Majority Leader used democratist humanitarian arguments against democratists who wished America to actively side with the Bosnian Muslims in the war.

Mitchell also felt that acting in a unilateral manner regarding the lifting of the arms embargo would cause the US great hardship in the international arena. He stated, 'If we now unilaterally lift the arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia, we will be saying to every participant against those other sanctioned countries (Haiti, Iraq, Libya, maybe North Korea), you can jump out whenever you see fit. We will completely undermine the international effort through the UN and with our allies to use sanctions as a means of attaining universally accepted international objectives.'¹³ As with most of those who held an institutionalist stance on Bosnia, Mitchell was thinking in larger terms and of larger objectives than the Bosnian conflict itself. Mitchell worried that the sanctions weapon, so crucial for institutionalists in their attempt to order the world, would be discredited generally if the US was to actively arm the Bosnian government.

Mitchell also did not accept the neo-realist position on Bosnia, that the US could arm the Bosnian Muslims yet remain aloof from the conflict. He stated, 'If this resolution passes [the Dole-Lieberman resolution to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims] ... then it will be an American war, and we will be back here with requests to send Americans over there to do something about it. That is something we have been completely unwilling to do.'¹⁴

Mitchell agreed with the general institutionalist position on Bosnia that all lifting the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims would accomplish would be to bind American credibility to the lost Muslim cause. Eventually such a position would lead to either an ignominious American diplomatic setback or the US would be forced to intervene in the conflict with ground troops, which as Mitchell pointed out was a political stance almost no one in America advocated. As for many who held the institutionalist position on Bosnia, the former Senate Majority Leader felt the administration's line was the best of a bad lot of policy options.

Mitchell echoed the general institutionalist stance that the Bosnian war was far lower in the overall foreign policy hierarchy of priorities than were America's relations with the European allies. Regarding Nato, whose preservation is a democratist and neo-realist priority, Mitchell observed, 'Many of those who are for this [Dole-Lieberman] amendment say they are for Nato but in fact support for this amendment will seriously undermine our relationship with our Nato allies.'¹⁵ Like the President, Mitchell believed it was imperative that the US and the European allies agree on Bosnia policy, even if that policy was not the first preference of the US. The European allies, fearing that an American lifting of the arms embargo on the Bosnian government would significantly increase the intensity of the conflict and subject their peacekeepers to unacceptable risks, had indicated that they would pull their troops out of Bosnia if the embargo was violated. This would certainly have threatened the foundations of Nato. For Mitchell, as for those advocating the general institutionalist stance on Bosnia, this was simply too high a price to pay whatever the merits of the neo-realist case.

The former Senate Majority Leader also maintained an institutionalist viewpoint regarding the European security structure. Bosnia struck at the heart of Mitchell's institutionalist conception of European security as being guided by a genuinely multilateral consortium of European states and the US. Mitchell, in line with President Clinton and the general institutionalist view, wanted the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own defense, and be proportionally accorded more of a say in the security decision-making process in multilateral institutions such as Nato. A unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would imply for Mitchell a greater US involvement in the Bosnian conflict at a time when institutionalist policy regarding Europe was to limit the American stake in European security. Thus part of Mitchell's institutionalist Bosnia argument

highlighted his institutionalist advocacy of a Europe with increasing and not decreasing responsibility for its own defense.

It is primarily over economic questions that Mitchell's overall democratist orientation can be seen. Regarding trade issues such as NAFTA, Mitchell stated, 'With the passage of this agreement, Congress affirms the leadership role of the US in this hemisphere and around the world.'¹⁶ This statement illustrates Mitchell's democratist leanings, as he stresses the political implications of NAFTA as being paramount, rather than taking an economics-first approach, which is the central institutionalist position. It was the political stability the free-trade pact would give to Mexico, a state moving torturously toward genuine democracy, that Mitchell saw as the central benefit of the agreement.

Regarding the MFN controversy with China, Mitchell emerged as a convinced democratist. This issue was of such importance for the Majority Leader that he publicly led the fight for conditions to be imposed on Chinese MFN status during both the administrations of George Bush and Bill Clinton. To this end Mitchell sponsored a bill, 'imposing conditions on the continued trade status enjoyed by China in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre'.¹⁷ Mitchell, horrified at the blatant murder of Chinese students by the Communist ruling elite, advocated the democratist line that gross human rights violators should not be economically rewarded with increased American trade. This was in line with his core democratist view that regarding foreign policy, the American approach, 'should be to shift our foreign policy's emphasis from exclusively protecting "interests" to advancing our [American] ideals'.¹⁸ Mitchell made his case against extending MFN to China in moral terms, stating,

The Chinese government is a Communist tyranny. It has a horrendous human rights record. It occupies the neighboring land of Tibet, supports the murderous Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, uses slave labor, illegally protects its market, and sells advanced weapons and technology to countries like Iran and Syria. Ever since Tiananmen Square, I have argued that we should firmly register our disapproval of China's behavior.¹⁹

Mitchell was against delinking MFN renewal from human rights issues as the institutionalists advocated, as well as initially disapproving of even granting MFN with conditions to the Chinese as the neo-realists desired (until the political realities of the situation led

him to side unsuccessfully with the neo-realists in a futile attempt to override the institutionalist argument) because, in standard democratist fashion, he objected to the very nature of the Chinese communist regime.

Mitchell advocated President Clinton's initiative to more vigorously support Russian reform. As with the general schools-of-thought orientation of the Clinton administration regarding Russia, Mitchell's policy preferences exhibited a dominant democratist impulse fused with an institutionalist viewpoint. This lesser institutionalist stance on Russia can be seen in Mitchell's belief that Russia should be substantially aided only after it had begun to put its own economic house in order. As Mitchell observed, 'If the members of the CIS join the IMF and proceed with economic reforms leading to a market economy, the world community – including Japan, Germany, and the US–must be prepared to provide assistance, including currency stabilization and debt relief, to assist in the transition.'²⁰ Not only does Mitchell here advocate financially aiding Russia in a multilateral manner, he also identifies currency stabilization as a priority in this process. This is in line with classic institutionalist thinking. However Mitchell's overall majority democratist position on Russian reform is based on his fervor for the initiative, which exceeded the more cautious institutionalist approach. In criticizing President Bush's Russian policy, Mitchell stated, 'The President wants to concentrate all attention on Yeltsin. Let's support democracy, not individuals and let's do it wholeheartedly.'²¹ In order to do this America should, in Mitchell's view, engage Russia both more vigorously and broadly than President Bush did, by disbursing some aid locally and not wholly through the center in Moscow, as well as engaging local democrats, such as Anatoly Sobchak, the Mayor of St Petersburg, in direct dialogue with the US. Mitchell's belief in increasing and diversifying Russian aid to bolster democracy lay at the heart of his overall democratist policy preference regarding aiding Russian reform.

SPECIFIC NEO-REALIST DECISION-MAKERS

Joseph Biden, Jr. – Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs

Senator Biden offered what is by far the clearest expression of the democratist case on Bosnia in his report to the Senate upon return-

ing from a fact-finding mission in April 1993. Yet as ringing a call to arms as 'To Stand Against Aggression'²² is, Biden is not a democratist. Rather his democratist stance regarding Bosnia is a minority position, as in all four other issue areas Biden is a convinced neo-realist.

Senator Biden saw the Bosnian conflict not as a civil war, rather he viewed it as a clear cut case of Serbian aggression. As he caustically stated, 'Is this a civil war? Only if you think Austrians and Czechs had civil wars in 1938.'²³ Biden's choice of the Anschluss and the Nazi aggression on the Czechoslovakian regime of Benes as like political examples to what was going on in Bosnia provides an interesting comparison. In all three cases restive local minorities within a state encouraged and were encouraged by an expansionistic larger state to revolt against a fairly weak central government, with this rebellion being the pretext for the aggressive Germans and Serbs to attempt to dismember Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Bosnia, respectively. By comparing the Serbs to the genocidal Nazis, Biden left little doubt as to where both his sympathies lay and his blame for the conflict fell as well. In line with standard democratist thinking, Biden blamed the Serbs almost totally for the war.

Senator Biden believed the likely Serb victory in the conflict would have deleterious consequences for the rest of Eastern Europe, whose ethnic minorities and secessionist tendencies became apparent after the thawing of the Cold War. As Biden noted, 'What happens in Bosnia will form a prominent precedent: not for the abstract notion of a new world order but for political decisions looming in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic states.'²⁴ Biden raised the specter of increased ethnic conflict within the CIS being made more likely by the successful Serbian rape of the Bosnian state. For in strongly backing the Bosnian government Biden felt he was paradoxically supporting Yeltsin, even if the Russian President did not realize it. Biden untangled the puzzle, believing the US should actively intervene in the Bosnian conflict as 'any action that curtails the power and longevity of the Milosevic regime ultimately serves the interest of both Yeltsin and Russian democracy'.²⁵ In supporting the secessionist Bosnian Serbs, Yeltsin was opening a Pandora's box by implicitly encouraging his own restive minorities²⁶ to seriously consider seceding from Russia itself. As the Russian republic stood to lose more than any other European state if its borders were open to question, due to the large number of ethnic

minorities it contains, the Russian encouragement of the Bosnian Serbs could seriously come to weaken Yeltsin's hold on his own state.

Biden was an early and consistent supporter of the 'lift and strike' option in Bosnia, that is, lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and using American air strikes to shield the Bosnian government until the weapons given to them altered the military situation on the ground.²⁷ However Biden's advocacy of the Bosnian cause took him even beyond this standard democratist policy prescription. Biden urged active military support for the Muslims, saying,

The US must lead the West in a decisive response to Serb aggression, beginning with air attacks on Serb artillery everywhere in Bosnia and on Yugoslavian National Army units in Serbia that have participated in this international crime. Western forces should destroy every bridge across the Drina river by which the Serb authorities continue to resupply the Bosnian Serbs.²⁸

Biden's aggressive prescription was designed: to quickly even the material disparity between the Serb and Muslim forces, by destroying all links between Serbia proper and its allies at Pale; to destroy Bosnian Serb heavy weaponry such as artillery, which was central to the Bosnian Serb successes; and to punish elements of the Yugoslav army in Serbia itself which were directly involved in the fighting, in an attempt to deter any further incursions. Biden boldly resolved a possible contradiction in democratist thinking over Bosnia, disdaining the institutionalist view that appeasing the Serbs would save lives. As humanitarian concerns are of great importance to democratists, the charge that democratist policy prescriptions would lead to a great intensification of the fighting was one Biden could not afford to ignore. He resolved this apparent contradiction between humanitarian concerns and principle, by coming down firmly on the side of ideological purity. Biden affirmed the democratist viewpoint that if the Serbs succeeded, adventurism by many states in the region was bound to ensue, which would ultimately cost more lives than would a resolute military response to Serb aggression. For instance Hungary has irredentist claims on portions of Romania, Romania has similar claims on Moldova, and Albania has claims on Kosovo within Serbia itself. If the Serbs succeeded Biden believed the law of the jungle Serb success would encourage would almost

certainly lead to further ferocious conflict in the region, and as such, it was in the humanitarian interest to advocate that the US uphold principle and militarily challenge the Serb aggressors.

Senator Biden reserved the greatest measure of his vitriol about Western policy regarding Bosnia for America's European allies. He saw the whole peacekeeping rationale used by the British and the French as a ruse to justify inaction in Bosnia, rather than as having genuine validity. He observed,

In my discussions with relief workers throughout Bosnia, and with the government itself, it became clear that Bosnian civilians face a far greater threat of annihilation from Serb artillery attacks than from a lack of food or medicine. However well intentioned, the presence of UN relief personnel and peacekeeping forces, by inhibiting stronger Western action, now constitutes more an obstacle than a contribution to the humanitarian relief they were deployed to provide.²⁹

Biden believed the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia failed on two counts. Firstly, it attempted to put a bandage on a hemorrhage, as at its best, UN humanitarian relief merely kept people alive so they could be either killed or subjugated by the Serb tactic of ethnic cleansing. The humanitarian relief effort, in Biden's view, thus obscured the reality that only by militarily dealing with the main cause of the humanitarian disaster, the Bosnian Serbs, could the West genuinely stem the flow of blood in Bosnia. Secondly as the peacekeepers were lightly armed, they functioned as virtual Serbian hostages whenever the Serbs found the tactic of detaining them useful. For example one of the reasons given by European powers as to why significant Western bombing of the Serbs was not used to protect the Bihac safe haven, was that UNPROFOR troops, then 'detained' by the Serbs, might suffer reprisals. Thus in Biden's and the general democratist view, the peacekeepers came to symbolize the limits of Western concern for the fate of the Bosnian government.

Over the MFN controversy with China Senator Biden adopted a neo-realist line. He came to feel, 'it is fundamentally misguided to believe that Most-favored-nation status can catalyze fundamental change in Chinese government policies'.³⁰ This statement is an explicit refutation of the democratist position on MFN as Biden stressed that the MFN weapon was not sufficient to radically alter China's human rights policies. Instead he adopted a neo-realist stance, suggesting that MFN be extended in 1994 but as an aide

to Biden commented, 'The Senator felt we ought to link one issue to MFN renewal, not human rights, but proliferation. We ought to try to get the Chinese not to sell missile technology to Iran and Pakistan.'³¹ Biden felt that placing limited conditions on China's MFN status with strictures regarding arms sales would be far more practical than analyzing the nebulous concept of its human rights record. Also as Biden noted, it was in China's interest to comply with these limited conditions. Its \$15 billion trade surplus with the US was ten times the rate of its earnings from weapons sales. Biden believed, 'we [the US] can present China with a stark choice: irresponsible arms trade with the world-or the continuation of a far more profitable trade with the US'.³² So while Biden rejected the democratist view that MFN was a stick the US could use to fundamentally change the nature of the Chinese communist regime, he also refuted the institutionalist notion that MFN should not be used by America as a means to secure more modest alterations in Chinese behavior.

Biden also follows the general neo-realist line regarding aid to Russia. He does not see aid to President Yeltsin's regime as the single most important foreign policy issue confronting America today. Rather as an aide to Biden stated, 'The most important issue is non-proliferation, to in the Senator's words, decrease the arsenals of Armageddon built up during the Cold War. Here obviously Russia is important. The Senator favors aid to Russia to help dismantle nuclear weapons, to ratify START 2, and go even further in dismantling the Russian nuclear arsenal.'³³ To advance the cause of non-proliferation, Biden was a cosponsor of the Nunn-Lugar bill, which gave assistance to Russia to partially dismantle its nuclear stockpiles as well as adequately house Russia's restive military. The Nunn-Lugar bill was the policy centerpiece of the American neo-realists' plan to provide limited, targeted aid to the former rival superpower.

Biden agreed with other neo-realists that such aid should be limited. He argued, 'The urgent question is not whether we will provide billions to the post-Soviet Commonwealth in traditional development assistance. Money on that scale is not available, nor could it be used without enormous waste.'³⁴ Biden advances the declinist view that as relatively the US is not in as strong an economic position as it was in the immediate post-1945 period, it is unable to provide aid to Russia on a Marshall Plan scale, as the democratists would like. Nor does Senator Biden, as the above quotation demonstrates, have confidence in the Russian leadership

to use large-scale aid wisely. Although Senator Biden wants to support Russia, there are distinct neo-realist limits as to how far he desires to assist its experiment in democracy.

The Senator also adheres to the skeptical neo-realist position regarding the global expansion of free trade. As an aide to Biden noted, both by inclination and committee assignment, Senator Biden is not overly enamored with trade issues. While he did vote for both NAFTA and GATT, he favored NAFTA late in the political day.³⁵ Biden's hesitation about NAFTA is encapsulated in his remarks, 'All three parties [Mexico, Canada, and the US] can gain, but only with stipulations on Mexican labor and environmental standards that ensure against a rush of northern industry to the south. No principle of efficiency would be served by abetting the rise of a low wage pollution belt across the Mexican border.'³⁶ In the end Biden supported NAFTA, but as this quotation makes evident, he feared the environmental and economic drawbacks of the accord, shortcomings institutionalists and even democratists did not feel were important compared with free-trade expansion.

Nor was Biden sanguine about the long-term survival prospects of Nato. While Senator Biden favored the President's institutionalist Partnership for Peace initiative,³⁷ he was not as optimistic as President Clinton was about its significance. His negative neo-realist reaction to the chances of Nato's survival had both a general and a specific component. Generally he followed the neo-realist maxim that without a common enemy to unify them, Western Europe and the US were likely to find that conflicting national interests increasingly divided them.³⁸ If Senator Biden had qualms about Nato's survival generally, they were confirmed for him by the role the Europeans played in the Bosnian crisis. In his frustrated democratist zeal for Bosnia, Biden saw the end of the alliance. He charged, 'What the devil use is Nato? . . . if it cannot affect the carnage in the middle of Europe, what do we need it for?'³⁹ Such anger at the failure of the alliance to reverse Serb gains in the Bosnian conflict predicates Senator Biden's skeptical neo-realist stance regarding the future of the alliance itself.

Richard Lugar – Ranking Minority Member, Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs

Senator Lugar is generally considered the most politically effective Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee from the mid-

1980s to the present day. Yet despite his bipartisan reputation Lugar is a solid Republican, as his consistent neo-realist positions on foreign policy matters attests to.

Regarding Bosnia, Lugar was a consistent critic of the institutionalist stance throughout the 103rd Congress. He never resigned himself to the position advocated by the Clinton White House. As *The Christian Science Monitor* noted in its interview with Lugar, 'The Senator would increase pressure on the Serbs by arming the Bosnian Muslims and he would do that unilaterally if the Europeans refused to go along.'⁴⁰ Here Senator Lugar espouses the classic neo-realist position on Bosnia. Crucially he felt the US ought not to give anyone, even the European allies, a virtual veto over US policy prescriptions. In his defense of America's right to pursue a Bosnia policy unencumbered by multilateral constraints, Lugar adopted a clear neo-realist stance.

Further, Lugar saw the European rationale for limiting Western action in Bosnia as an untenable excuse to justify the appeasement of the Serbs. In a joint missive, Senators Dole and Lugar argued,

The continuing war in Bosnia, can largely be attributed to the pursuit of half-measures on the part of the Europeans and the UN Our allies have argued for the maintenance of a significant number of American troops in Europe as a means of preserving European stability. However, the inability of Nato to act effectively to contain and stop a major war on European soil is bound to raise grave doubts among both the American people and the Congress about whether the enormous yearly investment we make in Nato is reaping sufficient benefits.⁴¹

Here Lugar criticized the UN as being inept and vacillating over the Bosnian crisis, a stance entirely consistent with a school of thought which distrusts international organizations as either being too powerful and therefore a threat to a state's sovereignty, or as too weak and thus not really helpful to a state pursuing its national interests through the organization. More striking was Lugar's advocacy of the standard democratist and neo-realist assumption that Bosnia was a test case of the continued efficacy of Nato. Senator Lugar directly linked questions about the European response to Bosnia with the continued vitality of Nato itself.

Yet although neo-realists such as Senator Lugar question the continued relevance of Nato in the post-1989 era, they are not for

its abolition. As Kaplan stated, Lugar's telling sound bite on the future of Nato is, 'Nato: Out of Area or Out of Business'.⁴² It was created to contend with the specific threat of possible Soviet military adventurism and as that threat has waned (though not wholly disappeared in the neo-realist view) the *raison d'être* for Nato has correspondingly shrunk. It is only with a new mandate serving as military guarantor to the fledgling democratic states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic that new life can be given to the alliance. Thus Senator Lugar feels the Clinton administration is missing out on an historic opportunity to revitalize Nato. As Lugar stated, 'If the object [of the Partnership for Peace plan] was to impart a greater sense of security and stability toward the countries of Eastern Europe by meeting their political and psychological need for a road map to inclusion in the West, Partnership for Peace alone did not and cannot do the job.'⁴³

Lugar adheres to the standard neo-realist view that the institutionalists' advocacy of the President's Partnership for Peace initiative is a dangerous cul-de-sac retarding rather than catalyzing Nato's eastward expansion, as it neither allows for a specific timetable for the admission of the Central European states into Nato, nor did it initially lay down prerequisites needed to be fulfilled for inclusion in the alliance.⁴⁴ Further, Lugar felt the delay the Partnership for Peace initiative signalled in the process of admitting the Central European states into the alliance threatened Nato's position as the premier European security organization. Lugar felt the delay could lead to the watering down of Nato's role in favor of European security structures such as the WEU and the Eurocorps, as well as the more multilateral OSCE. In keeping with general neo-realist and democratist views, and in opposition to the institutionalist Clinton administration, Lugar desired that Nato reform itself quickly so as to solidify its position as the preeminent security structure in Europe, as it is relatively much more susceptible to American wishes than are either the WEU or the OSCE. Lugar believes the Partnership for Peace initiative should be replaced by a policy that both stabilizes Central Europe and buttresses Nato itself in the post-Cold War era.

Lugar also advocates the general neo-realist stance on aid to Russia. On this foreign policy issue, he joined with the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, a Democrat, to push aid to Russia through the Senate by means of the Freedom Support Act.⁴⁵ This aid was targeted specifically to meet American

military concerns about the new Russia. Lugar stated, 'If extreme nationalists regained control, their nuclear missiles might again pose a threat to the US. That is why it is urgent to begin dismantling the Russian and other ex-Soviet republic's arsenals even before the START treaty is ratified.'⁴⁶ Thus, whatever became of Yeltsin's efforts at democratic reform, an American initiative to fund the removal of some of Russia's nuclear stockpiles was in the national interest, according to the neo-realists.

Neo-realists also advocated partially funding the resettlement of Red Army veterans who had been stationed in the Soviet Empire, especially in the Baltic states.⁴⁷ These soldiers had threatened not to leave their bases unless homes were built for them in Russia, as many had nowhere to go with the collapse of the USSR. Lugar and Nunn successfully advocated giving US aid for this project, so the Russian army had no excuse not to withdraw from Central Europe and the Baltic states. Neo-realists reasoned it was in the national interest to do this, again especially if the generally pro-Western Yeltsin government was to give way to a more aggressive, nationalist successor, it would be unable to easily reclaim the military dominance of the former Soviet sphere of influence. Lugar's policy prescriptions were predicated upon following the standard gloomy neo-realist assessment of the chances for Yeltsin to succeed with his democratic reform, as indicated by the fact that his initiatives would serve America's strategic interests whether Yeltsin survived or not.

Bob Dole – Senate Minority Leader

Senator Dole has undoubtedly been the most formidable critic of President Clinton in his first two years in office. While noted more for his domestic expertise, Dole has also consistently opposed the administration's overall institutionalist foreign policy, advocating the neo-realist point of view in the post-Cold War era. On no foreign issue has Dole's disagreement with the President been stronger than over American policy toward Bosnia.

As Dole stated during his introduction of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, which if it had passed would have forced President Clinton either to arm the Bosnian government or veto the \$263 billion Pentagon budget to which it was attached, 'For more than two years now the US has gone along with failed policies in the name of consensus.'⁴⁸ Here Dole attacks the President's own explanation as to why he had not been more forceful during the

Bosnian crisis, his championing of the institutionalist tenet that allied consensus on Bosnia outweighed all possible Western policy outputs. Dole turned this argument on its head, contending that this sacrificing of successful policy initiatives (after all it was President Clinton himself who said he did not agree with the Europeans regarding the arms embargo) was *precisely* the reason that the West's response to the Bosnian crisis had proved so dismal.

Like most democratists and neo-realists Senator Dole believed the Europeans were even more to blame for the West's feeble response to the Bosnian crisis than was the Clinton administration. Dole, during the climactic debate over the Dole-Lieberman amendment on 1 July 1994, attacked the President's supporters, who had admonished the Minority Leader for speaking critically of America's European allies, 'Several senators have asked how we dare tell our European allies what to do, since they have troops on the ground. I think the real question is how dare we tell the Bosnians what to do.'⁴⁹ Dole largely ignored what he saw as diplomatic niceties in favor of championing the principle that all states inherently have the right to defend themselves in the anarchic international system. He felt this right was being withheld from the Bosnian Muslims as a result of the UN arms embargo which denied them the chance of attaining military parity with the Serbian forces. The right of all states to self-defense is a cardinal neo-realist belief.

Dole believed the UN's operational supremacy during the Bosnian crisis was part of the reason for the West's failure of policy during the conflict. Dole has the instinctive neo-realist dislike of international organizations that try to function as foreign policy actors themselves. As Stephen Rosenfeld observed, 'Dole wants a more assertive policy in which America is the "predominant" player, "first among equals", not just "one of equals". He reserves special animus for an ostensibly overreaching UN, to which, he declares, President Clinton has "subcontracted" American independence.'⁵⁰ Senator Dole's world view, in accordance with both democratist and neo-realist thinking, does not have the UN at the center of any attempt to fill the role of global cop. Dole believes the UN, without an army at its disposal, showed itself to be all too dependent on the whims of the multilateral Security Council over Bosnia, and has proven to be far from an effective power.

Frustratingly for Dole the UN was allowed by the President to eclipse the one international organization that could have made a difference in the war, Nato. As Nato has always been led by the US

and as it has the military wherewithal which neo-realists feel is still an essential part of international diplomacy, it has long been a favorite instrument of the neo-realist school of thought. As Dole stated during the Senate debate on the Dole–Lieberman amendment, ‘Nato’s credibility has suffered because of decisions to subordinate Nato to the UN in Bosnia-allowing UN officials to have control over Nato forces.’⁵¹ The dual key mechanism the West used in threatening limited force in Bosnia through the use of air strikes was so often vetoed by UN officials as to have little impact on the conflict. For neo-realists it was the worst of all possible worlds, the UN still did not function effectively in Bosnia as it lacked the political consensus of the states in the Security Council, yet by thrusting itself to the forefront of the Bosnian war, with the blessings of both the European allies and President Clinton, it negated the one multilateral organization, Nato, neo-realists such as Dole warmly advocated being used in the Bosnian conflict.

As is true for most neo-realists, the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo was central to the then Minority Leader’s Bosnia policy preference. Knowing that the democratist policy advocacy of massive American troop involvement in Bosnia was unpopular as Americans feared that the US might get bogged-down in some Vietnam-style quagmire, Dole portrayed the neo-realist preference of lifting the arms embargo as the policy option *least* likely to drag the US into a major conflict in the Balkans. Dole argued, ‘The bottom line is that the arms embargo is immoral and illegal and so, our choice is clear: support the Bosnians’ fundamental right to self-defense and lift the embargo – or support sending thousands of US troops to partition Bosnia.’⁵² Here Dole interestingly fused majority neo-realist thinking with minority isolationist views. Dole believed that the White House’s institutionalist commitment to help police any agreement the Contact Group eventually brokered was more likely to lead the US into war in the Balkans. For instance if the deal came unstuck with US soldiers already on the ground, it was likely the US would be dragged into the conflict. Dole, while obviously responding to US public opinion with this argument, nevertheless believed that lifting the embargo would decrease the chances of direct American involvement in the Bosnian war.

Senator Dole also holds a neo-realist stance on the question of the future US role in European security. He observed, ‘Nato’s influence has been marginalized because of a failure to define a clear and independent role in the post-Cold War era. Moreover,

Nato has been weakened by its willingness to allow Russia to dictate the terms of our security relations with former Warsaw Pact countries, like Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.⁵³ For Dole, this example of Russian intransigence merely confirms his worries about the nature of the Yeltsin regime and redoubled his efforts to expand the alliance. Dole believes the malaise in the alliance goes well beyond its misuse in the Bosnian *débâcle*. Like his neo-realist colleague, Senator Lugar, Dole is pessimistic about Nato's long-term prospects, especially in the wake of the President's indecision over whether to advocate expansion of the alliance eastwards, symbolized by the administration's adoption of the Partnership for Peace initiative. Senator Dole correctly sees concerns about the Russian bear lurking behind the White House's European policy. He criticizes the President for failing to adopt an unfettered foreign policy regarding European defense issues, a concept cherished by neo-realists. If President Clinton's Bosnia policy is a hostage to the European allies, the UN, and Russia, as Dole sees it, so his policy on Nato expansion is a captive of the administration's concerns about the Russian democratic experiment.

Dole is also a neo-realist regarding trade issues. Like most neo-realists he saw the GATT agreement as potentially of great advantage to the US. The root cause of Dole's vacillations on GATT were the sovereignty questions the newly-formed WTO posed. Senator Dole felt the WTO was not necessarily in the national interest. He wanted legislation outside the GATT accord to 'extricate us from the WTO, if we are getting adverse decisions. That's the big sticking point.'⁵⁴ Unlike the institutionalists, the Senate Majority Leader does not see international organizations as a good in and of themselves, as is illustrated by the fact that Dole was not ready to sign on to the WTO until he was assured that the US could quickly leave the organization if it felt it was being treated unfairly. Dole was not prepared to abandon American economic sovereignty for some possible long-term economic benefits, as befits his neo-realist orientation. In the end Dole was successful in obtaining his concessions from the President and he voted for the GATT accord.

While Senator Dole's overall orientation is obviously neo-realist, he curiously advocated the institutionalist position regarding the MFN controversy with China. Throughout the time of the Clinton administration's torturous climbdown from its hawkish campaign rhetoric over China, Dole maintained a consistent institutionalist stance. In the run-up to this policy about-face, as Cornwell stated,

'The President, Dole advised, should simply declare it was wrong to link trade expansion to progress on human rights.'⁵⁵ Here Dole struck at the heart of the MFN debate, arguing the institutionalist line that trade issues and human rights concerns should always be considered separately. Over American policy to China, one finds one of the rare occasions when the President and his chief tormentor found little to disagree about.

The same cannot be said about American policy to Russia, over which Senator Dole sharply disagrees with the President. The Majority Leader criticized President Clinton for, 'defending, denying and rationalizing Russia's misdeeds'.⁵⁶ Among them, Dole counts: the brutal attempt to extinguish Chechen secessionism; interference in the US – North Korean nuclear agreement; the program to sell arms to Iran; and the pressure put on the governments of the *near abroad* states, such as Moldova. For Dole these examples are telling signs that Russia is returning to its adventurist ways. He argued, 'We must face the fact that geopolitical rivalry with Russia did not end with the demise of Soviet Communism.'⁵⁷ He sees Russia as as much enemy as ally due to its differing geopolitical interests with the US over the litany of issues listed above. For this reason, he adheres to the neo-realist position that aid to Russia should be quite limited.

SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONALIST DECISION-MAKERS

William Perry – Secretary of Defense

While it is to be expected that Perry shares the overall schools-of-thought orientation of his boss, what is slightly curious are the strong neo-realist minority views of the head of the Pentagon. For example even though Perry ultimately espoused the institutionalist point of view regarding Bosnia, he did so for largely neo-realist reasons. The Secretary of Defense is emblematic of a minor flaw in the overall schools-of-thought paradigm, as his neo-realist givens lead to, paradoxically, institutionalist policy outputs. While there are no other leading decision-makers chronicled in the paradigm who exhibit this flaw, nevertheless it is significant. As Perry stated, using neo-realist terminology, 'What are the national interests of the US in this war? It does not involve our supreme national interest ... our national survival does not hinge on its outcome.'⁵⁸ Perry agreed

with the standard neo-realist position that Bosnia was not enough of an American national security interest to justify large-scale military involvement. However he did not concur with the general neo-realist line that Bosnia was still important enough, as the first ethnic conflict to break out in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to merit US interest to the point of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo. He disagreed with the neo-realist policy position based upon a different calculation of American national interests. Perry believed the fundamental American interest in Bosnia was to prevent the violence from spreading, and that lifting the arms embargo was not the best way to further this goal.⁵⁹ Thus Perry arrived squarely at the institutionalist stance regarding Bosnia. His different reading of the givens underlying neo-realism reminds one that even a successful social science paradigm, like schools-of-thought analysis, can never completely map every ideational impulse of every decision-maker.

Secretary Perry's minority neo-realist orientation can also be seen in his stance on American relations with Russia. He argued, 'What Russia and some of its neighboring states are trying to do today in terms of reforming their political and economic system has a very uncertain outcome.'⁶⁰ Perry's pessimism about the prospects for successful Russian reform predicated his cautious neo-realist policy preference regarding aid to the former superpower. As in his mind there is 'the small but real danger that reform in Russia might fail and a new government arise hostile to the US',⁶¹ he is prepared to hedge his bets regarding America's defense posture toward the Yeltsin regime. For example the conclusion of a classified September 1994 document by the Pentagon urged the US not to push for further nuclear reductions than previously negotiated, and to scale back American nuclear stockpiles at exactly the same rate the Russians did in their implementation of the START 1 and START 2 treaties.⁶² While Perry is prepared to provide aid to Russia along Nunn-Lugar lines,⁶³ that is as far as he is willing to go in fostering Russian reform. His skeptical neo-realist outlook stands out in an administration of Russia-firsters.

The Secretary of Defense's policy prescriptions regarding Europe are more in line with the general thrust of the Clinton administration. Writing with Secretary of State Christopher in opposition to Speaker Gingrich's *Contract With America* that calls for the quick admission of the Central European states into Nato, Perry and Christopher reasoned, 'the bill unilaterally and prematurely desig-

nates certain European states for Nato membership... Our present steady and deliberate approach to Nato expansion is intended to ensure that each potential member is judged individually.⁶⁴ Beyond seeing the neo-realist initiative as 'premature', here Perry also fears that singling out some states (like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary) for quick Nato admission will create new divisions in Europe and actually exacerbate instability as states left outside Nato, from Romania to Russia, will feel isolated and neglected by the West. Perry believes in the general institutionalist view that regarding the expansion of Nato, it is imperative not to draw a new East – West line as existed during the Cold War.

Warren Christopher – Secretary of State

For Christopher the key interests the US had in the Bosnian conflict were, as Palmer and Walker observed, 'in preventing any widening of the war and in maintaining the credibility of Nato'.⁶⁵ This latter preoccupation assumed an even greater importance for the Secretary of State as the conflict continued. For Christopher Nato credibility hinged on retaining a multilateral consensus above all else, a central institutionalist precept. As Christopher remarked, 'This is a multilateral problem and it must have a multilateral response.'⁶⁶ The Secretary's belief that only a multilateral response to the conflict was appropriate ruled out for him all democratist and neo-realist initiatives regarding Bosnia, as they were based on a more positive view of the chances for unilateral policies proving successful. Christopher's determination to keep the alliance together on Bosnia, whatever the moral cost, sometimes reached ridiculous extremes. As Anthony Lewis observed, 'Christopher did himself mortal damage when he said all sides in Bosnia were guilty of human rights violations, thus ignoring the role of Serbian leaders as inciters of genocide.'⁶⁷ For Christopher the institutionalist imperative of keeping the multilateral consensus going on Bosnia overrode real questions about who was perpetrating the vast majority of human rights abuses in the war.

Regarding aid to Russia Christopher agrees with the President in advocating a democratist response. The Secretary follows the standard democratist line in viewing Russia's reform experiment as *the* major priority of US foreign policy during President Clinton's term of office. Unlike the neo-realists Christopher believes a lasting change in the relationship with America's former enemy is possible,

and that this metamorphosis will favorably alter all global strategic calculations. By bolstering the Yeltsin government, Christopher hopes 'we can help turn our most dangerous enemy into an enduring partner'.⁶⁸ This partnership will be built on the shared democratic values of the two states. As democratists fundamentally believe that democracies do not go to war with one another, it is easy to see why those, such as Christopher, who hold democratist views regarding aid to Russia, see the Yeltsin government's reform program as such an exciting opportunity. For if the Russians become a genuine, stable democracy, the US and Europe need no longer fear a state with thousands of nuclear warheads.

At critical times during the past two years, Secretary of State Christopher has remained true to his democratist orientation regarding Russia. During the conflict between President Yeltsin and the unreconstructed Russian parliament Christopher publicly supported Yeltsin, citing a democratist rationale. Christopher argued, 'The US does not easily support the suspension of parliaments. But these are extraordinary times The parliament and the court were vestiges of the Soviet Communist past, blocking movement to democratic reform.'⁶⁹ In fact, Christopher saw the benchmark for the US suspending aid to Russia as being 'if Moscow reversed its democratic course'.⁷⁰

The Secretary of State adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding questions about the European security structure in the new world order. Christopher is an EU-firster, seeing in the European supranational organization the key to the continent's defense future. For the institutionalists, the relative growth of power of the EU is an opportunity for the US to safely decrease American military commitments to the continent. Christopher implicitly affirms this declinist institutionalist analytical perspective in calling for increased burden-sharing in the alliance. He noted, 'The US will maintain its military commitments and responsibilities in Europe. But President Clinton and I must be able to show the US Congress that the allies are doing the same. Sharing must be a visible Nato principle: sharing of burdens, sharing of responsibilities, sharing of decisions.'⁷¹ Unlike neo-realists and democratists, institutionalists such as the Secretary of State are willing to cede some authority over European security decision-making in exchange for an important but lessening American involvement on the continent. The savings this course of action would produce could be used to combat American decline at home.

Another sign of Christopher's EU-firster, institutionalist orientation is that he does not believe a timetable should be adopted by the West for Nato's eastward expansion. Christopher initially favored a quick expansion of Nato, but was overruled by the President and the Secretary's supposed subordinate, Strobe Talbott.⁷² As on other occasions, Christopher merely abandoned his earlier belief and became a convinced institutionalist on this point. Secretary Christopher's volte-face ties in with his democratist policy preference regarding Russia. As the Secretary argued, 'Swift expansion of Nato eastwards could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy.'⁷³ Here Christopher illustrates the institutionalist policy preference regarding European security, which is partly predicated on the belief that Russian reform must take precedence over the speedy expansion of Nato.

Yet while Christopher's democratist inclinations regarding Russian reform rule out adopting the neo-realist policy preference regarding Europe, which is for quick expansion of Nato, he does not adopt the democratist policy plan for Europe, which is for no expansion at all. Rather he favored the Partnership for Peace initiative, which allows that Nato will expand eastwards but not in the short term. Crucially, no timetable was announced regarding the 'when' of Nato expansion when the partnership was established. As Christopher observed, 'The January [1994] summit should formally open the door to an evolutionary process of Nato expansion. This process should be non-discriminatory and inclusive. It should not be tied to a specific timetable or criteria for membership.'⁷⁴ In the end the Secretary of State adopted the institutionalist position regarding European security, hoping not to offend Russia and yet to encourage the fledgling Central European states. Neo-realist critics of the Secretary and the initiative said that as with most compromises, it succeeded in satisfying no one and offending everyone.

The Secretary of State also advocates an institutionalist position regarding trade matters in the new world order. Christopher stated, 'President Clinton and I have placed economic policy at the heart of our foreign policy.'⁷⁵ Indeed the Secretary of State strongly favored both NAFTA and GATT. Regarding NAFTA, Christopher commented that it 'is one of the great opportunities of this generation'.⁷⁶ This high praise for the agreement is consistent with the standard institutionalist position that free trade expansion is an unmitigated good, a stance not taken by the other two schools of thought. Along with Russian reform, free-trade expansion forms the

other major foreign policy priority for both Secretary Christopher and the Clinton administration as a whole.

A sign of how important trade relations are for Christopher is his about-face over China policy. As Manning noted, at the beginning of the administration, Secretary Christopher had democratist views regarding China. He then noted, 'Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from Communism to democracy.'⁷⁷ This emphasis on political factors regarding US-China relations rather than concentrating on the economic aspects of the relationship indicated the democratist viewpoint. Thus there was a conflict between Christopher's institutionalist orientation regarding trade expansion and his early democratic murmurings regarding China. The latter were dropped, as Christopher adopted the institutionalist position regarding MFN extension, showing the priority of trade expansion for institutionalists in general. Christopher honestly conceded that China had not complied with American conditions for MFN renewal in 1994 but urged the President to both renew MFN and delink trade from human rights issues anyway, all because of the imperative of the huge Chinese market.⁷⁸ The Secretary's turn-about on China, while it can be read as an unprincipled and desperate attempt to get his President off a large political hook, can also be seen as an illustration of just how important Christopher's institutionalist advocacy of expanding free markets is for understanding his overall foreign-policy orientation.

Anthony Lake – National Security Adviser

Like Perry, Lake is not a maverick within the administration but neither is he merely an advocate of the President's policy prescriptions. For example regarding the future of the European security structure, Lake hews to a neo-realist policy preference despite being a member of an institutionalist administration. Regardless of the Russia-first orientation of the Clinton White House, Lake has maintained, 'strong support for Nato's eastward expansion, against those counseling deference to Russian sensibilities',⁷⁹ such as Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. While Lake also believes the success or failure of Yeltsin's democratic experiment is of primary importance for the United States, he does not feel that this should determine American policy regarding the revitalization of the alliance. By this neo-realist stance, Lake illustrates that he is not afraid to contest a collectively held truth of the administration.

This does not mean that Lake is indifferent to the significance of Russia's attempt to become a democratic state. In his famous 'Enlargement Speech' of 21 September 1993, Anthony Lake provided the context for his democratist support for Russian reform. He stated, 'Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies, now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement-enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies.'⁸⁰ At the time, the 'Enlargement Speech' was hailed as the definitive word regarding the Clinton administration's foreign policy, the big idea so many had been calling for. Since then it has begun to be seen for what it is, a rhetorical cul-de-sac. Lake's speech and subsequent clarifications contained almost no specific policy prescriptions which, as this schools-of-thought analysis has made clear, are a key distinction between rhetoric and genuine sub-ideological constructs being implemented as concrete actions. However the one practical policy prescription that grew from Lake's overly touted speech was his democratist policy preference regarding aid to Russia.

National Security Adviser Lake sees Yeltsin's efforts at reform as a central issue for American foreign policy. He argued, 'Nothing is more important to the long-term security of the US than the successful transformation of Russia and the former Soviet republics into democratic nations that respect the rule of international law and the rights of their people.'⁸¹ In practice Lake has acted on the democratist premise that the success of Yeltsin's Russia is crucial to global stability. Despite the coup attempt against Yeltsin and the unfavorable December 1993 elections, 'Lake never deviated from full support of Yeltsin.'⁸² For Lake support for Yeltsin is imperative as he is the bulwark of Russian democracy, and despite his flaws President Yeltsin is the only genuine hope for the stabilization of the second Russian revolution.

Lake also touts the standard administration line regarding trade issues, avowing institutionalist policies. Lake saw support for NAFTA as leading to enhanced economic opportunities within the US, in line with the institutionalist precept that foreign and domestic issues can no longer be separated. He argued, 'We began last year with the hard fight for NAFTA, which already has increased our exports to Mexico by nearly 20% and produced tens of thousands of new, better-paying jobs.'⁸³ Lake also strongly favored

the GATT accord, citing it as a pivotal vote in post-Cold War American history. Lake stated, 'I believe that the Senate vote on GATT is a watershed event much like the vote on the League of Nations at the end of World War I and the ones on the Marshall Plan after World War II.'⁸⁴ By comparing the GATT vote with such seminal events in American history as the vote on the League of Nations and the Marshall Plan, Anthony Lake made clear his strong belief that trade issues ought to be an absolutely central aspect of American foreign policy.

Lake also adhered to institutionalist precepts regarding the MFN controversy with China. Indeed by the time the climactic moment of May 1994 arrived, 'All of President Clinton's top advisers back[ed] extension of China's low tariff trade status despite Beijing's uneven human rights performance.'⁸⁵ However Lake went far beyond this. In the months leading up to the President's decision to delink MFN consideration from human rights concerns, he met Chinese Ambassador to the US, Li Daoyu, in an attempt to provide political cover for the administration about-face on China. This was done by suggesting sending an American envoy to China to press its government to improve its human rights record.⁸⁶ While the mission, predictably, met with little success, it speaks volumes about Lake's commitment to the administration's new institutionalist policy regarding China. Aware of the political flak the President would run into for his about-face and the restraining effect such criticism might have on Clinton, Lake attempted to provide him with enough political camouflage so that the administration, while swallowing hard, would shift its China policy to a more sustainable institutionalist vein. It is a mark of Anthony Lake's loyalty to the new policy that he was prepared to attempt this transparent ruse to deflect criticism from the President, and make, if only a little, the administration's policy shift more palatable.

The prime example of Anthony Lake's ability to disagree in a nuanced manner with the general White House line, yet remain firmly within the Clinton administration's schools-of-thought fold, was his advocacy of a more vigorous institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia than the administration had implemented. Lake's more hawkish institutionalist line had as its point of departure the un-institutionalist notion that the Serbs were the primary villain of the Bosnian piece. He believed, 'The Serbian-dominated federal army stoked the flames of war as several republics of the country [Yugoslavia] – Slovenia, Bosnia, and Croatia, – sought independence.'⁸⁷

Lake espoused an institutionalist policy prescription regarding Bosnia not because the Serbs were seen as only equally culpable as the Croats and Muslims for instigating the conflict but because while the US had clear reasons to support the Bosnian Muslims, Lake did not believe they should obliterate other American interests regarding Europe and Russia.⁸⁸ This sober calculation was the key factor behind Lake's advocacy of an institutionalist policy regarding the American response to Bosnia.

While Lake accepted that any Western response to the Bosnian crisis must be implemented in a multilateral manner, he urged a heightened military response to the Serbian flouting of the international will. Lake stated, 'In Bosnia, we have not seen all the progress we would like, but when diplomacy has been married to military power, positive movement has been the result.'⁸⁹ Lake believed the Serbs only acquiesced with international demands, as in the confrontation over Gorazde, when confronted by allied military will.

President Clinton

As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, it is no surprise that the President's specific schools-of-thought policy preferences in each of the five key issue areas analyzed coincide perfectly not only with the executive branch's foreign policy prescriptions, but also mirror overall American foreign policy outputs as well. This is an expression of just how powerful an actor the President can be in formulating American foreign policy. This great significance of the president makes correctly classifying him essential to the operation of a schools-of-thought analysis of American foreign policy.

Bosnia was one example where candidate Clinton's rhetoric did not match President Clinton's general institutionalist tendencies. During his campaign, Bill Clinton accused President Bush of being too passive regarding foreign affairs. This activist rhetoric came back to haunt him as throughout his administration the President has consistently advocated institutionalist positions regarding foreign affairs, often the least activist of the three general schools of thought. For example, during his 12 October 1992 presidential debate with President Bush, Clinton argued, "I think we should stiffen the embargo on the Belgrade government, and I think we have to consider whether we should lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians since they are in no way in a fair fight with a heavily armed opponent bent on ethnic cleansing." While always opposing

intervention with ground troops, Clinton called for air strikes against the Serbs.⁹⁰ Thus Bill Clinton advocated the democratist 'lift and strike' option for Bosnia, but with an important reservation. Again during his presidential campaign, he stated, 'If the Serbs persist in violating the terms of the current cease-fire agreement, the US should take the lead in seeking UN Security Council authorization for air strikes against those who are attacking the relief effort.'⁹¹ It is curious that even here, where the President's rhetoric is obviously tougher than events would later make it prudent to be, his chief concerns were still institutionalist, highlighting a conviction that the Security Council had the power to authorize action in Bosnia, not the US itself, and that military action should not be taken to help the Bosnian Muslims directly, but only to support UN humanitarian efforts. While President Clinton's rhetoric did change over Bosnia, the core of his institutionalist policy can be seen even during his days on the hustings.

The President's institutionalist policy preference can be most clearly illustrated over the critical question of whether to lift the arms embargo. President Clinton left little doubt that he thought the European allies were incorrect in their contention that the embargo ought not to be lifted. In an interview with William Safire, the President described his failure in May 1993 to induce the European allies to lift the embargo as 'the biggest single disappointment I've had as president'.⁹² Yet he still did nothing to unilaterally aid the Muslim cause. In the crucial month of May 1993, the President, 'made an ironclad pledge to avoid unilateral intervention, saying the US "is not about to act alone and should not act alone" in the Balkans'.⁹³ By doing this the President effectively gave the European allies a veto over American initiatives in Bosnia. When pressed about the possible efficacy of unilateral action in Bosnia, Prentice and Brodie noted, 'the President said: It would kill the peace process and harm relations with our Nato allies, undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia over broad areas and undermine UN embargoes'.⁹⁴ In true institutionalist fashion, the President saw these other priorities as outweighing any inclination for the US to go its own way on the Bosnian crisis by lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.

The President also adheres to an institutionalist policy regarding European security. Clinton publicly affirmed his institutionalist EU-first strategy, stating, 'We also want Europe to be strong. This is why America supports Europe's own steps so far toward greater

unity – the EU, the WEU, and the development of a European defense identity.⁹⁵ The President believed, ‘The US should be ready to relinquish some of its leadership prerogatives; as the president envisaged it, the US role should be “to tip the balance . . . not to bear every burden”’,⁹⁶ much as British diplomacy operated in Europe in the nineteenth century. The President accepted this lessening of American power in Europe as the necessary price for pursuing his reformist strategy at home.

The President’s strategy for the expansion of Nato, embodied in the Partnership for Peace scheme, also bears the institutionalist stamp. As President Clinton remarked, ‘The question is no longer whether Nato will take on new members, but when and how.’⁹⁷ Unfortunately for the President, his deliberate lack of clarification about the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of expansion failed to mollify either the Central European states, eager for quick admittance to Nato, or the Russians, who would be happiest with a scenario entailing Nato’s demise at best, or its permanent non-expansion at worst. The President chose the institutionalist middle way regarding Nato expansion, and predictably, was attacked as being both too bold and too timid.

Regarding aid to Russia President Clinton was at his most activist, pursuing a consistent democratist policy preference. As a candidate, Clinton believed ‘The Bush administration has been overly cautious on the issue of aid to Russia.’⁹⁸ This was a mistake the President was determined not to repeat. At the heart of President Clinton’s vigorous support for Russian reform was the democratist notion that the, ‘fate of the world will be in doubt until stable democracies rise from the debris of the Soviet empire’.⁹⁹ As Cox noted, ‘the Clinton strategy was less economic than political . . . US policy was taken to mean, and certainly was perceived, as a “Russia-first” policy.’¹⁰⁰

The President saw helping Russia become a stable democracy as having several tangible benefits. As President Clinton observed, ‘A small amount spent stabilizing the emerging democracies in the former Soviet empire today will decrease by much more the money we may have to commit to our defense in the future.’¹⁰¹ Implicitly this statement reveals a strategy based on the democratist idea that if Russia becomes a stable democracy, as democracies do not war with one another, the US need no longer fear Russia and can redirect military expenditure back into domestic reform, which is the general reason the President was elected in the first place.

American help for Russia thus relates paradoxically back to the domestic-first priorities of the Clinton administration.

Secondly, in keeping with the overall institutionalist administration's desire for the US not to be the global policeman, a democratic Russia would have a constructive role to play in global ordering. As Cox observed, 'in Clinton's version of the new world order, in which the US was neither willing or able to act as "world cop", a secure and integrated Russia had several important parts to play',¹⁰² such as serving as a barrier against hyper-nationalism in the other CIS states, and as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in the former southern Soviet republics. President Clinton felt these benefits to be so important, that along with free-trade expansion, aid to Russia became the major foreign policy priority of his administration.

Even more than regarding Russian policy, Clinton felt President Bush had neglected the economic aspects of foreign policy to the detriment of the US. President Clinton believed this was particularly true regarding free-trade expansion, despite Bush's efforts as a founder of the NAFTA initiative. In accordance with general institutionalist thinking Clinton began his term, 'By defining his presidency as an effort to promote economic growth and trade liberalization.'¹⁰³ Underlying this priority lay several basic institutionalist precepts. The President agreed with the institutionalist notion that foreign and domestic policy were so interconnected that overall policies had to take account of both realms. As Clinton noted, 'our first foreign policy priority and our first domestic priority must be one and the same, a revitalized economy, for we can not be strong abroad if we are not strong at home.'¹⁰⁴ The President also agrees with the institutionalist belief that 'Trade, as much as troops, will increasingly define the ties that bind nations in the 21st century.'¹⁰⁵ These beliefs form the institutionalist theoretical backdrop for the President's consistent and aggressive pursuit of expanded free trade opportunities in the new world order.

The President's commitment to free trade expansion can be vividly illustrated by the controversy over NAFTA ratification. In the debate President Clinton incurred large political penalties due to his support of the accord. As Woodward observed, 'Clinton knew that backing it [NAFTA] would alienate organized labor, a key part of the Democrats' constituency, and hurt his chances in big union states such as Michigan and Ohio But Clinton believed in free trade.'¹⁰⁶ The amount of time the White House lobbied Congress

to push for the ratification of NAFTA is another illustration of how vital free trade was for the administration. As Ifill remarked, 'The strategy [regarding NAFTA] consumed nearly all the time of the President and his lieutenants for 56 critical days.'¹⁰⁷ While the GATT accord did not generate the political heat and thus require the intensive political intervention of the Clinton White House that NAFTA did, it was no less a priority for the President. As he stated, 'The congressional vote on the GATT will be the defining decision for America as we head into the next century.'¹⁰⁸

President Clinton's policy U-turn on MFN status for China also reflected his strong institutionalist orientation. As a candidate for the presidency, Clinton adopted a democratist stance in attacking President Bush's record on China. Clinton argued that despite Deng Xiaoping's massacre of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square, 'The [Bush] administration continues to coddle China.'¹⁰⁹ Yet this democratist campaign rhetoric gave way to an institutionalist policy. In May 1994 President Clinton renewed MFN status for China, and announced the delinking of human rights conditions from future consideration of China's MFN status. The President, as Friedman sardonically observed, 'on Thursday gave what was surely the most eloquent defense of the Bush administration's China policy ever uttered at the White House'.¹¹⁰ In the conflict that arose over this seeming contradiction, President Clinton chose the economics-first institutionalist policy preference that marked the rest of his thinking on foreign affairs. As Friedman stated, 'three numbers told the story: \$33 billion in Chinese exports to the US, \$9 billion in US exports to China – worth almost 150,000 American jobs'.¹¹¹ It is not too much to say that without changing his mind over China President Clinton would have sabotaged the economics-first, free-trade thrust that he has made a cornerstone of his foreign policy.

It would seem on initial glance that as the President's foreign policy preferences in the five critical issue areas analyzed perfectly match the overall American policies in these areas, a schools-of-thought analysis of American foreign policy would begin and end with an examination of the orientation of the president. Yet the American foreign policy-making process is not that simple. While the president is the central, and at times dominant, actor in determining American foreign policy outputs, as Chapter 7 will illustrate he is not the only relevant figure in need of analysis if the process of American foreign policy-making is to be understood. As Chapter 7 will explore, particularly if a presidential policy is deemed to be a

Chart 5.1 Specific Democratist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Democratist View Reached from the Givens	Interventionist	Large-Scale Aid	Hard-line Anti-MFN	Generally in Favor	Nato-firsters, no Nato Expansion
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Security
Talbott – Deputy Secretary of State, Democrat	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Mitchell – Former Senate Majority Leader, Democrat	Follows institutionalist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (-)

(+) consistent with the general democratist policy prescription

(-) inconsistent with the general democratist policy prescription

Chart 5.2 Specific Neo-realist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Neo-Realist View Reached from the Givens	Non-Interventionist, Lift Arms Embargo	No Large-Scale Aid	Soft-line Pro-MFN, perhaps with some conditions	Tactically Favor	Nato-firsters, Favor quick expansion of the alliance
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Security
Lugar – Ranking Republican on Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)			Pro (+)
Dole – Senate Minority Leader, Now Senate Majority Leader, Republican	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows institutionalist line (–)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Biden – Former Chairman of Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, Democrat	Follows democratist line (–)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)

(+) consistent with the general neo-realist policy prescription

(–) inconsistent with the general neo-realist policy prescription

Chart 5.3 Specific Institutionalist Policymakers Regarding Five Key Issues

Majority Institutionalist View Reached from the Givens	Non-Interventionist, No Lifting of Arms Embargo	Aid Co-ordinated by Multilateral Institutions. No Easing of Shock Therapy	Pro-MFN, Want to Decouple it from Human Rights Concerns	Crucial, Strongly Favor	EU-firsters, Evolutionary Expansion of Nato
Issues	Bosnia	Russia	China	Nafta/Gatt	Nato/Western European Security
Christopher – Secretary of State, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Clinton – President of the United States, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)
Perry – Secretary of Defense, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows neo-realist line (-)			Pro (+)
Lake-National Security Adviser, Democrat	Pro (+)	Follows democratist line (-)	Pro (+)	Pro (+)	Follows neo-realist line (-)

(+) consistent with the general institutionalist policy prescription

(-) inconsistent with the general institutionalist policy prescription

failure by the Congress and the American people, such as the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, there is every possibility it will be overturned, particularly if the Congress espouses a different schools-of-thought orientation from the executive branch, as it has a thought-out policy preference to take the place of the executive's failed initiative.

6 The Overall Schools-of-thought Orientation of the Clinton Administration Regarding the Bosnian Crisis

The Bosnian crisis is an ideal illustration of how schools-of-thought analysis of post-Cold War American foreign policy initiatives works. This is due to the fact that the Clinton administration's Bosnia policy was the result of the intersection of three policies (US-Russian, US-European, as well as US-Balkan initiatives) that have already been delineated in the analysis of the schools of thought in Chapters 2-5.

To analyze how the American foreign policy process works using the schools-of-thought paradigm, it is necessary to first determine which schools of thought the Clinton administration adhered to regarding its policies toward Russia, Europe, and then Bosnia. Having delineated and analyzed both the macro-level (overall American policy) and the micro-level (individual decision-makers' schools-of-thought orientations) of schools-of-thought analysis, a short survey of the bureaucratic political interplay that led to the overall American institutionalist response to the Bosnian crisis will be executed in Chapter 7. Finally Chapter 8 will look at the efficacy of schools-of-thought analysis itself, as a tool for analyzing the post-Cold War era.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY REGARDING RUSSIA

The Clinton administration's overall policy regarding Russia has reflected a dominant democratist orientation with some minority institutionalist impulses. President Clinton has long been a proponent of significant aid to Russia; as long ago as the New York Primary, he advocated the US constructing a \$6 billion fund to stabilize the rouble and urged the major Western states and financial institutions to postpone Russian debt repayment.¹ As president, Clinton continued his democratist stance toward Russia despite

significant opposition.² The US has contributed a significant amount of bilateral aid to Russia. At the Vancouver summit in April 1993, President Clinton offered President Yeltsin an aid package worth \$1.6 billion, which included a \$50 million enterprise fund to encourage the creation of small businesses in Russia, expertise to repair its oil pipeline system, a \$95 million privatization fund for the nascent Russian banking industry, \$700 million in agricultural credits enabling the government to purchase grain easily, and \$215 million to help finance the dismantling of the Russian nuclear arsenal as was mandated by the START treaties.³ Between 1992 and 1993, Russia received more than half the US aid to the former Soviet Union. In 1993, in addition to the Vancouver summit aid, the US pledged another \$3 billion with the G-7 at the Tokyo summit, as well as \$2.5 billion in technical aid and humanitarian assistance.⁴ As Strobe Talbott, then the administration's roving ambassador to the former Soviet Union, noted, the Clinton strategy was to emphasize, 'we will do all we can to help, but we will not do it alone. We will show our leadership by taking the initiative, but we will do so largely in order to leverage much greater amounts of money from the international financial institutions and from other industrialized democracies.'⁵ Thus although the Clinton administration stressed multilateral institutions regarding aid to Russia (a seemingly institutionalist stance), as it was increasingly the driving force behind sustained aid to Russia its economic initiatives can be characterized as more democratist than institutionalist.

Beyond the Clinton administration's mix of democratist and institutionalist initiatives regarding economic aid to Russia there has been a great deal of non-economic support for President Yeltsin, confirming America's overall democratist policy. As Philip Zelikow noted, 'Clinton has wholly cast America's lot with Yeltsin, despite having criticized Bush for too strongly and lengthily attaching American interests to Gorbachev.'⁶ This strong political and diplomatic support reached its peak during the failed October 1993 coup by parliamentary leaders, led by Khasbulatov and Vice-President Rutskoi, where the US found itself in the difficult position of endorsing the shelling of a sitting parliament. Yet as Yeltsin had shown restraint in dealing with parliament, as his attempt at negotiations with Khasbulatov illustrated, and as he called for new parliamentary elections and a referendum on a new constitution to replace a parliament elected under a

Brezhnev-era system, the Clinton administration believed that in supporting Yeltsin they were furthering genuine democratic reform in Russia. Nor did this support for reform waver after the disastrous December 1993 parliamentary elections, in which the Communists and ultra-nationalists (led by the crypto-fascist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy) won the majority of parliamentary seats at the expense of the radical reformers clustered around Yegor Gaidar. As Michael Cox stated, 'one result of the December "wake-up call" was to cause initial confusion followed by a resolute White House defence of its original strategy'.⁷ This staunch defense of a Russia-first policy is a crucial sign of the importance President Clinton places on Russia.

The underlying reasons for President Clinton's democratist view of Russia spring from his desire to concentrate on domestic initiatives. As Friedman observed, the President 'sees this issue as an adjunct of his domestic agenda. At its crudest, the White House logic goes like this: No Russian reform, no American defense cuts, no chance for the Clinton administration to deliver on its pledge to halve the budget deficit in four years, no dealing with the deficit, no reelection.'⁸ This illustrates President Clinton's contention, first made during the primaries, that there are no longer real divisions between foreign and domestic policy. Thus ironically, even President Clinton's activist democratist stance regarding Russia can be seen as a largely defensive effort to protect American reform at home.

So what are the implications of the Clinton administration's democratist Russia policy regarding American initiatives toward the Bosnian conflict? The Russia-first policy intruded upon and partly determined American policy toward Bosnia. The Russia-first policy meant that the administration would go to great lengths to avoid any crisis with Yeltsin that would force him to either look weak by meekly submitting to American dictates, or lead to a direct confrontation with the Russian regime, as both these outcomes would work to the advantage of President Yeltsin's ultra-nationalist foes.

These dangers were all too apparent to Clinton in Bosnia. In the very contrasting interpretations of the conflict lay the seeds of a possible Russo-American confrontation over Bosnia. American public opinion saw the conflict as a clear-cut case of Milosevic and Karadzic wishing to create a greater Serbia from the rubble of the former Yugoslavia, and as men who would use almost any

means, including ethnic cleansing, to achieve their ends. This viewpoint clashed with Russian public opinion, which generally favored its Orthodox religious cohorts, the Serbs, at the expense of the largely Muslim Bosnians and the largely Catholic Croats. This innate difference in apprehending the nature of the conflict is one of the internal tensions that was present throughout President Clinton's handling of the Bosnian crisis.

Fundamental differences of opinion between the US and Russia over Bosnia became part of the administration's rationale for its institutionalist policy. President Clinton felt that without close cooperation with the Russians over Bosnia, the real differences between America and Russia were likely to lead to a far greater crisis. Supporters of the administration's institutionalist line on Bosnia pointed out that any time it appeared that the US might act unilaterally in the crisis, in accordance with democratist and neo-realist views, the Russians angrily upped the diplomatic ante. For example when the Americans indicated that they might unilaterally lift the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, the Duma stormily announced its intention, 'to lift the arms embargo against Serbia if the US or any other country begins supplying arms to Bosnian Muslims'.⁹ While President Yeltsin did not explicitly endorse the confrontational stance taken by the Russian legislature, his about-face on the Partnership for Peace initiative, where he quickly changed his position regarding the admission of Central European states into Nato after the strong denunciation of such a course by the Duma illustrated that he was susceptible to pressure from right-wing nationalists in the legislature.¹⁰ Thus the Clinton administration's democratist Russia-first policy set the stage for its institutionalist response of advocating a low level of involvement in the Bosnian crisis. This is due to the fact that it ranked Russian goodwill and support for President Yeltsin above the sufferings of the Bosnian Muslims.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY REGARDING EUROPE

The Clinton administration's policy toward Europe is unambiguously institutionalist. The White House does not see the European Union as a possible rival to either Nato or American power, as institutionalists do not fear that a strengthened EU will make Nato

irrelevant, unlike the Nato-firster democratists and neo-realists. Stephen A. Oxman, then the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, elaborated on this institutionalist theme, 'we [the US] should continue to encourage our allies to take on a greater share of the burden of European security. We welcome the Maastricht Treaty's call for development of a European security and defense identity, which can form the basis of a European pillar of Nato.'¹¹ Unlike its predecessors the Clinton administration has no schizophrenic reaction to increased European integration and enhanced defense capabilities, as it sees these developments as wholly positive.

Unlike its forebears, the Clinton administration's policy is genuinely multilateralist. This multilateralist policy illustrates a recognition of America's declining role in Europe, another institutionalist belief. As the US role in Europe declines, the Clinton administration clearly hopes increased European political and defense efforts will fill any security vacuum that may develop. As with the Clinton Russia policy, the administration's policy toward Europe relates back to its concentration on domestic affairs. As part of this process, an increased European role means that the US could lessen its commitment in Europe to promote domestic initiatives without destabilizing a vital American interest. Policy-wise the American institutionalist stance means supporting the expansion of the Western European Union, as well as the fledgling Eurocorps. As the *International Herald-Tribune* reported, 'To give political effect to Europe's greater security role, the allies agreed in principle to make available Nato military resources to the WEU.'¹² To allow Nato to give wherewithal to the WEU is a startling sign of how comfortable the Clinton administration is with the expansion of integrated European defense capabilities.

Not only is the administration amenable to the relative lessening of its role in Europe, it also has been markedly hesitant to expand Nato into Central Europe. This hesitation resulted in the Partnership for Peace initiative, a halfway measure that affirmed Nato's intent to allow Central European states to join the organization, without setting a specific timetable for this expansion or, until 1995, outlining a clear set of standards that had to be met before leading to new admissions.¹³ Stephen Oxman's endorsement of the scheme indicates the main reason behind it, 'It will also create a truly integrated Europe, without drawing lines which exclude some countries.'¹⁴ Oxman's comment is an implicit criticism of the American

neo-realist contention that Nato should quickly admit Central European states such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia, believing such an expansion is bound to threaten and antagonize Russia. The administration fears that the acceptance of Central European states into Nato could provoke a strengthening of the Russian nationalist position at the expense of President Yeltsin, as he would be seen by the Russian people as unable to avoid Western domination. It would also enhance traditional Russian fears of encirclement. Paradoxically, the administration feels the risk of Russian domestic destabilization that the expansion of Nato might provoke would actually lessen the security of the Central European states. This ever-present fear of destabilizing Russia highlights the primacy of Russian concerns over Central European fears of renewed Russian domination in the Clinton administration's hierarchy of priorities. Indeed, a large part of the rationale for Clinton's institutionalist policy toward Europe is the dominance of both domestic and Russian concerns over European considerations.

While Europe is not as important to the Clinton administration as Russia, it is still a greater priority than American policy regarding the Bosnian conflict. As Jehl noted, 'Clinton, for his part, declared the partnership [The Partnership for Peace plan] as one that would be more important to the future shape of Europe, "than whatever is or isn't done with the tragedy of Bosnia at this late date".¹⁵ The administration's Bosnia stance can be seen as a policy partly based on the belief that both Russian concerns and alliance unity supersede anything taking place in the Balkans. Even the manner in which the crisis was institutionally dealt with reflected the primacy of Europe over Bosnia for the Clinton administration. As Gompert observed, 'The US deferred to the European wish that trans-national coordination take place in EC-US channels instead of Nato.'¹⁶ To use the EU rather than Nato as the primary institution for dealing with US-European relations during the Bosnian crisis meant a larger European role in the affair, as the US is far more dominant in Nato than the EU in which it is not a member. It is just one sign of many that throughout the Bosnian crisis the European point of view of the Bosnian affair took precedence over Bosnian Muslim concerns. The Clinton administration's policy during the Bosnian crisis becomes explicable when seen as part of the inter-connection of US-Russian and US-European policies, and as the least important of the three relationships.

GENERAL ADMINISTRATION POLICY REGARDING BOSNIA

Despite some rhetorical vacillations, American foreign policy regarding Bosnia under the Clinton administration has been consistently institutionalist throughout its tenure in office. Before a detailed analysis of the overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is possible, a brief and very general overview of the concrete American actions in the early stages of this labyrinthine conflict is necessary.

The multiethnic¹⁷ republic of Bosnia seceded from the rump Yugoslav state in April 1992 and war began almost immediately, even before it was recognized by the EU and UN. This recognition is a strong point in the American neo-realist case for greater American activity to help the Bosnian Muslim cause, for under the UN Charter, every state is guaranteed the right of self-defense. This point looms large when considering the effect of the arms embargo, which will be further discussed. The war pitted the mostly Muslim Bosnian government against Bosnian Serb rebels, who had refused to take part in the multiethnic elections held on the eve of Bosnia's secession. The Bosnian Serbs were substantially aided by Serbia proper which had retained the lion's share of the Yugoslav army's mostly Serbian officer corps and the vast preponderance of its heavy weaponry, particularly its heavy artillery and tanks. This aid took the form of some direct military intervention by the Serbian Serbs as well as a great amount of military aid which proved decisive in the early days of the conflict, when the Bosnian Serbs scored most of their decisive gains.

As a presidential candidate Bill Clinton denounced Serb aggression and took the Bush administration to task for its lukewarm involvement in the crisis. This was the militant, decidedly un-institutionalist attitude toward Bosnia that President Clinton brought to the White House. The President proposed to the allies that they remove their peacekeepers from Bosnia and that the UN lift the arms embargo against the Muslims, so as to give them a chance to defend themselves against the Serbs. Air strikes were also to be threatened to compel the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from territory they had acquired through the morally repugnant practice of ethnic cleansing. This was the 'lift and strike' initiative that Secretary of State Christopher took with him to the European capitals in May 1993.

Chart 6.1 Key Diplomatic Events Early in the Bosnian Crisis

- Warfare between Muslims and Serbs starts – March 1992
 - Bosnia recognized by the EU – April 1992
 - Candidate Clinton denounces Serbs, calls for an increased American role in the conflict – Summer 1992
 - Collapse of the Vance–Owen plan favored by the Europeans – May 1993
 - Clinton endorses ‘lift and strike’ policy, as Christopher tries to get European allies to concur – May 1993
 - Europeans reject American proposal of tougher action against the Serbs; Clinton abandons ‘lift and strike’ – May 1993
 - Safe havens initiative, with enclaves guaranteed by the UN–May 1993
 - After market-place bombing in Sarajevo, a partial Western success achieved by threatening Nato air strikes to protect Sarajevo and Gorazde–February–April 1994
 - Muslim–Croat federation brokered by the US – March 1994
 - Contact Group endorses 51–49 Bosnia split – May 1994
 - Gore breaks Senate tie regarding the Dole–Lieberman amendment that would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims–July 1994
 - Failure to enforce Contact Group plan against Bosnian Serbs–July–September 1994
 - Bosnian and Croatian Serbs all but take Bihac safe area: this leads to Contact Group recriminations–November 1994
 - New ‘take it or leave it’ plan by Contact Group would lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it recognized and policed its borders with Croatia and Bosnia–February 1995
 - ‘New’ plan proposed by US and Russia to other Contact Group members would gradually lift sanctions on Serbia proper if it incrementally implemented principles that keep Bosnia intact, without any formal recognition being required – March 1995
-

The European refusal to accept the American proposal for a greater aiding of the Bosnian Muslims, and the Clinton administration's reaction to it, was without doubt a major diplomatic turning-point of the war. The European allies, particularly Britain and France, unanimously and publicly rejected the Clinton initiative in favor of maintaining their peacekeepers in Bosnia under UN command. They preferred to attempt to resuscitate the Vance–Owen plan, jointly brokered by the EU and UN, which would have sustained some Serbian gains made by aggression. Faced with a possible allied crisis over Bosnia the Clinton administration retreated to a firmly institutionalist position stating that, though the US disagreed with the Europeans about taking a harder line with the Serbs, it would not act unilaterally, even to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. For the administration, alliance unity overcame doubts about Europe's Bosnia policy.

While not diverting from their overall Bosnia policy, the French and British, partly as a sop to the Americans, orchestrated the UN construction of 'safe areas' in May 1993. The US pledged to use air power to protect the UN peacekeepers guarding six Bosnian towns (including Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde and Bihac) that were designated safe havens by the UN Security Council. The plan was an indication that the UN and the Europeans, while not wishing to actively aid the Muslims, would at least limit their sufferings through continued humanitarian assistance as well as offering some geographical security.

The safe-havens plan was still part of an overall institutionalist policy, in that it was enacted by the multilateral UN and, as Sciolino pointed out, was not, 'aimed at rolling back the territorial gains of the Serbs',¹⁸ who by then controlled roughly 70 per cent of Bosnia. It aimed at managing the conflict but not by punishing Serbian aggression, as American democratists and neo-realists desired. Sciolino also agreed that the acceptance of the safe haven policy, and the Clinton administration's decision to abide by European concerns and drop their more hawkish policy, was a major climbdown. 'The acceptance of the creation of safe areas is a turnabout in policy for the Clinton administration. During his tour of Europe only two weeks ago, Secretary of State Christopher said that such areas would essentially put the Muslims into ethnic ghettos and thus reward 'ethnic cleansing' by Serbian nationalists.'¹⁹ As the crisis progressed, the Clinton administration would often be hamstrung by critics who pointed to the President's earlier more militant

remarks belying a more cautious current American policy. In other words the President had to deal with a credibility gap.

The spring of 1993 also saw the collapse of the Vance–Owen plan. Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, agreed to it provisionally, while in practice his usually pliant parliament overturned his acceptance in May 1993. It is extremely likely that Karadzic's initial signature was little more than a diplomatic ploy, and that he knew that the self-styled Serbian parliament at Pale would reject the deal. However the final nail in the coffin to the plan was delivered by none other than the Americans. The administration rejected a Security Council resolution that was designed to demonstrate the international community's full support for the Bosnian peace plan, as the White House did not want to be seen rewarding Serbian aggression. As Cohen noted, 'the so-called Vance–Owen map never won clear support from President Clinton and was ultimately abandoned precisely because it was deemed to be morally abhorrent'.²⁰ While the events of May illustrated that the administration was moving toward a firmly institutionalist-based policy on Bosnia, the American rejection of the Vance–Owen plan showed that the President was not prepared, at the time, to go as far as were the British and the French in sanctioning a fragmentation of Bosnia into cantons. The scuttling of both the Vance–Owen plan and the Clinton administration's more hawkish proposals in the spring of 1993 left the allies united behind institutionalist precepts but without a tangible peace plan.

Matters continued to drift through the winter of 1993 and into the spring of 1994. The war ground into a stalemate, with the Bosnian Muslims unable to roll back the initial Serbian gains, while the Serbs were unable to eradicate the Bosnian government army which had a manpower advantage over the Bosnian Serbs, while still being far inferior in weaponry. The UN, US and European allies did experience one success during this period. By threatening Nato air strikes against the Serbs besieging first Sarajevo and then Gorazde in February 1994, the West was able to stabilize the situation in both safe areas with a minimal use of force. However it is important to note that this very limited use of military power and the tougher stance toward the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs did not signal an overall change from the policy advocated by American institutionalists, as no one in the administration suggested doing anything other than protecting the safe havens which was itself an institutionalist initiative. The President wanted to

strengthen the multilateral institutionalist response to the crisis not to change policy direction by increasing support for the Bosnian Muslims, as neo-realists and democratists wished.

Emboldened by this limited success, the administration was able to broker a new Muslim–Croatian alliance in March 1994. Initially the Muslims and Croats had been allies against Milosevic, as both had seceded from the rump Yugoslav state. However Tudjman, the leader of Croatia, and Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats, switched sides and attacked the primarily Muslim Bosnian government, as they feared a complete Serb victory could well lead to the partition of Bosnia, and the Croats were determined to acquire and safeguard the portions of Bosnia that were primarily Croatian in ethnic content. Fierce fighting ensued, particularly around the Bosnian city of Mostar. The Clinton administration was able to induce the Croatian government and Bosnian Croats to again ally with the Bosnian government. In exchange for agreeing to a loose Croatian–Muslim confederation, the US and Russia promised to give Tudjman full diplomatic backing in his struggle to reunite Croatia by restoring its rule over the Croatian Serb area known as the Krajina. Also the administration promised to lift the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Croatia when it had joined the Serbs in attacking Bosnia. Yet this diplomatic bolstering of the Bosnian government was limited, as the Muslim–Croatian federation has never functioned as a coherent entity. This initiative should not be seen as a change by the Clinton administration from its institutionalist policy. The Contact Group’s peace plan was to confirm the overall institutionalist thrust of the White House’s policy toward Bosnia.

In May 1994, the Contact Group of the great powers concerned with the Bosnian conflict (comprised of: Russia, the US, France, Germany, and Britain) proposed a peace plan for Bosnia that was eerily reminiscent of the Vance – Owen plan advocated by the European powers just a year previously.

They [the European delegates within the Contact Group] said they were particularly pleased that Secretary of State Christopher had explicitly agreed to endorse the 51–49 division of territory – the most important plank of a plan issued by Europe last year. The communiqué said a US-brokered Muslim-Croat federation would have to be set up within the 51% target, not within 58% of the territory as agreed previously by the Muslims and Croats.²¹

The Clinton administration was now agreeing to the exact percentage division of territory it had found morally repugnant just a year before in the Vance–Owen plan. The Contact Group peace proposal illustrates just how strongly institutionalist the Clinton administration's policy toward Bosnia had become. In it one can discern that making the deal attractive for the Bosnian Serbs had become a priority, whereas the American rejection of the Vance–Owen plan had attacked the Europeans for rewarding aggression. A year on, ending the war by at least partly appeasing Bosnian Serb and Serbian Serb objectives had displaced any notion of rolling back the Serbian aggressors' victories. Thus ending the war, an institutionalist priority, had taken on a new precedence over aiding the Bosnian victims of aggression. Secondly over the matter of the 58–51 per cent controversy regarding the percentage of Bosnian territory the Muslims and Croats would receive, the US sided firmly with the Europeans over the Bosnian Muslims despite promises made at the time of the founding of the Bosnian–Croatian federation to fight their corner in the Contact Group. Following institutionalist precepts, alliance unity easily took precedence over Bosnian Muslim claims.

Tied into the Contact Group plan was a clause that indicated that despite all the aspects of the initiative designed to lure the Serbs into an agreement, the Contact Group's patience was wearing thin. The plan was described by the Contact Group as a take it or leave it offer. That is, if either side refused to sign the pact, a diplomatic penalty would be paid. For the Bosnian Muslims refusal to sign would lead to a lifting of economic sanctions imposed on both the Bosnian Serbs and on Serbia proper, which were having a significant impact on their economies. In the end the Bosnian government reluctantly agreed to the plan. If either the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs refused, it was agreed that there would finally be a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and possibly increased sanctions imposed against both Milosevic and Karadzic. It was at this point that a significant schism occurred between the Serb leaders. Milosevic, who by the pact would have acquired and received international sanction for most of his territorial designs, agreed to the plan, feeling that a lifting of sanctions would greatly bolster the Serb economy. However Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs scorned the initiative, incurring the wrath of both the Contact Group and the Serbian Serbs themselves. In exchange for a minor lessening of sanctions against Belgrade, Milosevic

himself blockaded the Bosnian Serbs who were heavily dependent on the Serbian Serbs for *matériel*. From a Western perspective the best thing that can be said about the Contact Group initiative is that to an extent, it divided the Serbian Serbs from the Bosnian Serbs.

Meanwhile the US domestic scene grew restive regarding the administration's policy toward Bosnia. This process culminated in a 1 July 1994 Senate vote on the Dole–Lieberman amendment, which would have unilaterally lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Vice-President Gore's vote broke a 50–50 tie on the bill, but for its legislative victory the administration was forced to pay a considerable political price. To persuade wavering Senators to give the Contact Group plan time to work, the President was forced to make concessions and endorse the Nunn–Mitchell amendment. The amendment stated that if the peace plan was not accepted by the Bosnian Serbs by 15 October 1994 the US would again attempt to convince its Security Council allies to multilaterally lift the arms embargo, and if they remained adamantly opposed, by 15 November 1994, the administration would unilaterally stop enforcing the ban. These administration concessions are not to be viewed as a change in overall American policy, but rather the reverse. They were desperate inducements made by the Clinton administration to give the institutionalist Contact Group plan time to work, for if the Dole–Lieberman amendment had been enacted it would have meant the end of President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy and would have called into question the primacy of presidential decision-making over the Bosnian crisis itself. The Nunn–Mitchell concessions should be viewed as an illustration of just how desperate the administration was to retain the thrust of its institutionalist policy.

Yet with the Bosnian Serb rejection of the plan, the hollowness of Western threats was once again exposed. As Cohen stated, 'The Bosnian Serbs rejection was supposed to lead quickly to tighter trade sanctions on Serbia, a stricter enforcement by Nato of the weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde and the establishment of similar areas around the Muslim-held towns. But nothing has happened.'²² When it became apparent that the Contact Group plan was not going to work all the members retreated on carrying out the punitive aspects of the agreement against both the Bosnian Serbs and Serbian Serbs, which would have embroiled them more deeply in the overall conflict.

The very fact that the plan had been favorable to the Serbs was a strong indication of the great desire of all members of the Contact Group to end the struggle, from their point of view, relatively painlessly if dishonorably. The Bosnian Serbs shrewdly saw this institutionalist precept of the West wanting to avoid entanglement in the conflict as being at the heart of the entire pact, and reasoned that the Contact Group would not apply genuinely punitive measures against anyone, as they would not wish to become more significantly involved in the Bosnian crisis at this late date.

Nowhere can Western reluctance to increase its involvement in the Bosnian crisis be better seen than in the controversy as to lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, with France, Russia, and Britain flatly contradicting their earlier Contact Group pledge to punish the Serbs in this manner if they failed to sign the pact. In the end, the Izetbegovic government saved the West from further embarrassment. The Bosnian government said it was willing to live with the arms embargo for another six months. The Bosnian Muslims, at last getting significant illegal arms through contacts in Zagreb with the tacit approval of the Americans, could well have faced an increased Bosnian Serb onslaught before new arms could have reached them from the West to turn the tide of battle in their favor. President Izetbegovic worried that a lifting of the embargo would heal the rift between Milosevic and Karadzic, if Milosevic felt the overall balance of power in Bosnia was significantly changing. These battlefield considerations saved President Clinton from fulfilling a distasteful commitment, as the Contact Group pact itself had backed him into lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. Yet the failure of the Contact Group to punish the Bosnian Serb refusal to join the peace initiative, and the near crisis averted in the Western alliance, prophesied the divisions that were to occur over the Bosnian Serb offensive around Bihac.

A briefly successful military advance by the Bosnian V Corps from the Bihac pocket was met by a fierce counterattack in which the Bosnian Muslims not only lost all the territory they had so fleetingly recaptured, but also effective control of the entire Bihac enclave. Augmented by forces loyal to the Bosnian Muslim rebel Abdic, as well as the Milosevic-dominated Krajina Serbs in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs were able to attack the V Corps from three sides. The Bosnian Serbs also managed to best Western diplomacy. Despite some urgency from the Clinton administration, the Contact Group was unable to agree on a tougher policy toward the Bosnian

Serbs, despite their incursion into the Bihac safe haven, which in theory was supposed to be protected and guaranteed by the UN. The Clinton administration, realizing that it had failed to convince its Contact Group partners of the necessity of air strikes to save Bihac, went along with the Europeans' newly-evolving policy of altering the heretofore unalterable take-it-or-leave-it pact, by possibly allowing the Bosnian Serbs to unite in a confederation with Serbia proper, in exchange for its acceptance of the original 51–49 per cent plan. That the administration would go along with a European initiative to sweeten the Contact Group pact and ignore the blatant Bosnian Serb humiliation of the UN at Bihac, highlights how far President Clinton was prepared to go to adhere to an overall central institutionalist precept regarding Bosnia; alliance unity came first in the overall hierarchy of American foreign policy priorities. While this general narrative exposes a gradual softening of American support for the Bosnian Muslims, it also makes clear that at least from May 1993 the Clinton administration pursued an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia.

After the Bihac crisis began, the strongest international actor likely to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims was the resurgent Republican Congress of Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole. After their stunning mid-term election gains in November 1994, which saw the GOP turn a 256–178 minority in the House into a 231–203 majority, and a 56–44 deficit in the Senate into a 54–46 advantage, the largely neo-realist Republicans held control of both the houses of Congress for the first time since the 1950s. Dole's increased authority, as shall be illustrated in Chapter 8, was a key component in the overall struggle for control of American policy regarding the Bosnian crisis that occurred in the summer of 1995.

Before continuing with a more detailed analysis of the overall American policy regarding Bosnia, three general comments are necessary. Firstly, it is essential to note the centrality of the embargo issue to the whole of the Bosnian conflict. Without the lifting of the embargo the Serbs had a locked-in military advantage. As *The Economist* noted, regarding Serb military superiority, 'the Serb forces are more professionally organised and led, having inherited virtually intact the general staff of the Yugoslav army. (Secondly) the Serbs together outgun their adversaries 4–1 in tanks, 2–1 in guns and more than 10–1 in aircraft.'²³ The UN arms embargo, introduced in September 1991 against the whole of Yugoslavia, had been an effort to control ethnic bloodshed in a rapidly disintegrating state.

Its great effect on the Bosnian conflict was one of its unintended consequences. Serb military superiority was an established fact. If the embargo was not lifted, institutionalist critics rightly reasoned, the Bosnian government stood no chance of military success and would be either militarily destroyed or forced to agree to almost any peace terms the West and the Serbs could cobble together. Surprisingly institutionalists agreed with much of this analysis but felt that a lifting of the arms embargo would lead to a spreading of the war. They feared this could result in far more being lost than merely the Bosnian Muslims' right to self-defense, for example the unity of the alliance itself, as well as the chance for Russia to make a successful transition to democracy with Western help.

A second general comment it is necessary to make about the Bosnian conflict is the striking consistency of the British and the French positions. The European allies were leery of any diplomatic or military provocation of either the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian Serbs, as European peacekeepers, who comprised the vast majority of the UN force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), would be at risk either to Serb military retaliation or as hostages. While there is a dispute as to how effective the UN's humanitarian program was, its political significance cannot be overrated. For example during the Bosnian Serb assault on the UN safe haven of Bihac, several hundred peacekeepers were detained in a successful effort to deter substantial Nato air strikes. While consideration for their nationals undoubtedly played a part in the French and British hesitance to get tougher with the Serbs, as Colin Smith noted, in many ways the British and French peacekeeping argument became a useful excuse for doing little to alter the military facts on the ground in Bosnia. As Smith observed, there had developed, 'a certain symbiosis between the President and his two main European allies in Bosnia, Britain and France. London and Paris blatantly exaggerate the effectiveness of their soldiers' humanitarian role, and use the prospect of Serb retaliation against them as an excuse for not taking decisive military action.'²⁴

This somewhat facile peacekeeping argument lay at the heart of European objections to any increased Western stance against Serb aggression, and to lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. They feared this would lead to a more general war that would spell the end of the UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia and might well lead to military reprisals against the UN peacekeepers. Yet to a large extent the Europeans hid behind their peacekeepers so as to

further their chief institutionalist aim of containing the conflict. However the Europeans were not alone in using sophistry to further their policy. It was President Clinton who seized upon the European peacekeeping argument as the reason not to lift the arms embargo.

Throughout the crisis the President said he advocated lifting the embargo but that he was sensitive to the peacekeeping arguments of the Europeans, who unlike the US had troops in Bosnia. By upholding the central institutionalist tenet of multilateralism Clinton pledged not to act alone, thus directly linking America's Bosnia policy to the European peacekeeping arguments against lifting the embargo. If the embargo became the key factor behind the West's Bosnia policy, so the Europeans' peacekeeping argument became the rationale for the very limited Western support the Bosnians received throughout the crisis. Yet this contentious argument hid the institutionalist policy adhered to by both the Clinton administration and the Europeans; their first priority was to limit the conflict rather than provide succor for the wronged Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans hid their overall policy behind their peacekeepers, but the Clinton administration certainly hid its institutionalist thrust behind the Europeans.

Thirdly, despite its firm support for an institutionalist policy, the administration became increasingly skeptical about the efficacy of the UN, the central, global, multilateral institution. Time after time the UN compelled restraint by Nato after Serb violations of UN directives. For instance as Paul Lewis stated regarding the Serb incursion into the allied safe haven of Gorazde in the spring of 1994, UN leniency toward the Serbs led to a growing rift with Nato and particularly the US.

The policy dispute began in April when Akashi [the ranking UN official in Bosnia] blocked plans by Nato for air attacks on Serbs surrounding Gorazde after the Serbs failed to meet an ultimatum to withdraw. Last week, [end of April 1994] Akashi publicly criticised the [Clinton] administration for refusing to send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia . . . on Saturday, a senior military officer and a senior civilian official with the UN in Sarajevo said the Bosnian government had greatly exaggerated the damage and casualties in Gorazde in the hope of encouraging Nato to attack the Serbs. The officials' comments made it clear that the two top UN officers in the former Yugoslavia, Lapresle of France and Rose of Britain, also had opposed the Nato air strikes, arguing

that they would turn the Serbs against the peacekeepers, force the UN to end its operations and prolong the war.²⁵

This vignette represents the seeds of dissent that led to a widening rift between the Clinton administration and the UN as the Bosnian crisis progressed.

Under the dual key operational plan constructed by Nato and the UN for use during the Bosnian crisis only UN commanders could call in air strikes, and until the autumn of 1994, they alone chose the targets to be hit. Also operationally until the autumn of 1994, the UN commanders warned the Serbs when Nato was about to strike, which of course greatly limited the effectiveness of any such action and as the siege of Bihac illustrates, gradually led to the elimination of any deterrent effect air strikes may have had on the Serbs.

Neo-realists in Congress found this operational arrangement incomprehensible. They also objected because the operational plan effectively bound the US to European and UN policy dictates, and eliminated any possible role for unilateral American initiatives, a cardinal sin for both democratists and neo-realists. While the institutionalist administration did not object to the dual-key operational procedure with the UN *per se*, it increasingly regarded the UN as feeble and incompetent and saw it as a barrier to an effective multilateralist policy. For example Akashi stopped Nato bombing Serb forces around Gorazde, even after they failed to meet a deadline the UN had mandated, as he argued they were withdrawing, if slowly. The Clinton administration saw the failure to promptly reply to this technical violation of a UN directive as yet another example of the Serbs besting the international community in a test of will. The administration was not as prepared to ignore Serb violations of UN resolutions as were the UN officials and European allies who led UNPROFOR. Differences over Gorazde highlight the split between the Europeans and UN, who were concerned primarily with the security of the UNPROFOR forces, its humanitarian mission, and a desire to contain the war and bring it to a close under almost any circumstances; and the Clinton administration, which while prizing international consensus still saw the Muslims as the victims of the conflict and wanted a marginally tougher international response to Serb transgressions.

The Gorazde example illustrates that the rhetorical aspects of Western differences on Bosnia policy got increasingly out of hand, thereby weakening the international community's efforts in the eyes

of the Serbs. Akashi's intemperate remarks about the US did Clinton political damage as they were grist for the mill of neo-realists such as Senator Dole, who disliked UN and European primacy over the international decision-making process regarding the Western response to the Bosnian conflict. The increased rhetorical differences between the US, the Europeans, and UN officials called into question just how stable the international consensus was over Bosnia, despite the fact that allied consensus was the administration's central selling point for its institutionalist policy. These rhetorical attacks on the US also reinforced the neo-realists' suspicion that UN officials were themselves hopelessly pro-Serb. For example that senior UN officials should blame the people of Gorazde for overstating the damage to their city, inflicted by temporary Serb flouting of the UN resolutions regarding safe havens, struck many who were neither neo-realists nor democratists as being a case of blaming the victim.

Neo-realists and democratists in the US encouraged the public belief that the UN would do almost anything to end the conflict quickly, including sanctioning Serbian victory in the war. As Paul Lewis noted, 'US officials complain that Akashi is too conciliatory toward the Serbs. The envoy says he has a personal "friendship" with Karadzic and calls him "a man of peace".'²⁶ Such ludicrous statements further galvanized neo-realist critics of the administration, as they called into question American deference toward the UN and the European allies' initiatives regarding Bosnia. If Akashi's judgement was so flawed, why should the US harness its policy to an operational procedure that revolved around his determinations about the usefulness of air strikes? Nor was Akashi the only hate-object for both Clinton administration officials and critics of American policy. Lieutenant-General Rose, the British commander of UN forces in Bosnia, also criticized the American position. As Roger Cohen noted, regarding the Contact Group plan, 'The map, prepared by the US and four other countries as part of a peace agreement, is regarded by Rose and the British officers who surround him as unrealistic, ill-conceived and unfair to the Serbs.'²⁷ In a state such as the US, where civilian control of the military is so total as to often preclude any public statement by a serving officer that would be critical of government policy, such a diatribe was culturally misjudged. The notion of a UN officer criticizing the US for being unfair to the Serbs alienated the democratists and neo-realists in Congress, who viewed the Bosnian conflict as the result of

Serb aggression in the first place. Increased disagreements between UN officials and the US transformed a marginal difference over policy into an outright cooling of even the institutionalist Clinton administration's enthusiasm for viewing the UN as a candidate for the role of global policeman.

While the US advocated a marginally more aggressive approach to the Bosnian conflict than its European allies, its policy was still very much within the institutionalist context. As Williams and Marcus noted, 'The Clinton administration's more aggressive approach to the Bosnian conflict involves two tracks: threatening Serb forces with air attack unless they stop the "strangulation" of Sarajevo, and pressing the Muslims to accept a proposed partition of Bosnia.'²⁸ The goal was to threaten the Serbs to the negotiating table but the outcome of the talks would still be predicated by an institutionalist recognition, that in order to end the war the Serbs would be allowed to gain from their aggression and the Muslims would not be aided in their efforts to roll back Serb territorial gains. So while the administration was slightly more bellicose in its policy than the Europeans, both were still well within the overall institutionalist rubric.

This triumph of institutionalism can be seen in the Clinton administration's adoption of the Contact Group initiative, which was partly predicated on the idea that a speedy end to the conflict would greatly ease humanitarian suffering even though the Serbs would be unjustly rewarded for their aggression. As Cohen illustrated, 'In drafting and backing a new map for a territorial settlement in Bosnia, the Clinton administration has taken an extraordinary step: It has formally backed the handover to Serbs of towns in which tens of thousands of Muslim civilians were killed, put in prison camps or evicted.'²⁹ By the spring of 1994, with its acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan for Bosnia, it was obvious that the Clinton administration had solidified its institutionalist stance.

The administration's choice of an institutionalist policy for Bosnia makes increasing sense. Whether damned or supported the President's policy was a consistent and coherent response to the crisis, contrary to accepted conventional wisdom. The President's overall institutionalist desire for Europe to shoulder more of its own security burden dovetailed nicely with his specific Bosnia policy. As Pfaff concluded, 'Like President Bush, President Clinton called the Yugoslav crisis a European responsibility and said the US would

back whatever the Western Europeans decided to do about it.³⁰ As Bosnia was objectively a low priority in the US hierarchy of interests, it is not surprising that the Clinton White House was happy to follow the lead of its European allies particularly as its subordinate role in decision-making regarding the Bosnian crisis was congruent with its overall institutionalist European policy in general. The decisive reason Washington adopted an institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia is that to do otherwise was seen as imperiling American initiatives toward Russia and Europe, both of which were regarded as more important to the US than was Bosnia.

7 Political Analysis of the American Response to the Bosnian Crisis

This chapter will examine how overall American foreign policy outputs were derived in the time of the 103rd Congress (January 1992 – November 1994), by assessing the relationship between the White House and the Congress and classifying the collective schools-of-thought priorities of the executive and legislative branches of the American government. In the Conclusion, this process will be repeated regarding American policy toward Bosnia during the time of the 104th Congress, with the schools-of-thought paradigm serving as an analytical tool to assess the climax of the crisis, the Dayton Peace Accord.

Something must now be said about the bureaucratic political method which, coupled with schools-of-thought analysis, provides the methodological background to this endeavor. The bureaucratic politics method is the natural partner of schools-of-thought analysis. The paradigm asserts that 'politics within a government influences decisions and actors ostensibly directed outward'.¹ Thus the key to any analysis of US foreign policy-making must rest on a vision of the government as a series of bureaucratic fiefdoms, where individuals and organizations compete for the political power to most strongly influence overall decision-making. As Rubin argued, 'Perhaps the greatest difficulty in understanding US foreign policy arises when the process itself is left out of consideration. Anyone who has dealt directly with international affairs knows that these human elements and bureaucratic considerations cannot be ignored.'² The large degree of pluralism that is indicative of US foreign policy decision-making is a unique feature distinguishing America's policy-making process from that of other states. As this is the case the schools-of-thought orientations of the leaders of government bureaucracies, such as the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the collective schools-of-thought ethos of these bureaucracies themselves, for example the general institutionalist orientation of the State Department, become crucial factors in charting the bureaucratic interplay that results in overall American foreign policy outputs.

This book will utilize both Graham Allison's organizational processes model and his bureaucratic politics paradigm in analyzing America's response to the Bosnian crisis. He indicates their compatibility for fusion in his assessment of the two paradigms as emblematic of his double-pronged assault on the standard rational actor model of foreign policy decision-making. Allison reasoned, 'Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine – the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process.'³

The organizational processes model sees foreign policy as largely predicated on the outputs of large organizations, functioning according to regularized patterns of behavior.⁴ It concentrates on the notion of the distinctiveness of the bureaucracies operating within the American government. As Neustadt observed,

operating agencies owe their existence least of all to one another – and only in some part to him [the president]. Each has a separate statutory base; each has its statutes to administer; each deals with a different set of subcommittees at the Capitol. Each has its own peculiar set of clients, friends, and enemies outside the formal government. Each has a different set of specialized careerists inside its own bailiwick.⁵

These differing functions and interests lead to fundamental differences in overall schools-of-thought orientations between the various bureaucracies. As Allison noted, 'Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of distinct individuals encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be important',⁶ or in the famous phrase, 'Where you stand depends on where you sit.'⁷ Thus Allison sees operational differences between bureaucracies as largely facilitating perpetual cleavages that lead to genuine differences about what is in America's general interest. For example as Halperin noted, 'participants come to equate national security with the interests of their organization'.⁸ Those who decide to work at the Department of Defense are likely to feel that national security is largely determined by military power, at least to a greater extent than the general American public. Every day this initial belief is reinforced by confined contact at work with others who, having joined the military for similar reasons, are likely to share a general

neo-realist orientation. This is how individuals are socialized into bureaucratic structures, and the reason these organizations are likely to retain unchanged their collective schools-of-thought orientation.⁹

The organizational processes model leads one to the conclusion that a decision-maker must be sensitive to his/her organization's schools-of-thought orientation,¹⁰ and that this collective orientation can constrain his/her policy options. For example the institutionalist Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, was poorly received by the neo-realist Department of Defense who complained of his bureaucratic shortcomings to the press. Aspin was eventually replaced by William Perry who, while an institutionalist, had significant neo-realist minority beliefs, particularly regarding US relations with Russia and the American position on Bosnia, both primary Pentagon concerns.

The organizational processes model identifies governmental bureaucracies as powerful factors in overall US foreign policy formulation. American foreign policy outputs are seen as an amalgamation of bureaucratic governmental organizations and interests, with the president acting largely as the coordinator of these divergent governmental strains. As Rubin argued, 'the State Department, National Security Council Staff, White House aides, Defense Department, CIA and Treasury and Commerce departments each represent a portion of reality which must be brought together to make or end decisions'.¹¹ The model correctly recognizes, as Schurmann put it, 'the dual nature of the state – as a realm of ideology and a realm of interests'.¹² While the schools-of-thought paradigm explains the nature of the ideational struggle within the American government, it is the organizational processes model and the bureaucratic politics paradigm that help discern the roles both interests and bureaucratic power play in the American foreign policy decision-making process.

It is, however, Allison's bureaucratic politics model that proves most useful in applying a schools-of-thought analysis to American foreign policy. While the organizational processes model correctly identifies government institutions as central players in the making of American foreign policy, the bureaucratic politics model perceives the essentially conflictual nature of American foreign policy decision-making. Such decision-making results from various bargains struck by bureaucratic players in the national government.¹³ The bureaucratic politics paradigm sees the government as an arena

where these differing bureaucracies compete for power at the expense of other entrenched organizations. Further, the bureaucratic politics model sees this conflict as being carried out largely by individual decision-makers representing both personal and bureaucratic interests. Adherents of the paradigm feel that to correctly analyze how decisions are reached in American foreign policy it is essential to ascertain: who is primarily concerned with the issue? (who is playing the bureaucratic game?); what determines each player's stand?; and what determines each player's influence?¹⁴ This analytical list will be used in a modified form in this assessment of American foreign policy responses to the Bosnian crisis.

It is important to note the natural linkages between the bureaucratic politics model and schools-of-thought analysis. Firstly, both methodological tools relate to specific individuals who are central to the American foreign policy-making process. Where bureaucratic politics analysis stresses power relationships, schools-of-thought analysis reveals how bureaucratic players determine their policy stands more convincingly than either the organizational processes model or the bureaucratic politics paradigm. While accepting that bureaucratic position and organizational orientation help determine an individual decision-maker's policy preferences, schools-of-thought analysis provides the crucial ingredient as to what primarily decides a bureaucratic player's policy orientation. Hence, it is an important refinement of the bureaucratic politics model.

The three overall factors posited as determining bureaucratic political outcomes in American foreign policy in the post-Cold War era are modifications of Allison's bureaucratic political analysis. A player's bureaucratic success is suggested to be determined by his/her: bureaucratic position, and its general structural power within the American government; the personal characteristics of each individual decision-maker that hamper or enhance the player's power; and the ideational fervor each decision-maker brings to the table regarding specific issues.

A player's bureaucratic position, and its general strength within the government, is crucial in determining his/her chances for political success. For example, both tradition and the constitutional elaboration of powers mean that the views of a Secretary of State are usually considered more influential in determining overall American foreign policy outputs than those of an Assistant Secretary of Defense. The bureaucratic politics model has demonstrated that the president does not make foreign policy alone. This modi-

fication of the bureaucratic politics formula acknowledges this, but also stresses that while there are many bureaucratic pieces on the chessboard, as in chess, these pieces are not all equally powerful.

A player's personality effects the bureaucratic equation, as Halperin stated, 'The single most important determinant of the influence of any senior official is his relationship with the President',¹⁵ and this relationship is largely influenced by the personalities involved. To win the president's trust a player must illustrate that he/she has mastered his/her bureaucratic brief, and yet still has the president's interests at heart.¹⁶ Often these two considerations will be in conflict, for example if the schools-of-thought orientation of a bureaucratic department does not jibe with the predilections of the president. Also, the attributes needed to master a bureaucratic brief: intellectual dominance; vigorous leadership; and adopting the bureaucracy's concerns; do not wholly coincide with the traits required to show the president that a player has his interests at heart. These traits include: a sublimation of personal views for the administration's good; the propensity to be a 'team player'; and the ability to override bureaucratic objections and make presidential preferences into policy.

If a player can personally master these contradictions his/her bureaucratic reward is great. It includes the power implicit in the general acceptance of 'closeness' to the single most important foreign policy decision-maker, measured by how seriously the president considers the player's views, and in access to the chief executive. As Smith stated, access is both a channel for doing business and is also emblematic of presidential trust and bureaucratic importance.¹⁷ While the impact of personality on the decision-making process is difficult to analyze, it is essential to apprehend.

Lastly, success in bureaucratic politics relates to a player's ideal fervor. As Halperin stated,

If power in general depends on relationships with the President, power on a particular issue may depend much more on the amount of time, energy, and interest one is prepared to devote. A senior official who is prepared to devote substantial energy to a problem can exert influence far beyond his ordinary performance. The same is often true of a junior official who has the confidence of his principal and devotes himself passionately to any one issue.¹⁸

This fervor is largely predicated by schools-of-thought considerations. For example, democratists in the Clinton administration have exerted an influence far beyond what their political power would deem probable in the debate over policy to Russia. This influence can be largely explained by the fact that for the democratists Russia policy is *the* crucial issue confronting America today. As such, democratists like Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott were prepared to devote significant political capital to influencing the President.

The most obvious, and in many ways the most important bureaucratic competition, is the eternal battle between the presidency and Congress for control of American foreign policy. The executive branch has dominated foreign policy since the 1940s,¹⁹ but Congress is not without institutional power regarding foreign affairs.²⁰ Indeed, as Patterson argued,

Congress is probably the most impressive specimen of its genre. Among other things it is a powerful *legislative* [his emphasis] body. In an era in which law-making has in most countries fallen heavily into the hands of executives, the American Congress continues to be a significant, independent law-making institution, capable of legislative innovation and able to undertake the creative art of law-making without executive leadership if necessary.²¹

Congress's most potent power is, 'to refuse to vote public moneys for foreign policies with which it disagrees'.²² Congress pushes its agenda through control of foreign affairs appropriations. In the area of foreign aid Congressional amendments to appropriations bills enabling the president to conduct foreign policy usually contain riders that reflect congressional opinion as to how that money ought to be spent. Hence, through its control of all government expenditure, Congress is assured relevance in foreign policy decision-making.

Constitutionally there is little doubt the Founding Fathers intended Congress to play a large role in foreign affairs decision-making. They gave Congress sanction to: regulate commerce; ratify treaties (in the Senate); raise and maintain armed forces; control immigration; impose tariffs; and most importantly, to declare war (Article I Section 8).²³ As Schlesinger observed, 'it should not be in the power of a single man to bring the country into war - [this]

unquestionably expressed the original intent',²⁴ of the Founders. That many of these powers have been operationally ceded to the presidency is not a sign of Constitutional intent, but rather of the executive's successful struggle throughout the twentieth century, particularly during the Cold War, to wrest the foreign policy initiative for the executive branch.

Yet there is no doubt that the Founders intended the president to play a central role in foreign policy decision-making. Noted constitutional scholar Edward Corwin, paraphrasing *The Federalist Papers*, lists four general reasons for presidential leverage over Congress,

- (1) unity of office – whereas the president operates as a single decision-maker, Congress speaks with many voices
- (2) secrecy and dispatch – the president conducts policy in private away from public scrutiny. Congress by its nature is a very public institution
- (3) superior sources of information – the president has access to information from the entire executive branch apparatus
- (4) presidential availability – whereas Congress must meet formally and act as one body, the president has the flexibility to act without formal processes, increasing his ability to respond to rapidly changing events.²⁵

These prodigious institutional advantages have enabled the president to dominate foreign policy-making throughout the history of the American republic. As Lee Hamilton noted, 'We [the Congress] can modify, we can alter. But the fundamental policy remains the president's policy. . . . I think a president can win any foreign policy issue if he fights hard enough for it.'²⁶ While this may be overstating the president's power somewhat, the quotation neatly illustrates the general preponderance of presidential power over the legislative branch in the making of foreign policy.

One of Corwin's points needs to be further discussed as it bears directly on this schools-of-thought analysis of the Bosnian crisis. The executive branch's unity of office gives the chief executive a huge advantage in maintaining schools-of-thought coherence *vis-à-vis* the Congress. The president selects his advisers and cabinet and can fire them at will, whereas individual senators have no role to play in selecting their fellow colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee. The president is likely to select foreign policy advisers

who share his schools-of-thought orientation, and in any case, even if they deviate from the executive's schools-of-thought line, as he can fire them, the president has the vast preponderance of power within the executive branch in setting its overall schools-of-thought orientation. This bureaucratic advantage means the executive branch's schools-of-thought orientation is apt to be more coherent and less divided than any congressional schools-of-thought response to a foreign policy issue. This institutional advantage goes a long way toward explaining the Clinton administration's success in determining that American policy regarding Bosnia remained institutionalist during the time of the 103rd Congress.

The presidency was granted broad if limited powers in the Constitution. Although Congress was given the power to declare war, the president, as Commander-in-chief, was delegated the responsibility for conducting all military operations. The Constitution also mandated that the president is to receive foreign envoys, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors to serve America abroad.²⁷ The president was also granted the responsibility for negotiating treaties, that to become law need a two-thirds majority in the Senate. This constitutional enumeration of powers leads one to conclude that the Founders generally expected the president to run foreign policy, but the Congress, especially the Senate, was to have a legislative veto over the executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs.

In reality, inter-branch conflict over foreign policy decision-making was and is as inevitable as anything is likely to be in the social sciences. This is because inter-branch conflict has both structural and bureaucratic origins. Bureaucratically, the nature of the American system itself has made inter-branch conflict likely. As in other cases of bureaucratic politics, differing operational duties lead to different perceptions being formed in the Congress and the executive branch. This leads to endemic conflict. The President is asked to solve major national and world problems, his constituency is uniquely the entire country. Congressmen's constituencies are more local and parochial.²⁸ It is not surprising then that these two branches should disagree about many issues, as their bureaucratic interests and areas of competency are so unlike. For example over the ratification of NAFTA, President Clinton argued that on balance the accord was in America's interest. Even if this objectively was the case, it is not surprising so many members of the House derided the treaty and voted against its ratification. For a congress-

man from a district that would be hurt by the agreement, such as one with a large work force that manufactured textiles or had a large union representation, even if NAFTA was in the national interest it was most assuredly not in the local interest, and as the local interest motivates the electorate of a congressman, he/she would ignore its dictates at his/her peril. The struggle between the presidency and the Congress is in many respects merely the institutional reflection of a deeper conflict inherent in any state between differing national and local interests.

It is a major underlying premise of this book that with the end of the Cold War, presidential dominance of foreign policy decision-making is at an end. As Hart noted,

In times of crisis, other branches of government, and other powerful influences within the American political system, tend to stand back and let the president get on with the job But in non-crisis times, the American polity is less enthusiastic about presidential leadership and less willing to give the president a free hand. In these more normal periods, the political system reverts to type and becomes what it was originally designed to be, a system of multiple centers of power.²⁹

We are now returning to a more normal time, and hence to a more 'normal' American foreign policy system of presidential leadership but not dominance of the decision-making process. The urgencies of the Cold War era have given way to more diffuse, less immediate threats to American security. This has practical consequences for the inter-branch rivalry between Congress and the president. As Jamison argued, 'with the passing of the strategy of containment as a central organizing principle between the executive and legislative branches of government on questions related to the international role of the US, age-old questions of the purposes and conduct of US foreign policy are returning'.³⁰ These questions have been raised anew by the Clinton administration's handling of the Bosnian crisis, but have not yet been answered. What is clear is that congressional actors will play an increased role in foreign policy decision-making in the post-1989 era, compared with that of the Cold War. For a schools-of-thought analysis of American foreign policy to be accurate, congressional leaders' schools-of-thought orientations need to be examined, as well as executive elites', for a comprehensive picture of the American foreign policy decision-making process to emerge.

THE SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT STANCE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DURING THE 103rd CONGRESS

As was noted in Chapter 6, the executive branch has maintained a strong institutionalist stance throughout the Bosnian crisis. This point is affirmed by the fact that the five individual policy-makers classified in Chapter 5 who work in the executive branch (Clinton, Christopher, Perry, Lake and Talbott), all individually favored the institutionalist position toward Bosnia. It is now necessary to examine how this overall policy output was arrived at in the executive branch by looking again at each of the five individual's commitment to his schools-of-thought priority, and then at their personal and bureaucratic power within the executive branch.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher

An institutionalist stance on Bosnia reflects Secretary Christopher's personal preferences, however ideational fervor is not Christopher's most outstanding personal characteristic. Rather, as Leslie Gelb noted, he is, 'not a policymaker and has no known policy agenda ... he thinks case by case'.³¹ Secretary of State Christopher emerges as a competent technician, rather than as an ideologue eager to stamp American foreign policy with his overall schools-of-thought views. It is Jim Hoagland who comes closest to accurately probing the essence of the man. Hoagland stated, 'A lawyer, Christopher took the President on as his client and has been willing to argue whatever case the President wanted argued, no matter what his own views were.'³² While Secretary Christopher undoubtedly held institutionalist views regarding the Bosnian crisis, a sign that he did not play the primary instrumental role in setting the overall institutionalist direction of US policy regarding Bosnia is that he simply lacks the ideological commitment for the part.

Although the Secretary of State is traditionally the dean of American foreign policy formulation, second only to the president in bureaucratic clout, Christopher has not assumed the major role in foreign policy-making that other Secretaries of State have held throughout American history. Christopher had served in government before, under Lyndon Johnson as Deputy Attorney General, and under Carter as Deputy Secretary of State, where he made a name for himself by negotiating the release of the American hostages with Iran. Thus Christopher came to the administration with

federal government experience, unlike many on the Clinton team, giving him a large bureaucratic advantage in that he was used to the unique political culture of the capital city. The Secretary also has a relatively close relationship with President Clinton.³³ An example of this close tie is that Christopher was co-chairman of the Clinton transition team and headed the search that led to the selection of Al Gore as Vice-President, tasks normally assigned only to highly trusted aides.

Yet Secretary of State Christopher has proven to be a bureaucratic loser within the Clinton administration, and has wielded far less power than had originally been thought likely. Most put this disappointing bureaucratic record down to the personality of the Secretary himself. As Anthony Lewis reported, *The Times* of London put it well, 'Christopher may have qualities, but dynamism, creativity, vision and leadership are not among them.'³⁴ Woodward concurred, describing Christopher as, 'A small man, with a wizened face and a hesitant voice, Christopher was known for his caution and ability to lawyer any problem to death.'³⁵ While caution and painstaking attention to detail may be admirable qualities for a lawyer to possess, they help little in winning bureaucratic arguments in the rough-and-tumble world of Washington politics.

Christopher has been unable to win policy battles at the cabinet level, or quell dissent within the State Department. At first it appeared that the cautious Christopher would fit in well running the State Department, which has a bureaucratic reputation for staid circumspection. Beyond the Secretary's personal caution meshing with State's bureaucratic culture, Christopher and the State Department shared a general institutionalist orientation. Yet despite these affinities, 'in the department there is a general agreement that there has not been such public protest by those charged with carrying out a policy since the height of the Vietnam war',³⁶ as there has been over Bosnia.

The revolt against the administration's Bosnia policy was centered at the middle and lower levels of the State Department. As Jon Western, one of four mid-level staffers who quit the department over Bosnia policy stated, 'The dissent is not confined to the European bureau. I've covered or been associated with the Yugoslav issue since the outbreak of hostilities. In my time, I have met one, possibly two people, in the department below the level of assistant secretary who believe in the policy.'³⁷ This wholesale revolt had a democratist, rather than a neo-realist

schools-of-thought focus. As Marshall Freeman Harris, the chief State Department adviser on Bosnia, noted while resigning, 'I can no longer serve in a Department of State that accepts the forceful dismemberment of a European state and that will not act against genocide and the Serb officials who perpetuate it.'³⁸ This democratist indictment of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy signalled that the Secretary of State could not keep order, even in his supposed bureaucratic stronghold.

Nor does Christopher fare much better at the cabinet level. Most agree that President Clinton personally dominates the Secretary of State. As Friedman and Sciolino noted, 'Another thing that strikes foreign visitors is how President Clinton alone conducts the [foreign policy] meetings from the American side, while his aides seem rather intimidated. His secretary of state and national security advisor speak only if called upon by the President.'³⁹ This lack of confidence in Christopher by the President can be seen in several bureaucratic instances. As Christopher's White House critics noted, 'he has failed, most recently with the Haiti crisis, to project an image as a strong Secretary of State. With the exception of the Middle East, they say, he has essentially ceded policy portfolios to subordinates or other government agencies.'⁴⁰ The Secretary has failed at the most basic level of bureaucratic politics, to protect and expand his bureaucratic 'turf'. For example during the Haitian crisis, Secretary Christopher was not included in a key meeting to discuss Jimmy Carter's Haitian plan unlike National Security Adviser Tony Lake, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili, and Strobe Talbott.⁴¹ Christopher's exclusion from the decision-making process of an issue so obviously within his bureaucratic responsibility is a telling sign of his increasing irrelevance regarding American foreign policy formulation.

Likewise, the President has himself undermined his Secretary of State. As Devroy reported, 'President Clinton will wait until the end of the year [1994] to decide whether his administration's much-criticized performance in international affairs merits the replacement of Secretary of State Christopher or other members of his foreign policy team, according to senior officials and outsiders who have talked to the President.'⁴² The White House did not even bother to issue the customary denial of this scathing report. That Christopher was put on probation regarding his very bureaucratic survival as Secretary of State is the most damning indication that he

was not the bureaucratic locus behind the executive branch's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia.

Secretary of Defense William Perry

While the Secretary of Defense is a major bureaucratic player in the American government, the President's overall institutionalist orientation means that the Pentagon is organizationally not as important as it would be under a neo-realist chief executive. Thus Perry came to the job knowing his general bureaucratic position would be less advantageous than that enjoyed by powerful Secretaries of Defense like Robert McNamara, Caspar Weinberger and Dick Cheney. The initial signals seemed to suggest that Perry's personality would not be a bonus in his dealings with the President; yet it has proven his chief bureaucratic strength. For Secretary Perry has mastered his brief,

uniformed leaders say, he [Perry] has restored a sense of order and discipline to the Pentagon, streamlining the department's policy shop by eliminating 2 of the 6 Assistant Secretary jobs and conducting crisp, clear meetings that begin on time and often end with a decision. In the process, he has helped repair the Clinton administration's sometimes prickly relationship with military leaders, who chafed under Aspin's lax management style and perceived habit of limiting major decisions to a small circle of civilian aides.⁴³

Secretary Perry's popularity at the Pentagon also stems from the fact that he has long been a part of its bureaucracy. He was Aspin's chief deputy and first served as a technical consultant to the DoD in the 1960s, and later as Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering under President Carter. Perry's appointment was well-received by the Pentagon bureaucracy as it saw his tenure as signalling that at last 'one of us' was rightly running the armed services, as opposed to the 'outsider', Secretary Aspin. Perry's bureaucratic triumph within the DoD enhanced his status with President Clinton, who had reason to be pleased that his cultural and bureaucratic troubles with Defense had been contained.

Yet as is so often the case, the personality aspect of bureaucratic politics cut both ways for Secretary Perry. While the President was grateful to him for quelling the dissent in the Pentagon toward the

administration, the very qualities that make Secretary Perry successful at running the DoD limit his relationship with Bill Clinton. Perry's popularity at the DoD is based partly on the fact that he is not an intimate of the President. Yet this lack of intimacy limits Perry's overall bureaucratic power. As Freedland observed, Perry was the President's fifth choice to be Secretary of Defense (after Aspin, Inman, Nunn, and Rudman), hardly a ringing personal endorsement.⁴⁴ Nor does Perry have the easy access to the President that is so often indicative of a strong personal relationship with the chief executive.⁴⁵ The major reason for this personal distance is because Perry is perceived by the Clinton administration as having been partly captured by the Pentagon bureaucracy.

That Perry should be captured by the DoD bureaucracy is not a strange phenomenon. As Halperin argued, 'The pressures on Cabinet officers from their subordinates, as well as from outside pressure groups, is so great that they often come to see themselves as their department's representative to the President.'⁴⁶ Regarding Bosnia, as was shown in Chapter 5, Secretary Perry agreed with the President's institutionalist stance, but for largely neo-realist reasons. This anomaly can be explained by his adoption of the Pentagon's point of view regarding American military intervention. In general the Pentagon has been against new military commitments by the US and has opposed post-Vietnam American military intervention.⁴⁷ In Bosnia the Pentagon saw civil war and quagmire instead of a case of clear-cut Serbian aggression. The DoD feared that arming the Muslims and utilizing possible air strikes to protect the Bosnian government before the weapons arrived, could lead to deeper American involvement. Secretary Perry embraced this departmental position which, though it coincided with the President's policy, was determined more by intra-bureaucratic interests and processes.

The reason that Secretary Perry was easily co-opted by his department is that he has exhibited little ideational fervor of his own. As Drew recounted, Perry is 'essentially a technical man, with no real policy-making or political experience, or practice as a public communicator. Perry was solid but colorless as Lake and Christopher.'⁴⁸ While Secretary Perry was definitely a player regarding the Bosnian crisis, as his skillful mastering of his brief enhanced his power status, his lack of ideological zeal, symbolized by his co-option by the Pentagon over Bosnia, and his lack of personal closeness to the President meant he was not the principal architect

of America's Bosnia policy. Nevertheless, he was a bureaucratic political force militating against any change in the administration's position on Bosnia.

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake

Like Christopher and Perry, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake is in a position of significant bureaucratic political power due to the fact that he holds the last of the three major governmental positions devoted to foreign policy in the Clinton administration. As NSA he is the senior official most closely tied to the President. Therein lies the power and limitations of Lake's unique office.

The National Security Adviser has a dual function, he alternatively manages the foreign policy process as well as serving as a source of independent advice for the President.⁴⁹ In his function as coordinator of the foreign policy process the NSA administers National Security Council meetings by setting their agenda, briefing the President and controlling the preparation of material prior to each meeting.⁵⁰ The NSC members are by law: the President; the Vice-President; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the NSA; and any other officials the President desires to attend the meeting. The Clinton administration has rarely used the formal NSC apparatus, preferring the informality of the Principals' Committee, which is composed of the NSC core members. This bureaucratic shift has cost Lake little power, as he simply coordinates foreign policy informally at his mid-week lunches with Secretaries Christopher and Perry. Lake's role as overall coordinator of the administration's foreign policy is a significant source of bureaucratic power.

The NSC staff and NSA are not only part of the executive branch, but also part of the President's personal staff. As such, they are not subject to review by Congress. Thus the NSA is the only one of the three major foreign policy actors serving under the president in the executive branch not subject to congressional oversight. This lack of a congressional check on the NSA is another major source of his/her power.

Thus the key to the NSA's power, even more than for the other executive branch foreign policy actors, is his/her relationship with the President. As DeParle observed, 'Lake alone sees President Clinton on a daily basis.'⁵¹ This proximity to the president is even more bureaucratically important in the Clinton administration than

is usually the case. As a top administration official argued, 'Because the President is not involved in foreign policy as much as other presidents have been, Tony is in a unique position. He is the only one who sees the President every day. That puts him in a very strong position to be the interpreter',⁵² of foreign policy issues. Nor are Perry and Christopher likely to attack Lake's prerogative. As DeParle argued, 'Lake gains an additional edge from the colorless qualities of his would-be rivals, Christopher and Perry.'⁵³

However, unlike Christopher and Perry, Lake does not have an independent Cabinet power base. The NSA's very bureaucratic closeness to the president is also a limitation on his/her bureaucratic power. The growth in the power of the NSA has been a symbiotic process, whereby the president himself has accrued greater power through independence from the foreign policy bureaucracies at State and Defense. The NSA serves as the president's specific emissary in bureaucratic battles. While Lake undoubtedly has real bureaucratic power in the Clinton administration, in the end, 'the NSC is and must remain essentially a surrogate for the President'.⁵⁴ The president is more master than servant of the NSA. This lack of an independent bureaucratic base is a severe bureaucratic limitation of Anthony Lake's power.

Nor do Lake's personal characteristics make it likely that he will confront foreign policy issues as an equal with the President, as Kissinger and Brzezinski nearly did during their powerful tenures as NSA. Like Perry and Christopher, Lake is a team player who values consensus highly. During the Carter administration, like Christopher, Lake served as one of Secretary of State Vance's top aides, as director of policy planning in the State Department. As Heilbrunn argued, 'Still haunted by memories of the warfare between Vance and Brzezinski when he worked in the Carter White House, Lake has sanctified the notion of collegiality into a mantra.'⁵⁵ Thus like Secretaries Christopher and Perry, although Lake is in a strong bureaucratic position by virtue of his top position within the Clinton administration, his collegial temperament does not earmark him as the driving force behind American foreign policy outputs.

Nor does Lake enjoy a close personal relationship with President Clinton, compared with either Secretary of State Christopher or Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. As a high-ranking administration official observed, 'Tony always gives you the impression that he is not that sure of his relationship with Bill Clinton. I can see it in meetings; he is nervous of it.'⁵⁶ Lake, who became a top foreign

policy adviser to Bill Clinton during the campaign, nevertheless came to the job late, and is not considered a 'true believer' in the President. Thus despite Lake's bureaucratic advantage of seeing the President every day, his physical proximity to him is not matched by a personal closeness.

As Chapter 5 illustrated, Lake is an institutionalist both generally and regarding Bosnia specifically. Yet Lake was not happy about the UN's lack of military resolution in the face of Serbian provocation. As Heilbrunn argued, 'Lake has managed to appear more hawkish than the administration [regarding Bosnia] and yet completely loyal to it.'⁵⁷ What Lake desired was a more muscular form of institutionalist policy in Bosnia. For example, he championed the threat of Nato air-strikes to deter Serb attacks on the safe havens of Sarajevo and Gorazde. Lake ultimately desired a revamping of, but not a fundamentally altered, institutionalist policy in Bosnia. Lake's personality and bureaucratic limitations made it unlikely he would be the central executive actor behind the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy. However his advocacy of a more hawkish brand of that policy made it also doubtful that he would favor a fundamental schools-of-thought change in overall American policy regarding the conflict. In his bureaucratically important role as NSA Lake was likely to support attempts to make the West's Bosnia policy more muscular through the increased use of air-strikes, while remaining committed to the administration's overall policy.

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott

Nor was Strobe Talbott the key figure molding the executive's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia. The Deputy Secretary of State brings both a strong personality and a clearly defined ideational vision to the foreign policy arena. Talbott's personal bond with the President is strong, as the two men shared digs at Oxford when both were Rhodes Scholars in the late 1960s. As Adams stated, 'he [Talbott] is one of the few people with instant access to the Oval Office – better than Warren Christopher, his ostensible boss'.⁵⁸ As access to the president and an official's relationship with the executive are two crucial aspects of bureaucratic political power within the American system, Talbott is well placed to exert influence on American foreign policy as a whole.

Yet there are significant bureaucratic limitations on Talbott's power. Before he was Deputy Secretary of State, Talbott was

Ambassador-at-large to the CIS states and he is still thought of primarily as a Russian expert rather than as an actor crafting overall foreign policy. While Talbott's personality and strong democratist convictions have greatly affected US policies regarding aid to Russia and questions about European security, he had little direct impact on the administration's Bosnia policy. Talbott's influence regarding the conflict was largely indirect, as he has played a major role in setting the administration's democratist Russia-first policy, which, as was illustrated in Chapter 6, partially motivated its institutionalist Bosnia stance.

Talbott's bureaucratic power is also limited in the sense that as Deputy Secretary of State he is in too junior a bureaucratic position to actively drive the Clinton administration's overall foreign policy. Given his unique relationship with the President and his clear democratist orientation, Talbott has probably maximized the amount of bureaucratic power that can be retained by someone not of cabinet-level status. As for Talbott being the driving force behind overall American foreign policy, he is simply too junior an official to be considered for the role. For the part of chief instigator of the administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia, one must look to President Clinton himself.

President Bill Clinton

Is this not the President that was supposed to concentrate on domestic affairs? Just because it is true that Bill Clinton has spent little time on foreign affairs does not mean he has not dominated American foreign policy-making. The standard perception of a President inattentive to international affairs is largely correct. As Hoagland noted in the first ten full months of his presidency, "The President has chaired just eight full NSC meetings . . . or about one a month."⁵⁹ Apart from an intensive involvement in the promotion of free trade, as is evidenced by his leadership regarding the NAFTA treaty, the President has not devoted much energy or attention to foreign affairs.

This lack of focus on foreign affairs mirrors candidate Clinton's pledge to spend the bulk of his time as president on domestic reform, as opposed to the conduct of President Bush. Thus the President's domestic priorities directly affected his administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy, which advocated the least amount of American involvement in the conflict of the three major schools of

thought. This is a strong indication that despite the President's lack of attention to foreign affairs, he personally was still firmly in charge of the executive branch's foreign policy outputs.

In fact it was the fatal combination of President Clinton's lack of attention to foreign affairs coupled with his dominance of the foreign policy-making process, that many critics pointed to as the major reason for the administration's oft-criticized foreign policy. For critics of the President, it is bureaucratically the worst of all possible worlds. Bill Clinton proved personally unable to turn foreign policy-making over to a strong Secretary of State, so he could concentrate on the domestic reform program that led to his election. Instead he still dominated the policy outputs for international affairs, without giving them the time they so obviously warranted.

The very bureaucratic foreign policy formulation process itself reflects the dominance of the president in conducting international affairs. Friedman and Sciolino assessed the bureaucratic nature of how the executive branch obtains its foreign policy outputs (see Chart 7.1). According to them, there are several levels of foreign policy bureaucracy working within the administration. At the lowest level are the Interagency groupings for different issue areas, such as Russia, Iraq, and Haiti. Meetings at this level are conducted by Assistant Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, who prepare policy option papers for the Deputies' Committee. The Deputies' meeting, attended by the Deputy Secretaries of State (Talbot), Defense, and Treasury send their policy recommendations to The Principals' Committee, which is comprised of the Secretaries of State and Defense (Christopher and Perry), the Permanent Representative to the UN (Albright), the National Security Adviser (Lake), the Director of Central Intelligence (formerly Woolsey), and usually the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Shalikashvili), who make recommendations which are sent to President Clinton.⁶⁰

This process is designed to produce consensus, with each committee sorting out its bureaucratic differences before passing a unified position on to the next level of policy-making. This is precisely what the President had in mind. As Gelb stated, 'he [President Clinton] almost always urges them [top aides] to think broadly and act cautiously within a consensus'.⁶¹ One of the president's powers is the ability to arrange the foreign policy decision-making process to suit his personal idiosyncrasies. As such, the exact decision-making procedures regarding foreign policy

Chart 7.1 A Flowchart of the Clinton Administration's Bureaucratic System Leading to Foreign Policy Outputs

(inspired by Thomas L. Friedman and Elaine Sciolino, 'Under pressure, Clinton Crafts A Foreign Policy', *IHT*, 23 March 1993)

A Interagency Groups for specific areas (eg Russia, Haiti)

- Assistant Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury

Policy Recommendations

B Deputies Committee

- Deputy Secretaries of State (Talbot), Defense, Treasury

Policy Recommendations

C Principals Committee

- Secretary of State (Christopher)
- Secretary of Defense (Perry)
- National Security Adviser (Lake)
- Director of Central Intelligence (formerly Woolsey)
- Permanent Representative to the UN (Albright)
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Shalikashvili)

Policy Recommendations

D President Clinton

Policy Outputs

vary president to president. Bill Clinton's bureaucratic process rules out the administration adopting bold or risky foreign policy initiatives, for instance advocating the democratist stance on Bosnia, as risky positions by definition will almost never lead to consensus.

This desire for consensus reflects the personality of the President himself, and is another indication that he is the primary actor determining the executive branch's institutionalist Bosnia policy. The President has been consistently accused by his critics of valuing consensus over both fixed principles and even good policy. It has been charged the President is, 'so open to suggestion as to be practically an empath',⁶² like the Woody Allen character Zelig, who assumed the opinions and mannerisms of all those he met. This criticism is largely unfounded. The President brings a strong institutionalist orientation to crafting foreign policy. Yet it is true that he values consensus far more than conviction politicians like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. That his bureaucratic

foreign policy decision-making process reflects traits in Bill Clinton's personal character is a strong sign that he is central to foreign policy formulation within the executive branch.

Like President Carter before him, Bill Clinton has been accused of being unable to delegate responsibility even regarding an area such as foreign policy where he has a secondary interest. This propensity can be seen in the administration's overall bureaucratic method of obtaining foreign policy outputs (see Chart 7.1). In the Clinton administration's decision-making structure, the ultimate decisions about policy are made only at the highest level by President Clinton himself, instead of by one of the cabinet officials, as has sometimes occurred in American history.⁶³ Yet as former President Nixon remarked, 'No secretary of state is really important. The president makes foreign policy.'⁶⁴ Nixon was correct about the vast power of the presidency making it possible for the executive to dominate foreign policy-making in the executive branch. Certainly this has been the case with President Clinton. Indeed as was noted in Chapter 5, it is no mistake that the President's specific policy preferences regarding Bosnia, Russia, and Europe perfectly reflect administration policy and overall American foreign policy as well. This result merely confirms that President Clinton himself played the major bureaucratic role in concocting the administration's overall institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia.

THE SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT STANCE OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH DURING THE 103rd CONGRESS

Next it is important to determine the overall schools-of-thought orientation of the 103rd Congress, by identifying the crucial actors responsible for the formulation of Congress's schools-of-thought policy preferences. This orientation is almost wholly determined by the Senate. For beyond an ability with the Senate to limit presidential requests for funding, the House plays little role in shaping foreign policy outputs. This was the intent of the Founders, who gave the Senate rather than the House the power to ratify treaties and approve foreign policy appointments. They did so because the creators of the Republic felt the House, whose members are elected every two years, was too susceptible to public opinion to be involved as a major participant in foreign policy-making, which

required long-term thinking about policy initiatives. This institutional fact is the reason that all the congressional decision-makers surveyed here reside in the Senate. While this analysis does not include every major foreign policy actor in the Senate, enough are discussed so that an overall congressional schools-of-thought orientation can be discerned.

Before individual senators are assessed regarding their role in forming the legislative schools-of-thought orientation of the 103rd Congress, some general bureaucratic comments about the nature of the Senate's specific decision-making process would be helpful. Firstly the Senate was politically divided throughout the 103rd Congress, in a way in which the bureaucratically more compact executive branch can institutionally never be. There are simply more players involved in creating the Senate's overall schools-of-thought orientation than will ever exist in the more exclusive executive branch. Also the 103rd Congress, though nominally Democratic, did not have a working majority on most issues. The Democrats, with only 56 votes, fell short of the 60 needed to end a filibuster.⁶⁵ Thus, without compromising with Republicans, Democrats would be unable to advance any foreign policy initiatives, as the Republicans could obstruct any critical vote by talking the issue to death without fear of having their filibuster overridden. This trend toward moderation was bolstered by the ideational make-up of the upper chamber, as the Senate was generally less partisan and more moderate than the lower chamber. About 25 of the Democrats in the Senate were liberals, with around 25 Republicans affirming a solidly conservative agenda. That left half the votes, and the bulk of the political power, with the moderates of both parties.⁶⁶ This moderate tilt of the Senate made radical foreign policy initiatives, such as the democratist prescription for Bosnia, unlikely to emerge as the foreign policy choice of the chamber.

Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell

Mitchell became Senate Majority Leader in 1988, and soon used this top position to make himself a major participant on almost every issue that the Senate dealt with.⁶⁷ This was likely to occur as the majority leader traditionally directs legislative strategy regarding key bills. After the election of President Clinton Mitchell's position became if anything more important, as he was expected to steer

legislation favorable to the President (they did disagree strongly about China's MFN status) through the treacherous waters of the Senate. As the President and Mitchell shared an institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia it became Mitchell's task to thwart any congressional attempt to unify around legislation inimical to President Clinton's policy predilection, such as the Dole-Lieberman amendment which would have lifted the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and effectively scuttled the President's supremacy in crafting Bosnia policy.

George Mitchell emerged as a key figure in determining the overall congressional schools-of-thought policy preferences regarding the Bosnian crisis as a result of both the bureaucratic power the Majority Leader wields in the Senate, and how this power is expanded in foreign affairs debates when his/her schools-of-thought orientation coincides with that of the executive branch. While it was not in the realm of political possibility for Mitchell to ignore the strong neo-realist revolt in the Senate against the President's handling of the Bosnian crisis, as shall be illustrated later in this chapter, he was able (just) to preserve the President's policy by keeping most Democrats (who were, after all, mainly institutionalists) in the fold. Mitchell's crucial institutionalist input into the overall congressional schools-of-thought orientation helped keep congressional opinion divided and, in so doing, ensured the ultimate supremacy of the Clinton administration's policy regarding Bosnia during the 103rd Congress. The Majority Leader shocked many by retiring after the 103rd Congress.

Senator Joe Biden – Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee

Senator Biden was one of the few key decision-makers in the Senate who espoused the democratist policy preference regarding Bosnia. Thus while Biden's strong ideational fervor was evident, unusually, this may actually have been a hindrance to his successful pursuit of his democratist goals regarding Bosnia, as he was so politically out of step with both the Congress and the American people in general. Biden's schools-of-thought orientation's lack of political acceptance made it essential that if his views were to be relevant regarding the Bosnian debate, he would be forced to compromise.

Senator Biden's personal character helped advance his democratist viewpoint regarding Bosnia. *Politics in America* noted that Biden's

character does not quite eclipse his reputation as somewhat of a political lightweight. It stated, '[Biden has] the talent and charisma to be an influential Democrat for decades to come. He is personable, conciliatory, and an impressive orator. Yet a question remains: Does he radiate more heat than light?'⁶⁸ While Biden's prodigious gifts are partially offset by questions about his intellectual seriousness, in the case of the Bosnian debate his skills were successfully exploited. Biden's character does not make him much of either a legislative strategist or a drafter of laws. 'With his glib tongue and preference for action, his strength is at the podium, not the bill-drafting table.'⁶⁹ During the time of his alliance with the neo-realists in the 103rd Congress, Biden's strengths were catered for. While neo-realists such as Senators Dole and Lugar plotted legislative strategy and drafted the Dole-Lieberman amendment, Biden was utilized as a spokesman in the Senate for the anti-Clinton position on Bosnia. Biden used his bureaucratic position as Chairman of the European Affairs Subcommittee as a personal pulpit to attack the administration's Bosnia policy, often lecturing Secretary Christopher about American inaction over Bosnia in the full glare of television cameras. With the Democrats defeated in 1994, Biden no longer held his pivotal post. Yet with his reputation for being good copy for the media, Senator Biden's personal talents continued to make him a powerful foe of the administration's institutionalist policy. Due to his democratist fervor regarding Bosnia, Biden continued to play a large role in the democratist/neo-realist coalition that remained determined to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims.

Senator Richard Lugar – Ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee

Senator Lugar is a perplexing figure for the schools-of-thought paradigm. While as Chapter 5 attested he is a solid neo-realist on a wide range of foreign policy issues, including Bosnia, as time progressed Lugar increasingly questioned the wisdom of the thrust of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, seeing in it a diminution of presidential authority that would hurt the US both then and in the future. While Lugar generally agreed with his neo-realist colleague Senator Dole about the short-comings of the administration's Bosnia policy, he came to question the neo-realist legislative strategy he formerly supported in the 103rd Congress. Instead he valued broad

historical precedents that stood to be lost regarding presidential primacy in foreign policy-making, if a version of the Dole–Lieberman amendment was enacted, over concerns about the specific merits of the Bosnian case.

As a result of his personal abilities, Lugar has managed to retain a large amount of power over congressional foreign affairs decision-making despite some bureaucratic setbacks. Lugar, who was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1985 to 1986, lost control of the chairmanship due to both Republican defeat in the Senate in 1986 as well as the machinations of Jesse Helms, noted Republican anti-communist firebrand, who used his seniority over Lugar to become the ranking Republican on the committee. Lugar was able to remain more prominent than Helms on the Foreign Relations Committee due to both Helms' increasing lack of vitality after major heart surgery and the lack of relevancy of his anti-communist philosophy, which after the failed August Coup became increasingly outdated. Lugar's reputation as an articulate conservative capable of genuine bipartisanship made him, 'his party's de facto leader on the broad fronts of agricultural policy and foreign affairs'.⁷⁰ His success in remaining a Senate leader regarding foreign policy is a testament to his perceived personal skills, rather than to Lugar holding a leading bureaucratic position as he once had.

Still Lugar, as the ranking Republican on the European Affairs Subcommittee in the 103rd Congress, was both personally and bureaucratically well-placed to play a key role in determining Congress's overall schools-of-thought orientation regarding Bosnia. A solid neo-realist, he closely collaborated with Senator Dole in supporting the Dole–Lieberman amendment which so nearly scuttled the administration's institutionalist foreign policy thrust regarding Bosnia. So it came as a shock that, in the 104th Congress, Senator Lugar appeared to be hedging his bets about advocating congressional action that would lift the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims. As *The Economist* noted, 'Lugar criticised Dole's Bosnia and peace-powers initiatives because they would "tie-up the President's ability to take action".'⁷¹

This change in position is not without practical cause. In April 1995 Lugar formally announced his bid for the presidency. While many felt he had little chance to win, a large number of observers believed Lugar could well end up as Secretary of State in a new Republican administration.⁷² Lugar's change of position was in line with the standard neo-realist Republican view that Congress should

let the president take the lead in formulating American foreign policy.⁷³ While this volte-face may be largely tactical, a case of not wanting to handcuff the possible Republican president in 1996, and while Lugar did not clearly state that he would vote against his neo-realist ally Senator Dole over a new initiative to lift the embargo, clearly Lugar's position had changed. He adopted an undecided position over whether such a plan should be attempted again in the 104th Congress. While Lugar's neo-realist schools-of-thought orientation remained constant, his loyalty to Dole's neo-realist legislative strategy did not.

Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole

Senator Dole was the focus of neo-realist efforts in Congress to reverse the Clinton administration's institutionalist policy regarding Bosnia. As the statements in Chapter 5 indicated, there was no doubting Dole's neo-realist ideational fervor about the Bosnian crisis. He consistently and actively sponsored efforts to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, as is illustrated by his authorship of the Dole-Lieberman amendment, as well as his primary role in plotting legislative strategy for the anti-Clinton Bosnia cause in the Senate. Beyond his clear commitment to changing America's overall Bosnia policy, Senator Dole brought considerable personal skills as well as an unparalleled bureaucratic position to the Bosnia debate, making him a crucial factor in determining the overall congressional schools-of-thought orientation regarding the Bosnian crisis.

Dole's personal characteristics, which to some extent have hindered his presidential campaigns, have paradoxically enhanced his Senate career. Senator Dole's take-no-prisoners rhetoric has become legendary. The reason for Dole's meanness or strength (depending on one's viewpoint) can be traced to the battlefields of Italy in World War II, where Dole suffered grievous wounds which still cause him pain today.⁷⁴ The negative aspects of Dole's personality have plagued him nationally since the 1976 presidential campaign when Dole, as President Ford's running mate, harshly attacked the Carter ticket to the detriment of his own cause. As Cramer stated, 'Everybody knew Dole was . . . a hatchet man',⁷⁵ a tag that has stuck with Dole to this day. However in the Senate, Dole's rhetoric is seen as a component of a man who has the courage of his convictions, a man who engenders as much respect in the chamber as fear. It also provides Senator Dole with ample

political cover to be the bipartisan pragmatist that he is. As *Politics in America* stated, 'foremost he is a legislative pragmatist, a deal maker'.⁷⁶

Likewise Senator Dole's bureaucratic position helped him assume a leading role in developing Congress's schools-of-thought orientation regarding Bosnia. Dole has been the Republican leader in the Senate since 1984, and has made his position as chief Republican unassailable. It was as Minority Leader during the 103rd Congress that Dole utilized his considerable gifts, becoming one of the most important and effective minority leaders in Senate history. Senator Dole managed to keep his minority 44 Republicans together on issues such as the President's stimulus plan, where his filibuster strategy effectively killed this major Clinton initiative. Dole also easily scuttled President Clinton's Health Care plan, which had been the centerpiece of his legislative program. Even when the President was successful, as over NAFTA, Dole provided the majority of the Senate's votes for the President, and thus claimed a large share of the credit for what should have been viewed as a victory for Clinton. Dole, as the successful and undisputed chief Senate Republican legislative strategist of the past ten years, was indeed central to the development of Congress's schools-of-thought predilections regarding the Bosnian crisis.

THE INTERACTION OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT STANCES DURING THE 103rd CONGRESS

As the last section of this chapter illustrated, unlike the White House, the legislative branch had collectively a conflicting schools-of-thought orientation. While powerful Senate leaders in foreign affairs, such as Dole and Lugar, advocated a neo-realist position, equally important Senators, such as George Mitchell, advanced the President's institutionalist stance. It is this division in the schools-of-thought orientation of the various Senate leaders that largely explains the administration's success in maintaining its institutionalist policy over Bosnia during the time of the 103rd Congress.

There are other factors which explain the White House's success in maintaining its Bosnia policy. Even with the end of the Cold War era, it is certainly true that the executive branch has much more of a role to play in determining foreign policy outputs than does the

legislative branch. Historically, 'except for treaties, tariffs and an occasional declaration of war, foreign affairs were generally understood to be the prerogative of the Executive'.⁷⁷ This historical expectation that the president is and ought to be the primary actor determining foreign policy outputs, has had a subtle but telling influence on executive-legislative relations regarding international affairs, making Congress hesitant to override the presidential will on foreign policy-making, whether it agreed with him or not. President Clinton used this point to his advantage in the Bosnian crisis as hesitant legislators backed the Nunn-Mitchell amendment despite reservations about the President's institutionalist Bosnia policy, citing the historical precedent of presidential authority in determining overall American foreign policy initiatives.

In light of the presidency's obvious institutional advantages, what is striking about the schools-of-thought controversy regarding America's Bosnia policy in the 103rd Congress was how close the anti-Clinton congressional forces came to success. Almost all the bureaucratic advantages the president generally enjoys over Congress regarding foreign policy-making went President Clinton's way over Bosnia. The President did dominate the executive's schools-of-thought posture toward Bosnia. The same, of course, could not be said for Congress, where Majority Leader Mitchell used his considerable powers to oppose Senators Dole and Lugar, who attempted to overturn the arms embargo placed on the Bosnian Muslims. Despite all these advantages, the President was forced to compromise. His supporters in the Senate on Bosnia, such as Mitchell and Sam Nunn, the powerful Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in a desperate attempt to defeat the Dole-Lieberman amendment to the Defense budget, introduced the Nunn-Mitchell bill which generally supported the President's institutionalist policy preference regarding Bosnia, but at some cost. 'The bill stated the President would have until October 15 [1994] to seek multilateral support for lifting the arms embargo. Failing that and failing a peace agreement, all funds supporting the involvement of US forces in the embargo would end on November 15 [1994].'⁷⁸

This was enough to win over a sufficient number of wavering institutionalist Senators, and guarantee the continued survival of an overall institutionalist policy. In defense of his amendment, Nunn stated, 'I think the time has been - really, is overdue, in terms of lifting the embargo. But I believe it matters how we do it. I do

believe it matters that we coordinate what we do with the British and the French.⁷⁹ This desperate institutionalist rationale to siphon off natural Dole supporters succeeded but only because, as the quotation illustrates, Nunn conceded the central point that the embargo ought to be lifted, and soon. Clearly a majority of Senators were for some strategy that eventually led to a lifting of the embargo in July 1994. In the end, waverers decided to give the President more time to rally the European allies around a plan to end the embargo on the Bosnian government. However some former hesitant supporters of the President, such as the democratist Senator Biden, had had enough. In the earlier spring 1994 vote on lifting the embargo, Biden argued, 'We should lift the arms embargo, but we should first make one more attempt, in good faith, to end it where it began – in the UN Security Council.'⁸⁰ Then Senator Biden voted to give the administration conditional support for an interim period to lift the arms embargo. By July 1994 his patience had run out and he voted with Senator Dole on Dole–Lieberman. Senator Biden's changing legislative position reflected a general move in the Senate toward Senator Dole's neo-realist policy prescription on Bosnia.

Thus while the embargo would not be unilaterally broken as the neo-realists called for, Nunn–Mitchell, with its conditions for ending US involvement in the enforcement of the embargo, was not a ringing endorsement of the President's institutionalist position either. The Nunn–Mitchell compromise passed only after Vice-President Gore killed Dole–Lieberman by breaking the tie in the Senate vote of 1 July 1994. How had the neo-realists managed to come so close to overturning the President's institutionalist policy?

That Senator Dole and his allies almost managed to severely embarrass the President (doubtless he would have vetoed the defense budget if Dole–Lieberman had passed, and Congress would have been unable to override the veto), gives an indication of the perceived degree of failure of the administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy. Critics of the President's policy believed it to be flawed, as it failed to bring the benefits institutionalists had insisted such an initiative would result in if their policy preference was pursued. For example, despite the institutionalist priority for preserving Western unity whatever the Bosnia policy, Western European leaders, particularly in Britain and France, hearing President Clinton deride their policy preferences regarding Bosnia as he went along with them, reacted coolly to the American position. Likewise

while President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy did not seriously damage Yeltsin's position, as the Chechnya conflict illustrates neither did it prevent him from appeasing some of his nationalist foes at the expense of relations with democrats such as Yavlinsky and Gaidar.

These diplomatic failures of the American institutionalist line coupled with the fact that the war in Bosnia continued, despite a general appeasement of the Serbs, called into question the validity of the policy itself. While Americans were no more prepared to go to war on behalf of the Bosnian government in November 1994 than they had been in May 1993, with the failure of Clinton to seriously try, as he had promised to under Nunn–Mitchell, to unite the allies behind a plan to lift the embargo, the neo-realist option was adopted increasingly throughout the Republican Party. After the stunning Republican triumph in the mid-term elections, and the corresponding growth in strength for the neo-realist school of thought at the expense of the institutionalist position, it was an open question as to whether President Clinton could successfully use his veto to override the renewed neo-realist onslaught on his Bosnia policy in the 104th Congress.

8 Schools-of-thought Analysis and the Culmination of the Bosnian Crisis

One of the problems with any study of International Relations is that its shelf-life is limited. This truism is particularly apt for a discipline that revolves around analysis of current events as the factor of time makes many studies of International Relations merely the assessment of a 'snapshot', while the world quickly moves on. A truly useful International Relations work, like fine literature, art, or cinema, must be able to stand the test of time. So how has schools-of-thought analysis of the Bosnian crisis, initially made during the time of the 103rd Congress, stood the test of the tumultuous events that have occurred during the 104th Congress? As this chapter shall illustrate, the schools-of-thought policy preferences of leading decision-makers have exhibited quite a remarkable constancy as the Balkan crisis culminated in the Dayton Accord of November 1995.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE DAYTON ACCORD

At the domestic political level the schools-of-thought orientations of the leading decision-makers in the administration and the 103rd Congress remained markedly fixed during the 104th Congress. True to form, the neo-realist, Senator Dole, reintroduced an amendment to lift the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims on the first day of the new Congress' session, 4 January 1995. The new Dole bill, again cosponsored by Senator Lieberman, would have required the President to end US participation in the arms embargo against the Bosnian government after UN peacekeepers withdrew from Bosnia or within twelve weeks of a request by the Bosnian Muslims.¹ Sven Alkalaj, the chief Bosnian emissary to the US, indicated that if the Dole bill survived a presidential veto, this was a request the Bosnian government would immediately make.²

In late July and early August of 1995 the congressional-executive showdown over Bosnia, largely predicated by their differing collective schools-of-thought orientations, came to a climax. On 26

July the Senate passed the Dole–Lieberman bill 69–29, with Senators Dole, Lugar, and Biden all voting in favor of the initiative in line with their respective neo-realist and democratist policy preferences. Their position mirrored the feeling of the general public. In a *New York Times*/CBS poll taken in the summer of 1995, 61 per cent favored lifting the embargo on the Muslims with 24 per cent opposing such a move.³ Comparing this Senate vote with the earlier Dole–Lieberman efforts is instructive. Whereas the 1994 vote resulted in a close defeat for Dole–Lieberman the 1995 bill not only passed, but the initial tally was two votes beyond what was needed to overturn a presidential veto. This illustrates the political slippage the administration endured between the summer of 1994 and the summer of 1995, as a result of both its institutionalist policy in Bosnia failing to meet with success and large neo-realist gains made in Congress due to the Republican victories of November 1994. By the early summer of 1995, the Clinton administration's institutionalist Bosnia policy was in real political peril.

The President's political position regarding Bosnia was even worse in the House, which had been dramatically transformed into a neo-realist Republican bastion by Speaker Gingrich's November 1994 triumph. On 1 August the House voted 298–128 to support the Dole–Lieberman bill. It became apparent in the summer of 1995 that the House would easily be able to override President Clinton's expected veto of Dole–Lieberman, but that the Senate vote would be a cliffhanger. It appeared that the vote would be decided by the position of moderate Republicans clustered around Senator Lugar and conservative Democrats grouped with Senator Nunn of Georgia. Lugar, while voting for Dole–Lieberman, was still unresolved as to what to do regarding a second Senate vote to override President Clinton's veto. As Chapter 7 attested to, Lugar believed that the president, not Congress, should take the lead on national security issues, a standard neo-realist point of view. Doubtless the President planned to vigorously lobby Lugar and other moderate Republicans to try to take advantage of the neo-realists' contradiction between their specific antipathy to President Clinton's institutionalist Bosnia policy and their general belief that the executive branch should take the lead in American foreign policy formulation.

However the focus of the crisis shifted once again, away from the ornate chambers of Congress back to the ghastly killing fields of Bosnia. Here for the first time the battlefield initiative came to rest

with the Bosnian Muslims, or more exactly their Croatian allies. In the fall of 1995, after Croatia had earlier recaptured the Krajina from the Croatian Serbs, a joint Bosnian-Croatian offensive retook much of northwest Bosnia, so at its end they controlled approximately 50 per cent of Bosnia itself. Sarajevo, long the symbol of suffering in Bosnia, was at last out of range of Bosnian Serb artillery shells as it was protected by British and French soldiers on the ground, and decisively, by American servicemen in the air. How did this dramatic change come about and what does it say about the earlier schools-of-thought analysis of the American response to the Bosnian crisis?

There is no doubt that the situation in Bosnia changed dramatically in the summer of 1995. Croatia's lightning thrust into the Krajina was the immediate, historical reason for the shift in the fortunes of the war. Even more importantly the shift was accepted by Serbia proper, which did nothing to overturn the Bosnian and Croatian gains beyond calling on the international community to curb the Federation offensive. Milosevic came to accept that roughly half of Bosnia would remain under Bosnian and Croatian control, based on the fact that the West would not allow all of Bosnia to be overrun. In this context Milosevic's non-action makes sense. He was merely allowing losses in Bosnia to occur, as eventually he would have been forced to trade such land in negotiations anyway. In return for his restraint, Milosevic hoped to receive both condonation by the West of Serbian gains in Bosnia as well as a lifting of the crippling sanctions imposed on his country.

What was more surprising was that after so long American and Western European resolve began to stiffen. The fall of the UN safe haven of Srebrenica to Bosnian Serb forces 11 July 1995 was the worst blow of the war for the UN. The Bosnian Serbs were so contemptuous of UN authority as to overrun an area designated as under UN protection. Rightly they guessed that the UN commander, General Bernard Janvier, would not live up to the UN commitment to defend the Muslims in Srebrenica. In the end the UN authorized four planes to make a pinprick attack on the rampaging Bosnian Serbs. Even this woefully inadequate response was halted when the Bosnian Serbs predictably took the Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica hostage.⁴ The Bosnian Serbs then committed the single worst war crime in Europe since World War II, killing perhaps 6000 mainly Bosnian Muslim men by the banks of the river Drina, an

Chart 8.1 The Culmination of the Bosnian Crisis

January 1995	A four-month cease-fire, negotiated by Jimmy Carter, goes into effect.
May 1995	Nato bombs Pale which leads the Bosnian Serbs to take 350 UN peacekeepers hostage. Bombing stops. In response, Britain and France reinforce their peacekeepers with a Rapid Reaction Force.
July 1995	The Bosnian Serbs overrun the UN 'safe havens' of Srebrenica and Zepa. At Srebrenica the greatest human rights violations in Europe since World War II are perpetrated, as up to 6000 Muslim men are exterminated. Nato says any further attacks on the remaining safe areas (Sarajevo, Bihac, Gorazde) will lead to massive air strikes.
26 July 1995	The Senate votes 69–29 to end the arms embargo on the Bosnian government.
August 1995	Croats retake Krajina from the Croatian Serbs. New American peace plan is formulated with the Western European allies. The Bosnian Serbs delegate their negotiating powers to Milosevic.
1 August 1995	The House votes 298–128 to end the arms embargo on the Bosnian government.
11 August 1995	President Clinton vetoes congressional legislation to end the arms embargo on the Bosnian government.
September 1995	After Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo in late August, Nato commences a two-week massive bombing campaign. A Muslim–Croatian offensive takes much of northwest Bosnia.
12 September 1995	Russia fails in the UN to end the air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs.
12 October 1995	Cease-fire in Bosnia.
1 November 1995	Peace talks begin in Dayton.
8 November 1995	Russia agrees to serve in peacekeeping mission. Russian troops to serve under US (not officially under Nato) command.
21 November 1995	Peace deal initialed in Dayton by Izetbegovic, Milosevic, Tudjman.
13 December 1995	Congress, while not supporting the Dayton Accord, grudgingly decides to do nothing to hinder it.
14 December 1995	Dayton Accord formally signed in Paris.
19 January 1996	All sides pull back 4 kilometers from the front lines with IFOR in between in accordance with the Dayton Treaty.
31 January 1996	Nato to be fully in place to enforce the Dayton Accord.
February 1996	All sides to cede territory to comply with the Dayton Accord.

atrocities so systematically planned that there is evidence General Mladic actually watched the killings.⁵ The President's increasingly reactive institutionalist policy, which implicitly ceded the European peacekeeping powers' control of the West's response to the Bosnian crisis, left the administration far too disengaged to halt the slaughter at Srebrenica. As Engelberg and Weiner noted, 'Clinton officials said they did not believe that the town was in imminent danger, nor did they know that General Janvier was balking at air strikes.'⁶ This outrage by the Bosnian Serbs made either an increased Contact Group effort in Bosnia or total UN withdrawal the only possible options, as the UN's frayed credibility was at last completely shattered. It was in the aftermath of Srebrenica that Nato warned that any further attacks on the safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, or Gorazde (Zepa also fell at the same time as Srebrenica) would be met with massive air strikes.

Not surprisingly, given the West's history of retreating from its rhetoric in the Balkans, the Bosnian Serbs did not view the new Nato threat as any more credible than the earlier warnings. On 28 August 1995 the Bosnian Serbs again shelled the Sarajevo marketplace. However this time the Western response proved different. Nato forces carried out a massive two-week bombing campaign that not only made the capital safe from Bosnian Serb shelling but also significantly damaged Serb command and control centers throughout Bosnia. In the end the Bosnian Serbs agreed to pull their artillery out of range of the city and to pursue negotiations with both the Croats and Muslims, under the auspices of Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. In two weeks Nato bombing accomplished more than the institutionalists had dreamed possible.

Yet this dramatic turning of the tide masked the great continuities linking American policy in the summer of 1995 with its efforts of the prior three years. *For US policy remained institutionalist.* America's more muscular form of institutionalism, exhibited in the summer of 1995, was the result of a policy driven by a series of domestic and international alarm bells that went off simultaneously, coupled with new opportunities that arose at exactly the time the more static institutionalist policy of the West was dying, along with the victims of Srebrenica.

The three alarms of: Srebrenica, European pressure to leave Bosnia, and congressional hostility to the arms embargo, made continuing the West's passive institutionalist policy toward Bosnia

impossible. In fact Srebrenica was described by senior administration officials as the most important event in transforming attitudes, here and in Europe, regarding the West's Bosnia policy.⁷ The Srebrenica disaster played into the hands of the administration's opponents, and fueled anti-institutionalist sentiment in the Congress. As Lippman and Devroy observed regarding the embargo override possibility, 'Clinton was staring at a potential domestic political disaster in which he would lose control over US policy',⁸ in Bosnia. As the President had largely lost control of the domestic agenda after the Republican mid-term triumph, repudiation of his Bosnia policy would have administered the coup de grace to his presidency. Clinton was forced to adopt new tactics to save the overall institutionalist thrust of his Bosnia policy. The President adopted a more hawkish version of institutionalism, epitomized by the stance of National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. The Clinton administration, seeing the danger the fall of Srebrenica and the congressional revolt against its Bosnia policy posed, adopted a more muscular institutionalist policy largely to disarm these threats and only secondarily as a response to the situation in Bosnia, which had not unduly concerned the President for over three years.

The third alarm bell, Western European pressure to end the peacekeeping ordeal in Bosnia, meant that the White House had little time to formulate new institutionalist tactics. As Apple noted, 'According to one official involved in the plans, the French and British alike sent word in recent days that they would have to decide by the end of this month [August 1995] whether or not to leave their soldiers in the peacekeeping force in Bosnia.'⁹ The President had obligated 25 000 American troops to assist the peacekeepers in withdrawing. This was something the administration wanted to avoid at all costs. To put American troops in harms way for the sake of extricating the West from a failed policy in Bosnia had all the earmarks of a political disaster. Western European pressure to decide quickly how to augment the UN peacekeepers concentrated the administration's thinking, as it raised the specter of a total failure of the West's Bosnia policy.

The President was able to adopt more muscular institutionalist tactics because of three new opportunities the summer of 1995 presented him. Firstly the Croatian invasion of the Krajina and the joint Muslim-Croatian offensive in northwest Bosnia highlighted that the war was turning against the Serb cause, and that it was now in their interest to negotiate to protect the territorial

gains they had won early in the conflict. Also the territorial division after the Croatian counterattacks left the two sides each with roughly half of Bosnia, in line with what the various Western peace plans proposed. For the first time the battlefield realities were in line with Western diplomacy, making a settlement more likely.

Secondly the emergence of President Chirac of France made a real difference in the Western response to Bosnia. Unlike his predecessor, François Mitterand, Chirac agreed with Clinton that Western policy should become more martial. In fact Chirac's France wanted to go further still, suggesting the radical democratist preference for Western ground troops to be employed in overturning Bosnian Serb gains such as those made around Srebrenica. As a top US diplomat at this time noted, 'The French want to attack, the Americans want to bomb, and the British want to have another meeting.'¹⁰ This crucial shift left the US policy option as the compromise position for the first time. The air strikes can be explained as another diplomatic maneuver to maintain Nato's precarious unity. However this time the compromise led to the enactment of an American policy preference. Thanks to Chirac allied consensus, so crucial for the institutionalists, allowed for the shift to a more aggressive Western stance.

Thirdly it was at last plain that Milosevic, the puppet-master of the Bosnian conflict, genuinely wanted peace. His central position in the Serbian leadership was illustrated by the fact that the Bosnian Serbs delegated their negotiating powers to him in August 1995. As both Karadzic and Mladic were indicted for war crimes their absence from the talks (as they would be arrested if they left Serbian territory) erased what would have been an extremist voice from the Dayton negotiations. Milosevic, in not intervening to save the Croatian Serb or Bosnian Serb territorial gains in northwest Bosnia, had shown he did not view Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb interests as identical to his own. The only explanation for this change in policy was that Western economic sanctions, as predicted by the institutionalists, were causing such grave harm to the Serbian economy as to possibly endanger Milosevic's long-term hold on power. This was the one major vindication of the institutionalist policy position regarding the Bosnian war. Sanctions had made Milosevic, however odious, a man the West could do business with.

Yet this 'new' plan was still very much institutionalist. The more muscular initiative was not enacted until it received the approval of Britain and France in late July – early August of 1995, in line with

the institutionalist belief in multilateralism. That the new initiative, embracing a more robust response to Serbian provocation while setting forth similar terms as a basis for negotiations, was primarily Anthony Lake's creation is beyond doubt. It was Lake who was sent to London 8 August 1995 to hammer out an agreement to bolster UN forces in Bosnia, a compact that eventually led to the massive Nato air strikes of late August-September. That Secretary of State Christopher was not the primary author of this new tactic is symbolized by the fact that it was Lake, not him, that led the American delegation to Europe. Such a stance was in line with the NSA's long-held views regarding Bosnia.

Lake's more muscular initiative proved an unqualified success in two central ways. It reunited the Western alliance (an institutionalist imperative) around a more aggressive policy after the Srebrenica debacle, and provided cover for the administration to derail Senator Dole's neo-realist challenge to its Bosnia policy. Even administration officials agreed that congressional pressure played a major role in moving Clinton.¹¹ The air strikes provided proof of the administration's resolve to get tougher with the Bosnian Serbs, at the same time opportunities to negotiate an overall settlement looked more promising than they had in years. This political cover not only allowed the President to veto Dole-Lieberman on 11 August, it also froze Congressional opposition in its tracks. The President cleverly played on fears that if Dole-Lieberman was enacted the British and French would realize their threat and withdraw their peacekeepers from Bosnia, with American troops to extricate them. This the neo-realist Congress did not want. As Doherty observed, for Republicans, 'The idea of lifting the arms embargo and arming the Muslims has won broad support precisely because it seemed a way to avoid direct involvement in Bosnia.'¹² While this threat was merely a variation on the Clinton tactic of hiding behind the UN peacekeepers to ensure a continuation of institutionalist policy, there can be little doubt it caused many in Congress to waver in their support for Dole-Lieberman.

However the explicit reasons the President gave for vetoing Dole-Lieberman were the same institutionalist precepts he had espoused since at least the spring of 1993. The President charged that lifting the embargo would cause the fighting in Bosnia to escalate, enhance the danger of the war spreading, endanger the humanitarian aid mission and create serious divisions with the allies.¹³ Bill Clinton's objections read like a list of institutionalist

priorities. The President also exploited the neo-realists' contradiction between their specific dislike of his Bosnia policy and their general desire to let the executive branch run foreign policy. He did this, paradoxically, by rallying his arch-enemy Bob Dole at least temporarily to his side. Dole stated he was 'willing to consider postponing Senate action [regarding a veto override] if the recent Western attacks prove to be part of a new and effective policy which leads to a just and lasting peace settlement'.¹⁴ While Dole did not agree with the President over Bosnia, his neo-realist belief in a strong presidency led him to delay the vote on the Senate override of Clinton's veto of Dole-Lieberman. Thus for neo-realist reasons, Dole gave the President's more muscular institutionalist tactics time to work.

Another sign of the continued institutionalist thrust of the administration's Bosnia policy was its desperate desire to include Russia in the Contact Group initiative. Given Yeltsin's avowed pro-Serbian sentiments this was not easy. That the administration persevered is a sign of just how important it felt it was to have all the great powers on board in case any settlement was reached. Under effective political criticism from the ultranationalists and especially the Communists who were patrons of the Serbian cause, President Yeltsin was under increasing political pressure to adopt a more pro-Serbian, anti-Western stance regarding Bosnia. As Hoffman observed, 'Anti-Western sentiment, stoked by ultranationalists, reached a fever pitch over Nato's aerial attacks on the Bosnian Serbs.'¹⁵ The air strikes, which the Western allies did not inform Yeltsin of in advance,¹⁶ confirmed for many Russians their demotion to second-class status on the world scene with the end of the Cold War. Under pressure, Yeltsin dispatched humanitarian aid to the Bosnian Serbs (which was not an infraction of the embargo), growled that continuing the air strikes might force Russia to rethink its policies regarding the Partnership for Peace Plan and even its commitment to the CFE and START 2 treaties, but this was largely bluster advanced for domestic consumption. The reality was that when Russia actually tried to do something concrete about the air strikes, to use the Security Council to halt them, it found out just how in the minority its pro-Serb position was after Srebrenica. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, only China sided with Russia, as Britain, France and the US all backed continuing the air strikes until the Bosnian Serbs removed their heavy artillery from around Sarajevo.

Yet in the frantic planning that preceded the Dayton Accord in November 1995, the Clinton administration successfully included Russia in the great power plan to enforce the Dayton Agreement. The end result was an organizational sleight of hand that somewhat mollified the Russians while including them in the agreement. Around 1500 Russian troops were to serve with an American division in Bosnia, but not under the direct command of Nato. (The fact that all American division commanders in Europe indirectly received orders from General Joulwan, the Supreme Nato commander, was a fact conveniently ignored by the Russians.) In attempting to explain the precise command structure of the IFOR mission, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said somewhat lamely, 'I would have to draw pictures and show you diagrams.'¹⁷ The reason that this bureaucratic fudge is important is that it provided Yeltsin with political cover as he did not have to justify why Nato, the old Soviet adversary, had preeminence over Russian military leaders in Bosnia. The clumsy force structure enabled Russia to participate in the mission, something the multilateralist-leaning administration dearly wanted. This points out the strong institutionalist character of the American position up to the signing of the Dayton Agreement.

THE DAYTON ACCORD

Before any analysis of the Dayton Accord can be undertaken, it is necessary to provide a brief synopsis of its main provisions. Territorially, Bosnia was divided into two 'entities', with the Bosnian Serbs getting 49 per cent and the Muslim-Croat Federation 51 per cent. Bosnia was not formally partitioned and was kept a single state, at least in name. Sarajevo, the symbol of the Bosnian government's cause, was united under Muslim control, and the Muslims also received a land corridor connecting the safe area of Gorazde to Federation lands. All Bosnian citizens are free to travel throughout the state, and roadblocks and checkpoints are to be dismantled. Eastern Slavonia, an oil-rich sliver of Croatia now under Serbian control, will revert to Tudjman in two years. International arbitrators will decide the fate of Brcko, a city linking the two halves of the Bosnian Serb domain. By early February 1996 all territories on both sides that are to be ceded in compliance with Dayton are to be

evacuated. The new owners of the ceded lands will be allowed to take possession of them 19 March 1996.

Governmentally Bosnia is to consist of three administrations, the Federation entity, the Bosnian Serb entity and the national government. The central government is to be chosen in free elections under international and UN supervision. Anyone charged with war crimes, such as Karadzic and Mladic, is to have no political part to play in any of the administrations. The central government is to have an ethnically rotating presidency (the same system that did not work in Yugoslavia after Tito), a parliament, a national court, and a central bank with a common currency linked to the Deutschemark. It will run foreign and trade policy, monetary policy and immigration matters. Bosnia will have no common defense, as each of the three ethnic groups gets to keep its army, and each military force is forbidden from entering the other's territory. As Mearsheimer and Van Evera observed, 'This means, in effect, that each regional government can defy the central government's wishes at will.'¹⁸ Each entity is allowed to establish a special relationship with a neighboring state, for example the Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb entity) can confederate in some undefined manner with Serbia proper. As Bruce Nelan noted, 'The biggest worry for Bosnians is that those links will turn into de facto secession and that Milosevic and Tudjman may yet divide up Bosnia.'¹⁹ This fear is well founded as the central government established by the Dayton Treaty is, unsurprisingly, very weak. Bosnia is both one state and two entities. These differing conceptions, the Muslim view of Bosnia as a single, multiethnic state and the Serbian vision of Bosnia as three ethnically-driven mini-states, are not reconciled in the Dayton Accord. They are a contradiction that will likely not long endure. Certainly the President of Croatia does not think so. As Mearsheimer and Van Evera stated, 'Tudjman tipped his hand last May when he told a British parliamentarian [Paddy Ashdown] that he envisioned a Bosnia eventually divided and conquered by Croatia and Serbia, a scheme he illustrated with a now-notorious sketch on a menu.'²⁰ With Bosnia's lack of a common defense to provide the central government with enforcement powers, it is more than likely the wily President of Croatia's assessment of Bosnia's long-term future will turn out to be accurate.

What blandishments were given in return for these concessions? Both entities are to have elections for president and a legislature, that is, at Dayton their ethnic administrations received codification.

Beyond the powers mentioned above that were preserved for the central government, all other governmental functions will be overseen at the 'entity' level. Milosevic, whose support was absolutely central to the diplomatic success at Dayton, had UN sanctions lifted against Serbia as a reward for his contribution to the agreement. The Bosnian government was promised economic aid by the US, EU and other friendly states such as Saudi Arabia and Japan. Croatia was also promised economic aid by the US and the EU, especially by its traditional ally Germany. But it was the American agreement to at last militarily aid Bosnia that was the most controversial reward given for the Dayton Accord.

Given the history of the Bosnian conflict, it was not surprising that the Muslims wanted guarantees of military aid as a precondition for signing the accord. The unwritten agreement with the Bosnian government for America to sponsor the arming and training of the Bosnian army was a key to the success of the accord, as it gave the Bosnian government the confidence to reach an agreement with its two militarily superior ethnic neighbors. As has been true throughout the conflict, the question of arming the Muslims was pivotal to the Bosnian crisis. However, faced with the strong criticism of the European allies, the US agreed to bolster Muslim security indirectly. Firstly the administration decided to contract the job of training the Bosnian Muslims to private companies composed of high ranking former American officers, such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which had trained the Croatian army so successfully. Thus the American role as a neutral arbiter of the Bosnian conflict, in the guise of IFOR peacekeepers, would not be compromised by the US directly arming the Muslims at the same time. This somewhat facile differentiation was intended to square the long-running circle in America's Bosnia policy as to whether the US was neutral or pro-Muslim. As always, the President's policy decision here illustrates an effort to be both.

Secondly, again due to European pressure, America would not immediately provide weapons to the Bosnian government. The accord calls for the Bosnian Serb arsenal to be half the size of that of the Muslim-Croatian Federation. Today the Serbs have ten times as many artillery pieces as the Muslims, and have 400 tanks to the Bosnian government's 100.²¹ Written into the treaty is a six-month extension of the arms embargo on all the signatories, during which time these force reductions are to be

achieved. If as is likely the time limit expires with no agreement eroding the Bosnian Serbs long-held weapons superiority over the Muslims, it is at this juncture the American promise to at last arm the Bosnian government comes into force. As Thompson stated, 'If the Bosnian Serbs refuse to disarm, the US has a solution: it will pour sufficient arms into the Muslim military to make it twice as powerful as the Serbs.'²² Friendly Islamic states such as Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt are willing to pay much of the cost of training and equipping the Bosnian army, estimated to be between \$100 and \$400 million. In its standard institutionalist deference to the allies, the Clinton administration was prepared to postpone giving the Muslims weapons and to urge them to pursue disarmament talks with the Bosnian Serbs. However, in deference to the neo-realist Congress, the President at last agreed to underwrite Bosnian security.

To implement this ambitious agreement the Nato-led peacekeeping force of IFOR was created, composed of 52 000 soldiers from 25 states. The US supplied around one-third of this number, with Britain and France supplying another one-third. While IFOR is under Nato control it is a truly multinational force, a fact pleasing to the institutionalist-minded administration. The IFOR troops were placed in three zones, with the British in Western Bosnia, the French headquartered in Sarajevo and the US billeted in Eastern Bosnia around Tuzla. Unlike the ill-fated UN peacekeepers IFOR troops have robust rules of engagement, meaning the well-armed soldiers can use almost any level of force they deem necessary. This change in the rules of engagement was pressed by the administration and is indicative of both its more militant institutionalist stance and as an effort to assuage the neo-realist Pentagon, perpetually nervous about American military involvement in the post-Vietnam era. In another concession to the neo-realist Congress IFOR is led by US Admiral Leighton Smith, who reports directly to the American, General Joulwan, the Supreme Nato Commander. IFOR is to separate the combatants, supervise their return to designated barracks, and patrol the four kilometer demilitarized zone erected on both sides of the cease-fire line throughout Bosnia. All three sides were given 30 days to withdraw behind the cease-fire lines, a process that was successfully completed by mid-January 1996. Within 120 days of the formal signing of the accord the combatants are required by Dayton to have completed moving their heavy weapons to designated barracks. The IFOR mission has a crucial advantage over the UN efforts at peacekeeping, it is

deployed in accordance with the wishes of all three ethnic groups. The early indications are that this reservoir of good will for IFOR has helped lead to compliance with the first provision of the Dayton Treaty, and that all three sides have indeed withdrawn and formalized the cease-fire lines.

However in many ways the IFOR mission is extremely limited. Again in deference to neo-realists in Congress and the Pentagon, IFOR troops are to stay in Bosnia only one year completing their final departure by December 1996. It is an open question as to whether this will be long enough to stabilize a state racked by a murderous war in which 2 million people have been the victims of ethnic cleansing. Another sign of the limited nature of the IFOR mission is that nation-building is left to civilian agencies, under the aegis of UN Commissioner Carl Bildt. Bildt is in charge of: returning refugees to their homes (though Dayton does not stipulate how this is to be done and most observers do not believe it will occur); supervising national and ethnic elections through the auspices of the OSCE; coordinating Croatian, Serbian and Muslim cooperation on war crimes evidence for the World Court in the Hague (something else agreed to in Dayton that most experts do not believe will happen); to commencing regional and intra-Bosnian arms control negotiations; and coordinating economic reconstruction efforts. IFOR is only in Bosnia to provide the stability that will facilitate these nation-building efforts. US troops are there for a very limited time with a very limited mission.

The President faced a daunting sales job with both the general public and the neo-realist Congress, if the institutionalist Dayton Treaty was to receive the minimum of domestic political support it needed in order to ensure American participation in IFOR. The President agreed to seek an expression of congressional support for any peace plan that entailed American troops being sent to Bosnia. He said he would seek a non-binding resolution of both Houses, which does not have the force of law. The President made it quite clear that as Commander-in-Chief he was determined to send American soldiers to Bosnia however Congress voted. Whatever the merits of the constitutional arguments as to whether the President could legally do this, politically the President very badly needed some sort of positive statement from Congress to sustain the IFOR mission.

The Dayton Accord was not popular with the general public. According to an ABC News poll, the disapproval rating of the

President's Bosnia policy actually increased after his prime-time speech to the nation, during which he explained the Dayton Accord, from 44 per cent to 50 per cent.²³ A *New York Times*/CBS poll showed 36 per cent of those polled in favor of sending US peacekeepers to Bosnia, while 58 per cent responded that American troops should be left out of the Balkans.²⁴ With his institutionalist Bosnia policy so unpopular both with the public and the neo-realist Congress, the President was forced to compromise, even during negotiations regarding the treaty, adopting some neo-realist planks in the accord so that the package stood a chance of receiving congressional approval.

Two basic initiatives of the Dayton Accord are neo-realist in nature, the prominence of Nato in the mission and the unwritten promise to arm the Bosnian Muslims. The first of these exposes a case where there was a congruence of viewpoint between the White House's more martial institutionalism and the neo-realist perspective. As Chapter 6 illustrated the President was fully disenchanted with the UN record of peacekeeping in Bosnia, and was likely to have pressed for Nato control over the mission even if he had faced no congressional pressure. As it was, making the enforcement of the Dayton Treaty a Nato mission suited both the institutionalists and the neo-realists. Illustrating their preference for utilizing international organizations to solve international problems, institutionalists saw in the divided zones of responsibility in the IFOR plan, and the fact that the US was contributing only 15 000 troops to the mission, evidence of a true multilateral construct. The institutionalists were also pleased that the UN, for all its shortcomings, is in charge of the civilian reconstruction program in Bosnia. For institutionalists Bosnia was a case where the international community was clearly present, acting as the global policeman.

The neo-realists favored Nato leading the IFOR mission for very different reasons. Rather than seeing Nato as an expression of the international will, neo-realists perceive it as an international organization that basically expresses the American point of view. As Dole stated, 'We are Nato as far as I'm concerned.'²⁵ For neo-realists the fact that Nato is largely a creature of American interests, particularly in Bosnia, is organizationally symbolized by the fact that an American, Admiral Smith, is in direct command of IFOR, and that another American, General Joulwan, is Nato's Supreme Commander. Thus neo-realists were confident Nato would largely

advance American interests in Bosnia and not primarily function as a multilateral organization.

The President very cleverly played upon neo-realist fears that Nato's efficacy could be at an end in advancing the Dayton Agreement. In the run-up to the congressional votes regarding sending American troops to Bosnia, the President, 'started to emphasize the broader issues, including the future of Nato and the damage that would be done by failing to act'.²⁶ It was a devastating argument to put to neo-realists who, unlike institutionalists, have commonly viewed Nato as the linchpin of American-Western European affairs. As Nato's credibility would be shattered if the Nato-dominated IFOR mission was to go ahead without the US, here neo-realists, who had not thought that Bosnia was a primary interest, at last found a reason for American involvement, the continued survival of history's most successful military alliance. As the Dole-McCain resolution, which tepidly backed the Bosnia mission, said, 'preserving US credibility is a strategic interest'.²⁷ Much of this credibility the US had invested in its leadership of Nato. Putting Nato at the forefront of the IFOR mission was a policy which united neo-realists and institutionalists, and was an essential reason the President obtained even the limited support he received for the Dayton Accord.

In agreeing to at last arm the Bosnian Muslims the President adopted an initiative that was unambiguously neo-realist. Without it the neo-realist Congress would have flatly rejected sending troops to Bosnia. The balance of power, a ruling construct of neo-realist thinking, required that Bosnia, if it was not to revert to war and cause another crisis for the Western alliance, must be militarily able to fend off covetous Croatia and Serbia in the future.

These considerations found legislative expression in the Dole-McCain resolution, which was the culmination of the President's effort to win congressional support for the Dayton Treaty. The resolution was a largely successful effort by Majority Leader Dole to place neo-realist shadings on to what was still an institutionalist initiative, as part of an uneasy, temporary compromise between the executive and legislative branches. In return for Dole-McCain, which claimed to support American troops in Bosnia even if not quite endorsing the agreements in Dayton, Dole asked for three conditions. Firstly, that IFOR be limited to the implementation of military provisions of the accord. Secondly, that IFOR's exit strategy be linked to a military balance of power which would leave

Bosnia able to defend itself. Thirdly, that the US lead that effort to give Bosnia the means to defend itself.²⁸ The President agreed to all three neo-realist conditions and the Senate voted in favor of Dole–McCain 69–30, with Senators Dole, Biden, and Lugar predictably all favoring the measure.

Yet despite these politically necessary neo-realist codicils, the Dayton Agreement was in fact the institutionalist culmination of the administration's longterm Bosnia policy. That the Clinton administration was unlikely to change its institutionalist policy on Bosnia can be partially explained through the use of schools-of-thought analysis. As Chapter 5 indicated, President Clinton, Secretaries Christopher and Perry, and National Security Adviser Lake are all institutionalists and as such a specific institutionalist Bosnia policy was in keeping with their general global view. Thus the policy was not likely to change. In Chapter 7 it was determined that President Clinton himself was the dominant bureaucratic figure in the setting of the administration's schools-of-thought orientation. As his primacy in the executive branch was not in question, the overall schools-of-thought orientation of the executive branch and its specific institutionalist Bosnia initiative were likely to remain constant.

Further, the crucial arguments the President placed before the general public and Congress as to why the Dayton Treaty should be supported had an undeniably institutionalist tone. For example during his speech to the nation regarding the Dayton Accord, President Clinton justified the agreement using first principles of the institutionalist school of thought. In listing his policy goals regarding Bosnia, the President stated, 'American has worked with our European allies in searching for peace, stopping the war from spreading and easing the suffering of the Bosnian people. We imposed tough economic sanctions on Serbia.'²⁹ In listing what the primary allied objectives have been in Bosnia the President clothed his policy in unambiguously institutionalist terms. In mentioning imposing sanctions on Serbia, President Clinton put forth what institutionalists increasingly believe will be the prime diplomatic weapon of the future. He went on to state that if America did not send troops to support the IFOR mission, 'a conflict that already has claimed so many victims, could spread like poison throughout the region, eat away at Europe's stability and erode our partnership with our European allies'.³⁰ As Chapter 6 attested, this latter concern has always been more important for the institutionalist administration than the situation in Bosnia. For

institutionalists, if the US was to renege on its promise to participate in the IFOR mission, international cooperation with America itself, an absolutely central notion for their school of thought, would be adversely affected. For the President Bosnia must not be allowed to call America's credibility into question, as this itself could disrupt the smooth functioning of the increasingly interdependent world and certainly harm America's place in it, as it could not be counted upon to perform as a responsible member of the international community.

Some of the myriad problems facing the IFOR mission in Bosnia are mirrored in criticisms of institutionalism in general. The example provided by democratists, that institutionalism overvalues peace at the expense of justice, has practical consequences for the IFOR mission. For Dayton can be seen as, 'the diplomatic instrument that delivered half of Bosnia to the people who raped, tortured and murdered their way to what they now call Republika Srpska'.³¹ The agreement, based on the institutionalist priority of ending the war and the suffering over pursuing justice in the Balkans, left the Bosnian Muslim leadership decidedly unenthusiastic. At Dayton they 'ended up being badgered into agreement'.³² While given their present military inferiority and dependence on the United States, it is unlikely the Muslims will instigate major trouble for the IFOR mission. However if it runs into serious difficulties they are not likely to defend Dayton.

Curiously, the same can be said of the Bosnian Serbs. Their compliance with the Dayton Accord is mixed with disaffection toward the IFOR mission. This alienation is largely based on another general critique of the institutionalist school of thought, its over-reliance on sanctions as a panacea for solving political problems. The coercing of Milosevic, through the use of sanctions, to play a vital and constructive role in the Dayton drama must stand as institutionalism's greatest triumph in the Bosnian conflict. So far he has been able to grudgingly coerce the Bosnian Serbs into following his leadership, getting them to agree to the Dayton Treaty. However the manner in which this was done may foreshadow future problems for IFOR. While this diplomatic strategy worked to perfection in Dayton where the economically malleable Milosevic had been given the Bosnian Serb proxy-vote, he wholly ignored their interests (for example Milosevic reportedly showed the final map of the Dayton Accord to the chief Bosnian Serb delegate in Ohio only 10 minutes before the signing ceremony³³). The process at Dayton left the Bosnian Serbs feeling betrayed, and

only supportive of the IFOR mission because they seemed to have no other choice. What this over-reliance on sanctions did not do was ease the long-term Bosnian Serb antipathy to remaining in a multi-ethnic state. After the IFOR mission ends in one year, this brilliant institutionalist tactic may well prove an ephemeral success in the face of the Bosnian Serbs' long-term strategy of advocating secession from Bosnia and unification with Serbia proper. In the end it is unlikely the sanctions-driven strategy of Dayton will solve the Bosnian crisis. Rather it may well give the concept of a multi-ethnic Bosnia a decent and peaceful burial.

When the President adopted Anthony Lake's more muscular brand of institutionalism, many observers came to see this as a new direction in America's Bosnia policy. Yet by utilizing schools-of-thought analysis, there can be no doubt that this new stance was merely part of the 'old' institutionalist construct. This is best illustrated by the fact that the outline of the Dayton Peace Agreement, so laboriously pursued by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, is eerily reminiscent of the oft-maligned Vance-Owen initiative of spring 1993. The Dayton treaty, like Vance-Owen, calls for the Bosnian Serbs to receive 49 per cent of Bosnia despite pursuing aggression, still gives the Bosnian Serbs the right to have a 'special relationship' with Serbia proper in return for remaining in a very weak Bosnian state, and still mandates that sanctions on Milosevic should be lifted in return for his approval of the West's plan. Nowhere within the institutionalist Clinton administration was there any talk about helping the Muslims to continue to overturn Bosnian Serb gains made by aggression, despite the change in fortunes on the battlefield. The underlying goals of the Clinton administration have remained the same throughout the crisis: to end the war as quickly as possible, to stop Bosnia from facilitating crises with either the Western Europeans or the Russians, despite the fact that such a policy rewards Serbian aggression. As schools-of-thought analysis shows, despite all the drama of the past year, the underlying policy of the Clinton administration regarding the conflict in Bosnia remained the same.

A REASSESSMENT OF SCHOOLS-OF-THOUGHT ANALYSIS

Schools-of-thought analysis, as this book has demonstrated, is a vital methodological tool needed for understanding how American

foreign policy outputs are reached in the post-Cold War era. However, like every other paradigm in the social sciences, it is not perfect. As the example of Secretary of Defense Perry exhibited in Chapters 5 and 7, it is possible for some decision-makers to follow one school of thought's policy prescription using another school of thought's rationale. In this case Secretary Perry adopted the institutionalist policy on Bosnia for largely neo-realist reasons. In the abstract, this would seem to be a serious flaw with the schools-of-thought model. In actuality, out of 41 decision-maker issue areas identified, Perry's position was the only example of such a process taking place. This rate of error seems acceptable to countenance.

More usefully, the Secretary's position on Bosnia does point out the important fact that other processes besides schools-of-thought analysis need to be analyzed in determining American foreign policy outputs. As Chapter 7 highlighted, Perry's position can be largely explained through bureaucratic political analysis, that he was captured by the collective schools-of-thought orientation of the Pentagon. What William Perry's stance on Bosnia *does* point out is that while schools-of-thought analysis is an important tool needed for understanding American foreign policy outputs, as it explains and assesses the sub-ideological aspects of decision-making, it must be coupled with analysis of governmental bureaucratic power to apprehend the complete picture of what is involved in making US foreign policy.

What schools-of-thought analysis has accomplished in this book is to illustrate the overlooked commonalities of the Clinton administration's response to the Bosnian crisis, by delineating the hierarchy of policy priorities that motivated America's response to the Bosnian tragedy. Schools-of-thought analysis has also shown the process by which major issue areas are linked together by decision-makers, a process that is largely the result of an individual's sub-ideological orientation. Schools-of-thought analysis has also provided the building blocks to assess how an overarching American foreign policy is likely to be constructed in the new world order, and if such a process is currently taking place. Thus schools-of-thought analysis ought to occupy a valued place in the methodological and analytical armory of those who wish to study American foreign policy outputs in the new era.

The boxing of individual decision-makers has proved a success. Out of 41 specific policy prescriptions analyzed (see Chart 8.2) 30 coincided with the majority schools-of-thought box individual

decision-makers had been placed into, or an accuracy rate of 73 per cent. When minority orientations are taken into account, defined as two issues areas out of five corresponding to the same school of thought, the percentage of prescriptions correctly classified rises to 83 per cent. Clearly these figures show that a schools-of-thought analysis can be implemented with success, particularly when minority orientations are also taken into account.

The success of the schools-of-thought model confirms a central hypothesis of this book, that major issue areas are linked together by decision-makers and that the linkages themselves are largely the product of an actor's general schools-of-thought orientation. For example in Chapter 6 it was illustrated that the Clinton administration predicated its Bosnia policy partly on the conflict's lesser relevance in the administration's hierarchy of foreign policy priorities than it placed on US policies to Russia and Western Europe. This prioritization was shown to be in line with general institutionalist thinking. The success of schools-of-thought analysis confirms that the linkage of the issue areas a decision-maker confronts itself follows a pattern.

Further, as was mentioned in the introduction, schools-of-thought analysis provides the building blocks for assessing whether a new overarching policy is germinating in the post-Cold War era. Based on the evidence presented in this book, the answer so far is a resounding no. As Schurmann's analysis of the post-war world and Chapter 7 illustrate, for an overarching policy to become institutionalized it needs the support of both the president and the Congress. This book illustrates that such a political process has not taken place after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As has been shown there are currently institutional, political, and sub-ideological divisions, symbolized by different schools-of-thought orientations, between the Congress and the executive branch and the Democratic and Republican Parties. The 1994 mid-term elections widened the schools-of-thought gulf. As the Bosnian case study highlights, whereas the 103rd Congress had no overall dominant schools-of-thought orientation, the 104th Congress is now effectively run by neo-realist decision-makers such as Majority Leader Dole, who fundamentally disagree with the institutionalist Clinton administration about the first principles that should guide American foreign policymaking. These basic differences regarding foreign affairs are symbolized by Senator Dole's strenuous disagreement with the President's Bosnia policy. When it came compromise over Bosnia

policy, highlighted by the House's refusal to support Dayton and the Senate's tepid endorsement of the accord with neo-realist conditions, proved messy and temporary, and certainly did not herald a new era of foreign policy bipartisanship, a condition that is essential for a new overarching foreign policy to emerge. Rather as Apple observed, the House and Senate debate on Dayton 'exposed a broad vein of doubt and anxiety about the whole enterprise, and while neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives, both deeply divided, was ready to thwart the President's will, they were equally unwilling to give his policy any ringing endorsement'.³⁴ Until either a hybrid school of thought emerges as the result of a compromise between the neo-realist Republicans and the primarily institutionalist Democrats, or one party gains control of both houses of Congress as well as the presidency and institutes policies predicated by its school of thought that become widely accepted by the general public, no new overarching foreign policy theme will emerge. At the moment it is doubtful these circumstances will occur, at least with the present administration in office.

The row over Bosnia policy amounted to a near-miss for Congress in its perpetual struggle to erode presidential supremacy in the making of foreign policy. As Lee Hamilton observed, in the end, 'Congress will either vote to deploy, or do nothing'.³⁵ It did both as the House voted to support the troops while condemning the mission (nothing) while the Senate voted to support the troops and the mission itself in slightly more positive language than the House, in return for neo-realist concessions from the President. The slightly different legislative paths the two Houses took regarding Dayton may foreshadow a real political division between the increasing numbers of realist-isolationists in the House and the majority realist-internationalists in the Senate. The Bosnia votes, more than anything else, illustrate the sustained bipartisanship of the Cold War era is ebbing away and will continue to do so until the conditions for a new, overarching American foreign policy are again restored. For as Apple stated, the President failed, 'to build a genuine constituency for his Balkan strategy on Capitol Hill'.³⁶ In the end, in the absence of the coalescing of a new overarching policy, the President was forced to rely on the inherent powers of his office to sustain his institutionalist Bosnia policy. Regarding the creation of an all-encompassing policy to take the place of the containment doctrine in the new world order, the struggle is far from over.

Finally, schools-of-thought analysis is an analytical innovation that refines and enhances the concept of ideology. It is a refinement that directly links systemic beliefs to specific policy outputs. As it functions as a sub-ideology, it more tangibly links the remote realm of ideology to concrete action. Fukuyama was right, liberal democracy is currently victorious in the realm of ideological combat. Yet that does not mean that the ideational contest is over, for within liberal democracy schools-of-thought analysis effectively illustrates that sub-ideological differences have concrete policy implications. As this is so in the United States, the primary state exponent of liberal democracy, it is likely this process is occurring throughout the liberal democratic world. Schools-of-thought analysis is the useful analytical link between personal belief systems and ideologies. Valentine, the hero of 'Arcadia', was right. Very little is known about this new era we find ourselves in. The schools-of-thought process is an analytical device that can help one to comprehend where the world is at the moment and why, and where it is going.

Chart 8.2 Results of the Schools-of-thought Boxing Process

Issue areas correctly boxed out of those analyzed

Democratists 6/10
Neo-realists 11/13
Institutionalists 13/18

Minority schools-of-thought orientations calculated as being correctly boxed

Democratists 10/10
Neo-realists 11/13
Institutionalists 13/18

Notes

Chapter 1

1. Tom Stoppard, 'Arcadia', Theatre Royal, London, 7 September 1994.
2. For a fuller discussion of the current limited but interesting ordering schemes for the post-Cold War world see: Ronald D. Asmus, *The New US Strategic Debate*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1994); Cecil Van Meter Crabb, *Policy-Makers and Critics: Conflicting Theories of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Praeger, 1986); Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, 'Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of Nato', *Security Studies*, vol.3 no.1, (Autumn 1993); Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders – after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993); *Prisms and Policy: US Security Strategy After the Cold War*, Norman D. Levin, ed., (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1994); Alan Tonelson, 'Beyond Left and Right', *The National Interest*, no.34, (Winter 1993–4); Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990).
3. Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 30.
4. Schurmann, *ibid.*, p. 31.
5. Schurmann, *ibid.*, p. 18.
6. Schurmann, *ibid.*, p. 31.
7. Schurmann, *ibid.*, pp. 150–1.
8. For a fuller discussion of the alliance between the Republican Party and the Navy see: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Peter Karsten, *The Naval Aristocracy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1972); Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Richard O'Connor, *Pacific Destiny*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969).
9. Indeed, one of the great nationalist symbols, General MacArthur, was, in effect, the largely unfettered Shogun of Japan immediately after the war.
10. Schurmann, *op.cit.*, p. 58.
11. Schurmann, *ibid.*, p. 198.
12. Schurmann, *ibid.*, p. 179.
13. For a fuller discussion of the concept of ideology see: Thomas J. Biersteker, 'The "Triumph" of Neoclassical Economics In The Developing World: Policy Convergence And Bases of Governance In The International Economic Order', in *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*, James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History And The Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Clifford Geertz, 'Ideology as a Cultural System', in *Ideology and Discontent*, David E. Apter, ed., (1964); Melvin J. Hinich and

- Michael C. Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); M. Kent Jennings, 'Ideology among Mass Publics and Political Elites', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol.56 no.4, (Winter 1992); James Rosenau, 'Governance, Order, And Change In World Politics', in *Governance without government*; William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1959).
14. This idea was kindly suggested to me by Professor Paul Wilkinson, who called it a 'mini-ideology'.
 15. Ben J. Wattenberg, *The First Universal Nation; Leading Indicators and Ideas About the Surge of America in the 1990s*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 203.
 16. Schurmann, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
 17. Hinich and Munger, *op.cit.*, p. 142.
 18. For a fuller discussion of belief systems see: James David Barber, *The Presidential Character; Predicting Performance in the White House*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977); Ole R. Holsti, 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study', in *International Politics and Foreign Policy; A Reader in Research and Theory*, James N. Rosenau, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1969); Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, 'How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model', *American Political Science Review*, vol.81, (1987).
 19. Holsti, *ibid.*, p. 544.
 20. *ibid.*
 21. Barber, *op.cit.*, pp. 7–8.
 22. For a fuller discussion of elites and elite consensus see: George F. Bishop and Kathleen A. Frankovic, 'Ideological Consensus and Constraint among Party Leaders and Followers in the 1978 Election', *Micropolitics*, vol.1 no.2, (1981); Johan Galtung, 'Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position', in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*; Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders - after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993); M. Kent Jennings, 'Ideology among Mass Publics and Political Elites', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol.56 no.4, (Winter 1992).
 23. Jennings, *ibid.*, p. 434.
 24. *ibid.*, p. 436.
 25. Thomas B. Edsall and E.J. Dionne, Jr., 'Democrats' Strength Based on Massive Shift of Alliances', *The Washington Post*, 4 November 1992.
 26. For a fuller discussion of the role perception plays in formulating foreign policy see: Alexander L. George, *Bridging The Gap; Theory and Practice In Foreign Policy*, (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 1993); *Belief systems and international relations*, Richard Little and Steve Smith, eds., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
 27. Alex Danchev, review of Lawrence Friedman and Efraim Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict 1990–91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, *Review of International Studies*, vol.20 no.1, (January 1994), p. 102.
 28. Robert O. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics', *Neorealism And Its Critics*, Robert O. Keohane, ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 3–4.

29. Keohane, 'Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond', *Neorealism And Its Critics*, p. 193.
30. See George, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

Chapter 2

1. For a fuller discussion of the common values all democracies share see: *The Idea of Democracy*, David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, eds, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); R.S. Downie, *Government Action and Morality: Some Principles and Concepts of Liberal Democracy*, (London: Macmillan, 1964); Francis Fukuyama, 'Liberal Democracies as a Global Phenomenon', *Political Science and Politics*, vol.24 no.4, (December 1991); Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', in *Conflict After the Cold War; Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Richard K. Betts, ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994); C.B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1987); Alexis de Toqueville, *Democracy in America*, J.P. Mayer and Max Lerner, eds, (London: Collins, 1968).
2. Fukuyama, 'The beginning of foreign policy: America confronts the post-Cold War world', *The New Republic*, 17 August 1992.
3. Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol.12 no.3, (Summer 1983), p. 213.
4. *ibid.*, p. 217.
5. Ben J. Wattenberg, *The First Universal Nation*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 224.
6. Samuel Huntington, 'American Ideals versus American Interests', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 97 no.1, (Spring 1982), p. 20.
7. Stanley Hoffmann, 'The American Style: Our Past and our principles', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46 no.2, (January 1968), p. 363.
8. Doyle, *op.cit.*, p. 231.
9. Fukuyama, 'Liberal Democracies as a Global Phenomenon', *op.cit.*, p. 662.
10. Graham Allison, 'Testing Gorbachev', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.67 no.1, (Fall 1988), pp. 31–2.
11. Wattenberg, *op.cit.*, p. 194.
12. Fukuyama, *op.cit.*, p. 659.
13. *ibid.*, p. 664.
14. Allison, 'Introduction and Overview', *Rethinking America's Security*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1992), pp. 15–16.
15. Richard Nixon, *Seize the Moment*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 26.
16. Fukuyama, 'The beginning of foreign policy', *op.cit.*
17. Charles Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', *Council on Foreign Relations*, vol.70 no.1, (1991), p. 29.
18. William Pfaff, 'Redefining World Power', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70 no.1, (1990–1), p. 45.
19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'America and Europe', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.49 no.1, (October 1970), p. 15.

20. Nixon, *op.cit.*, p. 113.
21. Allison and Robert Blackwill, 'America's Stake in the Soviet Future', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70 no.3, (Summer 1991), p. 93.
22. Keith Bradsher, 'China: Clinton's Balancing Act', *IHT*, 15–16 May 1993.
23. See Robert Elegant, 'China: The Party's "Mandate of Heaven" Is Fraying', *IHT*, 28 April 1993.
24. Michael Richardson, 'Value Clash Looms for US and Asia', *IHT*, 3 May 1993.
25. Fukuyama, 'The beginning of foreign policy', *op.cit.*
26. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
27. A.M. Rosenthal, 'Yes, Democracy in other lands is America's Cause', *IHT*, 23–4 January 1993.
28. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders – after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993), pp. 243–4.
29. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 20.
30. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72 no.3, (Summer 1993), p. 28.
31. *ibid.*, p. 32.
32. Tommy Thong–Bee Koh, 'This Way or That, Get on with Good Government', *IHT*, 6 May 1993.
33. Richardson, *op.cit.*
34. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *op.cit.*, p. 32.
35. Michael H. Posner, 'Here and There: Human Rights Should Be a Common Concern', *IHT*, 18 February 1993.

Chapter 3

1. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan; Or The Matter, Fortune and Power Of A Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*, Michael Oakeshott, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946).
2. Henry A. Kissinger, 'Reflections on American Diplomacy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.35 no.1, (October 1956), p. 48.
3. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1977), p. 168.
4. Richard Nixon, *Seize the Moment; America's Challenge In A One Superpower World*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 33.
5. James Schlesinger, 'Quest For A Post-Cold War Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72 no.3, (Summer 1993), p. 22.
6. Kissinger, 'Foreign Policy Is About the National Interest', *IHT*, 25 October 1993.
7. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Containment: A Reassessment', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.55 no.4, (July 1977), p. 886.
8. Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwartz, 'American Hegemony Without An Enemy', *Foreign Policy*, no.92, (Fall 1993), p. 22.
9. Paul Kennedy, 'American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning From the European Experience', *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 176.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72 no.3, (Summer 1993), p. 22.

11. Huntington, *ibid.*, p. 25.
12. Joseph M. Grieco, 'Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism', *International Organization*, vol.42 no.3, (Summer 1988), p. 498.
13. Lawrence Eagleburger, 'Lawrence Eagleburger Cites Gains, Warns of Future Challenges', *United States Information Service*, (Official Text: Council on Foreign Relations Address), 7 January 1993.
14. Schlesinger, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
15. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At The Highest Levels; The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War*, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1993), p. 166.
16. John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol.15 no.1, (Summer 1990), p. 12.
17. Caspar Weinberger, 'Secretary Weinberger on the Uses of Military Power', *Survival*, vol.27 no.1, (January-February 1985), p. 33.
18. Nixon, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
19. Huntington, *op.cit.*, p. 39.
20. Gaddis, 'Was The Truman Doctrine A Real Turning Point?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.52 no.2, (January 1974), pp. 386–7.
21. *ibid.*, p. 387.
22. Mearsheimer, 'Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe', *International Security*, vol.9 no.3, (Winter 1984–5), p. 24.
23. Nixon, 'After Viet Nam', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46 no.1, (October 1967), p. 114.
24. *The Economist*, 'The World at his door', 10 April 1993.
25. Pat Buchanan, 'Rebuttal', in *The First Universal Nation*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 198.
26. Kissinger, 'Reflections on American Diplomacy', *op.cit.*, p. 43.
27. Kissinger, 'America Can't Police The World Forever', *The Times*, 12 March 1993.
28. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, *op.cit.*, pp. 309–10.
29. Nixon, *Seize The Moment*, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
30. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Weighing Power and Principle', *Problems of Communism*, vol.32 no.3, (May–June 1983), p. 75.
31. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders – after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993), p. 241.
32. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 731.
33. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *op.cit.*, p. 24.
34. Henry Kissinger, 'Reflections On A Partnership: British and American attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, vol.58 no.4, (Autumn 1982), p. 578.
35. Josef Joffe, Forward to William C. Cromwell, *The US and the European Pillar*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1992), p. x.
36. Jim Hoagland, 'Winter Death for Bosnia, With the West Looking On', *IHT*, 4 November 1993.
37. *The Economist*, 'A formidable baton to pass', 9 January 1993.
38. Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, vol.18 no.2, (Fall 1993), p. 56.
39. John Gray, 'Backward Into The Future', *The National Review*, 29 March 1993.

40. Stephen F. Cohen, 'American Policy and Russia's Future', *The Nation*, 12 April 1993.
41. *ibid.*
42. Nixon, *Seize the Moment*, *op.cit.*, p. 163.
43. Robert O. Keohane and Robert Axelrod, 'Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', *World Politics*, vol.38 no.1, (October 1985), p. 176.
44. George Washington, *The Washington Papers*, Saul K. Padover, ed., (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1955), pp. 321–2.
45. David Gergen, 'America's Missed Opportunities', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71 no.1, (1991–2), p. 13.
46. Buchanan, *op.cit.*, p. 199.
47. *ibid.*
48. Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Security*, vol.17 no.3, (Winter 1992–3), p. 55.
49. Jack Snyder, 'Averting Anarchy in the New Europe', *International Security*, vol.14 no.4, (Spring 1990), p. 38.

Chapter 4

1. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 68.
2. John Lewis Gaddis, 'Toward The Post-Cold War World', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70 no.2, (Spring 1991), pp. 104–5.
3. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'Power and Interdependence', *Survival*, vol.15 no.4, (July–August 1973), p. 162.
4. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Sean Lynn-Jones, 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', *International Security*, vol.12 no.4, (Spring 1988), p. 25.
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Selective Global Commitment', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70 no.4, (Fall 1991), p. 4.
6. C. Fred Bergsten, 'The World After the Cold War', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.69 no.3, (Summer 1990), p. 105.
7. Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p. 20.
8. Nye and Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', *International Organization*, vol.25 no.3, (Summer 1971), p. 726.
9. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Transnational Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics*, vol.27 no.1, (October 1974), pp. 47–8.
10. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'Multinational Corporations in World Politics', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.53 no.1, (October 1974), p. 159.
11. Robert O. Keohane and Van Doorn Ooms, 'The Multinational Enterprise and World Political Economy', *International Organization*, vol.26 no.1, (Winter 1972), p. 107.
12. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organization*, vol.25 no.3, p. 340.
13. Keohane and Ooms, *op.cit.*, p. 120.
14. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe', in *After the Cold War; International Institutions*

- and *State Strategies in Europe 1989–1991*, Keohane, Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, eds, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 8–9.
15. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, 'The US and International Institutions in Europe after the Cold War', in *After the Cold War*, p. 105.
 16. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise Of The Trading State; Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), p. 148.
 17. Robert O. Keohane, 'Economics, Inflation, and the Role of the State: Political Implications of the McCracken Report', *World Politics*, vol.31 no.1, (October 1978), p. 123.
 18. Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, 'A Lesser US Role in the World', *IHT*, 27 May 1993.
 19. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 'What New World Order?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71 no.2, (Spring 1992), p. 96.
 20. Stephen J. Rosenfeld, 'In This Turn to Asia, a Creaking of History', *IHT*, 20–1 November 1993.
 21. Barton Gellman, 'US Reconsiders Putting GI's Under UN', *The Washington Post*, 22 September 1993.
 22. Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders – after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993), p. 239.
 23. Paul F. Horvitz, 'A New Isolationism Floods America', *IHT*, 2 November 1993.
 24. Daniel Yankelovich, 'Foreign Policy After the Election', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.71 no.4, (Fall 1992), p. 8.
 25. Paul Lewis, 'UN Peacekeeping Funds Cut', *IHT*, 23–4 October 1993.
 26. General Oakes, 'European Security – The Picture Today', Lecture, St Andrews University, Scotland, 16 April 1993.
 27. Martin Walker, 'Clinton inherits a windfall economic miracle', *The Guardian*, 23 December 1993.
 28. *The Washington Post*, 'Bosnia Policy Is a Farce', *IHT*, 11 August 1993.
 29. Gaddis, 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Security*, vol.17 no.3, (Winter 1992–3), p. 45.
 30. Leslie H. Gelb, 'Tailoring A US Role at the UN', *IHT*, 23 January 1993.

Chapter 5

1. Strobe Talbott, 'How Not to Break China', *Time*, 3 August 1992.
2. Strobe Talbott, 'The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era', The Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford University, *United States Information Service* (20 October 1994), p. 9.
3. Strobe Talbott, 'US Policy on Support for Reform In the New Independent States', *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.4 no.2 (18 October 1993), p. 722.
4. Talbott, 'The New Geopolitics', *op.cit.*, p. 11.
5. Talbott, 'US Policy on Support for Reform', *op.cit.*, p. 723.
6. Michael Cox, 'The necessary partnership? The Clinton presidency and post-Soviet Russia', *International Affairs*, vol.70 no.4 (October 1994), p. 650.
7. Michael Gordon, 'US to Keep East at Bay Over Nato', *IHT*, 3 January 1994.

8. See: Elizabeth Drew, *On The Edge; The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 403.
9. Martin Ives, 'Doves were right all along, says Clinton's new man', *The Times*, 1 February 1994.
10. Talbott, 'The New Geopolitics', *op.cit.*, p. 6.
11. Strobe Talbott, 'Beware of the Three-Way Split', *Time*, 13 June 1992.
12. George Mitchell, 'Statement of Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell Regarding The Lifting of The Arms Embargo' (obtained from personal correspondence of 6 July 1994), released 24 June 1994, p. 1.
13. *ibid.*, p. 2.
14. George Mitchell, 'Statement Of Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell Regarding the Lifting Of The Arms Embargo On Bosnia' (obtained from personal correspondence of 6 July 1994), released 1 July 1994, p. 2.
15. *ibid.*, p. 1.
16. Helen Dewar, 'Senate's Stamp of Approval for NAFTA', *IHT*, 22 November 1993.
17. *In Politics in America 1994; The 103rd Congress*, Phil Duncan, ed., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993), p. 666.
18. George Mitchell, 'Mitchell Urges Shift In Emphasis On Foreign Aid From Military to Economic; Advancing of American Ideals In Foreign Policy, Calls For Bipartisan Talks On Policy Towards CIS' (obtained from personal correspondence of 6 July 1994), address to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (16 March 1992), p. 2.
19. *ibid.*, p. 10.
20. *ibid.*, p. 15.
21. *ibid.*, p. 14.
22. See: Joseph Biden, Jr., 'To Stand Against Aggression: Milosevic, The Bosnian Republic, And the Conscience of the West', Report of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 19 April 1993).
23. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'More UN Appeasement on Bosnia', *The New York Times*, 7 June 1993.
24. Biden, 'To Stand Against Aggression', *op.cit.*, p. 8.
25. *ibid.*, p. 13.
26. Such as the Chechens, who have been engaged in a bitter military struggle with the Russian army since December 1994.
27. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'Bosnia: Should American Forces Codify Serbian Aggression?', statement released 5 October 1993.
28. Biden, 'To Stand Against Aggression', *op.cit.*, p. 2.
29. *ibid.*, p. 3.
30. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'Don't Link Human Rights and China Trade', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 May 1994.
31. Interview with an aide to Senator Biden, 6 March 1995.
32. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'China's Decision: The American Market Or The Arms Market', Statement released 23 July 1991, p. 2.
33. Interview with an aide to Senator Biden, *op.cit.*
34. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'Biden Urges Early Recognition Of Post-Soviet Commonwealth', statement released 16 December 1991, p. 2.

35. Interview with an aide to Senator Biden, *op.cit.*
36. Joseph Biden, Jr., 'The American Agenda For The New World Order, Part Two', *The Congressional Record*, vol.138 no.97 (1 July 1992).
37. See: Joseph Biden, Jr., 'The Future of Nato', Hearings Held Jointly by the Subcommittee on European Affairs and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1 February and 23 February 1994), p. 2.
38. *ibid.*, p. 3.
39. Joseph Biden, Jr., *The Congressional Record* (27 January 1994).
40. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 'Lugar to Clinton: Change Bosnia Policy', 21 April 1993.
41. Paul F. Horvitz, 'Allies Defend Bosnia Plan, Hinting at Tougher Steps', *IHT*, 25 May 1993.
42. Lawrence S. Kaplan, 'Nato in the 90's: An American Perspective', *Paradigms*, vol.7 no.2 (Winter 1993), p. 19.
43. Richard F. Lugar, 'The Future of Nato', Hearings Held Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs and the Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1 February and 23 February 1994), p. 13.
44. In 1995 the Clinton administration did finally tell the Central European states what criteria they needed to meet to qualify for Nato membership, but it still did not provide the former Warsaw Pact states with any sort of timetable for admission.
45. *Politics in America 1994, op.cit.*, p. 390.
46. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Investment in Russian Change', 31 March 1993.
47. See: Paul F. Horvitz, 'Clinton Seeks To Sell Aid To Russia As Investment', *IHT*, 2 April 1993.
48. Robert Dole, 'Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo', statement released 24 June 1994.
49. Robert Dole, 'Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo', statement released 1 July 1994.
50. Stephen Rosenfeld, 'Feeling His Way Amid the Sniping', *IHT*, 19–20 February 1994.
51. Dole, 24 June 1994, *op.cit.* Lieberman, cosponsor of Dole–Lieberman, was a chosen by Dole to sponsor the anti-embargo bill largely because he was a Democrat.
52. Dole, 1 July 1994, *op.cit.*
53. Dole, 24 June 1994, *op.cit.*
54. Paul F. Horvitz, 'Dole Wants Exit Hatch From World Trade Unit', *IHT*, 17 November 1994.
55. Rupert Cornwell, 'Clinton Scrambles to solve China puzzle', *The Independent*, 17 May 1994.
56. Jim Hoagland, 'Dole's Weakness: You Can Look It Up', *The Washington Post*, 9 March 1995.
57. Robert Dole, 'Dole, Gingrich Outline Views On US Interests, Leadership', *United States Information Service* (8 March 1995), p. 4.
58. William Perry, 'US Military Objectives; Bosnia – Serbia', Address to the National Security Industrial Association, *Vital Speeches of the Day* (10 March 1994), p. 363.

59. See: George Graham, Laura Silber, and Bruce Clark, 'Dole blames UK and France for Nato "breakdown"', *The Financial Times*, 28 November 1994.
60. William Perry, 'To Secure Post-Cold War Gains', *IHT*, 6 April 1994.
61. R. Jeffrey Smith, 'US Keeps Nuclear Guard Against Russia', *IHT*, 23 September 1994.
62. *ibid.*
63. Perry, *op.cit.*
64. William Perry and Warren Christopher, 'A Bill to Maim American Foreign Policy', *IHT*, 14 February 1995.
65. John Palmer and Martin Walker, 'Nato ready to strike', *The Guardian*, 23 April 1994.
66. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Russia Pushes Own Peace Plan For the Balkans', 19 May 1993.
67. Anthony Lewis, 'Mr. Clinton Abroad', *The New York Times*, 12 July 1993.
68. Warren Christopher, 'Assistance to Russia And the Foreign Affairs Budget', Address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.4 no.17 (26 April 1993), p. 281.
69. Warren Christopher, 'A New Generation of Russian Democrats', Address at the National Academy of the National Economy, Moscow, 23 October 1993, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol.LX no.3 (15 November 1993), p. 66.
70. Paul F. Horvitz, 'Christopher Tempers Support for Russia', *IHT*, 17 January 1994.
71. Warren Christopher, 'US Leadership After the Cold War: Nato and Transatlantic Security', Address to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, 10 June 1993, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.4 no.25 (21 June 1993), pp. 449–50.
72. See: Drew, *op.cit.*, p. 404.
73. Warren Christopher, 'A Partnership for Peace Open to Former Warsaw Pact Members', *IHT*, 10 January 1994.
74. Warren Christopher, 'American Foreign Policy; The Strategic Priorities', Address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 November 1993, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, vol.LX no.6, p. 164.
75. *ibid.*, p. 163.
76. *ibid.*
77. Robert A. Manning, 'Clinton and China: Beyond Human Rights', *Orbis*, vol.38 no.2 (Spring 1994), p. 195.
78. Daniel Williams, 'US Closer to Renewing China's Trade Status', *IHT*, 25 May 1994.
79. Jason DeParle, 'The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy', *The New York Times Magazine*, 20 August 1995.
80. Anthony Lake, 'A Quartet of Foreign Policy Speeches', Address to Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, (November–December 1993), p. 41.
81. Anthony Lake, 'The Need for Engagement', Address to Princeton University, 30 November 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.5 no.49 (5 December 1994), p. 805.
82. Jacob Heilbrunn, 'Lake Inferior', *The New Republic*, 20 and 27 September 1993.
83. Lake, *op.cit.*, p. 805.

84. *ibid.*
85. Ann Devroy and Daniel Williams, 'Top Clinton Advisers Are Said to Support China Trade Breaks', *The Washington Post*, 20 May 1994.
86. Daniel Williams and Ann Devroy, 'China's Disbelief of Rights Threat Sank Clinton Ploy', *The Washington Post*, 28 May 1994.
87. Anthony Lake, Address to Johns Hopkins University, 7 April 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.5 no.17 (25 April 1994), p. 227.
88. Lake, 'A Quartet of Foreign Policy Speeches', *op.cit.*, p. 44.
89. Anthony Lake, 'American Power and American Diplomacy', Address to Harvard University, 21 October 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.5 no.46 (14 November 1994), p. 768.
90. Lou Cannon, 'The "Peace Strategy" Rewards Aggression', *IHT*, 13 December 1994.
91. Stephen Engelberg and Michael R. Gordon, 'Use of Force in Bosnia: When a President Faces A Candidate's Rhetoric', *IHT*, 5 April 1993.
92. William Safire, 'Idling Fuzzily Over Bosnia, in Multilateral Fog', *IHT*, 17 September 1993.
93. Paul F. Horvitz, 'Intervention in Bosnia: Clinton Mutes His Fervor', *IHT*, 13 May 1993.
94. Eve-Ann Prentice and Ian Brodie, 'General Rose says Muslims cannot win Bosnia war', *The Times*, 26 May 1994.
95. Bill Clinton, 'Clinton: US, Europe Must Pursue Shared Strategy for Peace', Transcript of Remarks to the French National Assembly, *US Wireless File*, 7 June 1994, p. 18.
96. Michael J. Brenner, 'EC: Confidence Lost', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 1993.
97. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Clinton Hints Nato Would Defend East From Attack', 13 January 1994.
98. Bill Clinton, 'Clinton says US should lead alliance for Democracy', Address to The Foreign Policy Association, 1 April 1992, p. 33.
99. Bill Clinton, 'Clinton says US needs new national security policy', Address to Georgetown University, 12 December 1991, p. 28.
100. Cox, *op.cit.*, p. 647.
101. Clinton, 'Clinton says US needs new national security policy', *op.cit.*, p. 31.
102. Cox, *op.cit.*, p. 645.
103. Linda B. Miller, 'The Clinton years: reinventing US foreign policy', *International Affairs*, vol.70 no.4 (October 1994), p. 631.
104. Bill Clinton, 'Clinton addresses B'Nai B'rith Convention', delivered 9 September 1992, p. 12.
105. Lawrence Friedman, 'Clinton Gives Kohl Plan For Special Relationship', *IHT*, 12 July 1994.
106. Bob Woodward, *The Agenda; Inside The Clinton White House* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 55.
107. Gwen Ifill, 'For Clinton Team, a Fine-Tuned 56-Day Blitz', *IHT*, 20–21 November 1993.
108. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'China Lags on World Trade Reform, US Says', 14 November 1994.
109. Clinton, 'Clinton says US needs new national security policy', *op.cit.*, p. 30.

110. Lawrence Friedman, 'Economy Wins Over Rights as Clinton Eats A Little Crow', *IHT*, 28–29 May 1994.
111. *ibid.*

Chapter 6

1. Bill Clinton, 'Clinton Says US should lead alliance for Democracy', Address to the Foreign Policy Association, 1 April 1992.
2. A *US News and World Report* poll taken in January 1993 reported only 27 per cent of those polled in favor of more aid to Russia, with 68 per cent against any further aid. Steven V. Roberts, 'High Hopes', *US News and World Report*, 25 January 1993.
3. Paul F. Horvitz, 'Clinton offers \$1.6 billion in Aid To Bolster Yeltsin Reform Effort', *IHT*, 5 April 1993.
4. Steven Greenhouse, 'US to Focus More on ex-Soviet Republics', *IHT*, 22 March 1994.
5. Strobe Talbott, 'US Policy on Support for Reform In The New Independent States', *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.4 no.2, (18 October 1993), p. 724.
6. Philip Zelikow, 'Beyond Boris Yeltsin', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.73 no.1, (January–February 1994), p. 45.
7. Michael Cox, 'The necessary partnership? The Clinton presidency and post-Soviet Russia', *International Affairs*, vol.70 no.4, (October 1994), p. 652.
8. Thomas L. Friedman, 'Sense of Urgency And Foreboding For Clinton at Summit Talks', *IHT*, 3–4 April 1993.
9. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'West and Russia Back 51–49 Bosnia Split', 14–15 May 1994.
10. See: *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Yeltsin Endorses Polish Nato Bid', 26 August 1993.
11. Stephen A. Oxman, 'Nato: In Business To Stay', Address to The Atlantic Council of the US, *United States Information Service*, (17 August 1993), p. 4.
12. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Nato Chiefs Hail New Era, But War Still Casts Clouds', 12 January 1994.
13. See 'Partnership for Peace: Invitation', Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at Nato Headquarters, Brussels, 10–11 January 1994.
14. Oxman, *op.cit.*, p. 4.
15. Douglas Jehl, 'Specter of Bosnia Hangs Over Nato At Summit Meeting', *IHT*, 11 January 1994.
16. David Gompert, 'How to Defeat Serbia', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.73 no.4, (July–August 1994), p. 35.
17. Malcolm states that at the time of its independence, the Bosnian population was 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb, and 17 per cent Croat. Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 222–3.
18. Elaine Sciolino, *IHT*, 24 May 1993.
19. *ibid.*
20. Roger Cohen, 'Map on Bosnia: An Abandoned "Moral Bridge"', *IHT*, 7 July 1994.

21. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'West and Russia Back 51–49 Bosnia Split', *op.cit.*
22. Roger Cohen, 'Pope's Cancellation Leaves Insecure Sarajevo in Limbo', *IHT*, 8 September 1994.
23. *The Economist*, 'Arms to Bosnia: Serbs still win', 6 August 1994.
24. Colin Smith, 'Biting the Bosnian Bullet', *The Observer*, 25 April 1993.
25. Paul Lewis, 'Top UN Aides in Bosnia Flout Policy, US Says', *IHT*, 3 May 1994.
26. *ibid.*
27. Roger Cohen, 'Map Blocks a Bosnia Peace', *IHT*, 8 November 1994.
28. Daniel Williams and Ruth Marcus, 'West Puts Its Bet On Bosnia Talks', *IHT*, 7–8 August 1993.
29. Cohen, 'Map Blocks a Bosnia Peace', *op.cit.*
30. William Pfaff, 'America's Turn Toward Germany – and Away From "Europe"', *IHT*, 30–1 July 1994.

Chapter 7

1. Morton H. Halperin with Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kantor, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 5.
2. Barry Rubin, *Secrets Of State; The State Department and the Struggle Over US Foreign Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. xi.
3. Graham T. Allison, *Essence Of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), p. 5.
4. *ibid.*
5. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power And The Modern President; The Politics Of Leadership From Roosevelt To Reagan*, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 39.
6. Allison, *op.cit.*, p. 145.
7. *ibid.*, p. 176.
8. Halperin, *op.cit.*, p. 26.
9. See: Irving Janis, *Groupthink*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).
10. Allison, *op.cit.*, pp. 219–20.
11. Rubin, *op.cit.*, p. 262.
12. Franz Schurmann, *The Logic Of World Power; An Inquiry Into The Origins, Currents, And Contradictions Of World Politics*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 183.
13. Allison, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
14. *ibid.*, p. 164.
15. Halperin, *op.cit.*, p. 219.
16. *ibid.*, pp. 219–20.
17. Hedrick Smith, *The Power Game; How Washington Works*, (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 71.
18. Halperin, *op.cit.*, p. 225.
19. For a fuller discussion of presidential dominance of foreign policy see: Joseph Biden, Jr., 'American Policy In Bosnia', Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 103rd Congress, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), p. 76; Fred I. Greenstein,

- 'Change and Continuity in the Modern Presidency', in *The New American Political System*, pp. 45–6; John Hart, 'The Presidency in the 1990's', in *Developments in American Politics 2*, Gillian Peele, Christopher J. Bailey, Bruce Cain, and B. Guy Peters, eds, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994), p. 118; William C. Olson, 'The US Congress: an independent force in world politics?' *International Affairs*, vol.67 no.3, (July 1991), p. 547; Charles Peters, *How Washington Really Works*, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1980), p. 128; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 206.
20. For a fuller discussion of congressional powers regarding foreign policy decision-making see: Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *Congressmen in Committees*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973); Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the US*, (New York: Random House, 1977); Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., ed., *Congress Against the President*, (New York: Praeger, 1975); Gary Orfield, *Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change*, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Patterson, 'The Semi-Sovereign Congress's', in *The New American Political System*, p. 125; Randall B. Ripley, *Congress: Process and Policy*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).
 21. Patterson, *ibid.*
 22. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, 'The Foreign Policy of the United States', in *World Politics; an introduction*, James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd, eds, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 41.
 23. Schlesinger, *op.cit.*, p. 3.
 24. *ibid.*, p. 43.
 25. Linda S. Jamison, 'Executive-Legislative Relations After the Cold War', *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 1993), p. 192.
 26. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, *The Almanac of American Politics 1994*, (Washington, D.C.: The National Journal, Inc., 1993), p. 461.
 27. Schlesinger, *op.cit.*, pp. 6–7.
 28. Peters, *op.cit.*, p. 127.
 29. Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 112.
 30. Jamison, *op.cit.*, p. 191.
 31. Leslie Gelb, 'Assessing Christopher, Aspin, Lake', *IHT*, 21 December 1992.
 32. Jim Hoagland, 'Support the Secretary of State or Replace Him', *IHT*, 4 July 1994.
 33. See Leslie Gelb, 'Triangles For Clinton To Inspire', *IHT*, 25 January 1993.
 34. Anthony Lewis, 'Mr. Clinton Abroad', *The New York Times*, 12 July 1993.
 35. Bob Woodward, *The Agenda; Inside The Clinton White House*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 59.
 36. Steven A. Holmes, 'At State Department, "Dissent and Frustration" Over Bosnia', *IHT*, 27 August 1993.
 37. *ibid.*
 38. Michael R. Gordon, 'Bosnia Officer at State Quits in Policy Protest', *IHT*, 6 August 1993.
 39. Thomas L. Friedman and Elaine Sciolino, 'Under Pressure, Clinton Crafts A Foreign Policy', *IHT*, 23 March 1993.

40. Elaine Sciolino, 'Christopher-Lake Struggle Heats Up', *IHT*, 24–5 September 1994.
41. *ibid.*
42. Ann Devroy, 'For Christopher, a 6-Month Second Chance', *IHT*, 4 July 1994.
43. John Lancaster, 'US Foreign Policy's New Heavyweight', *IHT*, 8 April 1994.
44. Jonathan Freedland, 'Businessman named for Pentagon job', *The Guardian*, 25 January 1994.
45. *The Economist*, 'Perry-patetic', 9 April 1994.
46. Halperin, *op.cit.*, p. 96.
47. *ibid.*, p. 60.
48. Elizabeth Drew, *On The Edge: The Clinton Presidency*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 373.
49. Carnes Lord, *The Presidency And The Management Of National Security*, (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. 62.
50. John Prados, *Keepers Of The Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush*, (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1991), p. 62.
51. Jason DeParle, 'The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy', *The New York Times Magazine*, 20 August 1995, p. 34.
52. *ibid.*, p. 46.
53. *ibid.*, p. 34.
54. Lord, *op.cit.*, p. 149.
55. Jacob Heilbrunn, 'Lake Inferior', *The New Republic*, 20 and 27 September 1993.
56. DeParle, *op.cit.*, p. 46.
57. Heilbrunn, *op.cit.*
58. James Adams, 'Rising US star pulls the strings', *The Sunday Times*, 9 January 1994.
59. Jim Hoagland, 'This Isn't the Way to Make Foreign Policy', *IHT*, 1 November 1993.
60. See Friedman and Sciolino, *op.cit.*
61. Leslie Gelb, 'Clinton's World: Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind', *IHT*, 12 March 1993.
62. *The International Herald-Tribune*, 'Mining the President's Mind', 15–16 October 1994.
63. As Drew noted, the Principals' Committee dominates the Clinton White House's foreign policy decision-making process, and the President dominates the Principals' Committee. See: Drew, *op.cit.*, p. 145.
64. *The Economist*, 'Otherwise Engaged', 30 October 1993.
65. Barone and Ujifusa, *op.cit.*, p. xli.
66. *ibid.*, pp. xlii–xliv.
67. *Politics in America 1994, The 103rd Congress*, Phil Duncan, ed., (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993), p. 668.
68. *ibid.*, p. 310.
69. *ibid.*, p. 311.
70. *ibid.*, p. 520.
71. *The Economist*, 'Calling Dr. Kissinger', 14 January 1995.

72. Stephen Rosenfeld, 'Useful Questions About the Partnership for Peace', *IHT*, 4 July 1994.
73. See: Elaine Sciolino, 'Global Concerns? Not in Congress', *The New York Times*, 15 January 1995.
74. Barone and Ujifusa, *op.cit.*, p. 490.
75. Richard Ben Cramer, *What It Takes: The Way to the White House*, (New York: Vantage Books, 1992), p. 752.
76. *Politics in America 1994*, *op.cit.*, p. 587.
77. Olson, *op.cit.*, p. 547.
78. John J. Fialka, 'Clinton May Have to Quit Bosnia Embargo', *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 August 1994.
79. Sam Nunn, *The Congressional Record*, vol.140 no.82, 103rd Congress, (24 June 1994).
80. Joseph Biden, Jr., statement to Lift the Bosnian embargo, 12 May 1994, p. 4.

Chapter 8

1. Ann Devroy, 'Veto Keeps Arms Ban On Bosnia', *The Washington Post*, 12 August 1995.
2. Stephen Engelberg, 'Bosnia and US Politics: High Stakes for Dole', *The New York Times*, 20 July 1995.
3. *The New York Times*, 'Defiant Senators Vote To Override Bosnia Arms Ban', 27 July 1995.
4. Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, 'Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter', *The New York Times*, 21 September 1995.
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid.*
7. Thomas W. Lippman and Devroy, 'Clinton's Policy Evolution', *The Washington Post*, 11 September 1995.
8. *ibid.*
9. R.W. Apple, Jr., 'Clinton Sending Two Foreign Policy Advisers to Europe With New Proposals on Balkans', *The New York Times*, 9 August 1995.
10. William Safire, 'Clinton Abdicates As Leader', *The New York Times*, 27 July 1995.
11. Lippman and Devroy, *op.cit.*
12. Carroll J. Doherty, 'Dole Takes A Political Risk In Crusade to Aid Bosnia', *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol.53 no.10, (11 March 1995), p.762.
13. Bill Clinton, 'Bosnia-Herzegovina Arms Embargo', *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol.6 no.34, (21 August 1995), p.646.
14. Carroll J. Doherty, 'Hill Warily Awaits Outcome Of Nato Strikes on Serbs', *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, vol.53 no.34, (2 September 1995), p. 2668.
15. David Hoffman, 'Attack on Bosnia Shows Russia's Drift From West', *The Washington Post*, 16 August 1995.
16. Alan Cooperman, 'Russia's fury over its loss of sway', *US News and World Report*, 25 August 1995.
17. Craig R. Whitney, 'Russia Agrees To Put Troops Under US, Not Nato', *The New York Times*, 9 November 1995.

18. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, 'When Peace Means War', *The New Republic*, 18 December 1995.
19. Bruce W. Nelan, 'A Perilous Peace', *Time*, 4 December 1995.
20. Mearsheimer and Van Evera, *op.cit.*
21. Mark Thompson, 'The Peacekeeping Paradox', *Time*, 11 December 1995,
22. *ibid.*
23. Tom Morgenthau and John Barry, 'On the March', *Newsweek*, 11 December 1995.
24. R.W. Apple, 'Flimsy Bosnia Mandate', *The New York Times*, 14 December 1995.
25. Joe Klein, 'Indisputable Imponderables', *Newsweek*, 11 December 1995.
26. *The Economist*, 'Mr. Christopher's monument', 25 November 1995.
27. Katharine Q. Seelye, 'GOP Opposition Forces Dole to Delay Vote on Bosnia', *The New York Times*, 6 December 1995.
28. *The New York Times*, 'Excerpts from Senate debate on sending US troops to Bosnia', 14 December 1995.
29. *The New York Times*, 'Clinton's Words on Mission to Bosnia: "The Right Thing To Do"', 28 November 1995.
30. *ibid.*
31. *The New Republic*, 'Why The Troops Should Go', 18 December 1995.
32. Elaine Sciolino, Roger Cohen, and Engelberg, "'Good" Muslims and "Bad" Serbs Did a Switch', *The New York Times*, 23 November 1995.
33. *The Economist*, 'Peace at last, at least for now', 25 November 1995.
34. Apple, *op.cit.*
35. *The Economist*, 'Mr. Christopher's monument', *op.cit.*
36. Apple, *op.cit.*

Select Bibliography

- Allison, Graham. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971).
- Allison, Graham and Robert Blackwill. 'The Grand Bargain: The West and the Future of the Soviet Union', in *Rethinking America's Security*.
- Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).
- Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character; Predicting Performance in the White House*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977).
- Barone, Michael and Grant Ujifusa. *The Almanac of American Politics 1994*, (Washington D.C.: National Journal Inc. 1993).
- Biden, Jr., Joseph. 'To Stand Against Aggression: Milosevic, The Bosnian Republic, And The Conscience Of The West', Report of the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Europe to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 19 April 1993).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Out Of Control; Global Turmoil On The Eve Of The 21st Century*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 'Selective Global Commitment', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70 no.4, (Fall 1991).
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Collier Books, 1989).
- Buchanan, Patrick J. *Right from the Beginning*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1988).
- Bull, Hedley. 'Society And Anarchy In International Relations', in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1966).
- Clinton, Bill. 'Clinton Says US Needs New National Security Policy', Address to Georgetown University, 12 December 1991.
- Clinton, Bill. 'Clinton Would Stress Economic Issues in Foreign Policy', Address to the World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, 13 August 1992.
- Cox, Michael. 'The necessary partnership? The Clinton presidency and post-Soviet Russia', *International Affairs*, vol.70 no.4, (October 1994).
- Cramer, Richard Ben. *What It Takes; The Way to the White House*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
- Dole, Bob. 'Lift Bosnia Arms Embargo', Statement delivered on Senate floor, 1 July 1994.
- Doyle, Michael W. 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol.12 no. 3, (Summer 1983).
- Doyle, Michael W. 'Liberalism and World Politics', in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, Richard K. Betts, ed., (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994).
- Drew, Elizabeth. *On The Edge; The Clinton Presidency*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
- Fukuyama, Francis. 'The beginning of foreign policy: America confronts the post-Cold War world', *The New Republic*, vol.207 nos 8-9, (17 August 1992).
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End Of History And The Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

- Gaddis, John Lewis. 'International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War', *International Security*, vol.17 no.3, (Winter 1992–3).
- George, Alexander L. *Bridging The Gap; Theory and Practice In Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: US Institute Of Peace Press, 1993).
- Germond, Jack W. and Jules Witcover. *Mad As Hell: Revolt at the Ballot Box, 1992*, (New York: Warner Books, 1993).
- Girling, John. 'Franz Schunmann and the logic of world power: a reappraisal', *Review of International Studies*, vol.11 no.4, (October 1985).
- Grieco, Joseph M. 'Anarchy and the limits of Cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism', *International Organization*, vol.42 no.3, (Summer 1988).
- Halperin, Morton with Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kantor. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).
- Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994).
- Hoffmann, Stanley. 'The American Style: Our Past and Our Principles', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46 no.2, (January 1968).
- Holsti, Ole R. 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study', in *International Politics and Foreign Policy*.
- Holsti, Ole R. and James N. Rosenau. 'The structure of foreign policy beliefs among American opinion leaders—after the Cold War', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993).
- Hunt, Michael. *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
- Huntington, Samuel P. 'America's Changing Strategic Interest', *Survival*, vol.33 no.1, (January–February 1991).
- Huntington, Samuel P. 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72 no.3, (Summer 1993).
- Huntington, Samuel P. 'The US – Decline or Renewal?' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.67 no.2, (Winter 1988–9).
- Jamison, Linda. 'Executive-Legislative Relations After the Cold War', *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 1993).
- Kant, Immanuel. 'Perpetual Peace', in *Conflict After the Cold War*.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye, Jr. 'Power and Interdependence', in *Conflict After the Cold War*.
- Keohane Robert O., with Joseph Nye, Jr. 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics*, vol.27 no.1, (October 1974).
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. *Dictatorships And Double Standards; Rationalism and Reason In Politics*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. *The Reagan Phenomenon – And Other Speeches On Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983).
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. *The Withering Away Of The Totalitarian State...And Other Surprises*, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1990).
- Kissinger, Henry. *A World Restored*, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1977).
- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
- Kissinger, Henry. 'Foreign Policy Is About the National Interest', *IHT*, 25 October 1993.
- Lind, Michael. 'The fission thing: the future foreign policy fight', *The New Republic*, vol.207 no.14, (28 September 1992).
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*, (London: Macmillan, 1994).

- Mannheim, Karl. *Ideology And Utopia; An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970).
- Mearsheimer, John J. 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol.15 no.1, (Summer 1990).
- Muravchik, Joshua. *Exporting Democracy; Fulfilling America's Destiny*, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992).
- Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power And The Modern Presidents; The Politics Of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan*, (New York: The Free Press, 1990).
- Nixon, Richard. *Beyond Peace*, (New York: Random House, 1994).
- Nixon, Richard. *Seize The Moment; America's Challenge In A One-Superpower World*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph. *Bound to Lead; The Changing Nature of American Power*, (USA: Basic Books, 1990).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph. 'Multinational Corporations in World Politics', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.53 no.1, (October 1974).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph with Robert O. Keohane, 'Power and Interdependence', *Survival*, vol.15 no.4, (July-August 1973).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph with Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion', *International Organization*, vol.25 no.3, (1971).
- Nye, Jr., Joseph with Robert O. Keohane, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organization*, vol.25 no.3, (1971).
- Peters, Charles. *How Washington Really Works*, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1980).
- Peterson, Paul E. 'The President's Dominance in Foreign Policy Making', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.109 no.2, (Summer 1994).
- Politics in America 1996; The 104th Congress, Phil Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence, eds, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995).
- Rosecrance, Richard. *The Rise Of The Trading State; Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986).
- Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. *The Imperial Presidency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973).
- Schurmann, Franz. *The Logic of World Power*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974).
- Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game; How Washington Works*, (New York: Random House, 1988).
- Talbott, Strobe. 'The New Geopolitics: Defending Democracy in the Post-Cold War Era', Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford, *United States Information Service*, 20 October 1994.
- Tonelson, Alan. 'Beyond Left and Right', *The National Interest*, no.34, (Winter 1993-94).
- Tucker, Robert W. and David C. Hendrickson. 'America and Bosnia', *The National Interest*, no.33, (Fall 1993).
- Waltz, Kenneth. 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, vol.18 no.2, (Fall 1993).
- Waltz, Kenneth. 'The New World Order', *Millennium*, vol.22 no.2, (Summer 1993).
- Wattenberg, Ben J. *The First Universal Nation: Leading Indicators and Ideas About The Surge of America in the 90's*, (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
- Woodward, Bob. *The Agenda; Inside The Clinton White House*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).
- The World Almanac Of US Politics: 1993-95 edition, Robert Wogman, ed., (Mahwah, New Jersey: Funk and Wagnalls Corp., 1993).

Index

- Acheson, Dean 3, 40
Akashi, Yasushi 130-2
Allison, Graham 3, 15-16, 25-6, 30, 46, 136-8
Aspin, Les 137, 147-8
- belief systems 8, 10-12, 17
Biden, Joseph 38, 85-90, 111, 157-8, 163, 166, 181
Bihac 88, 121-2, 127-9, 131, 168-9
Bosnia crisis 1, 11, 13, 16, 21, 29, 38, 42, 52-3, 58, 70-1, 73, 75-6, 78-80, 82-3, 85-7, 90-1, 93-9, 104-6, 110-38, 141-9, 151-2, 154-5, 156-86
 arms embargo controversy 53, 82-3, 94-5, 98, 105-6, 111-12, 117, 120-2, 125, 127-30, 157-8, 160, 162-6, 168, 172-3, 176
 ethnic cleansing 29, 88, 117, 120, 122, 178
Bosnian Croats 124, 174, 176
Bosnian government *see* Bosnian Muslims
Bosnian Muslims 79, 82-3, 86, 88, 91, 93-5, 104-6, 117, 120-5, 127-31, 133, 148, 157-8, 159, 162-5, 167-70, 172, 174-80, 182-3
Bosnian Serbs 79, 82, 86-8, 120-3, 125-9, 167-71, 173-6, 182-3
Britain 24, 46, 88, 95-6, 106, 121-4, 127-33, 163-4, 167-8, 170-3, 177
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 28, 49, 61-2, 75, 150
Buchanan, Pat 47, 55-6
bureaucratic politics analysis 3, 9-10, 13, 16, 44, 135, 137-9, 142, 146, 184
- China 5-6, 17, 21, 30-2, 35, 38, 54-5, 58, 74-5, 78-9, 84-5, 88-9, 96-7, 102, 104, 109-12, 157, 173
- MFN controversy with 17, 21, 30-1, 54-5, 58, 67, 74, 78-9, 84-5, 88-9, 96-7, 102, 104, 109-12, 157
Chirac, Jacques 171
Christopher, Warren 58, 71, 79-80, 99-102, 112, 120-2, 124, 144-51, 153-4, 158, 172, 181
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 15, 38-9, 50, 137
Clinton, Bill 30-1, 46, 49-50, 53-4, 61, 69, 80, 82-3, 85, 90, 93-7, 99-102, 104-9, 112, 114-17, 120-3, 126-8, 130, 132-3, 140, 142, 144-55, 156-8, 160-6, 168-70, 172-3, 176, 178-83, 185-6
Clinton administration 1, 13, 18, 29, 40, 54, 58, 68, 70-1, 77, 84, 91-4, 96, 98, 102-4, 108-9, 114-20, 122-8, 130-4, 140, 142-3, 145-55, 157-60, 162, 164-6, 169-70, 172-4, 176-7, 179, 181, 183-6
Congress 3, 7, 9, 12-13, 84, 91, 108, 113, 128, 131-2, 135, 140-4, 149, 155-66, 170, 172, 177-81, 185-6
 103rd Congress 91, 135, 142, 144, 155-9, 161-2, 165, 185
 104th Congress 135, 159-60, 164-5, 185
contact group 95, 121, 124-8, 132-3, 169, 173
containment doctrine 1, 4-7, 71, 186
Croatia 104, 117, 121, 124-5, 167-70, 175-6, 178, 180
Croatian Serbs 121, 124, 127, 167-8, 171
currents of thought 2-4, 6-7, 9, 12, 28
Czech Republic 24, 52, 80, 92, 96, 99, 119
- Dayton Accord 13, 135, 165, 168, 171, 174-83, 186

- Democratic Party 1, 3, 15, 19, 58,
156-8, 186
- democratism 9, 13-15, 19, 21-37,
39-42, 45-8, 51-4, 56-8, 61-3,
66-8, 72-5, 78-82, 84-92, 94-5,
99-103, 106-7, 109-12, 114-17,
122, 124, 131-2, 140, 145, 152,
155, 157-8, 163, 166, 171, 182,
187
- hyper-democratism 15, 21, 32-3
- moderate democratism 14-15, 21,
32-3
- Deng Xiaoping 17, 31, 74, 79, 109
- Department of Defense 15, 38, 50,
93, 97-8, 137, 147-8, 150, 177-8,
184
- Dole, Bob 38, 53, 91, 93-7, 111, 128,
158-63, 165-6, 172-3, 179-80,
185
- Dole-Lieberman amendments 82,
93-5, 121, 126, 157-60, 162-3,
165-6, 172
- Dole-McCain resolution 180-1
- Doyle, Michael 22-4
- EC (European Community) 26, 119
- elites 8, 11-12, 34
- EU (European Union) 28, 44, 52, 58,
71-2, 76, 100-1, 106-7, 112, 117,
119, 121-2, 176
- executive branch *see* presidency
- France 24, 46, 88, 95, 106, 121-3,
127-31, 133, 163-4, 167-8,
170-3, 177
- Fukuyama, Francis 8-9, 15, 22, 25-6,
32, 187
- G-7 (Group of Seven Industrialized
Countries) 60, 77, 115
- Gaddis, John Lewis 40, 46-7, 56, 59,
75
- GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade) 21, 29, 38, 43, 53,
57-8, 60, 65, 73, 81, 90, 96, 101,
104, 109-12
- Gingrich, Newt 98, 128, 166
- Gorazde 105, 121-3, 126, 130-2,
151, 168-9, 174
- Gore, Al 121, 126, 145, 163
- Gulf War 1, 26, 75
- Holbrooke, Richard 169, 183
- Holsti, Ole 10, 33, 49, 70
- House of Representatives 142, 155,
166, 168, 186
- Hungary 24, 52, 81, 87, 92, 96, 99,
119
- Huntington, Samuel 24, 32, 34-6,
41-2, 46, 49, 51
- ideology 2-3, 5, 8-10, 12, 21, 25, 30,
34, 36, 45-8, 54, 56, 76, 87, 137,
144, 148, 187
- IFOR (Implementation Force) 168,
174, 176-83
- imperialism 3-7, 21, 28, 38, 40, 47,
71
- institutionalism 5, 9, 13-16, 19, 23,
26-7, 30-1, 42-4, 49-50, 53-4,
57-79, 81-5, 87, 89-93, 96-115,
117-20, 122-4, 126, 128-35, 137,
142, 144-6, 148, 151-2, 154,
157-63, 166, 169-72, 174, 177-86
- internationalism 3-7, 58, 60, 71
- Janvier, Bernard 167, 169
- Kant, Immanuel 21-2, 24, 37
- Karadzic, Radovan 116, 123, 125,
127, 132, 171, 175
- Kennedy, John 58, 62, 72
- Keohane, Robert 15, 17, 55, 59,
63-5, 67
- Kissinger, Henry 15, 39-40, 45,
47-51, 71, 150
- Krajina, the 124, 167-8, 170
- Lake, Anthony 102-5, 112, 144, 146,
149-51, 153-4, 170, 172, 181, 183
- legislative branch *see* Congress
- Lugar, Richard 38, 53, 90-3, 96, 111,
158-60, 161-2, 166, 181
- Marshall Plan 59, 89, 104
- Milosevic, Slobodan 36, 86, 116,
124-5, 127, 167-8, 171, 175-6,
182-3

- Mitchell, George 14, 21, 28, 81-5,
110, 156-7, 161-2
- Mladic, Ratko 169, 171, 175
- NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement) 21, 29,
38, 53, 58, 73, 81, 84, 90,
101, 103, 108-12, 142-3, 152,
161
- nationalism 3-7, 21, 28, 30
- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) 21, 26-7, 29, 38,
41, 48, 50-2, 58, 61-2, 65, 72, 80,
83, 90-2, 94-6, 98-102, 107,
110-12, 117-19, 121, 126,
129-31, 151, 168-9, 171, 173-4,
177, 179-80
- neoconservatives 15, 19, 21, 28
- neo-realism 9, 13-15, 19, 24-6,
29-30, 35-6, 38-61, 63-6, 72-6,
80, 83-102, 111, 118-20, 122,
124, 128, 131-2, 137, 145, 147-8,
157-66, 172-3, 177-81, 184,
186-7
- realist-internationalism 14-15, 38,
47, 55, 186
- realist-isolationism 14-15, 38, 47,
55-6, 61, 186
- Nixon, Richard 15, 26, 29, 39, 45,
47, 50, 54, 155
- NSA (National Security
Adviser) 149-51
- NSC (National Security Council)
49-50, 137, 149-50, 152
- Nunn, Sam 92-3, 148, 162-3, 166
- Nye, Joseph 15, 59-60, 63-5, 68
- OSCE (Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe) 50, 92,
178
- Partnership for Peace plan 72, 90, 92,
96, 101, 107, 117-19, 173
- Pentagon *see* Department of Defense
- Perry, William 97-9, 112, 137, 144,
146-50, 153-4, 181, 184
- Poland 24, 52, 81, 92, 96, 99, 119
- post-Cold War era 1-3, 7, 9, 13-14,
16-20, 22, 28, 41, 52, 62, 68-71,
76, 80, 92-3, 95, 104, 114, 138,
143, 184-5
- presidency, the 2-4, 7, 9, 12-13,
15-16, 58, 71, 105, 109, 113,
135-7, 139-44, 148-51, 153,
154-60, 162, 165-6, 173, 180-1,
185-6
- Principals' Committee 149, 153-4
- Republican Party 1, 5-6, 15, 19, 38,
50, 53, 91, 128, 156, 159-61, 164,
166, 170, 172, 185-6
- Roosevelt, Franklin 5-6, 8, 13, 28
- Russia 21, 27, 29-31, 34, 38, 44-5,
53-4, 58, 73-4, 79-82, 85-6,
89-90, 92-3, 96-103, 105-8,
110-12, 114-19, 121, 124, 127,
129, 134, 137, 140, 151-5, 168,
173-4, 183, 185
- Sarajevo 121-3, 126, 130, 133, 151,
167-9, 173-4, 183, 185
- schools-of-thought analysis 1-3,
6-20, 32, 78, 81, 85, 97-8, 103,
105, 109, 114, 135, 137-8, 141,
143-4, 165, 167, 181, 183-5,
187
- first principles of 1, 12, 14, 17-19
- majority strains within 13-15, 21,
32, 38, 55
- minority strains within 13-16, 21,
32, 38, 55, 187
- as a sub-ideology 3, 8-9, 12, 17
- Schurmann, Franz 2-10, 12-13, 15,
18, 21, 28, 30, 38, 40, 47, 58, 60,
71, 137
- Secretary of Defense 135, 147, 149
- Secretary of State 135, 138, 144, 149,
153, 155
- Senate, 104, 126, 140, 142, 155-61,
163, 166, 168, 173, 186
- Senate Foreign Relations
Committee 90, 141, 159
- Serbian people (Serbian Serbs and/or
Bosnian Serbs) 53, 76, 79, 86-8,
90-1, 94, 99, 104-5, 116-17,
120-33, 148, 151, 164, 167,
170-8, 180-3
- Srebrenica 122, 167-73

- START agreements (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) 89, 93, 98, 115, 173
- State Department 3-5, 21, 50, 58, 71, 135, 137, 145-6, 150
- Taft, Robert 4-5, 7
- Talbott, Strobe 21, 28, 78-81, 101-2, 110, 115, 140, 144, 146, 150-4
- Truman, Harry 1, 3-4, 7, 40
- Tudjman, Franjo 124, 168, 174-5
- UN (United Nations) 27-8, 44, 47, 50, 58, 61, 67, 69-71, 76, 82, 88, 91, 95-6, 106, 117, 120-3, 128-33, 151, 163, 167-70, 172, 175-7
- peacekeepers 83, 88, 120, 122, 129-31, 165, 167-70, 172, 177, 179
- safe areas 122, 132, 167-8
- Vance-Owen plan 121-5, 183
- Vandenberg, Arthur 1, 3, 40
- Wallace, Henry 4-5, 7
- Wattenberg, Ben 8-9, 23, 25, 32-3
- Western Europe 8-9, 21, 28-9, 38, 46-7, 50-2, 55, 57-9, 62, 65, 68-9, 71-2, 76-7, 80-1, 83-4, 88, 90-2, 94-5, 98-102, 105-6, 110-12, 114, 117-19, 122, 125, 130-4, 152, 155, 180, 183, 185
- WEU (Western European Union) 58, 72, 92, 107, 118
- World Bank 55, 57-8, 65, 73
- Yeltsin, Boris 27, 30, 53-4, 79-80, 85-6, 89, 93, 98, 100, 102-3, 115-17, 119, 164, 173-4