

# **Taiwan's History**

## **An Introduction**

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### **EDITORS' INTRODUCTION**

Nothing happens that is not at least in part a result of what has gone before, and so we start this volume with a brief account of Taiwan by historian Andrew D. Morris.

This chapter is not the whole story. That would take many volumes. It is not the only perspective. There are many voices that deserve to be heard. It is not final. Much is yet to be discovered about the past just as about the present. But it can serve as an orientation to the subject and as a background to the other chapters in this volume.

Briefly, Taiwan is located off the coast of southeastern China, between the Philippines and Japan. Taiwan has the highest mountains east of Tibet, with a water runoff that could power all of Asia if it were used to power generators on a rainy day. Most people live in the small areas that are comparatively flat—principally the western plain formed over the millennia by mud washed down from the mountains.

The island's aboriginal Austronesian population is closely related to the peoples of the Philippines. About four hundred years ago, increasing numbers of Chinese began moving across the Taiwan Strait from Fujian Province and settling in Taiwan. Their origins varied slightly, and their squabbling over land rights and other issues in Taiwan often led them to seek alliances with people from the same places of origin to conduct petty local wars with other settlers, as the earlier non-Chinese population took refuge in ever-higher mountainous areas.

The dawn of centralized Qing administration of the island came in 1683, and in 1885 it was granted provincial status under the Qing dynasty. The two centuries between those dates were characterized by increasing population, settled farming, frequent plagues, occasional uprisings, and almost constant feuding and petty wars among ethnic groups and local interests. The whole island was a wild and woolly frontier, and no magistrate was enthusiastic about representing the imperial government in this remote and unruly region. Today every part of the island can produce accounts—not always true but always interesting—of the tragedy of its plagues or the nobility of its local militia or the intervention of its local gods during the imperial period.

In 1895, less than ten years after it was made a province, Taiwan was abruptly ceded by the Qing emperor to Meiji Japan. For the Japanese, this introduced the sudden responsibility to administer a subject population. For the Taiwanese, it was more than a change of government. It meant subjugation to a new and inexperienced colonial administration, speaking a foreign language, the imposition of foreign ways, and Japan's determination to convert the whole populace from being Chinese to Japanese.

The colonial record of Japan in Taiwan is mixed. In retrospect, and with our current distaste for colonialism, it is easy to be critical. It is also easy to forget that the political situation in Japan between 1895 and the end of World War II was rapidly evolving, and so colonial policy toward Taiwan also varied. Quite possibly, no two Japanese ever agreed on what the empire's "steady-state" relationship with Taiwan should be. But for better and for worse, Japanese possession of Taiwan—for an even fifty years—comprises part of the island's history and part of its identity. Industrial and commercial development during this period clearly provided the basis for the prosperity that was to follow.

Events in the rest of China were not static during those fifty years. Rebels threatened the imperial government at the end of the nineteenth century in the famous and bloody Boxer Rebellion, suppressed only with the help of European powers in 1900. Taiwan was untouched by this uprising because it was under Japanese administration.

In 1911 the dynasty was overthrown and in 1912 a new Republic of China was established, headed by the Nationalist Party, also known as the KMT (Kuomintang) or GMD (Guomindang). But the KMT government was so weak that some areas it claimed to control never in fact passed under its effective administration. The revolution was not without bloodshed, and local warlords ravaged the countryside in some areas. Taiwan again escaped the turmoil, for it was part of Japan.

In 1937, Japan—increasingly falling under the control of extremist military factions—invaded China, seizing much of the Eastern part of the country and imposing a brutal administration that lasted until the end of World War II in 1945. Taiwan, already long under Japanese administration, was once again sheltered from the suffering inflicted upon the mainland. In 1945, with

the defeat of Japan by the allied forces, Taiwan was turned over to the Republic of China, a government unknown to the people of Taiwan—and one scornful and suspicious of them as “Japanese collaborators.”

From 1945 to 1949, the government of the republic was engaged in a vicious civil war with forces of the Communist Party. The Communists prevailed and established a new People’s Republic of China. The government of the Republic of China lost control of all of China—all, that is, except Taiwan, the island it had so recently acquired and so scorned. The organs of government were hastily moved to Taipei, in northern Taiwan, which was identified as the “provisional capital” of the Republic of China during the “temporary period” of Communist rebellion.

With the chaos and change of regime on the mainland, there arrived in Taiwan about a million refugees: soldiers, teachers, merchants, bureaucrats, policemen, the good, the bad, the vicious, and the innocent, thrown in confusion upon the unwilling hospitality of a population that had not long before been briefly granted Japanese citizenship.

In this chapter, Morris recounts all these events and the remarkable challenges, contradictions, tribulations, heroism, and sometimes comic ironies that were involved.

In the midst of the civil war on the mainland, on February 28, 1947, tensions in Taiwan boiled over in a riot which, within days, led to a government-sponsored massacre. The die was now cast for an enduring Taiwanese hostility to mainland immigrants and “their” KMT government. The date 2/28, or “228,” was destined to live forever in the Taiwanese imagination as the formative moment in the emergence of a post-Japanese identity of Taiwanese as not really being Chinese after all. For if Chinese could do what the KMT did on 228, Taiwan wanted no part of it.

A state of martial law prevailed on the island until 1987. It is easy to imagine the period of martial law as darker than it was. Babies still giggled, children still laughed, and the sun continued to shine. Economic progress was so rapid that even severe critics conceded that it was almost a miracle. But criticism of the KMT or of the goal of retaking the mainland for the Republic of China was not tolerated. When martial law was lifted, a new era of openness and of open criticism of KMT abuses dawned. Taiwan, with a population now over 22 million—more than three times what it was in 1945—had at last become a democratic state.

Today the distinction between “Taiwanese” and “mainland immigrants” has been much muted with the passing of half a century since the fall of the KMT on the mainland. But many aspects of life are affected by the history of mainlander-Taiwanese relations. Meanwhile, the Communist government on the mainland has continued to insist that, as the successor to the Republic of China on the mainland, it is the only legal and legitimate government of Taiwan. The mainland, with nearly sixty times the population of Taiwan, has easily persuaded nearly all the nations of the world to conform, at least nomi-

nally, to this view. Recognition of the government of the Republic of China—Taiwan's current democratic government—brings the withdrawal of diplomatic relations from China. Few countries support Taiwan's claims to its legitimate independence under that threat.

Thus Taiwan today faces two dominant and inescapable dilemmas that are reflected through its cultural institutions. One is the question of how united its population is. Are the people of Taiwan all really Taiwanese, or are they all different, as history would seem to indicate? The other is the question of whether in the future (perhaps next week) Taiwan will abruptly become a province of the Communist state across the straits—once again a part of China. Within these ambiguities and under this threat, the people of the island go about their daily affairs, making themselves a remarkable font of creativity and cultural innovation.

The essays in this volume all relate in one way or another to this anxious situation, for it is the overwhelming reality of life in Taiwan today. In this introductory chapter, Morris provides the critical background that is so ready and real in all that Taiwanese do in daily life. ■

Long, long ago  
For generations on this piece of land  
Where no wealth or prosperity grows  
Where no miracles are ever produced  
My ancestors wiped away their sweat  
And brought forth their fated children.

Wu Sheng, preface to *Vignettes of My Village*

Land of the Eastern Barbarians<sup>1</sup> (Yizhou), Little Ryukyu (Lequeo Pequeno, Xiao Liuqiu), Little Eastern Island (Xiao dong dao), Beautiful Island (Ilha Formosa), Land of the High Mountain People (Gaoshanguo), gateway to Chinese commerce, place of banishment, solitary island, stone pointing at the south, first Asian republic, colonial laboratory, the Orphan of Asia, rebel province, Free China, unsinkable aircraft carrier, "Chinese Taipei," Republic of China on Taiwan, Austronesian homeland, and green silicon island—these are just some of the terms that have been used to describe Taiwan over the last several centuries.<sup>2</sup>

Clearly, the nationalist slogan of the 1980s and 1990s that Taiwan is "just Taiwan" is far too simplistic to be true. At the same time, its absolute converse—that Taiwan "has always been an inseparable part of the Chinese mainland"—is several dimensions farther removed from reality. Over the last several centuries, Taiwan has been home to or served as the subject of expansionist desires of far too many peoples and nations—native Austronesian, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, Manchu, British, German, French, American, Japanese, and Taiwanese—for its history to be summed up in either of these naïve fashions. This introductory essay on the history of Taiwan is meant to provide perspective on the diverse and eventful history that the people of this island state have inherited and made.

## THE SETTING

Taiwan is a mountainous island 245 miles (394 km) long by 90 miles (144 km) at its widest. It is shaped from north to south, depending on the taste of the beholder, like a tobacco leaf or a sweet potato—or even a whale. The island, the southern third of which is below the Tropic of Cancer, is separated from the coast of southeastern China by the deadly, rough, and shallow waters of the Taiwan Straits, some 81 to 137 miles (130–220 km) wide. About 70 miles (113 km) east of Taiwan lies Yonaguni-jima, the southwesternmost of the Sakishima Islands of Japan, and some 50 miles (80 km) to the south across the Bashi Channel lie the Batan Islands, the northernmost of the Philippine Islands. While Taiwan shares the continental shelf with China, it is part of the same island system as Japan.

With a total area of some 13,836 square miles (35,834 km<sup>2</sup>), Taiwan is slightly larger than Belgium or Maryland, half the size of Panama or West Virginia, or about one-twelfth the size of California. Its present population of 22.3 million makes Taiwan one of the most densely populated nations on earth.

## EARLIEST INHABITANTS

Taiwan's original inhabitants—thought by some to have migrated from the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos and by others to have come from southeastern China—have been divided into fourteen groups of lowland peoples and nine groups of mountain peoples (Stainton 1999b, 29–41; Wang 1980, 32). The first settlements of these groups, speakers of the earliest known Austronesian languages, date back at least fifteen thousand years. Their descendants today number some four hundred thousand, about 2 percent of Taiwan's population. They are known as aborigines (*yuanzhumin*), and they have suffered repeated discrimination by various colonizing powers in Taiwan.

The date of the earliest Chinese travel and migration to Taiwan is also the subject of great political debate. For decades, Chinese Nationalists have used vague references to the Land of Eastern Barbarians or the Ryukyu Islands in the *History of the Later Han dynasty* (25–220 C.E.) or the *History of the Three Kingdoms* (mid-third century C.E.) in an effort to prove that Taiwan has always been part of a timeless Chinese “motherland” (Fang 1994, 13–20). To assume, however, some intimate China-Taiwan relationship through the millennia would be wrong. Jack Wills has more accurately shown that even in 1600, Taiwan still “was on the outer edge of Chinese consciousness and activity” (Wills 1999, 85). Four centuries ago there was no permanent Chinese settlement on (or name for) Taiwan, although by that time there were Chinese and Japanese traders, fishermen, and pirates willing to brave the malarial fever that claimed the lives of so many visitors there. In 1603, the scholar Chen Di spent twenty-two days in Taiwan before publishing his *Record of the Eastern Savages* (*Dongfan ji*), marveling at their backward ways: “To this day they have no calendrical system, nor any

writing system and they do not feel the lack. Is that not strange?"<sup>3</sup> (Teng 1999, 445–450)

As would become a pattern in the island's history, Chinese interest and settlement in Taiwan picked up only with the presence of other foreign powers in the Taiwan Straits—in this case, the Dutch. Hoping to obtain a foothold in the lucrative China trade, the Dutch failed to gain trading posts in southeastern China. Ming dynasty officials pushed these pesky and dangerous traders farther east to an island not considered imperial territory but known to early seventeenth-century Chinese officials as Taiyuan, Dayuan, Taiwan, or Dawan (Nakamura 1954, 114).<sup>4</sup> The Dutch knew this island as *Ilha Formosa*, as it had been named by passing Portuguese sailors in the 1540s, and they set up their China trading operations there.

When they arrived in southern Taiwan in 1622, Dutch East India Company agents estimated populations of a thousand Chinese sojourners and traders and some seventy thousand plains aborigines on the western Taiwan coast (Wills 1999, 87–88; Hauptman and Knapp 1977, 175). After several tough years fighting Chinese and Japanese pirates and competitors, native and Chinese revolts on Taiwan, and Spanish forces from Manila colonizing the northern tip of Taiwan, in 1636 the Dutch colonial administration began farming land out to Chinese sojourners in order to acquire a more consistent food supply and regular tax revenue. By 1650, some twenty-five thousand Chinese had come to the Dutch colony to grow and sell rice, vegetables, sugarcane, and indigo, as well as to fish and hunt, during the three years that Chinese law allowed them to reside abroad. While some fled to Taiwan to escape the destruction of the Ming-Qing dynastic transition, others set sail on Dutch ships to Taiwan, attracted by Dutch promises of oxen, tools, and seeds for Chinese pioneer farm labor (van Veen 1996, 65–67).

At its largest, the Dutch population in Taiwan was a mere twenty-eight hundred, of whom some twenty-two hundred were soldiers. These vulnerable numbers required colonial forces to spend most of their income on fortifications, and their worst fears were realized in 1652. In an event later immortalized as the first Chinese “anti-Western uprising” in history, some fifteen thousand Chinese settlers armed with sharpened bamboo set out to “kill the Dutch dogs” at Fort Zeelandia. The Dutch recruited some two thousand Austronesian natives to aid in suppressing the revolt (Hsu 1980a, 15; van Veen 1996, 65–67, 71).

But the Dutch days on the Beautiful Island were numbered. Their presence on Taiwan forced the outgoing Ming dynasty and the new Manchu Qing to pay more attention to the island. Only under the Qing in the mid-seventeenth century was the name “Taiwan” officially adopted to refer to the whole island (Nakamura 1954, 114). It was in the context of this new Chinese consciousness of Taiwan that Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) sought to make the island the base of his movement to overthrow the newly founded Qing dynasty in the name of restoring the vanquished Ming.

## THE CHINESE/MANCHU PRESENCE ON TAIWAN

In 1661, after fighting Manchu Qing forces for more than a decade, Zheng's fleet of two hundred ships and twenty-five thousand men set sail from the southeastern Chinese coast for Taiwan. By this time, the number of Chinese settled in Taiwan had reached some fifty thousand. This large fifth column was twenty times larger than the entire Dutch occupation force, and it made Zheng's conquest easy. Zheng thus established the first Chinese administration of Taiwan—ironically, a regime formed in rebellion against China's ruling Qing. Zheng died four months later, but the easily appropriated elements of the story of this son of a Chinese pirate and a Japanese mother now dwarf the import of the twenty-one-year rule of his descendants on Taiwan. Diverse modern political forces in China and even Japan have sanctified Zheng for delivering Taiwan into Chinese hands for the first time—notwithstanding the myth that Taiwan had “always” been part of China. (Also ironic is the fact that before his sudden death, Zheng schemed to capture Luzon and the Philippines, suggesting a different goal than some consecrated mission of capturing Taiwan for Chinese posterity.)

The state administered by Zheng's son and grandson sought to expand land cultivation and transform the culture, economy, polity, and agriculture of Taiwan according to Chinese models. The regime provided thousands of soldiers with land and supplies, encouraged thousands more Chinese migrant farmers to open up new farmland, and established Chinese schools and Confucian temples in settler and native areas. These new migrants quickly made themselves at home, naming their new settlements after their hometowns in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces (Lin 1975, 5). Taiwan's position as a commercial center in maritime East Asia continued, as the Zheng regime pursued foreign policy according to trading needs. Formal relations were established with Japan, the Ryukyuan Kingdom, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and even England. The government was staffed largely with merchants from Fujian Province in China, another reason why one Taiwanese historian defines Zheng-era Taiwan simply as a “merchant nation” (*shangren guojia*) (Hsu 1980a, 25–27; Weng 1995).

During the Zheng period, the Chinese population, concentrated in the southwestern coastal plain, began to rival the numbers of Austronesian natives on Taiwan, doubling to roughly a hundred thousand after twenty-one years. Yet these numbers were of no aid when forces of the Manchu Qing dynasty, taking advantage of a famine on Taiwan, attacked in 1683. Koxinga's son Zheng Jing had hoped to negotiate independence from the Qing, promising to remain a loyal tributary state like Korea (Ren 1996, 85, 154). The Kangxi emperor, ruling that no ethnic Chinese state could exist separately from the dynasty, rejected this offer. This Kangxi Doctrine was formalized when the Qing navy took Taiwan by force. Qing conquest seems to have been inspired more by Manchu annoyance at this defiant Chinese island than by practical considerations. Immediately after taking this peripheral territory, Qing naval commander Shi Lang attempted to sell the island back to the Dutch, and other high Qing officials

planned to abandon and evacuate it altogether (Wills 1999, 102; Shepherd 1999, 108). Finally—for reasons not of Chinese historical destiny but of the very practical wish to keep the island out of the hands of pesky foreigners—Taiwan was integrated into the empire in 1684 as a prefecture of Fujian Province.

Once the Qing made the decision to undertake formal administration of Taiwan, Shi's forces moved quickly to consolidate rule and assure Chinese and native populations of the new government's benevolent intentions. Yet Qing officials were perhaps more nervous about this new frontier possession than were its inhabitants; they feared that rebellions could erupt on this far-off island, led by Chinese immigrant farmers incited by pirates and Ming remnants or by native Austronesians frustrated and displaced by growing Chinese immigration. These concerns guided the first century of Qing administration in Taiwan, marked by regulation of Chinese immigration to the island and cautious respect for the natives' positions in the mountainous eastern half of the island.

Admiral Shi Lang quickly moved to send back to the mainland any sojourners in Taiwan with neither wife nor property (and thus seen as less accountable), and it is estimated that as much as half of the Chinese population departed by the end of 1684 (Shepherd 1993, 106). The Qing soon prohibited family migration to Taiwan, hoping that any population there would consist of seasonal migrant laborers only. This "agricultural colony" of Fujian Province (DeGlopper 1980, 143) had to be maintained by someone. Yet the promise that this "island frontier" (Shepherd 1999) offered Chinese pioneer farmers, combined with the growing population pressures in southeastern China, made it hard for the Qing to maintain tight immigration controls for long. Immigration continued, and in a few decades Taiwan became the rugged, disordered frontier that the Qing so feared. For the next 150 years, these young rootless men would make up as much as 30 percent of the Chinese population in Taiwan (Chen 1990, 111).

There was a popular pioneer proverb that expressed the unlikely hopes of fulfilling the domestic Taiwan dream: "Having a wife is better than having a god."<sup>5</sup> Far away from their homes and without family ties, these Chinese men turned to other forms of mutual support in religious societies and sworn brotherhoods among men of the same ancestral places and dialects (Hsu 1980b, 88–90). Yet, as was true throughout so much of Chinese history, there was an infinitesimally thin line between these societies' functions of mutual support and the mutual competition that emerged between these same groups. Disputes between these organizations on the rough frontier could easily erupt into violent communal strife (*fenlei xiedou*)—often between the three main settler groups, Hoklos from Quanzhou and Zhangzhou Prefectures in Fujian and the Hakkas from northeastern Guangdong—or into popular uprisings against the Qing state.

Qing officials annoyed by this malarial frontier joked, with black humor, that Taiwan produced "a minor revolt every three years, a major one every five years." This was no exaggeration. During the 212 years of Qing rule in Taiwan, 171 "disturbances among the people" (*minbian*) were recorded—including 68

anti-Qing revolts and 38 battles fought between migrants from rival home prefectures on the mainland (Chen 1987, 11–12; Hsu 1980b, 94; Lamley 1981).<sup>6</sup>

Maintenance of a peaceful frontier became one of the dynasty's main objectives. For lack of an imperial military presence to handle such matters properly, rebellions were typically put down by hiring Austronesian natives or rival settler groups to fight the rebels. During the 1721 Zhu Yigui Revolt, led by a precocious duck breeder committed to restoring the Ming dynasty, the Qing military paid native Austronesian warriors a piece rate for every rebel they could kill (Shepherd 1993, 147). The Qing also took more Confucian long-term measures to prevent the rebellions in the first place, providing generous scholarships to encourage more Taiwan residents to seek advancement via the imperial exam system rather than through rebellion and forgiving farmers their land taxes during droughts (209–213, 289).

Qing officials were also concerned about the Austronesian native population, which they divided into two groups: the plains “cooked savages” (*shufan*, literally “cooked,” meaning matured by their exposure to the radiance of Chinese/Manchu culture), who were seen as more trustworthy than the exotic “raw savages” (*shengfan*) of the mountains. Qing officials feared, justifiably, an aboriginal “blowback”—that Chinese settlement in Taiwan could, by destroying Austronesian ways of life, force these aboriginal people to strike back against the settlers and the state. Accordingly, the first century of Qing rule in Taiwan was marked by coherent policies of protecting Austronesian land rights in the eastern half of Taiwan while hoping to acculturate these aboriginal peoples through the Confucian exam system and the spread of Chinese farming techniques (Shepherd 1993).

This level of attention to the remote Taiwan frontier was not maintained indefinitely, however. When the pressures of great population growth,<sup>7</sup> official corruption, and domestic unrest began to plague the proud Qing dynasty in the late 1700s, the administration of Taiwan was downgraded from an annoying but necessary responsibility to a nonpriority. For nearly a century, from the 1780s until the 1870s, Qing officials seemed in many ways to shut their eyes, hold their noses, cross their fingers, and hope that the officials judged to be “unfitted for responsible and administrative work” and corrupt troops stationed on this far-off island would be sufficient to maintain peace and regular rice shipments to Fujian (Davidson 1903, 100; Goddard 1966, 129).

This proved not to be the case, but this failure is not what revived the Qing commitment to Taiwan. As was true with the faltering Ming court more than two centuries before, it took a germinating imperialist interest—this time Japanese, British, French, American, and German—in the island to convince the Qing dynasty to renew its imperial title. In the 1850s–1870s, Qing sovereignty over Taiwan was openly challenged by American, British, Japanese, and German merchants and governments in several humiliating incidents, especially with respect to the Austronesian-populated eastern half of the island that the Qing admitted was “not yet entered in the maps” (*wei ji shouru bantu*) (Carrington 1977, 55–106; Chan 1973, 135–163; Gardella 1999, 167; Gordon 1976, 550–554; Huang 1986,

240–244; LeGendre 1874, 5). Domestic rebellions every few years were one thing, but repeated foreign incursions in Taiwan were another. In 1874 the Qing began considering how to strengthen their own claims to the island in order to halt these imperialist plans.

For the next two decades, and especially after a French invasion of Taiwan in 1884, the Qing sought to integrate Taiwan back into the empire after nearly a century of utter neglect (and to teach the foreigners a thing or two) by turning the island into a “foundation of national wealth and power” (Kuo 1973, 237). Upgraded in 1885 from a prefecture of Fujian Province to a province in its own right, Taiwan became the object of several modernizing reforms in military, industrial, educational, commercial, political, communications, and administrative spheres, particularly in the north. These reforms were as progressive as any in the empire, but the sudden influx of scholars and businessmen from the well-to-do central coast of China into the new capital at Taipei alienated many of the settlers who had done so much of the grunt work in recently reclaiming this northern part of the frontier (Chen 1956, 7; Lamley 1977, 201; Morris 2002, 5–8). This period also saw the abrupt reintegration of Taiwan into the world marketplace, as Taiwan’s economy and society were quickly reordered to provide for the efficient export of tea (Taiwan’s “green gold”), camphor and sugar, accompanied by the import of foreign cotton, wool, and opium (Gardella 1999, 171–176).

Yet even this work to establish a Qing dynasty presence over every inch of Taiwan could not prevent the interest of the eager imperialists of the Japanese military, who hoped to protect their nation from European and American expansion in Asia by expanding their influence in the same fashion as these Western powers. Many in China sensed this looming threat and made attempts to keep Taiwan out of Japanese hands. In 1894, Yung Wing, famed as the first Chinese graduate of an American university (Yale, 1854), proposed instead leasing Taiwan to a Western power at the price of \$400 million for ninety-nine years (Yung 1909, 244).

The reckoning finally came in 1895, when Japan defeated the Qing in the Sino-Japanese War, started by the Japanese in 1894 over the weighty Chinese influence in Korea. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan demanded possession of Taiwan, along with an indemnity of 200 million ounces of silver and various industrial privileges in China. Li Hongzhang, the unfortunate Qing envoy entrusted with the Japanese negotiations, sought to save the island by trying to convince the Japanese of just how troublesome Taiwan could be, what with the malaria, the British opium pushers, and the dangerous rebels who rose up from time to time to kill officials. The strategy failed, however; his counterpart Itō Hirobumi merely answered, “We have not swallowed [Taiwan] yet and we are very hungry” (NCH 1895).

Eventually, the decision to trade Taiwan for an end to the war became an easy one for the Qing. The governor of Taiwan, Tang Jingsong, learned of the cession two days later in a simple telegram, in which the imperial court reminded him that “Taiwan is certainly important to us, but obviously not as important as Beijing . . . since Taiwan is all by itself out there in the ocean, we

would not be able to help defend Taiwan anyway” (Lishi Jiaoxue 1954, 51). Forsaken by Beijing, the scholarly elite of Taibei formulated another strategy of avoiding colonization by the Japanese: an independent Taiwan, which could not be ceded legally by the Qing. These elites, with the reluctant cooperation of Governor Tang, founded the Taiwan Republic (with Tang as president) and issued the following statement: “The Qing court has not heard the mandate of the people; in ceding Taiwan they totally ignored our anger. . . . The public is full of grief and fury; a call for autonomy [*zizhu*] will arouse the people. . . . We must unite the people and gentry of Taiwan and establish a Taiwan Republic [Taiwan minzhuguo]. Together we will push forward a draft of a constitution, taking the good points of the American and French models. . . . This will be Asia’s first republic” (Zheng 1981, 81).

In terms of international law, the Taiwan Republic’s advent rendered meaningless the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded the island (Chen and Reisman 1972, 633). Yet the legal status of Asia’s first republic was no match for the military might of Asia’s first modern imperialist power. By the end of 1895, any large-scale organized resistance was squashed, and the Japanese were able to purchase with special privileges and honors the cooperation of gentry leaders up and down the island in helping to suppress the local anti-Japanese guerilla activities that would plague the new government for years (Lamley 1964, 215–225).

Many in Japan had supported the war with China as a way of proving Japan’s new imperialist mettle, in order that “Japan could no longer be regarded as a mere Far Eastern park . . . [but] should now be reckoned with as a definite world power,” but they had not seriously considered taking on any colonies in the process. After Taiwan fell into their laps, some Japanese officials even suggested the by now very unoriginal idea of selling the island to France for 100 million yen—an amount that would have been more than Japan’s annual government expenditure (Chen 1977, 62, 71; Halliday 1975, 85). But for others in Japan, the conquest of this “stone pointing toward the south” was a first step in the “southern strategy” (*nanshin*) of establishing a Japanese presence throughout Southeast Asia—and their view won out. Another deciding factor was the “living space” argument. Many Japanese were overjoyed that their population, constrained for so many centuries by Japan’s mountainous terrain, could now look to colonies like Taiwan (and soon Korea and Manchuria) as extra living space for a surplus Japanese population, which could then exploit the resources of the colonies to help feed the healthy, growing homeland (Peattie 1984, 89). It was for these reasons that, in just days, Taiwan went from being a model province of the Qing dynasty to Asia’s first republic and then to the first colony of Asia’s newest imperialist power.

## **JAPANESE COLONY**

After taking command of Taiwan, the Japanese lost no time in transforming it and its people. This newest symbol of Japan’s imperial power could not con-

tinue to look the way it had under what the Japanese saw as the obsolescence and decay of Chinese culture. This “laboratory,” as Civil Administrator Gotō Shimpei saw Taiwan, would be the perfect site to test the most modern theories of colonialism and showcase the brilliance of Japanese modernity. Two official doctrines of Japanese colonialism—“assimilation” (*dōka*) and “equal treatment under one [imperial] view” (*isshi dōjin*)—were representative of the enlightened, humanitarian ethos promised under Japanese rule. Not everyone in Taiwan took these pronouncements to heart, however. Over the next several years until 1902, the Japanese killed some twenty thousand “bandits” and “rebels” leading attacks on occupying Japanese forces (Lamley 1999, 207).<sup>8</sup>

Besides force, the Japanese also used more constructive colonialist justifications to pacify Taiwanese hard feelings. The colonial administration portrayed itself as a strong, strict, but benevolent force working for the betterment of Taiwan’s people, even if the natives could not appreciate it. Under Gotō’s civil administration, the Japanese continued the modernization projects begun under the Qing dynasty, building modern roads and railroads, establishing intensive and invasive police institutions, expanding postal and telegraph networks, introducing modern banking and currency measures, founding modern hospitals and public health services, standardizing weights and measures, entering Taiwan in the Greenwich time system, and even publicizing these advances through the use of propagandist motion pictures. The Japanese undertook the modernization of every aspect of agriculture in Taiwan, systematizing and expanding production of sugar, rice, and camphor, developing improved breeds of poultry and pigs, fruits and vegetables, and tea (Li 1995, 123–124; Williams 1980, 229; Wu 1995).

Yet this colonialist modernization program was a mixed bag. Improving the lives of Taiwanese farmers was clearly secondary to the obvious colonial goal of ensuring richer and richer exports back to Japan. Nitobe Inazō, a Quaker in charge of these agricultural modernizations, put it plainly: “Merely being kind to [colonial subjects] is insufficient. Primitive peoples are motivated by awe” (Peattie 1984, 88).<sup>9</sup> Chief among Japan’s “primitives” were Taiwan’s Austronesian aboriginal population; Gotō and Nitobe in fact used many American policies of “civilizing,” policing, and destroying Native Americans as a model for their own aboriginal policies in Taiwan (Knapp and Hauptman 1980).<sup>10</sup>

Japan’s fifty-year administration of Taiwan came to be defined by this model of the strict colonial overlord working in mysterious ways for the betterment of his native subjects. (Indeed, one important source of income used to pay for these agricultural modernizations was the 12,420,000 yen that the Japanese were able to earn from their official monopoly on opium sales in Taiwan from 1898 to 1907 [Ka 1995, 54–55]). The Japanese education system was extended to Taiwan, but Taiwanese youth were rarely able to complete education past the elementary level. Taiwanese were promised fair treatment as good Japanese imperial subjects, but Tokyo’s extraordinary (and unconstitutional) “Law No. 63” gave the ordinances of the Japanese governor-general of Taiwan the same status as the law of Japan, making him an independent lawmaker unto himself until 1921 (Chen 1984, 251–252).

Taiwanese “natives” could be only second-class imperial subjects under Japanese colonial rule—no surprise, given the government’s attempts to master the policies first employed by the British in India, the French in Algeria, or the Germans in Alsace-Lorraine (Fraser 1988, 95; Peattie 1984, 88).<sup>11</sup> But second-class imperial subjects were still imperial subjects, and early in this colonial era the Japanese set out to teach the Taiwanese people how to act as such. In 1903, it became official policy to expand Japanese language use to Taiwanese subjects, for the purpose of “assimilating” them into Japanese colonial society (Wu 1987, 7). Elementary schools, founded in 1896 for Taiwanese boys and girls (You 1988, 272), became ground zero for this experiment, as the new administration sought to attract students away from the Chinese-style *shufang* private schools by merely hiring their tutors to teach in Japanese schools. But this schooling was typically available for children of the upper classes only; in 1915, only 9.6 percent of elementary-age children were enrolled in schools. As late as 1919, after twenty-four years of colonial administration, only some 1.51 percent of the Taiwanese population of 3.54 million had been acculturated in Japanese schools. Where the education system could not do the job, Taiwanese elites, eager to demonstrate their Japanese imperial morality, founded public societies such as the Acculturation Society (Tongfeng Hui) or the Native Language Prohibition Society (Tuyu Jinzhi Hui) in the decade before 1920 to extend Japanese language education in their home cities (Tsurumi 1977, 13–44; Wu 1987, 8, 12).

The first decade of the 1900s saw the launch of several other movements to transform Taiwanese into good (if second-class) imperial subjects by eradicating what the Japanese saw as two of the “lowest customs” (Japanese *rōshū*; Chinese *louxi*) of Taiwan’s ethnic Chinese population: the binding of women’s feet and men’s wearing of the Manchu-style queue (or pigtail). In 1897, Japanese newspapers in Taiwan reported, perhaps apocryphally, that several foot-bound Taiwanese women were killed in a typhoon because they were not able to leave their homes (Wu 1995). A colonywide anti-footbinding movement had begun in earnest by 1900, with elites all over Taiwan transforming their community leadership along Japanese lines by forming local Natural Feet Societies (Tianranzu Hui) and newspapers holding public speaking contests on the topic of anti-footbinding (Wu 1986, 73–80; Wu 1995).

In 1911 the colonial government publicly started pressuring men to modernize their image, opining that the modern West would continue to laugh at Taiwanese if their men were still wearing queues and scholars’ robes in the twentieth century (Wang 1960, 14). Taiwanese community leaders, in organizations such as the Society for the Improvement of Folk Customs (Fengsu Gailliang Hui), called the queue unnatural, inconvenient, uneconomical, and unhygienic, and declared victory in 1915 when it estimated that only eighty thousand queue wearers (or just 5.7 percent of the male population) still remained in Taiwan (Wang 1960, 21–22).<sup>12</sup>

This acculturation campaign, part of what many Japanese saw as their “civilizing mission” (*bunmei kaika*) in Taiwan, also was the keystone of Japanese imperial rhetoric that separated their benevolent colonial project from the proven violence of Western colonialism (Ching 2001, 103; Ka 1995, 59). An important

side effect of such an ideology, however, was the production of Taiwanese colonial subjects who demanded to be treated as equal subjects under the gaze of the emperor. President Woodrow Wilson's thoughts on self-determination for all the peoples of the world, voiced at the end of World War I, became a guiding light for Taiwanese political activists, as well as for young thinkers in China, Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. In 1918, Taiwanese students and intellectuals in Tokyo founded an Enlightenment Society (Keihatsukai) in order to work for Taiwanese equality within the Japanese Empire. Groups such as the New People's Society (Shinminkai), the Taiwanese Cultural Association (Taiwan Bunka Kyōkai), and a journal called *Taiwan Youth* (*Taiwan seinen*) soon followed. These Taiwanese elites in Tokyo fought for a "self-determination" defined not by Taiwanese independence but by the right to vote for their own representatives to Japan's National Diet—and for the abolition of the hated Law No. 63, which institutionalized discrimination in Taiwan (Kerr 1974, 119–125). The League for the Establishment of a Formosan Parliament (Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmei) even submitted fifteen official petitions between 1921 and 1934, requesting formal self-governance on the island (Fulda 2002, 366). The colonial government by no means appreciated this literal but creative use of the Japanese authorities' official ideology of "equal treatment." Movement leaders were threatened and harassed, had business licenses revoked and loans recalled, and, during the crackdown following the 1923 Tokyo earthquake, were arrested and imprisoned as "agitators."

The issue of Taiwanese status within the empire was a compelling one in a maturing Japanese Empire, as the 1920s saw a growing Japanese understanding of Taiwan as a genuine part of their nation. During this era of the "extension of the homeland" (*naichi enchō*), more and more Japanese were educated, officially registered, and even buried in Taiwan. These developments worked to give more gravity to the growing intellectual movement for "local autonomy" (or "home rule," *chihō jitsu*) (Kerr 1974, 122). Furthermore, Japanese once opposed to these notions also came to see this "reformist" movement calling for equality under the emperor as infinitely preferable to more radical forms of anticolonialism led by socialist study groups. An example of the latter was the Taiwanese Communist Party, founded in 1928 and dedicated to overthrowing Japanese imperialism altogether and establishing an independent Taiwan Republic (Taiwan Gong-hueguo) (Hsiao 2000, 30–34; Hsiao and Sullivan 1983; Lu 1992, 55–62).<sup>13</sup>

By the 1930s, Taiwan had been transformed into a relatively stable, peaceful, and prosperous Japanese colony.<sup>14</sup> Thousands of college-educated Taiwanese, as one scholar described, "entered the ranks of Japanese [intellectuals], becoming almost indistinguishable from them."<sup>15</sup> Taiwan had become a reliable "sugar bowl" and "rice basket," providing foodstuffs and light industrial products for Japan's home islands; one proud example of this transformation was the 81 percent increase in land productivity achieved over the period 1901–1938 (Ka 1995, 61). The calm could be disrupted, as with the 1930 Musha (Chinese: Wushe) Rebellion, when Taroko tribesmen killed 197 Japanese as re-

venge for the repeated sexual assaults carried out on local women by Japanese police. Yet the official system of “local autonomy,” ensuring more low-level official control by Japanese colonists and Taiwanese elites, continued to evolve and was extended gradually to more cities and administrative districts during the 1920s and 1930s. In 1935, local elections were held, with suffrage extended to the 3.3 percent of the population (Japanese or Taiwanese) who had paid taxes of 5 yen or over and who could write the name of their candidate (Wu 1996).

These expanded rights for Taiwanese as Japanese subjects would soon be accompanied by additional responsibilities as Japanese as well, with the beginning of Japan’s “total war” against China in 1937. The colonial regime began to forcibly desinicize Taiwan’s ethnic Chinese majority, to be replaced by pure imperial Japanese culture in an intense Movement to Create Imperial Subjects (*Kōminka Undō*). During wartime, in order to mobilize true Japanese sentiments, use of the national language was pushed even harder. Chinese-language sections of newspapers were eliminated, Taiwanese public servants were ordered to speak only Japanese, and Taiwanese language was forbidden on public buses (Chou 1995, 126; Wu 1987, 69). Japanese-speaking Taiwanese families became eligible for a 50 percent raise in salary (Wu 1995). In 1940, the government even unveiled a public campaign to “sweep away non-Japanese speakers” (*kokugo hukaiisha o issōsu*) (Chou 1995, 134).

That same year the colonial regime announced a name-changing (*kai-seimei*) campaign, encouraging Taiwanese (not forcing, as in Korea) who spoke Japanese and had the stuff of a good imperial subject to take Japanese names. One applied through the local government for this privilege, and those whose requests were approved had to follow several guidelines in choosing their new name; for example, the use of Chinese place names was forbidden. Eventually some 7 percent of Taiwanese people made this change—an especially significant step, given the Chinese importance of the surname in connecting to one’s ancestors (Lamley 1999, 240; Wu 1995).

Any “un-Japanese” cultural institution could be suppressed during the *Kōminka* Movement. Taiwanese Buddhist temples were transformed into official Shinto shrines, and traditional puppet theater was banned, as was the wearing of traditional Chinese clothing in public (Lamley 1999, 241–242). The colonial school system played a crucial role in this movement, and by 1944, 71.31 percent of Taiwan’s school-age population was enrolled in elementary schools learning Japanese ways (Hsiao 2000, 46). Yet the supreme measure of equality as Japanese subjects was delivered in 1941 with the encouragement that Taiwanese men volunteer to serve—and “die beautifully,” if need be—in the Imperial Japanese military. Indeed, Li Qiao, in his epic novel *Wintry Night*, describes members of the Taiwan Youth Labor Corps in Miaoli in 1943, singing (2001, 185):

For Heaven we fight the unrighteous;  
Soldiers loyal and true are we.  
In glory we depart,

Leaving the motherland,  
Never to return unless victorious.  
Bravely, we vow to fight to the death.  
Banzai! Banzai!

For years, Taiwan elites had been requesting this “privilege” as part of their appeal for equal treatment (Kondō 1996, 34–36). Between 1941 and 1945, some two hundred thousand Taiwanese volunteered or were drafted into the armed services, with more than thirty thousand of these young men making the supreme sacrifice for their emperor (Lin 1996, 217–227).<sup>16</sup>

Pressures to conform and desires to be accepted aside, however, Japan’s war against China, the land of their ancestors, was clearly a difficult war for most Taiwanese to support.<sup>17</sup> Taiwanese subjects learned their position in the imperial order the hard way. Even though rice shipments to Japan decreased during wartime because of the lack of available ships, the rice not sent to Japan was stored rather than being distributed back to the Taiwanese population. The adult rice ration in 1943 was 414 cc (less than a cup and a half) a day—an amount justified by wartime pseudoscientists’ “findings” on just how little caloric intake humans actually needed to survive (Kerr 1965, 38; Wu 1996). The men who gloriously volunteered for the military were also accompanied by at least twelve hundred young Taiwanese women who were deceived or taken by force to war fronts in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Singapore, Borneo, or Okinawa to serve as sex slaves that the Japanese military grotesquely called “comfort women” (Wang and Chian 1997). This suffering and overall hypocrisy, characterized by Japanese novelist Ozaki Hot-suki as bestowing the honor “not to live as Japanese, but to die as Japanese” (Ching 2000, 252), brought most Taiwanese to anticipate the defeat of the Japanese military and a return of the island to Chinese rule after five decades of colonialism.

Yet the question that remained for the Taiwanese was: *Which* Chinese rule? Would Taiwan be restored to independence? Would it be incorporated into the Republic of China (ROC) government on the mainland, the successor regime to the Qing dynasty that ceded Taiwan fifty years earlier? No such questions troubled the minds of the American, British, and Chinese Allied Powers, however, which had resolved at Cairo (without consulting any actual Taiwanese people) to award Taiwan to the ROC government led by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi).<sup>18</sup>

In 1945, at war’s end, Taiwan had been heavily bombed in American air strikes but largely spared from the hell of invasion suffered on other Japanese islands, such as Okinawa. General Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the Allied Command in the Pacific, authorized Taiwan’s surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his ROC government as a trustee on behalf of the Allied Powers (Chen and Reisman 1972, 611). This surrender itself implied nothing about whether the ROC was the rightful “owner” of Taiwan. At the same time, Vietnam was also surrendered to Chiang as a trustee on behalf of the Allied

Powers; Manchuria and North Korea to Joseph Stalin as another such trustee; South Korea to U.S. General John Hodge as another, and so on (Taiwan Documents Project 1945). It did begin decades of debate over the legal status of Taiwan—namely, over the right of the ROC to accept command in 1945 over an island ceded to Japan by the defunct Qing dynasty in 1895.<sup>19</sup> Yet these debates could not change the fact that as of October 1945, Taiwan's half-century as "the Orphan of Asia" was over, and now the island's people had a new master—the government of the Republic of China.

### **RETROCESSION: 1945–1949**

Elation was the typical Taiwanese reaction to the news that the Japanese colonial authorities would be leaving their island. During the two months between Japanese defeat and the arrival of ROC forces, Taiwanese elites worked to ensure a smooth transition to Chinese rule. Several Taiwanese intellectuals approached the Japanese about possible support for an independent Taiwan regime, but they met with the stern opposition of the last Japanese governor of Taiwan, Andō Likichi (Kondō 1996, 666; Itō 1993, 133).<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, most elites turned their attention to the imminent arrival of Chinese forces, founding Preparatory Committees to Welcome the National Government and fervently organizing basic propaganda projects on behalf of their new Chinese rulers (Phillips 1999, 280).

This sense of appreciation would not last long, however, as Taiwanese people soon learned their place under the ROC government, which was wholly dominated by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, also commonly called KMT for Kuomintang). Due to the island's unique status as a former Japanese colony, Chinese leaders decided to govern the new Taiwan Province in quite a different way than the rest of the ROC. Taiwan came under joint party-government-military administration, with Governor-General Chen Yi enjoying a very broad mixture of civilian and military powers shockingly reminiscent of the early Japanese governors (Phillips 1999, 282). For having lived in relative peace under the modernizing Japanese colonial regime for fifty years, Taiwanese people were dismissed as brainwashed "slaves" who did not deserve the relatively modern conditions that they enjoyed (especially in comparison to conditions in China after eight years of war against Japan).

Perhaps not understanding the excitement most islanders felt about being annexed by the ROC, the conquering regime immediately began working in Taiwan toward two main goals that had little to do with the hopes of the recently liberated Taiwanese. First was the project of replacing any Japanese or unorthodox customs with Chinese, in order to make the island safe for ROC rule. Nothing bothered the Nationalists more than the fact, after eight years of awful war against Japan, that their newest and richest province looked, acted, and sounded Japanese!<sup>21</sup> The new regime's second goal was to use Taiwan's relative wealth—in 1939, Taiwan's per capita value of foreign trade was thirty-nine

times that of China (Chen and Reisman 1972, 611)—to win their new civil war on the mainland against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The implementation of these measures served quickly to erase the goodwill that the new government had won just for being Chinese. As Taiwan was officially and forcibly resinicized, unemployment lines became distinctly Taiwanese. Some 37,000 Taiwanese government workers lost their jobs in the transition, a trend made the more galling by the fact that only 22 percent of the posts in the Guomindang official bureaucracy were held by Taiwanese, as opposed to 56 percent of the posts under the Japanese (Lai et al. 1991, 65). A program of de-Taiwanization, designed to “eradicate the slave mentality” among Taiwanese, meant the banning of Japanese newspaper pages, rendering voiceless an entire generation of intellectuals educated under the Japanese and propagating an official cult of the benevolent and sagely dictator Chiang Kai-shek, honored as “Savior of the People” and “Grand Family Head” (Hsiao 2000, 53–54; Chang 1993, 141).

The ROC’s takeover of Taiwan also involved the establishment of control over all aspects of the economy for the public (but far too often, the private) good. The official “Taiwan Provincial Japanese Property Managing Committee” enriched the ROC state and its officials by relieving governmental organizations, enterprises, and individuals of 50,856 pieces of property worth 10,990,900,000 yen, or some 17 percent of Taiwan’s 1946 net domestic product (Itō 1993, 141; Lai et al. 1991, 71). Since Taiwan now belonged to the ROC, what belonged to Taiwan would belong to the ROC as well; organized carpetbagging units descended on Chinese Taiwan, stripping the island of everything from railway wiring and signal equipment to luggage on random rail baggage cars, industrial machinery, plumbing equipment, and entire factories—all to be sent back to Shanghai, Xiamen, or other coastal mainland cities (Kerr 1965, 132–135; Peng 1972, 49). This was in addition to the great amounts of raw materials—sugar, coal, salt, and cement—appropriated and shipped to the mainland in official fashion. Inflation quickly set in, reaching a rate of 350 percent during the first eight months of Guomindang rule (Lai et al. 1991, 73, 81). Official neglect also reached staggeringly dangerous levels. It was probably no coincidence that the first cholera epidemic to strike Taiwan in twenty-seven years came in the summer of 1946, after just several months of Nationalist rule, killing some 1,460 Taiwanese. Others were diagnosed with the bubonic plague, totally eradicated by the Japanese thirty years before the arrival of Chinese forces. The government had other worries, however; as the director of Public Health explained, “after all, only the poor people are contracting the disease” (Kerr 1965, 179–180).

Tensions were only exacerbated by the condescension with which so many Taiwanese viewed these arrivals from a very poor China. The following passage vividly expresses the shock that so many self-consciously modern Taiwanese felt in 1945 upon their first contact with “China” in fifty years:

The ship docked, the gangways were lowered, and off came the troops of China, the victors. The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who

looked and behaved more like a coolie than a soldier, walking off with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which was suspended his umbrella, sleeping mat, cooking pot, and cup. Others like him followed, some with shoes, some without. Few had guns. With no attempt to maintain order or discipline, they pushed off the ship, glad to be on firm land, but hesitant to face the Japanese lined up and saluting smartly on both sides. My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He had never felt so ashamed in his life. Using a Japanese expression, he said, "If there had been a hole nearby, I would have crawled in!" (Peng 1972, 51-52)

Taiwanese resentment of the corruption and waste that plagued the island under the Nationalists often was voiced in class terms; stories circulated about the military forces that the Taiwanese derided as "blanket soldiers" washing their rice in toilet bowls, mistaking hair dryers for fantastic pistols, and stealing bicycles but not being able to ride them. Taiwanese protests against the Guomintang began to take the shape of direct (and unanimously unfavorable) comparisons with the Japanese colonial regime. Voicing such concerns loudly was not wise, however, and was treated as the work of "disloyal subversives" who could only be planning Communist rebellion against the ROC. The government gave lip service to their promises of democracy; in 1946 public elections were held for village and town councils, who then elected county and city council representatives, who then elected a Provincial Consultative Assembly. These organs were very heavily represented by Taiwanese citizens, but they were given only "consultative" or advisory powers and thus could do little to relieve the frustration that was growing so rapidly (Phillips 1999, 286).

Disaster struck on the evening of February 27, 1947, when several Guomintang agents beat a forty-year-old widow for the offense of selling black market cigarettes. When word spread of the incident, pent-up Taiwanese anger at the Nationalist regime erupted in forms ranging from organized protests to premeditated violence against random mainland officials and soldiers. Protesters removed the characters for "China" from official and commercial signs, others put up Japanese-language banners screaming "Down with Military Tyranny," while others chanted Taiwanese-language slogans such as "The Taiwanese want revenge now!" "Beat the mainlanders!" "Kill the pigs!" "Let Taiwan rule itself!" and "Let's have a new democracy!" Even angrier Taipei residents began interrogating any mainlanders they could find and beating the unlucky ones who could not answer in Japanese or Taiwanese languages (Lai et al. 1991, 105-107). Over the next four days, through March 4, violence erupted throughout all of Taiwan's cities as the retribution for one original act of violence grew into a full-fledged urban uprising against Guomintang rule (121-134).

As this raw Taiwanese rage boiled over in the streets, elites in Taipei and other cities quickly founded Resolution Committees (Chuli Weiyuanhui) in order to negotiate between the Taiwanese majority and the Nationalist military government. These committees were in fact dominated by pro-Guomintang Taiwanese elites who should have been able to formulate demands amenable to

the government. Negotiations between these committees and the state stalled for days, but the commander of the Fourth Gendarme Regiment called on the Taipei Resolution Committee on March 8 to promise: “The Central Government will not dispatch troops to Taiwan” (Kerr 1965, 291). He was lying. Beginning that same day, two entire divisions of ROC troops were transferred to Taiwan from the mainland, and a reign of state terror against its opponents began. The Resolution Committees were abolished, and some outspoken members were tortured and executed (Lai et al. 1991, 138–150; Peng 1972, 70). Chinese troops landing on Taiwan began random killings of Taiwanese as soon as they came ashore, many shooting guns loaded with soft-nosed dum-dum bullets designed to wound even more painfully (Kerr 1965, 260). As Peng Ming-min (Peng Mingmin) remembered: “As the Nationalist troops came ashore they moved out quickly through Keelung [jilong] streets, shooting and bayoneting men and boys, raping women, and looting homes and shops. Some Formosans were seized and stuffed alive into burlap bags found piled up at the sugar warehouse doors, and were then simply tossed into the harbor. Others were merely tied up or chained before being thrown from the piers” (Peng 1972, 69–70).

For the next several months, thousands of Taiwanese elites who were seen as posing a threat to the regime—professors, doctors, lawyers, professionals, college and even high school students—were systematically arrested and executed in cold blood (Vecchione 1998). As George Kerr, a U.S. State Department official stationed in Taiwan at the time, described: “By March 17 the pattern of terror and revenge had emerged very clearly. First to be destroyed were all established critics of the Government. Then in their turn came Settlement Committee members and their principal aides, all youths who had taken part in the interim policing of Taipei, middle school students, middle school teachers, lawyers, economic leaders and members of influential families, and at last, anyone who in the preceding eighteen months had given offense to a mainland Chinese, causing him to ‘lose face’” (Kerr 1965, 299–300).

Anyone highly educated or accomplished in the Japanese language and/or culture could be targeted, as the “poisonous” Japanese influence on Taiwan was blamed for the uprising (especially since so many of the protests and insurrectionary radio broadcasts had been in Japanese). Taiwan was cleansed of any Japanese items—records, publications, flags, and so on, which were confiscated—at the same time as it was being cleansed over the next several months of its Japanese-educated elites, dual processes of finally “sinicizing” Taiwan for good (Hsiau 2000, 57–58). It was this kind of violence that led Taiwanese such as dissident Peng Ming-min’s father, a prominent Presbyterian doctor in Gao-xiong, to abandon totally their “Chinese” identity: “He went so far as to cry out that he was ashamed of his Chinese blood and wished that his children after him would always marry foreigners until his descendants could no longer claim to be Chinese” (Peng 1972, 69).

Final numerical estimates of the massacres of the spring and summer of 1947 vary widely, from an official government report estimating sixty-three

hundred total casualties to anti-Guomindang activists' own estimates that more than twenty thousand Taiwanese were killed in the suppression (Lai et al. 1991, 158–159). And what was called the “white terror” (*baise kongbu*) did not end in 1947; by the mid-1950s, the government had some fourteen thousand political prisoners (both Taiwanese and mainlander) in custody and had executed probably one or two thousand more (Taylor 2000, 211–212).

In 1949, the Republic of China government was chased out of mainland China by a victorious Chinese Communist Party after more than three years of civil war. In what can only be called a cruel irony, this newest Chinese province of Taiwan, the province in which the ROC government had the least legitimacy, became home to the entire regime. At the time of the 1947 uprising, Chiang Kai-shek, author of that year's brutal measures, could hardly have imagined that in just two years, this most despised and “poisoned” province of Taiwan would be all that he and his party would ever control again. Considering that even in the early 1990s, some anti-Nationalist activists would still be screaming that “KMT” really stood for “Kill Many Taiwanese” (*Xu Rongshu* 1991), the title of one book on the 1947 uprising—*A Tragic Beginning*—is thus all too accurate in describing early Nationalist rule of Taiwan (Lai et al. 1991).

#### **FREE CHINA: 1950–PRESENT**

By 1949, the fundamentally brutal nature of Guomindang rule in Taiwan, and the loss of all hope of avoiding a Communist victory in China, convinced the Truman Administration to give up on Chiang's “ChiNats,” to swear off publicly aiding Chiang, and to allow the island to be “liberated” by the CCP. Yet the assumptions of the Cold War quickly led General Douglas MacArthur and other policy makers to question this decision, as a worldwide struggle against Soviet and Chinese Communism could not allow the surrender of any possible anti-Communist allies, no matter how brutal or unpopular. When North Korean forces invaded South Korea in June 1950, launching the first hot war of the Cold War era, the importance of keeping Taiwan—this potential “unsinkable aircraft carrier”—out of Communist Chinese hands became crucial. Thus, the U.S. military command was ordered to defend Taiwan as a base of operations against China, renewing the ROC's status as a loyal client state and giving tacit American approval to the harsh regime for more than two decades to come (Garver 1997, 16–31).

Only in 1979 did the United States recognize the Communist People's Republic of China (PRC) regime as the government of China. Thus, for thirty years, the American government mouthed the inane fiction that Chiang's ROC regime on Taiwan was the rightful government of China. During the 1950s and 1960s, Americans referred to the ROC on Taiwan as “Free China” with a straight face, a notion made possible only in comparison to the uncannily low standards set by three decades of Maoist rule in the PRC. This “Free China” myth

was not attractive because it was cheap either: Chiang's regime was funded by American taxpayers to the tune of U.S. \$4 billion over the period 1951–1965 (Jacoby 1966, 38, 118).

Guomindang rule in Taiwan after 1950 was of a different sort than the awful late 1940s, as the party began a long transformation into a “soft authoritarian” regime. The civil war in China and the Nationalists' landing on Taiwan were disastrous enough that Chiang Kai-shek led his party through a period of serious, reflective reorganization from 1950 to 1952. One of the most important reforms was the transformation of the Guomindang into a party that, while still not democratic, was much more representative of the general population than it had been in China. Serious efforts were made to recruit peasant Taiwanese farmers, workers, and intellectuals, although a glass ceiling that favored mainlanders over Taiwanese was in place well into the 1970s (Dickson 1993, 79–81). The ROC government's insistence that it should be governing all of China meant that Taiwanese people were represented in the government only “proportional to their percentage of the 500 million people of China, giving them three per cent representation in their own homeland” (Chen and Reisman 1972, 614–615).

For the next two decades, Chiang and his ruling Guomindang were dedicated to this goal of retaking the Chinese motherland, often with explicit American aid. Tactics ranged from the quaint (sending care packages of chocolate, shoes, and pistols to Chinese “compatriots” by balloon) to the daring (landing hundreds of agents on PRC territory to set up rebel radio stations in hopes of sparking a counterrevolution), the sleazy (growing opium in northern Burma to fund pro-ROC forces in that border region), and the purely terrorist (blowing up a PRC-chartered Air India jet in 1955 in an attempt to assassinate Premier Zhou Enlai). (And Chiang was not done with Zhou, either; in 1971 his spies planned again to kill Zhou, this time with a trained “kamikaze dog” wearing a remote-controlled bomb [Minnick 1995, 55].)<sup>22</sup>

There was more to life in Taiwan than these cross-straits intrigues, however. Chiang's authoritarian rule was coterminous with—and in many ways related to—an incredible economic transformation that brought to “the Orphan of Asia” a major role in the world economy. The Guomindang was determined to assure that the economic collapse that spelled its doom in China would not be repeated in Taiwan. Land reform was instituted fairly, peacefully, and effectively during the early 1950s. Rents were reduced to a maximum of 37.5 percent of annual yields, and great expanses of public land were sold to tenant farmers (Wang 1999, 324). One of the most foresighted elements of this land reform was to use stocks and bonds to purchase excess lands from wealthy landholders and then sell these lands to more than 194,000 tenant farming families (Yang 1970, 82).

Of the billions of American taxpayers' dollars flowing into Taiwan during the 1950s, the minority not earmarked for the military was funneled into communications, transportation, and agricultural and industrial development. The American government, hoping to prove that capitalism was a superior form of development, encouraged and subsidized heavy export production in Taiwan,

hollowing out American postwar industry but providing an invaluable boost to Taiwan's economy (Johnson 2000, 195; Wang 1999, 328–332). Oakland and Cleveland's loss was Taiwanese industry's gain: By the 1980s, almost half of Taiwan's exports were purchased by Americans (Rubinstein 1999a, 375). An important characteristic of Taiwan's industrial development—and one that led to the uncommon equality of income distribution on the island—was the importance of small-scale factories that could be set up and run by members of the rural lower middle classes (Ho 1979; Wang 1999, 333). These government strategies and American aid programs, when combined with high household savings rates (13 percent in 1963) and a highly successful education system, produced an economic boom so dramatic and comprehensive that outsiders could only describe it as the “Taiwan miracle.” The Guomintang was fortunate, for it took an economic program this miraculous to sustain the Taiwanese people's faith in the ROC government after the “tragic beginning” of the late 1940s.

The economic transformation under Chiang did not imply or account for an equally miraculous political liberalization. “Retaking the mainland” was the only acceptable political orientation; any institution or practice that did not reflect this goal could be suppressed. The 1950s literary world was dominated by the semiofficial genre of “combat literature” (*zhandou wenyi*) (Hsiao 2000, 66). For the purposes of “unity,” only Mandarin Chinese was technically acceptable in government offices, courts, and schools. As the most stubborn and persistent reminder of a unique Taiwanese identity, Taiwanese language was targeted brutally as an inferior “dialect.” Even young students speaking Taiwanese were routinely beaten, humiliated, or fined (even into the 1990s) as the Guomintang and its supporters continued to work to “sinicize” this complicated island. In 1994, President Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui) stirred painful memories of this Nationalist legacy when he spoke to reporters about how his children had been made to wear “a dunce board around their necks in school as punishment for speaking Taiwanese” (Hsiao 2000, 125).

Signs of civil society were slow to develop under Guomintang rule. On the one hand, dissidents such as Peng Ming-min, chairman of the National Taiwan University Political Science Department and advisor to the ROC United Nations delegation, were still imprisoned for public, high-profile acts of defiance.<sup>23</sup> On the other, everyday Taiwanese found more room for free expression in the thousands of civic organizations, such as Rotary and Lions Clubs, founded in an era of very slow but sure political liberalization. Opponents of the Chiang regime who pounced on signs of weakness in the ROC's international standing were punished mercilessly, at the same time that the government worked to inculcate in the Taiwanese public a sense of nationalism and loyalty to the government as their own.

One such crisis in the early 1970s was the gradual erosion of the ROC's claim to represent “Free China” on the international stage. Though the United States had championed this regime as the rightful Chinese government for more than two decades (and would continue to do so until 1979)—and pressured many of its allies to do the same—the PRC had been successful in con-

vincing more and more First, Second, and Third World nations to recognize it as the true government of China. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's strategic shift toward "serious dialogue" with Communist China as a way to isolate the Soviet Union doomed the Chiang regime's international position. In 1971, the ROC delegation walked out of the United Nations General Assembly immediately before the assembly voted to award China's UN seat to the PRC and to "expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations" (Appleton 1972). It was a tellingly strong rebuke to Chiang's ROC, one of the founders of the UN and a Security Council member, and one that could only wound Chiang's legitimacy in Taiwan as well.

Opponents of the Chiang regime who favored Taiwan's independence from any Chinese rule took advantage of this development with coordinated protests all over the world, chaining themselves together in public places to call for recognition of Taiwan as an independent nation seated in the UN (Peng 1972, 259). A final indignity for the ROC government came the next year, with Nixon's 1972 visit to China. There, hoping to garner PRC help in ending the war in Vietnam, Nixon ended the ROC's special relationship with the United States by signing the Shanghai Communiqué, which "acknowledge[d] . . . there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" (*Joint Communiqué*, 1972).

This was the sorry state of the island nation when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975. Long incapacitated, Chiang had already left government affairs to his son Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo) for several years. The young Chiang, who had lived in Taiwan longer than he had lived in China, had a much more tolerant view of Taiwanese culture and political activity, and almost immediately set out to increase Taiwanese participation at the highest levels of ROC governance (Taylor 2000, 326). This new tolerance was in some ways an answer to persistent demands for a government that reflected the true population of Taiwan. A "native" (*xiangtu*) literature movement was inaugurated in the 1970s as cultural elites sought to rediscover the beauty of Taiwanese culture, suppressed for so long under the Guomindang (Hsiao 2000, 68). While many mainlanders saw this kind of pro-Taiwan stance as a threat, Chiang Ching-kuo welcomed it, even going so far as to say that after four decades of living in Taiwan, he was "Taiwanese," too.<sup>24</sup>

This liberalization under the young Chiang came in fits and starts. His government still used force to suppress dissidents, sometimes acting through ultranationalist secret societies that visited violent wrath upon opponents of the minority Guomindang regime. One famous case was that of the Gaoxiong Eight, dissidents associated with *Formosa* magazine who were given long sentences for their provocative roles in a World Human Rights Day rally in 1979. The Iron Blood Patriots, a radical gang associated with one of Chiang Ching-kuo's sons, added their own kind of justice, murdering the twin daughters and mother of one of the defendants, Lin Yixiong. This same Chiang son was also found to be behind the Bamboo Gang's murder in Daly City, California, of Henry Liu, author of an unflattering biography of President Chiang (Taylor 2000, 357, 386).

Simultaneously, however, Chiang was taking steps to guarantee that he would be succeeded by Taiwanese leaders who could carry on a pro-Taiwan Guomindang legacy, not by mainlanders with more loyalty to the long-lost mainland than to the Nationalists' Taiwan base. This mission eventually led Chiang to make three decisions in 1986–1987 that flew in the face of Guomindang orthodoxy: ending martial law, ending mainland “representation” in the ROC’s elected bodies, and choosing as his personal successor Lee Teng-hui, a Japanese- and American-educated agricultural economist (Taylor 2000, 408, 418). When Chiang died suddenly in 1988, Lee was named president and Guomindang chairman, and the “Taiwanization” of the Chinese Nationalist Party had truly begun.

### TAIWAN FOR THE TAIWANESE?

Lee’s twelve-year presidential reign, the second longest in the history of the ROC, saw Taiwan irreversibly transformed from Chiang’s “soft authoritarian” regime to a free democratic society. By 1989 a viable opposition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP; *Minzhu Jinbu Dang*), arisen from Taiwan independence forces persecuted so violently under the Chiangs, was seriously challenging the Guomindang in county and provincial elections. In 1991, the government terminated the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion”—the formal name for martial law—and the limitations on constitutional freedoms it mandated for four decades under the Chiangs. This



A 1991 pro-DPP handbill urging Taiwanese not to go along with the Guomindang (KMT) in their project of reunifying with mainland China. (Literally, “Please do not board this [KMT] flight.”)

Taiwanese phone cards from the mid-1990s commemorating both (top) the modern elements of the Japanese occupation period and (bottom) Liao Tianding, a Robin Hood figure who supposedly bedeviled Japanese police with his thievery and bravado.



gesture signaled finally that administering Taiwan—not recovering mainland China—was the real goal of the Guomindang. Since then, Taiwan has held two direct presidential elections. Those held in 1996 and captured by Lee Teng-hui were billed as the first in the five thousand years of Chinese history. In 2000, the Taiwanese DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian), captured victory for his once-illegal pro-independence party.<sup>25</sup>

This “quiet revolution” (*ningjing geming*) and the Taiwan population’s conspicuous reveling in their new political freedoms (as demonstrated in the essays by Alice Chu and Scott Simon in this volume) have also resulted in a new dialogue on ethnicity and the notion of Taiwan as a multiethnic, multicultural nation. The new native leadership of the DPP and Guomindang often portrayed their struggles as those of “the Taiwanese” vs. “the mainlanders.” However, two culturally and linguistically distinct minority groups—the Hakkas (approximately 12 percent of Taiwan’s population) and Taiwan’s several aboriginal tribes (2 percent)—were ignored in this formulation, in much the same way that they had been ignored by Japanese and Guomindang regimes describing a monolithic and inferior “Taiwanese” native population. As a result, both of these groups have taken advantage of this new political era to state their own claims

to cultural and political significance (and even self-government) and to challenge a new Hoklo chauvinism often present in the new “Taiwanese” politics.<sup>26</sup>

Taiwan’s economic boom also continued during this astounding political liberalization of the 1990s. Taiwan’s export strategy led to huge trade surpluses that, although angering trading partners—including the United States—allowed the ROC to amass mammoth foreign exchange reserves ranking first or second in the world through most of the 1990s.<sup>27</sup> Since the 1980s, the electronics and information technology industries have headed this export strategy, a fact made possible by the government’s unusually high expenditures in education (Woo 1991, 1039). This “green silicon island” (*lüse xi dao*) has been the world’s third most important supplier of computer hardware (after the United States and Japan) since 1995 (*Republic of China Yearbook* 2001). In 1999, Taiwan’s gross national product was U.S. \$290.5 billion, the seventeenth largest in the world.<sup>28</sup> Unfortunately, however, in many cases the people of this tiny island achieved such great wealth by devastating their own environment, destroying wildlife, agricultural land, and freshwater sources, while saturating the air and soil with the chemical and metallic by-products of industry (Williams and Chang 1994, 242–244).

Perhaps the most important tension in Taiwan at the turn of the millennium is the presence of the People’s Republic of China right across the Taiwan Straits. Abandoning its original position that Taiwan was a separate nation, distinguished culturally from the rest of China (Hsiao and Sullivan 1979, 447–458), the Chinese Communist Party during the 1990s stepped up its campaign to “re-unify” the entire Chinese nation by extending its control to Taiwan. Relying, often very successfully, on the brute force of nationalism to distract its citizens from political repression and the volatility of market transformations, the CCP has convinced not only their own people but most of the rest of the world that the PRC has legal title to Taiwan—an island that has never been under its control. Without realizing the possible boon that such an argument could be to diehard loyalists of the Ryukyuan, Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese empires, the PRC’s argument is based on the fact that since Taiwan was once part of the Manchu Qing empire, it should be part of China in perpetuity. The great majority of people in Taiwan look at the immense changes that have occurred in Taiwan and China in the century plus since Taiwan’s cession by the Qing, and they prefer the autonomy that has existed under more than fifty years of ROC rule.<sup>29</sup>

The PRC’s main strategy has been to isolate Taiwan diplomatically on the international stage, most successfully by blocking any attempts by Taiwan to reenter the United Nations after three decades of exclusion from that body. The PRC also is able to use its almost superpower status and economic clout to prevent virtually any international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. The pettiness of these measures can be mind-boggling, such as the PRC’s unconditional demand that any international organization recognize Taiwan’s diplomatic representatives, Little League and Olympic teams, or even Miss Universe contestants (*CND* 2000) only as representatives of “Chinese Taipei.” But they can also be deadly. In 1999, Beijing used its pull in the World Health Organiza-

tion (WHO) to keep Taiwan out of the international body and its citizens ineligible to benefit from or contribute to advancements made by WHO (AFP 1999). In September 1999, after a disastrous earthquake struck in central Taiwan, killing over two thousand people, the PRC government prevented UN and Russian rescue teams from reaching Taiwan for more than two days, explaining that “as Taiwan is not a member of the UN, then aid must be channeled through Beijing” (AFP 1999; CND 1999).<sup>30</sup>

As one China watcher puts it, for the PRC’s leaders, “Taiwan is an obsession, one that creates a hideous spectacle of a large dictatorship trying to intimidate a small democracy” (Chang 2001, 37). Yet this forceful approach to resolving the “Taiwan question” is exactly what many people inside mainland China have learned to welcome. In July 1999, a rare public opinion poll conducted in Chinese cities found that 86.9 percent of those surveyed favored an invasion of Taiwan “if necessary” (Reuters 1999).<sup>31</sup>

These actions have earned the PRC great enmity among many Taiwanese, yet many businessmen from Taiwan have found the profits to be made in China more significant than the threats to their nation’s sovereignty. Taiwan businesses, large and small, see China as an endless supply of cheap exploitable labor and loose environmental regulations. As a key to maintaining a “competitive edge,” these enterprises have invested more than U.S. \$100 billion in China, even as this has hollowed out Taiwan’s own industrial base (Hsing 1998; Studwell 2002, 280). As one Taiwan journalist writes, “Beyond the fact that the water, power, and environmental protection costs [in China] are all low, land can be acquired for next to nothing. Every Taiwanese businessman who comes here feels like a prince—complete with his own fiefdom” (Li 2001, 9). Consequently, a huge trade (U.S. \$25.84 billion in 1999) links Taiwan and China, a fact that many observers feel makes some form of reunification inevitable in the near future (*Republic of China Yearbook* 2001). Even in Taiwan itself, the struggling tourism industry is looking to well-heeled mainland Chinese tourists as a new source of income; as one business leader said in 2001, “Taiwan can become China’s Hawaii” (AP 2001). The PRC government also wisely uses these growing ties in order to sell Taiwan officials, academics, and businessmen on the financial benefits of reunification and has succeeded in pushing figures such as President Chen Shui-bian onto the defensive, calling for “economic war” against China (*The Economist* 2000, 48; *TTO* 2001).

Taiwan’s unique status at the turn of the twenty-first century is reflected best in one recent series of events. Liberal International, a London-based coalition of eighty-four liberal political parties from sixty-seven countries, selected President Chen Shui-bian to receive its 2001 Prize for Freedom, hailing his “solid record as a human rights activist” (Taipei Government Information Office 2001). Liberal International was scheduled to present the award in Copenhagen, Denmark. Yet because of political pressure from China—which forbids its diplomatic allies to allow visits by Taiwanese leaders—the Danish government refused to grant Chen a visa so he could receive the Freedom prize. And when Liberal International offered to present the award to Chen at a later Euro-

pean Parliament meeting in Strasbourg, the French government also refused to issue Chen a visa.<sup>32</sup>

Though it is Asia's most vibrant democracy, Taiwan's leaders must beg for visas to visit the United States or other countries that supposedly stand for principles of freedom and liberty. With the admission of Tuvalu into the UN in 2000, the Republic of China on Taiwan is the last nation in the world to be excluded from the world body. The world's seventeenth largest economy, Taiwan is recognized by less than two dozen tiny African and Caribbean nations. A sovereign nation in every way, Taiwan has to justify continually why it should *not* be swallowed up by the PRC, a regime that has never administered an inch of Taiwan's territory. And, intimately tied culturally and economically to China, Taiwan's future as a sovereign nation depends on its ability to convince the world of its historical independence from the mainland. Yet somehow these singular conditions seem fitting for Taiwan, an island whose history, as the following chapters describe, has been nothing if not complicated and extraordinary.

## Notes

### CHAPTER 1. TAIWAN'S HISTORY

1. Despite the important protestations of Lydia Liu (1999, 131–134), “barbarian” still seems the best English term available for translating the character “yi,” which, before it was used to describe westerners, referred to less-civilized peoples from homelands located to the east of China proper.

2. For explanations of some of these terms, see Cao 1980, 43; Carrington 1977, 79; Fang 1994, 13; Goddard 1966, 129; Hsu 1980a, 9; Nakamura 1954, 114; Phillips 1999, 277; Stainton 1999b, 37.

3. Even by the mid-eighteenth century, the popular novel *Yesou puyan* (A country codger’s words of exposure) still portrayed Taiwan as an island fundamentally different from China and orthodox Confucian values, an “allegoric wilderness” populated with lethal female sex-demons (Epstein 2001, 219–221).

4. These various names were meant to transliterate the native Austronesian name “Tayouan,” which in the native Sirayan language means “coastal area” and actually designated only the area now called Tainan on the southern coastal plain (and which was purchased from the Siraya by the Dutch for fifteen pieces of cloth in 1625) (Hsu 1980a, 12).

5. In Hokkien, “*U bou khaqhou cit-e thi: -gong-cuo.*” Thanks to David Schak and Ricky Pai for supplying this information.

6. In addition, seventeen were classified as native Austronesian anti-Qing movements, and several other revolts were organized through pioneer and native cooperation (Chen 1987, 11–12; Shepherd 1993, 130–132).

7. Annual population growth was 2.2 percent over the period 1683–1811 (Ka 1995, 39), a rate resulting in a doubling every thirty-three years!

8. The Japanese lost several hundred troops to these rebel attacks—but also several thousand troops to malaria (Fraser 1988, 94).

9. Nitobe would become the first chair of Colonial Studies at Tokyo University, and he was immortalized on the 5,000 yen bill.

10. These Indian-fighting techniques were also complemented by the Japanese regime’s own contribution to “savage” management: the first air raids in Asian history, carried out on unruly mountain villages in 1913–1914 (Kerr 1974, 104).

11. The Japanese government even enlisted the services of a British official adviser to help implement the “successful” techniques of British colonial rule in Egypt (Townsend 2000, 102).

12. Other Taiwanese elites, refusing to become totally “Japanized,” accepted the anti-queue movement but resented the attack on the traditional Chinese scholars’ robe, forming Societies to Cut the Queue but Keep the Clothes (Duanfa Bugaizhuang Hui) (Wang 1960, 20).

13. By the late 1920s, many Taiwanese student organizations in China had also come to call explicitly for independence as the solution to the exploitation of their island (Lan 2000, 16–23).

14. The population, still 95 percent rural, was 4.6 million, including 228,000 Japanese, most of whom were professionals, merchants, industrialists, and bureaucrats (Fraser 1988, 100).

15. Scholar Ō Ikutoku, cited in Tsurumi 1977, 177.

16. The Japanese government has never compensated those Taiwanese wounded or the families of those killed in World War II on the grotesquely legalistic grounds that after 1945 they were not Japanese nationals.

17. In fact, during the first several months of the war, more than a thousand cases were reported of Taiwanese cursing Japanese officials and police (Lai et al. 1991, 26).

18. Technically, the British did not agree to this condition, only that Taiwan “shall be renounced by Japan” (Chiu 1973, 205–207). What is more, this Cairo Declaration, which British Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted “merely contained a statement of common purpose,” and the 1945 Potsdam Declaration that confirmed Cairo, are not documents that under international legal norms could create Chinese title to Taiwan (Chen and Reisman 1972, 635–637).

19. The question is complicated enough that an entire academic subgenre has grown around this topic. For example, see Peng and Huang 1976 and Chen and Reisman 1972.

20. Andō soon would be convicted and sentenced to death as a war criminal, but he evidently felt obligated to honor the precise details of the surrender signed by his emperor.

21. Also annoying was the fact that the residents of Taiwan cared more about the Japanese treatment of *them* than they did about Japanese war crimes and brutalities carried out in far-off Chinese places like Nanjing or Manchuria.

22. The PRC made several strikes back against the ROC regime on Taiwan. One memorable example was the drugging of Taiwanese Olympic decathlete C. K. Yang (Yang Chuanguang), the world record holder and overwhelming favorite to win gold at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, by two traitorous teammates who spiked his event-day orange juice and then defected to the PRC (CP 1997).

23. This did not stop ROC postal authorities from issuing an “International Year for Human Rights” set of stamps for 1968.

24. One reason that this peaceful pro-Taiwan sentiment was acceptable to Chiang was that the alternative was the rise of a pro-independence terrorist movement. In 1970, Chiang had been shot at by radical pro-independence assassins in New York. In 1976, extremists sabotaged a power station in southern Taiwan and sent a letter bomb to Provincial Governor Xie Dongmin that blew off his left hand (Martin 1985, 24–29). In all, these pro-independence terrorists carried out twenty-one attacks on ROC officials or offices throughout the world between 1978 and 1981 (Tyson 1987, 165).

25. As of August 2001, there were ninety-five political parties in Taiwan, representing every possible social, economic, and political platform (CP 08/01/2001).

26. See Stainton 1999a, 419–435 on the “Aboriginal self-government” movement in the 1990s.

27. At the end of 1999, foreign exchange reserves were U.S. \$106.2 billion, the third highest in the world (*Republic of China Yearbook* 2001).

28. One unique aspect of this development, seen by many as a possible model for development in mainland China, is the overwhelming role of the state in Taiwan’s economy.

In the late 1990s, the ROC government and the then-ruling Guomindang owned or controlled about 50 percent of all corporate assets on the island, which accounted for 30 percent of Taiwan's gross national product (Johnson 2000, 155).

29. Since Nixon's visit to China, the United States has recognized this claim for thirty years, in order to keep healthy economic relations with the PRC. Many argue that the United States has definite interests in keeping Taiwan and the PRC separate and in avoiding competition with this potential super-rich pan-Chinese power. The United States reserves the right to sell arms to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, and thus it wins great profits for America's arms dealers. In 1996, when the PRC engaged in provocative war games and live-fire missile tests in order to disrupt Taiwan's first-ever direct presidential election, the United States sent two aircraft carriers into the region (although not into the straits themselves) to guard Taiwan.

But on the whole, the United States has been very complicit in the PRC's claims on the island. Perhaps the firmest show of support for the PRC came during President Bill Clinton's administration. When Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui stopped in Honolulu on his way to Central America in 1994, the U.S. State Department denied him a visa even for one night after consulting with PRC officials on the issue (Mann 1999, 315). In China in 1998, Clinton made a "deep, deep kowtow" to his hosts, volunteering in a speech in Shanghai that the United States would support no future for Taiwan other than absorption into the PRC (BG 1998, A-11). Then, in 1999, the United States for the first time opposed Taiwan's bid to rejoin the United Nations (He 2001, 8).

30. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claiming to represent the people of Taiwan, then proceeded to "thank" the international community for its concern and donations, an abhorrent move that Taiwan foreign minister Jason Hu likened to China "looting a burning house" (Reuters 1999).

31. In accordance with this "public opinion," plans relating to such an invasion of Taiwan make up 52 percent of the current PRC military budget (He 2001, 9).

32. The French foreign ministry did agree to allow First Lady Wu Shuzhen to receive the award on Chen's behalf, under the following illiberal conditions: that she not pass through Paris, that she leave France immediately after accepting the award, and that she not speak to reporters while in France (TTO 2001).

## CHAPTER 2. FOWL PLAY

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1. For more on these issues, see Ch'ü T'ung-tsu 1961; Esherick and Rankin 1990; Goodman 1995; Kuhn 1991; and Rowe 1989.

2. See, for example, Allee 1994; Lamley 1981; Ownby 1996; and ter Haar 1998.

3. See the following groundbreaking works: Chiu Hei-yuan 1988; Harrell and Huang 1994; and Rubinstein 1994.

4. See, for example, Bernhardt and Huang 1994; Huang 1996; Karasawa 1993; Macauley 1994, 1998; Reed 2000; Zhou 1995.

5. I have already published extensively on these rituals (see Katz 2000, 2001, n.d.) and plan to write a book-length manuscript on this subject in the future.

6. The use of the term "elder brother" suggests that Ch'en and Wang may have been sworn brothers.

7. For more on this cult, see Harrell 1974; Lin 1995; Tai 1997; and Thompson 1975.

8. For a discussion of scapegoats in the context of Chinese religion, see Katz 1995a, 1995b.

9. Implying that the deceased will not enjoy the benefits of mortuary rites intended to transform a ghost into an ancestor.

10. See also Kataoka 1921, 7.